

1 *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such
2 individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore
3 ineligible to be released on bond.

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5 5. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the
6 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to
7 individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the
8 United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a),
9 that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies
10 to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the
11 United States without inspection.

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13 6. Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the
14 statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a)
15 to people like Petitioner.

16 7. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that
17 she be released unless Respondents provide a new custody redetermination hearing
18 under § 1226(a) within seven days whereby the Immigration Judge does have
19 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s custody redetermination request.
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21 JURISDICTION

22 8. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is
23 detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia.
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1 9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas
2 corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of
3 the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

4 10. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
5 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28
6 U.S.C. § 1651.

8 VENUE

9 11. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410
10 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies with the district court having jurisdiction
11 over the custodian of the detainee. In the case at hand, venue is proper with the
12 United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, the judicial district
13 encompassing the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia in Stewart
14 County, Georgia.

15 12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
16 because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States,
17 and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims
18 occurred in the Middle District of Georgia.
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21 REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

22 13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order
23 Respondents to show cause “forthwith”, unless the petitioner is not entitled to
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1 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file
2 a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding
3 twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

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5 14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the
6 constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all
7 cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963)
8 (emphasis added).

9
10 **PARTIES**

11 15. Petitioner Milda Miranda Miranda is alleged to be a citizen of
12 Guatemala who entered the United States without admission, inspection, or parole.
13 Petitioner is currently detained at the Stewart Detention Center in the custody, and
14 under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents. Petitioner has been in
15 immigration detention since December 2025. After arresting Petitioner, ICE did
16 not set bond.

17 16. Respondent Jason Streeval is employed by CoreCivic as Warden of
18 the Stewart Detention Center where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate
19 physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.
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21 17. Respondent LaDeon Francis is the Director of the Atlanta Field
22 Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, LaDeon
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1 Francis is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's
2 detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

3 18. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of
4 Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
5 the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is
6 responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority
7 over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

9 19. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United
10 States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive
11 Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a
12 component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

14 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

15 20. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast
16 majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

17 21. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in
18 standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
19 Individuals detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a bond hearing
20 at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while
21 noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes
22 are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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1 22. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens
2 subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent
3 arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

4 23. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have
5 been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see*
6 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

8 24. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and
9 1225(b)(2).

10 25. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted
11 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
12 (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546,
13 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended
14 earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

16 26. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new
17 regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without
18 inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead
19 detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens;
20 Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum
21 Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

1 27. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without
2 inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond
3 hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8
4 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior
5 practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a
6 custody hearing before an Immigration Judge or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that
8 § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).
9

10 28. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new
11 policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and
12 reversed decades of practice.
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14 29. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention
15 Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the
16 United States without inspection shall now be subject to a mandatory detention
17 provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This interpretation of the statute applies
18 regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in
19 the United States for months, years, and even decades.
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24 ¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 30. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a
2 published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all
3 noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject
4 to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are therefore ineligible for bond
5 hearings.
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7 31. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal
8 courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities.²
9 Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same
10 reading of the statute as ICE.
11

12 32. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies,
13 Immigration Judges in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped
14 providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without
15 inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the
16 Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely
17 unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not
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19 ² Petitioner is a class member of *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.). In
20 *Maldonado Bautista* the court certified the Bond Eligible Class, defined as: All noncitizens in the United States
21 without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will
22 not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), §
23 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.
24 *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
Courts are obligated to apply the law to all class members, as determined in the binding, final judgment issued in
Maldonado Bautista on December 18, 2025. The Executive Office for Immigration Review is a Defendant in
Maldonado Bautista, and is thus bound by the ruling there, which has the full "force and effect of a final judgment."
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, immigration judges continue to find that they do not have jurisdiction pursuant to
Yajure Hurtado when respondents request custody redetermination hearings pursuant to class membership.

1 apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779
2 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

3 33. Subsequently, several courts have adopted the same reading of the
4 INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See*,
5 *e.g.*, *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July
6 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
7 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-
8 02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and*
9 *recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
10 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937
11 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No.
12 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-*
13 *Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D.
14 Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D.
15 Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL
16 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-
17 BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No.
18 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*,
19 No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose*
20 *J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL
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1 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-
2 BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v.*
3 *Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025);
4 *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL
5 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546,
6 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-
7 11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma*
8 *Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025)
9 (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2)
10 authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL
11 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-
12 03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

15 34. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation
16 because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have
17 explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a),
18 not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

20 35. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision
21 on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These
22 removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or
23 deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”
24

1 36. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being
2 inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. §
3 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by
4 default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the
5 *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific
6 exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the
7 statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing
8 *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400
9 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

11 37. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who
12 face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are
13 present without admission or parole.

15 38. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry
16 or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is
17 premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the
18 United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained
19 that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of
20 entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to
21 enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

1 39. Accordingly, the detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
2 apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the
3 United States at the time they were apprehended.

4 **FACTS**

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6 40. Petitioner has resided in the United States since approximately 2005
7 and lives in Calhoun, Georgia.

8 41. Petitioner previously submitted a Form I-918, Petition for U
9 Nonimmigrant Status before the United States Citizenship and Immigration
10 Services (“USCIS”) on or around November 21, 2025. That application is currently
11 awaiting receipt.
12

13 42. According to Petitioner, in the morning of December 6, 2025, DHS
14 ICE agents knocked on the door of her home and presented photos of her four (4)
15 grandchildren. She then allowed them to enter. When the agents entered her home,
16 she was arrested and taken into DHS ICE custody. Petitioner is now detained by
17 DHS at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia.

18 43. Petitioner is married. She has five children; four of her five children
19 reside in the United States—two of them are United States citizens and two of
20 them are permanent residents. Four (4) of her grandchildren reside in the United
21 States. She is the primary caretaker of her two (2) United States citizen children
22 and four (4) of her grandchildren. The grandchildren are thirteen (13), twelve (12),
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1 eight (8), and six (6). The Petitioner and her husband maintain a fixed address as
2 they have rented the same home in Calhoun, Georgia for approximately eight (8)
3 years. As such, Petitioner has significant ties to the community and is not a flight
4 risk.

5
6 44. Petitioner has not been arrested for any criminal violations to the
7 knowledge of the undersigned counsel. As such, Petitioner is not a danger to the
8 community.

9 45. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to the Stewart Detention
10 Center, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention
11 without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

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13 46. In the experience of undersigned firm, the immigration judge will not
14 consider Petitioner's bond request pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* despite
15 the final judgment issued in the *Maladonado Bautista* class action.

16 47. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this
17 court, she faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody,
18 separated from her family and community.
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1 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

2 **COUNT I**

3 **Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act**

4 48. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in
5 the preceding paragraphs.
6

7 49. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not
8 apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds
9 of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously
10 entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being
11 apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens
12 are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or
13 § 1231.
14

15 50. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his
16 continued detention and violates the INA.

17 **COUNT II**

18 **Violation of the Bond Regulations**

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20 51. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in
21 preceding paragraphs.

22 52. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and
23 the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret
24

1 and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and
2 Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being
3 applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been
4 admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without
5 inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at
6 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had
7 entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond
8 hearings before Immigration Judges under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing
9 regulations.
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11
12 53. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy
13 and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

14 54. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his
15 continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

16 COUNT III

17 **Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**

18 55. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
19 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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21 56. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
22 without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from
23 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
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1 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.”

2 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

3 57. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official
4 restraint.

5
6 58. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination
7 hearing to determine whether she is a flight risk or danger to others violates
8 her right to due process.

9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 11 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 12 b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle
13 District Court of Georgia while this habeas petition is pending;
- 14 c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause
15 why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- 16 d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release
17 Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
18 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- 19 e. Declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful.
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- 1 f. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to
2 Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any
3 other basis justified under law; and
4
5 g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and
6 proper.

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8 It is DATED this 16th day of January, 2026.
9

10 Respectfully Submitted,

11 The Kennedy Immigration Firm, LLC

12 /s/Alexandra H. Bradley

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