

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
COLUMBUS DIVISION

JOSE GUADALUPE ARIZMENDI MORA, )  
[REDACTED], )  
 )  
Petitioner, )  
 )  
vs. )  
 )  
JASON STREEVAL, in his official capacity as )  
*Warden of Stewart Detention center*; and )  
LADEON FRANCIS, *Field Office Director for ICE* )  
*Atlanta Field Office*, and )  
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as *Acting* )  
*Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement*; and )  
KRISTI NOEM, *Secretary of Homeland Security*; and )  
PAMELA BONDI, *U.S. Attorney General*. )  
 )  
Respondents. )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

CASE NO.:

VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS  
AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATIVE AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Petition challenges the ongoing and unlawful detention of Petitioner, Jose Guadalupe Arizmendi Mora (Petitioner), [REDACTED], by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Stewart Detention Center, Georgia. This detention, unlawful from its inception, began with a warrantless arrest that lacked statutory authority and is perpetuated by Respondents' misapplication of mandatory detention statutes meant only for noncitizens arriving at the border. Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. See Exhibit 1 (ICE Locator-although no information appears for Petitioner as to his current location, his family confirmed his location there). See also Exhibit 3 EOIR information.

2. Petitioner's initial and continued detention by ICE is unlawful and unconstitutional. The government's recent policy shift—reclassifying noncitizens who entered without inspection as “arriving aliens” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)—contradicts the statute, decades of established statutory interpretation, agency regulations and practice, and binding precedent. Petitioner, apprehended in the interior years after entry, is entitled to discretionary bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention without judicial review. *See* Exhibit 2 current list of nearly 300 district courts from around the country agreeing with Petitioner (current number is over 400), all rejecting Respondent's position. See also the landmark case from this Court rejecting the government's position and agreeing with Petitioner's that he is entitled to a bond hearing, *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-cv-342 (CDL), 2025 WL 3050094 (MDGA, Nov. 1, 2025). Since habeas relief is individualized and cannot be brought as a class action, each case has to be litigated separately.
3. Despite being apprehended within the interior of the United States long after arrival rather than at the border, Petitioner is now deemed ineligible for bond due to his entry without inspection. This stems from a controversial policy shift by ICE in July 2025, which aligns with a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision. This decision disrupts decades of established legal precedent by introducing a novel interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This interpretation, which contradicts both the statute's clear language and constitutional principles, reclassifies all noncitizens who entered without inspection, including the Petitioner, as “arriving aliens” or “applicants for admission.” Consequently, they are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rendering them ineligible for bond

hearings by immigration judges. However, this policy has now been VACATED under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) through a final, binding court order yet Respondents still continue to follow that policy, despite a final, binding judgement. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). See below full discussion regarding this case and its implications.

4. While § 1225 mandates detention without bond for noncitizens apprehended at the border as “seeking admission,” it does not apply to those like the Petitioner, who were detained within the United States long after arrival here. Therefore, the Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment from this Court affirming that his detention should be under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Additionally, the Petitioner requests that Respondents be prohibited from re-detaining him or put any restraints on his liberty unless they can meet the same evidentiary standard.
5. Respondents’ actions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving Petitioner of liberty without individualized assessment or a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker. The agencies’ interpretation also contravenes the INA and its implementing regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the *Accardi* doctrine, which obligates administrative agencies to follow their own rules, procedures, and instructions. Numerous federal courts have rejected the government’s novel reading of the detention statutes, reaffirming that interior apprehensions are governed by § 1226(a) and entitled to bond review.
6. Petitioner seeks immediate habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief, ordering

Respondents to be directed to immediately release Petitioner from custody. A detailed statement of facts and procedural history follows, supporting Petitioner's claims for relief.

## II. JURISDICTION

7. This Court has jurisdiction under several legal provisions, including 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal question jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over habeas claims is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, while non-habeas claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the APA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
8. Additionally, jurisdiction is supported by Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the Constitution, known as the Suspension Clause, and Article III, Section 2, which addresses the Court's authority to hear constitutional issues raised by the Petitioner. The Petitioner seeks immediate judicial intervention to address ongoing violations of constitutional rights by the Respondents. This action is grounded in the United States Constitution, the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*, and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551 *et seq.* Furthermore, the Court may also exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the action arises under federal law, and may grant relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
9. The Court has authority to issue a declaratory judgement and to grant temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Additionally,

the Court can utilize the All Writs Act and its inherent equitable powers to provide such relief. Furthermore, the Court has the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

10. This Court possesses federal question jurisdiction under the APA to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” deemed “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” as outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In the absence of a specific statutory review process, APA review of final agency actions can proceed through “any applicable form of legal action,” which includes actions for declaratory judgments, writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction, or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction, as specified in 5 U.S.C. § 703.
11. In *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, the Supreme Court held that federal courts retain *habeas corpus* jurisdiction under 28 USC § 2241, despite restrictions on judicial review enacted under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Consequently, section 2241 habeas review remains available to Petitioner.
12. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized district courts’ jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions raising colorable constitutional claims—including those alleging deprivation of liberty without due process, arbitrary or indefinite detention, and agency action contrary to law. Even though the government may detain individuals during removal proceedings, *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, (2003), (although that case involved detention under §1226(c) of certain criminal aliens) there are limitations to this power of the executive branch. Limitations like the Due Process Clause restrict the Government’s power to detain noncitizens. It is well settled that individuals in

deportation proceedings are entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306, (1993). Courts must review immigration procedures and ensure that they comport with the Constitution.

13. Federal courts have retained the statutory authority to grant writs of habeas corpus since enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In *Felker v. Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), the Supreme Court declined to find a repeal of § 2241 by implication as to its original habeas corpus jurisdiction. See also *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). In addition to the Supreme Court in many cases, all Circuit Courts of Appeals have recognized district courts' jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions raising colorable constitutional claims—including those alleging deprivation of liberty without due process, arbitrary or indefinite detention, and agency action contrary to law.
14. In this case, Petitioner asserts substantial constitutional violations—including deprivation of liberty without due process, arbitrary and capricious agency action, violations of the *Accardi* doctrine, and other injuries without notice or opportunity to be heard. These claims fall squarely within the scope of habeas review preserved by statute and recognized by controlling precedent. Accordingly, this Court has both the authority and the obligation to adjudicate the constitutional and statutory claims presented in this Petition and to grant appropriate relief to remedy ongoing violations of Petitioner's rights.
15. Petitioner's claims challenge only his civil immigration detention and the procedures used to prolong it—not the merits of removability or any final order of removal—and therefore fall outside 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)'s channeling provision. See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840–41 (2018) (detention challenges are not “questions of

law or fact arising from” removal proceedings). Consistent with that framing, any injunctive relief sought here is strictly as-applied to Petitioner—for example, directing Petitioner’s release under § 1226(a) or barring application of § 1225 as to Petitioner—and does not “enjoin or restrain the operation” of any statute within § 1252(f)(1)’s bar. In any event, § 1252(f)(1) permits individualized, as-applied relief for a single noncitizen, even while prohibiting class-wide injunctions. *See Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. 543, 548–49 (2022).

16. Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar the individualized injunctive relief sought here. That provision limits lower courts’ authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation” of the INA’s detention and removal provisions on a class-wide or programmatic basis but expressly preserves injunctive relief “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. 543, 548–50 (2022). Petitioner seeks only as applied relief tailored to Petitioner —e.g., directing Petitioner’s release under § 1226(a) or precluding DHS from enforcing the “arriving alien” definition of § 1225 toward Petitioner. That relief neither halts the general operation of any INA provision nor provides class-wide relief and thus falls squarely within § 1252(f)(1)’s carveout.
17. Section 1252(g) is likewise inapplicable. It is a “narrow” jurisdictional bar that applies only to three discrete decisions or actions: “to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Petitioner does not challenge any such decision. Petitioner challenges ongoing civil detention and DHS’s use of an unlawful interpretation to

nullify the plain language of the INA and its regulations as applicable to these agencies. Such detention related claims and challenges to custody procedures fall outside § 1252(g). *See id.* at 482–83; cf. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840–41 (2018) (§ 1252(b)(9) does not channel detention claims).

18. Section 1252(e)(3) is likewise inapplicable as it is narrowly tailored to channel systemic or facial challenges to the validity of the expedited removal “system” or its implementing regulations and written policies to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and only within 60 days of implementation. It does not bar as-applied, individualized habeas challenges to the legality or constitutionality of a particular noncitizen’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) or whether § 1225 governs Petitioner’s detention or § 1226. The text of § 1252(e)(3) is explicit: it covers “[c]hallenges on the validity of the system” and review of “whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy guideline, or written procedure ... is not consistent with applicable provisions of this title or is otherwise in violation of law.” It does not preclude review of the legality of detention as applied to a specific individual, nor does it bar habeas review of constitutional claims or claims that the government is misapplying the statute in a particular case.
19. To prevent ouster of this Court’s habeas jurisdiction, the Court should, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (All Writs Act) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, issue an immediate limited order prohibiting Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside the court’s District or otherwise changing Petitioner’s immediate custodian without prior leave of Court while this action is pending. Such relief is necessary in aid of jurisdiction because habeas is governed by the district-of-confinement/immediate-custodian rule, and

transfer can frustrate effective review. *See Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 441–42 (2004); *Ex parte Endo*, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944); *FTC v. Dean Foods Co.*, 384 U.S. 597, 603–05 (1966).

### III. VENUE

20. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia because Petitioner is currently detained at the Stewart Detention Center, Lumpkin, Georgia, under the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Respondent Jason Streeval, as the Warden of Stewart Detention Center, is the Petitioner’s immediate custodian and Respondents exercise authority over Petitioner’s custody in this jurisdiction, as supported by *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Habeas petitions generally are filed in the district court with jurisdiction over the filer’s place of custody, also known as the district of confinement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Additionally, with respect to Petitioner’s non-habeas claims seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials (agencies and officers of the United States) sued in their official capacities, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to these claims, including the initial arrest and continued detention of Petitioner and the enforcement of the mandatory detention agency interpretation, occurred in this District. Furthermore, the Respondents are officers of United States agencies, the Petitioner resides within this District, and there is no real property involved in this action.

#### IV. PARTIES

21. Petitioner, Jose Guadalupe Arizmendi Mora, is a 39-year-old noncitizen who has resided continuously in the United States, having entered through the Southern border without inspection more than two decades ago. He has lived in the United States for approximately twenty years. Petitioner is currently detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, following his arrest on or about October 1, 2025 by ICE. He remains detained pending immigration proceedings, without any individualized determination that his continued confinement is necessary.
22. Respondent Jason Streeval is the Jailer/Warden of Stewart Detention Center, Lumpkin Georgia. As such, Respondent Jason Streeval is responsible for the operation of the Detention Center where Petitioner is detained and is the immediate custodian who is currently holding Petitioner in physical custody. Because ICE contracts with private and county-operated detention facilities to house immigration detainees, Respondent Jason Streeval has immediate physical custody of the Petitioner and is sued in his official capacity.
23. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Field Office Director for the ICE Atlanta Field Office. As such, Respondent Francis is responsible for the oversight of ICE operations at the Stewart Detention Center. Respondent Francis is being sued in his official capacity. He is the head of the ICE office that unlawfully arrested Petitioner, and such arrest took place under his direction and supervision. He is the immediate *legal* custodian of Petitioner.
24. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As such, Respondent Lyons is responsible for the oversight of

ICE operations and the head of the federal agency responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States. Respondent Lyons is being sued in his official capacity.

25. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As Secretary of DHS, Secretary Noem is the cabinet-level official responsible for the general administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Respondent Secretary Noem is being sued in her official capacity.
26. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and is sued in her official capacity since U.S. government agencies are Respondents in this complaint. Furthermore, the Immigration Judges who decide removal cases and applications for bond and relief from removal do so as her designees at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
27. Petitioner names certain federal officials in their official capacities solely to preserve alternative, non-habeas avenues for prospective relief—such as as-applied declaratory and injunctive orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, 5 U.S.C. § 702, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651—necessary to enjoin enforcement of DHS regulations and their interpretation as applied to Petitioner, ensure compliance with DHS/EOIR custody regulations, prevent transfer or removal of Petitioner, and effectuate any release the Court orders at the agency level where policy and implementation authority reside. See, e.g., *Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.*, 337 U.S. 682 (1949); *Dugan v. Rank*, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).

28. Petitioner acknowledges, consistent with *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), that the proper respondent to the habeas claim is the immediate custodian, and does not rely on the federal officials as “habeas respondents.” Rather, Petitioner names these federal officials in their official capacities solely to ensure that the Court can issue effective relief on non-habeas claims, such as declaratory and injunctive relief, and to direct agency action to those with actual authority to implement it. Should the Court find these officials improper as respondents to the habeas count, Petitioner respectfully requests that any dismissal be limited to that claim and without prejudice to their continued status as respondents for the non-habeas claims. Maintaining these officials as parties is necessary to ensure that, if relief is granted, the responsible agency officials cannot simply re-arrest Petitioner or otherwise frustrate the Court’s order by invoking their erroneous interpretation of the INA. This approach is consistent with *Padilla* and ensures that the Court’s orders are both effective and enforceable.

#### **V. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

29. Petitioner, Jose Guadalupe Arizmendi Mora, is a 39-year-old noncitizen who has resided in the United States for over 20 years, having entered through the border without inspection. .
30. Petitioner is a primary financial provider for his household and supports his spouse, to whom he has been lawfully married since 2017 and his five United States citizen children (ages 19, 17, 11, 7 and 4). His detention has abruptly deprived his household of its sole source of income, jeopardizing his family financial stability and their ability

to maintain housing and basic necessities. The economic and emotional harm caused by Petitioner's continued detention weighs heavily against prolonged confinement and militates in favor of immediate release.

31. Petitioner poses no danger to the community. Although he has a criminal conviction, Petitioner is currently in full compliance with all terms and conditions of probation and has diligently fulfilled every requirement imposed by the court. He has lived openly and peacefully in the community while operating a lawful construction business and paying taxes.
32. Petitioner also presents no risk of flight. He owns and operates a small construction business and has resided in the same home in Adel, Georgia for more than thirteen years, all of which firmly anchor him to the United States. Moreover, after living in the country for over two decades, Petitioner has established strong family and community ties. He has maintained steady employment to support his family and is widely regarded as a person of good moral character.
33. On or about October 1, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by local law enforcement in Adel, Georgia, while on his way to work in the morning. Local officers were waiting near his residence and informed Petitioner that they were looking for him in connection with a pending matter originating from a prior petition filed by his former partner approximately ten years earlier. Petitioner was taken into custody by the county sheriff and held for approximately two hours while officers attempted to locate another individual. He was not charged with any serious criminal offense arising from this arrest. Local authorities subsequently contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which assumed custody of Petitioner. ICE officers informed Petitioner

that he was being sought due to the prior petition and that the case would be reopened. Petitioner was thereafter transported to Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, where he remains detained. Upon information and belief, his detention was executed without a valid warrant, which is required to detain someone under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1357.

34. Petitioner was arrested in the interior of the United States more than twenty years after entry and is therefore improperly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), ICE having not issued a warrant for his arrest. Had they issued a warrant, his arrest under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary bond or release on recognizance, may have been proper. Nevertheless, Respondents have classified him as an “arriving alien” and detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)—rendering him ineligible for bond under their new, unlawful policy.
35. Because all Respondents continue to treat Petitioner as detained under § 1225(b), any request for bond redetermination before an Immigration Judge would be futile, as the Immigration Court has already disclaimed jurisdiction over such requests. Accordingly, habeas relief is the only available and effective remedy to secure Petitioner’s release or a lawful custody hearing.
36. Petitioner is neither a danger nor a flight risk. He has lived in the same community for over two decades and raised a family of U.S. citizens. Less-restrictive alternatives remain available and adequate such as release on recognizance or posting a low bond.
37. Prolonged detention under these circumstances imposes unnecessary hardship on Petitioner and his family, depriving his U.S.-citizen children of their father’s financial and emotional support, and violating Petitioner’s right to due process and freedom

from arbitrary detention.

38. As of the time of filing of this Writ of Habeas, Petitioner remains confined to the Stewart Detention Center, Lumpkin, Georgia, solely because of ICE's invocation of its new interpretation that Petitioner is an "arriving alien" or "applicant for admission" and is therefore subject to mandatory detention. Even Petitioner were to file for a bond redetermination with the immigration judge, they would deny it pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216. All Respondents consider that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, it would be futile for Petitioner to request a bond for release from an Immigration Judge. Due to the binding nature of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, all immigration courts known to counsel are denying bond requests for similarly situated noncitizens, making habeas the only effective remedy. Similarly, even in cases an Immigration Judge would grant bond, ICE would appeal it which would leave Petitioner incarcerated through the appeal, which would take months and end up dismissed based on *Yajure Hurtado*.

## VI. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

39. **No statutory exhaustion requirement applies to habeas cases**, and the recent interpretations by DHS and EOIR have effectively closed all administrative avenues for securing release for noncitizens, like Petitioner, who entered the U.S. without inspection. ICE's internal policy from July 2025, coupled with the EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) precedent, mandates that immigration judges deny bond to the Petitioner and similarly situated noncitizens, rendering any further administrative steps futile. An administrative remedy may be inadequate where the

administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it as noted in *Gibson v. Berryhill*, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14 (1973). Requiring Petitioner to seek reconsideration with ICE or a bond hearing with an immigration judge “would be to demand a futile act” as no relief would be granted while Petitioner languishes in detention, as highlighted in *Houghton v. Shafer*, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968). Moreover, even if any remedies were available, the habeas statute does not require Petitioner to exhaust them.

40. Furthermore, even if applied, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been futile on claim attacking constitutionality of ICE’s actions and ICE’s and EOIR’s current interpretations of the mandatory detention provisions. Administrative hearings cannot address the constitutional claims at issue, rendering further proceedings ineffective. Moreover, where ICE seeks to quickly remove noncitizens like Petitioner even to third countries, without due process, particularly under the current administration’s policies, underscores the inadequacy of administrative remedies. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 146–49 (1992) (futility exception to exhaustion applies where administrative remedies are inadequate or unavailable). Thus, pursuing such remedies would be an exercise in futility, as they fail to provide any meaningful opportunity to address the constitutional violations at hand.
41. Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and Petitioner’s only remedy is by way of this judicial action.

## VII. UNLAWFUL ARREST AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

42. Upon information and belief, Petitioner's arrest and detention by ICE/DHS were unlawful under both statutory and constitutional standards. After being detained by local police without a warrant, Petitioner was transferred directly into ICE custody. This seizure and subsequent detention by ICE were conducted without an arrest warrant as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). As Petitioner was already in the custody of local law enforcement, there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest.
43. The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from stopping or arresting individuals based solely on ethnicity, appearance, language, or mere presence in a particular location. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "Mexican appearance" or similar ethnic characteristics alone are never sufficient to justify a stop, even near the border. Officers must have "specific articulable facts" that reasonably suggest a person is engaged in unlawful activity—generalizations or stereotypes are not enough. See *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975); *Reid v. Georgia*, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "[t]o be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion." *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, --- S.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 2585637, at \*3 (2025).
44. Although the government would argue that *Vasquez Perdomo* permits racial profiling, the Supreme Court in *Trump v. Illinois*, No. 25A443, 607 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2025) published on December 23, 2025, clarified the earlier *Vasquez Perdomo* decision. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, expressly clarified this exact point in a critical footnote (footnote 4, pages 6-7), explained that the long-standing prohibition on racial

profiling under the Fourth Amendment remains fully intact, and an officer's *subjective* belief that an individual "looks Hispanic" is, by itself, **insufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion required for a lawful stop or arrest**. This reasoning reinforces the foundational principle from *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) and repeats the *Whren* standard, that apparent ethnicity describes a vast category of innocent people and cannot be the sole basis for a seizure. Therefore, under the Court's most recent pronouncement in *Trump v. Illinois*, any stop or arrest by police, ICE or DHS predicated on nothing more than an individual's Hispanic appearance constitutes unconstitutional racial profiling and is a direct violation of the Fourth Amendment. There was no pre-arrest investigation and thus no lawful determination that Petitioner, specifically, was likely to abscond.

45. This warrantless seizure by ICE was statutorily invalid. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides two potential authorities for a civil immigration arrest: one with a warrant and one without. The authority for a warrantless arrest is strictly limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), which permits an officer to arrest a noncitizen only if they have reason to believe the person is in the United States unlawfully and is "likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained." Here, the second prong of that test—likelihood of escape—was impossible for Respondents to meet. Because Petitioner was already secured in the custody of local police and therefore posed no risk of escape whatsoever. The failure to satisfy this mandatory statutory prerequisite renders the warrantless arrest void.
46. Absent a valid basis for a warrantless arrest under § 1357(a)(2), Respondents' only authority to arrest and detain Petitioner is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). That statute is

unambiguous: “*On a warrant issued by the Attorney General*, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” (emphasis added). Respondents did not possess such a warrant when they took custody of Petitioner. Therefore, the arrest was not only a violation of the limited exception in § 1357(a)(2), but also a direct violation of the warrant requirement in § 1226(a). The detention is consequently unlawful *ab initio*—from its very inception.

47. The government’s subsequent issuance of a Notice to Appear or initiation of removal proceedings does not cure the original constitutional violation. The exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine require suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest. See *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 484–88 (1963); *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Courts have repeatedly held that a warrant obtained after an illegal arrest, or the subsequent initiation of removal proceedings, does not cure the original constitutional violation. See *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (ordering immediate release where detention was based on an unlawful arrest and all evidence and proceedings derived therefrom were suppressed).
48. In sum, Petitioner’s arrest is both legally and constitutionally insufficient. The only effective and constitutionally sufficient remedy for these ongoing violations is immediate and unconditional release—not a bond hearing, not further process, and not continued detention under a different label.
49. The necessity of a hearing on the unlawful arrest issue is firmly supported by controlling legal authority. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures.

Further, the statutory requirements for immigration arrests are clear. The primary authority for civil immigration detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), requires that an arrest be made “on a warrant.” The narrow statutory exception for warrantless arrests, found in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), demands both probable cause of unlawful presence and exigency in the form of a likelihood of escape—a condition that cannot be met when an individual is already in police custody.

50. Where an arrest is unlawful, the exclusionary rule applies with full force, requiring suppression of all evidence and proceedings derived from the unconstitutional act. See *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 484–88 (1963); *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Courts have ordered immediate release where detention was based on an unlawful arrest, and all derivative evidence was suppressed. See *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025).
51. Due to Petitioner’s unlawful arrest, which violates both the Fourth Amendment and the explicit warrant requirements of federal immigration statutes, a different remedy in the form of immediate release from custody, rather than a bond hearing before an immigration judge, is warranted.

### VIII. LEGAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

#### A. Noncitizens Are Entitled to Due Process

52. The principle that noncitizens present in the United States must be afforded due process is deeply rooted in our legal history for hundreds of years. See *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of race, color, or

nationality); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Fifth Amendment . . . protects every person within the jurisdiction of the United States from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . [i]ncluding those whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory[.]”) (citation omitted)).

53. These landmark Supreme Court cases affirm that due process protections apply to all persons within the U.S., regardless of their immigration status. These foundational principles are not merely historical artifacts but are vital, living tenets that must guide current immigration practices. The Court has consistently recognized that noncitizens facing deportation are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment, as seen in *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (noncitizens facing deportation are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment, which includes a full and fair hearing and notice of that hearing); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent).

**B. This Court’s Holding in *J.A.M. v. Streeval***

54. In a similar case litigated in this Court by undersigned counsel, the court found that while Petitioner technically qualified as an “applicant for admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those “seeking admission,” not all applicants for admission as the government contends to support its mandatory detention of Petitioner without bond pursuant to that section. Harmonizing §§ 1225 and 1226, the court held that § 1226(a) applies to aliens arrested in the interior who are not actively seeking admission, entitling them to a bond hearing. *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-cv-342 (CDL), 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025).
55. The Court further found that the phrase “seeking admission” is not synonymous with

“present in the United States who has not been admitted.” It requires an active attempt to gain lawful entry, not mere presence. Judge Land held that the statutory scheme and headings of § 1225 focus on inspection and admission at the border or upon arrival, not on long-term residents apprehended in the interior. The court rejected the BIA’s interpretation in *Yajure Hurtado* as inconsistent with statutory text and canons of construction, noting that many district courts have similarly rejected this reading.

56. The court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing to determine if Petitioner may be released on bond, in accordance with applicable regulations. The court found it unnecessary to reach Petitioner’s constitutional due process arguments in light of the statutory ruling.
57. Petitioner’s circumstances are the same or similar to that landmark case, therefore the Writ of Habeas should be granted for Petitioner and the Court should order similar relief, a bond hearing.

### **C. Recent Federal Court Cases Rejecting DHS’ and EOIR’s New Interpretation**

58. Similar court cases known to undersigned counsel that have dealt with the same issue from other courts, although this is certainly not an exhaustive list, just illustrative of the overwhelming authority around the country that Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is unjustified and unlawful.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Savane v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2774452 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025) (Petitioner arrested pursuant to 1225 which was improper; habeas petition granted and immediate release ordered within one business day); *Artiga v. Genalo*, 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025) (Petitioner unlawfully detained pursuant to 1225, government ordered to transport Petitioner back to EDNY within 24 hours and immediately upon effectuating his transfer, to release him from custody); *Cuevas Guzman v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025), (petitioner entered without inspection more than 30 years ago, detained

59. **See Exhibit 2 attachment containing nearly 300 recent district court cases from around the country and authorities continue to reaffirm that noncitizens apprehended in the interior are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C.**

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pursuant to 1225, court found 1226(a) applied based on statutory language; PI granted and court ordered release); *Echevarria v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025), entered without inspection in 2001, arrested in 2025 under 1225(b); the 24 year period petitioner resided in the U.S. made the plain language of 1225(b) was inapplicable to him, at the time of arrest an immigration officer was not “examining” him and he was not “seeking” admission; Based on *Jennings and Nielsen*, statutory scheme of 1226(a) applies); *Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley*, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (entered without inspection over 20 years ago; detained July 2025; court help petitioner held pursuant to 1226(a) not as the government contends 1225(b)(2); Yajure Hurtado renders requiring prudential exhaustion futile; PI granted and release ordered on IJ bond); *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 2025 WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (court granted summary judgement on behalf of a class of people without lawful status held in Tacoma who entered without inspection and not apprehended upon arrival, court held plain text of 1226(a) applies rather than 1225(b) and issues a detailed statutory analysis); *Guzman Alfaro v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2822113 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2025) (court granted similar relief as a class member of *Rodriguez Vasquez*; *Garcia Cortes v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (Court held 1226(a) and not 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention; procedural due process violated under *Mathews*, habeas granted); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*5-6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus ordering immediate release or bond hearing, where, for 30 years, courts have applied section 1226(a) to noncitizens like the petitioner who was already in the United States but facing removal, rejecting the government’s argument that section 1225 applied so no bond hearing was required; *Mena Torres v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2855739 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025) (Petitioner arrived without inspection in 2016, DEA encountered him in an unrelated search warrant and detained him under 1225(b)(2), court found that detention governed by 1226(a); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin*, Warden, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025) (detained under § 1226, and continued detention without a bond hearing before an IJ is unlawful); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025) (granting a TRO for a native Ukraine citizen, who entered the U.S. without being inspected by an immigration officer and applied for asylum, because her due process rights were violated without a bond hearing pursuant to section 1225(a)); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at \*4-5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus for petitioner for government’s failure to conduct a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a), rejecting the government’s argument that section 1225 applied because petitioner did not enter lawfully so was still “seeking admission”, where the petitioner had been living in the United States since 2005 and the amendment to section 1226 via the Laken Riley Act would have been redundant were section 1225 to apply); *Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at \*4 n.5, \*8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (holding that petitioner was likely to succeed under the merits that he was not subject to section 1225 and was wrongfully denied a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a), stating “[t]he Court is not bound by Matter of Yajure Hurtado’s interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226[.]” and may look to the “longstanding practice of government” and “the BIA’s interpretations of the INA for guidance, but [it] must not defer to the agency.”) (citations omitted); *Hernandez Marcelo v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-00094-RGE-WPK, 2025 WL 2741230, at \*7-8 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2025) (refusing to apply BIA’s *Yajure Hurtado* decision finding that all applicants for admission are necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of warranting application of section 1225, because “the legislative history and congressional intent of the Immigration and Nationality Act do not support mandatory detention for all noncitizens present in the United States” as further supported by the “weight of caselaw”).

**§ 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and that Respondents' interpretation is unlawful.**

60. As the *Lopez Benitez* Court poignantly articulated: “This understanding accords with the plain, ordinary meaning of the words “seeking” and “admission.” For example, someone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission” (or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to Mr. Lopez Benitez, because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.” *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, — F.Supp.3d at —, 2025 WL 2371588, at \*7.
61. “Moreover, Respondents’ novel position would expand § 1225(b) far beyond how it has been enforced historically, potentially subjecting millions more undocumented immigrants to mandatory detention, while simultaneously narrowing § 1226(a) such that it would have extremely limited (if any) application. If, as Respondents contend, anyone who has entered the country unlawfully, regardless of how long they have resided here, is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), see Conf. Tr. 19:9-20:4, then it is not clear under what circumstances § 1226(a)’s authorization of detention on a discretionary basis would ever apply. Perhaps it might still apply to a

subset of noncitizens who are lawfully admitted (e.g., on a visa of some sort), and who then remain present unlawfully. But there is no indication that Congress intended § 1226 to be limited only to visa overstays. And there is nothing in the history or application of § 1226 to even remotely suggest that it was intended to have such a narrow reach.” *Id.* at \*8. Like the petitioner in *J.A.M.*, Mr. Arizmendi Mora is a long-term resident of the United States who was apprehended in the interior, not at the border, and is therefore not 'seeking admission' in the manner contemplated by § 1225.

62. Courts all over the country have consistently rejected the new interpretation by DHS and EOIR, as it contradicts the INA. These courts have clarified that the plain language of the statutory provisions indicates that § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b), governs the detention of individuals like the Petitioner who entered without inspection. The challenge lies in the fact that habeas relief is granted on an individual basis, not on a class-wide scale, necessitating that courts tailor their findings to the specific circumstances of each person applying for a writ of habeas corpus.

## **IX. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT**

### **A. Habeas Jurisdiction**

63. Habeas corpus relief extends to a person “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States” if the person can show he or she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(1), (c)(3); *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001). See also *Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta*, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a petitioner’s claims are proper under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 if they concern the continuation or execution of

confinement). The U.S. Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004), (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). This includes immigration-related detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (addressing post final-removal order detention under § 1231). *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 285–86 (2018) (addressing § 1226 detention, which is more applicable to this instant case as Petitioner does not have a final order of removal).

64. “[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy,” *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995), that “[t]he court shall ... dispose of [] as law and justice require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. “[T]he court’s role was most extensive in cases of pretrial and noncriminal detention.” *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 779–80 (2008) (citations omitted). “[W]hen the judicial power to issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner’s release.” *Id.* at 787. The Petitioner seeking habeas relief must demonstrate he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); *Walker v. Johnston*, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
65. Even if Petitioner were to be released prior to this Court granting relief, “in custody” would still be satisfied because significant restraints short of jail, which include removal proceedings and the continuous threat of re-detention, satisfy § 2241. See *Hensley v. Municipal Court*, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
66. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to

show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

67. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000).

**B. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)**

68. The APA authorizes judicial review of final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA sets minimum standards for final agency action.
69. Final agency actions are those (1) that “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citation modified).
70. ICE’s “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission” constitutes a final agency action, making it subject to this Court’s review in the Petitioner’s case. Under this new interpretation, the agency asserts that the Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention without bond. This guidance represents the culmination of ICE’s decision-making process concerning the Petitioner’s custody and is an unlawful interpretation of the INA, contrary to its plain language.

71. Likewise, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), is a final agency action subject to this Court's review in Petitioner's case.

72. Both the ICE memo referenced herein, and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* led ICE to detain Petitioner in violation of due process rights under the Constitution, statutes, and regulations.

C. **The Accardi Doctrine Requires Agencies to Follow Internal Rules**

73. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, a foundational principle of administrative law, agencies must follow their own procedures, rules, and instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (setting aside an order of deportation where the Board of Immigration Appeals failed to follow procedures governing deportation proceedings); see also *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).

74. *Accardi* is not “limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations.” *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts must also reverse agency action for violation of unpublished rules and instructions to agency officials. *See Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (affirming reversal of agency denial of public assistance made in violation of internal agency manual); *U.S. v. Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969) (under *Accardi*, reversing decision to admit evidence obtained by IRS agents for violating instructions on investigating tax fraud).

**X. MALDONADO BAUTISTA CLASS ACTION MEMBERSHIP**

75. Petitioner is a member of the nationwide class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (*Maldonado* or *Maldonado Bautista*). On December 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a Final Judgment in the nationwide class action. Specifically, the court: (1) **DECLARED** that all members of the “Bond Eligible Class” are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), and are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge; (2) **VACATED** ICE’s policy, as described in its July 8, 2025 “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” finding it unlawful under the APA; (2) **ENTERED FINAL JUDGMENT** as to Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Class Complaint and certified those claims for immediate appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).. This section summarizes the binding and dispositive orders from that case to establish their legal effect on Petitioner’s detention. It does not re-litigate the merits of that action or summarize unrelated portions of the court’s opinions.
76. Petitioner is a member of the nationwide “Bond Eligible Class” certified and granted final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*. The class is defined as: All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the DHS makes an initial custody determination.

77. Petitioner squarely meets each element of this definition: (1) Petitioner is a noncitizen without lawful status who entered the United States without inspection several years ago. (2) Petitioner was apprehended in the interior of the U.S. several years after entry and was therefore not apprehended upon arrival. (3) Petitioner is not subject to any other mandatory detention provision. Petitioner has no criminal history that would trigger detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and Respondents have never alleged that his detention is authorized by § 1225(b)(1) or § 1231. Instead, Respondents are detaining Petitioner pursuant to the precise unlawful policy vacated by the *Maldonado Bautista* court.
78. The Final Judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is a binding, dispositive adjudication of Petitioner's rights as a class member. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California expressly entered final judgment as to Counts I, II, and III of the class complaint and certified the judgment for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). This was not a preliminary or interlocutory ruling, but a final decision on the merits of the core statutory claims after the court granted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration to enter final judgment due to Respondents' noncompliance with its earlier orders. As Respondents here are the same government agencies bound by that judgment, they are precluded from relitigating the issues decided therein against Petitioner, a member of the plaintiff class.
79. The doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents Respondents from re-arguing the central legal question resolved in *Maldonado Bautista*: that class members are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The court's judgment conclusively determined this issue. Critically, the court also VACATED the

DHS policy on which Petitioner's mandatory detention is based, finding it "not in accordance with law" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A vacated agency policy is legally void. Respondents cannot lawfully detain Petitioner based on a policy that a federal court has already nullified.

80. Furthermore, the court's order **DECLARES** that class members like Petitioner are entitled to bond hearings under existing regulations. A declaratory judgment has "the force and effect of a final judgment or decree," 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and is binding on the parties. The *Maldonado Bautista* court entered final judgment precisely because of new evidence showing Respondents were directing their agents to disregard the court's earlier orders, thus necessitating a final, coercive judgment to "eliminate any doubt" about their legal obligations.
81. While this action seeks the individual habeas remedy of release, which was unavailable on a class-wide basis in *Maldonado Bautista*, the legal findings underpinning that judgment are preclusive here. The court's certification under Rule 54(b) underscores the finality of its decision on the adjudicated claims, making it ripe for enforcement. Absent a stay from an appellate court, the final judgment remains in full force. This section does not assert that the judgment forecloses all future agency action, but it does establish that Petitioner's current detention, based on a vacated policy, is unlawful as a matter of settled, preclusive, and binding law.
82. While a single district court's ruling is not binding on another, a final judgment against the same federal agencies (Respondents here) on the identical legal issue, resulting in the vacatur of the very policy justifying Petitioner's detention, carries significant weight. Federal agencies are expected to apply the law uniformly. When a federal court

has conducted a thorough analysis and entered final judgment declaring a specific agency policy unlawful and vacating it under the APA, that judgment serves as a powerful indicator of how the law should be applied to all individuals affected by that policy, including Petitioner.

83. The *Maldonado Bautista* court’s decision to vacate the DHS policy is dispositive of the statutory classification question at the heart of this petition. The court did not merely disagree with the government’s position; it held that the DHS policy was “not in accordance with law” and formally **VACATED** it. A vacated agency rule is a legal nullity. Therefore, Respondents’ continued detention of Petitioner under the authority of this voided policy is, by definition, an act without a legal basis. The court’s declaration that class members are entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations is not an abstract statement but a definitive legal conclusion that directly refutes the basis for Petitioner’s mandatory detention.
84. Federal officials cannot continue to enforce a policy that a federal court has declared unlawful and vacated under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court entered its Final Judgment specifically to “eliminate any doubt regarding [Defendant Respondents’] legal obligations and ensure [their] compliance” after finding evidence of widespread noncompliance with its prior orders. Respondents’ continued detention of Petitioner—a member of the *Maldonado Bautista* class—based on this void policy is a direct violation of a binding federal court judgment.
85. This definitive ruling strongly supports immediate release, not merely a bond hearing. Petitioner’s detention was unlawful from its inception (*ab initio*), premised on a policy that has been judicially invalidated. A subsequent bond hearing is an inadequate

remedy for a fundamentally unlawful arrest and detention; it cannot cure the initial violation of Petitioner's liberty. The *Maldonado Bautista* court was compelled to enter final judgment precisely because of evidence showing Respondents' widespread noncompliance with its earlier, non-final orders. This history demonstrates that ordering another administrative hearing before the very agencies refusing to comply with federal court rulings may be futile and would prolong the unlawful detention.

86. Petitioner does not ask the Court to abdicate its role in conducting an individualized habeas review. Rather, it urges the Court to recognize that the central legal question—the validity of the detention policy under § 1225(b)—has already been answered with the force of a final judgment. Applying that settled precedent to the undisputed facts of Petitioner's case should lead to the conclusion that his detention is unlawful and requires immediate relief.
87. Accordingly, Petitioner requests that this Court enforce the rights adjudicated in the *Maldonado Bautista* Final Judgment. The most direct and appropriate enforcement mechanism is an order granting this habeas petition and directing Petitioner's immediate release, as his confinement lacks any lawful basis. A subsequent administrative bond hearing is wholly inadequate to cure the original statutory and constitutional violation of an unlawful seizure and confinement. When the initial deprivation of liberty is without legal authority, the proper remedy is to restore that liberty through immediate release.
88. To prevent Respondents from circumventing this Court's jurisdiction and frustrating effective relief, Petitioner also requests temporary equitable aid under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. This includes an order prohibiting Petitioner's transfer from this

district and an injunction barring his re-detention under the vacated DHS policy. Such relief is necessary to preserve the Court's power to grant a final remedy. All relief sought is individualized and as-applied to Petitioner, and this petition does not seek to enjoin the operation of immigration statutes on a class-wide basis in contravention of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).

89. Petitioner anticipates that Respondents may raise several unavailing arguments to evade the binding effect of the *Maldonado Bautista* Final Judgment, each of which fails at a matter of law. They may claim that the judgement is merely declaratory or non-binding. This argument is factually incorrect as the court entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) for the precise reason Respondents were refusing to comply. The court did so to “eliminate any doubt regarding [their] legal obligations” and to ensure compliance and VACATED the underlying DHS/ICE policy pursuant to the APA. Respondents may argue that Petitioner is not a party to the litigation, however he is a member of the certified nationwide class. Respondents may argue that a pending appeal limits the judgment's effect, which is incorrect as a final judgment from a district court is binding and has immediate preclusive effect unless and until stayed.
90. As the Supreme Court clarified in *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. 543 (2022), this statutory scheme deliberately separates broad, class-wide declaratory relief from coercive individual remedies. Consequently, the *Maldonado Bautista* court could only declare the government's detention policy unlawful; it could not order the release of any class member. This creates a right without a remedy at the class level. The Suspension Clause protects the writ of habeas corpus, not requests for injunctive relief, see *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 309 (2018), and individual habeas petitions

remain the necessary and distinct vehicle to enforce the rights established by a class-wide declaratory judgment. See *Hamama v. Adducci*, 912 F.3d 869, 879 (6th Cir. 2018).

91. A declaratory judgment “has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Courts have interpreted this language to mean that a declaratory judgment is operative when entered, even if other claims remain pending and no final judgment has issued. *Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (“A declaratory judgment...is a final and binding adjudication of the rights at issue.”). *Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.*, 260 F.3d 201, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Declaratory judgments may be operative even when interlocutory for purposes of appeal.”). *Allard v. DeLorean*, 884 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1989) (a declaratory judgment “settles the legal rights of the parties”).
92. In Rule 23(b)(2) civil rights class actions, declaratory relief automatically governs all class members. The Supreme Court is explicit that Rule 23(b)(2) classes are designed for exactly this scenario: Declaratory relief “operates uniformly across the class without the need for individualized action.” — *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 361–62 (2011). Therefore: a certified Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory class judgment binds all Respondents and their agents (including ICE, EOIR) when entered, not when a later “final judgment” resolves residual claims.
93. Furthermore, federal courts and multiple circuits distinguish final-judgment finality from the immediate operative effect of a partial summary judgment (PSJ). A PSJ is a valid, enforceable order - Rule 56(g) expressly authorizes: (1) a “partial summary judgment” that establishes certain facts or legal conclusions as “not genuinely

in dispute;” and (2) Those conclusions govern the case immediately, even if the court has not issued a Rule 54(b) certification or final judgment.

94. Petitioner’s membership in the *Maldonado Bautista* class does not preclude this individual habeas action because this petition does not seek the “same” relief as the class action. The *Maldonado Bautista* class sought and obtained a declaration of rights—that class members are eligible for bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This petition seeks **release from unlawful detention**, a coercive, individual remedy that the class action could not provide due to the remedial limitations of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), as affirmed in *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. 543 (2022).
95. Neither claim preclusion nor the exhaustion doctrine bars this Court from granting habeas relief. The doctrine of claim preclusion is inapplicable because Petitioner was unable to seek the core habeas remedy of immediate release in the prior class action. As courts have recognized, preclusion is meant to prevent a second bite at the apple, not deny the first. Because the *Maldonado Bautista* court was statutorily barred from awarding class-wide coercive relief, that action cannot preclude a subsequent, individual petition that specifically seeks that remedy. The declaratory judgment serves as a predicate for further relief, not a bar to it.

## XI. CAUSES OF ACTION AND CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### COUNT ONE

#### Declaratory Judgement

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner’s First Claim for Relief: Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment that Petitioner is not an “applicant for admission” or “arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that Petitioner’s detention is governed solely by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary bond hearings. This claim is grounded in the statutory text, longstanding agency practice, and recent federal court decisions rejecting the government’s contrary interpretation.*

86. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.
87. Petitioner requests a declaration from this Court that Petitioner is not an applicant for admission “seeking admission” or “an arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2). Petitioner further requests a declaration that Petitioner’s current detention by Respondents, if justified at all, is governed solely by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

## COUNT TWO

### **Statutory Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act: No-Bond Detention in Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Unlawful Detention Under Improper Statutory Classification (INA §§ 1225 vs. 1226)**

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner’s Second Claim for Relief: Petitioner challenges the no-bond detention as a violation of the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The government’s application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner is contrary to the statute and decades of agency and judicial practice.*

88. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.
89. Since Petitioner is not an applicant for admission “seeking admission” or an “arriving alien” subject to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) and has no disqualifying criminal arrests or convictions subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), Petitioner is entitled to a bond redetermination hearing by an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
90. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under §

1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231 (which is not the case with Petitioner).

91. Respondents' actions, as detailed herein, infringe upon the Petitioner's statutory right to a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. Additionally, the Respondents' application of § 1225(b)(2) to the Petitioner unlawfully enforces continued detention, contravening both the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Petitioner's constitutional rights, which will be further addressed below.
92. Petitioner's continued detention under § 1225(b)(2) is therefore unauthorized by statute, contrary to longstanding agency practice, and in violation of the INA and APA.
93. Even if the Petitioner were to have a bond hearing before an immigration judge, the judge would likely deny bond based on the same unlawful and novel statutory interpretation outlined in the *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, as previously discussed. Consequently, even if such a hearing were granted, Respondents would still infringe upon Petitioner's constitutional rights to a full and fair hearing (as immigration judges are no longer neutral arbitrators), thereby violating his lawful right to bond consideration.

### COUNT THREE

#### Violation of the Bond Regulations

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner's Third Claim for Relief: Petitioner alleges that Respondents' refusal to provide a bond hearing violates binding agency regulations, including 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19, which require that noncitizens apprehended in the interior be eligible for bond and custody review under § 1226(a).*

94. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

95. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (now DHS) issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] **who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.**” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.
96. Nonetheless, pursuant to the afore-mentioned ICE memo from July 2025 upending DHS’ policy and similarly *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* upending EOIR policy to apply § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner instead of § 1226 and deny bond.
97. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates these agencies to continually detain Petitioner and violates these agencies own regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

#### COUNT FOUR

##### **Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Substantive Due Process**

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner’s Fourth Claim for Relief: Petitioner asserts that the continued detention without a bond hearing violates substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, as recognized by the Supreme Court in *Zadvydas v. Davis* and *Jennings v. Rodriguez*. The government may detain only to prevent flight or danger, and Petitioner’s detention serves no such purpose.*

98. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

99. All persons residing in the United States are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
100. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This vital liberty interest is at stake when an individual is subject to detention by the federal government.
101. Under the civil-detention framework set out in *Zadvydas* and its progeny, the Government may deprive a non-citizen of physical liberty only when the confinement serves a legitimate purpose—such as ensuring appearance or protecting the community—and is reasonably related to, and not excessive in relation to, that purpose. Nonpunitive purpose such as preventing danger or flight and may not be excessive in relation to that purpose. See *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300–01; *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
102. Immigration detention is civil, not criminal, in nature, and therefore cannot be punitive. There are only two permissible reasons for immigration detention: to avoid flight risk, and to avoid danger to the community. Petitioner’s detention therefore does not bear a reasonable relationship to the two regulatory purposes of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or flight prior to removal.
103. After entering the United States unlawfully, Petitioner went on to develop ties to the community over the course of a long period of time. Petitioner is therefore a “person”

- within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.
104. Respondents' actions in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing before a neutral and detached magistrate deprives Petitioner of various rights and liberty interest without due process of law.
105. Petitioner's detention serves no legitimate, non-punitive purpose and is therefore excessive in relation to any permissible government aim. Accordingly, his continued confinement is unconstitutionally arbitrary, in violation of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

#### COUNT FIVE

##### **Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution**

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner's Fifth Claim for Relief: Petitioner contends that the detention as an "arriving alien" without individualized process violates procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have repeatedly held that civil detention must be accompanied by meaningful process and individualized findings. See Mathews v. Eldridge*

106. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.
107. The Fifth Amendment forbids deprivation of liberty without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a **neutral** decision-maker. The Supreme Court and several circuit courts of appeal have repeatedly affirmed that procedural due process applies to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens, and that civil detention must be accompanied by robust procedural safeguards.
108. In addition to being ultra vires, the novel interpretation of DHS and EOIR of Petitioner's detention under § 1225(b)(2) violates the due process rights of noncitizens

like Petitioner by subjecting them to continued mandatory detention solely on the basis of these agencies' wrongful interpretations, without any individualized assessment of flight risk or danger. This automatic and prolonged detention deprives noncitizens of their liberty without adequate procedural safeguards, contravening the fundamental requirements of due process under the Fifth Amendment.

109. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that civil detention must be accompanied by meaningful process and individualized findings; yet, Respondents are now permitted prolonged detention based on agency *interpretation* rather than judicial determination and legal basis. As a result, noncitizens are forced to remain in custody for an extended period, suffering significant harm and disruption to their lives, without any statutory, regulatory or constitutional justification. This scheme is not only beyond the authority granted by Congress, but also fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional.
110. The Supreme Court states in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976): “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Noncitizens are entitled to due process protections in removal proceedings, including notice and a hearing. *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Due process applies to all persons within the United States, regardless of immigration status. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

111. To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, (1976). Pursuant to *Mathews*, courts weigh the following three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.
112. Applying the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), test to Petitioner's case:
113. Petitioner's liberty interest is paramount; the risk of erroneous deprivation is extreme considering that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), is not a flight risk, and does not pose a danger to the community. Being free from physical detention by one's own government "is the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). The right to be free of detention of indefinite duration pending a bail determination, is "without question, a weighty one." *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. at 34, 103 S.Ct. 321. Petitioner is being held at a county jail in the same conditions as criminal inmates, unable to work and is far from family. At minimum, the government must come forward with concrete, case-specific reasons that outweigh Petitioner's substantial liberty interest in continued release.
114. The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is significant due to the absence of an independent adjudicator, as highlighted in *Marcello v. Bonds*, 349 U.S. 302, 305-306

(1955). This risk is exacerbated by the coordinated actions of both DHS and EOIR, which operate under a unified approach that effectively denies bond to noncitizens in Petitioner's situation, thereby unilaterally depriving them of their liberty.

115. ICE is acting as both the prosecutor as well as the adjudicator. ICE can effectuate long detention periods for Petitioner and others in his situation just because they now interpret Petitioner as being subject to mandatory detention as an "arriving alien" and immigration judges at EOIR are prevented from considering bonds under the same circumstances.
116. Lastly, the interest of the government in being able to invoke the challenged ICE memorandum and novel interpretation and EOIR's *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is minimal. This is primarily because the interpretation is not supported by the plain reading of the INA, which clearly delineates the circumstances under which noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention. The interpretation also conflicts with existing DHS and EOIR regulations that have historically distinguished between arriving aliens and those apprehended in the interior, providing the latter with the opportunity for bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). When the government ignores law (and agency breaks its own regulations, policies and procedures), it is more likely to waste limited financial and administrative resources on unnecessary detention of people who are neither flight risks nor dangerous. This waste drags down the efficiency of the entire immigration system. And because the government must also spend resources defending against a habeas corpus petition in federal court to compel Respondents to comply with law, requiring Respondents to instead follow the law and their regulations reduces fiscal and administrative burdens on the government.

Furthermore, the government's interest is further diminished by the potential constitutional violations that arise from denying noncitizens their due process rights, as the interpretation effectively eliminates the procedural safeguards intended to prevent erroneous deprivation of liberty.

117. In conclusion, all three *Mathews* factors favor Petitioner's position. The novel DHS and EOIR interpretations violate Petitioner's procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Collateral harms from detention—including separation from Petitioner's family and friends and Petitioner's ability to maintain employment—further underscore the weight of the private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. These are collateral consequences of continued confinement that amplify the ongoing liberty deprivation, are not compensable by money damages, and therefore weigh heavily in the *Mathews* balance and the equitable analysis, without expanding the scope of relief requested.

## COUNT SIX

### **Violation of Administrative Procedure Act and Ultra Vires Action**

#### **5 U.S.C. § 706(2)**

#### **Contrary to Law and Constitutional Rights**

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner's Sixth Claim for Relief: Petitioner asserts that the government policies mandating his detention are unlawful agency actions that must be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, the July 2025 ICE memorandum and the BIA's recent precedent decision, which reclassify long-term residents apprehended in the interior as "arriving aliens," are (A) contrary to law and constitutional right, (B) in excess of statutory authority and therefore ultra vires, and (C) arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner's detention, which is based solely on these unlawful actions, is void ab initio.*

118. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

119. Respondents' detention of Petitioner is predicated on two interconnected final agency actions: (1) an internal ICE policy memorandum from July 2025 directing officers to treat all noncitizens who entered without inspection as "applicants for admission" subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); and (2) a recent binding precedent decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals codifying this interpretation. These actions represent the consummation of the agencies' decision-making process and directly determine Petitioner's rights, from which his unlawful detention flows.
120. Under the APA, this Court must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; [or] in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(C). Respondents' actions fail on all three grounds.
121. The APA's reference to "law" in the phrase "not in accordance with law," "means, of course, any law, and not merely those laws that the agency itself is charged with administering." *FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc.*, 537 U.S. 293, 300 (2003) (emphasis in original).

**A. Contrary to Law and Constitutional Right**

122. The agencies' actions are "not in accordance with law" because they contravene the plain language and structure of the INA. The statute creates two distinct detention schemes: § 1225 governs the inspection and mandatory detention of "arriving" aliens "seeking admission" at the border, while § 1226 governs the discretionary detention

of aliens “already present in the United States” who are arrested “on a warrant.”. By classifying Petitioner—a resident of many years apprehended in the interior—as an “arriving alien,” Respondents unlawfully erase this statutory distinction. This interpretation renders § 1226(a)’s warrant requirement and discretionary bond provisions meaningless for a vast category of individuals for whom it was intended, a result that canons of statutory construction forbid.

123. These actions are also “contrary to constitutional right” because they subject Petitioner to prolonged, mandatory detention without the individualized procedural due process that is constitutionally required and statutorily provided for under the § 1226(a) framework.

**B. In Excess of Statutory Authority and Ultra Vires**

124. Respondents have acted in excess of their statutory authority. Congress did not grant DHS or the Attorney General the power to mandatorily detain long-term residents apprehended in the interior who are not removable for specific criminal or terrorism-related grounds under § 1226(c). The mandatory detention authority of § 1225 is strictly limited to the context of arriving aliens at the border. By applying it to Petitioner, Respondents are exercising a power Congress never gave them.
125. This legislative rulemaking by executive fiat is ultra vires and void. The agencies have, in effect, rewritten the INA to create a new, sweeping category of mandatory detention that is not authorized by the statute. Because the agencies lack any statutory power to subject Petitioner to mandatory detention under § 1225, the action is a legal nullity.

**C. Arbitrary and Capricious**

126. The agencies' policy shift is the definition of arbitrary and capricious action. It marks a sudden, radical, and unexplained departure from decades of their own consistent practice of treating individuals like Petitioner as subject to discretionary bond hearings under § 1226(a). An agency action that reverses a settled course of behavior without a reasoned explanation is arbitrary. See *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
127. The policy is also arbitrary because the agencies failed to consider crucial aspects of the problem, including the significant reliance interests of individuals like Petitioner who have built lives, families, and businesses in the United States under the prior, long-standing legal framework. Furthermore, the decision to impose mandatory detention fails to consider obvious and less restrictive alternatives, such as bond or conditions of release, for individuals who, like Petitioner, are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.
128. 132. Finally, Respondents' enforcement of this policy against Petitioner is arbitrary and capricious because a federal court in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), has already held the ICE policy to be unlawful under the APA and formally VACATED it. Continuing to detain Petitioner, a member of the plaintiff class in that case, under the authority of a legally void policy is an act of defiance against a binding judgment and is inherently arbitrary.
129. Because Petitioner's detention is premised exclusively on these unlawful agency actions, his confinement is "not in accordance with law" and must be set aside.

Petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the policy and its application to him are unlawful and an order directing his immediate release from custody.

130. Furthermore, while *Yajure Hurtado* was a published decision by the EOIR, it conflicts with the plain language of the INA and existing EOIR regulations. The decision appears to have been strategically published by the BIA to constrain immigration judges nationwide, effectively preventing them from granting bond to affected individuals, thereby undermining the procedural fairness guaranteed by the INA and the APA. Up until its publication, immigration judges were granting bonds to individuals who entered without inspection. See, e.g., *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).
131. These actions were contrary to the agencies' constitutional power under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as explained above. These recent changes were not in accordance with the plain language of the INA and implementing regulations governing who is an "applicant for admission" or an "arriving alien", as cited and discussed in the Statutory Framework section above.
132. DHS acted contrary to law. See also *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (agency must follow its own regulations) (a separate claim to relief under *Accardi* is forthcoming below). These novel interpretations should be held unlawful and set aside because it was contrary to the agency's constitutional power and not in accordance with the INA and implementing regulations.
133. By issuing this ICE memo and publishing *Yajure Hurtado*, this regulation, the agencies have exceeded the authority delegated to them by Congress, effectively rewriting the statutory scheme to permit DHS to prolong detention without judicial

determination or individualized findings for almost anyone present in the U.S. without an immigration judge review. This regulatory overreach undermines the statutory guarantee of prompt review and release and is inconsistent with the principles of separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine.

134. “Agency actions beyond delegated authority, are ‘ultra vires,’ and courts must invalidate them.” *U.S. ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998); see also *Romero v. INS*, 39 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an immigration regulation that is inconsistent with the statutory scheme is invalid). Similarly, agency regulations that conflict with statutory text or structure must be invalidated.
135. Because these agencies’ interpretations effectively transform a discretionary detention for people who are flight risks or a danger to mandatory detention to all without the possibility for release on bond, and as they directly contravene the plain language of the INA and its regulations, these decisions must be invalidated by this Court.
136. Petitioner’s detention, premised solely on this ultra vires interpretation is “not in accordance with law,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,” and “arbitrary [and] capricious” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), entitling Petitioner to immediate release.

#### **COUNT SEVEN**

##### **Violation of the *Accardi* Doctrine**

*Summary of Claim of Petitioner’s Tenth Claim for Relief: Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated the *Accardi* doctrine by failing to follow their own regulations and procedures, as required by *Accardi* and its progeny.*

137. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

138. The *Accardi* doctrine mandates that federal agencies must adhere to their own established regulations and policies. This principle ensures that agency actions are consistent, fair, and predictable, thereby safeguarding individual rights. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Petitioner has a right to set aside agency action that violated agency procedures, rules, or instructions. See *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (“If petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing”).
139. “[The ambit of the *Accardi* doctrine] is not limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations.” *Montilla v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Agency rules, whether codified or issued through internal guidance, are binding where they implicate important substantive and procedural rights. See, e.g., *Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv.*, 397 U.S. 521, 538 (1970) (*Accardi* applies most forcefully where agency rules are “intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion”); *Damus v. Nielsen*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 336 (D.D.C. 2018) (ICE bound by internal directive intended to protect noncitizens’ procedural rights). Where these criteria are satisfied, the reviewing court must invalidate agency action or policy violating the agency’s own rules.
140. The recent policy shifts by ICE and EOIR, as outlined in ICE’s July 2025 memorandum and EOIR’s *Yajure Hurtado* decision, violate the *Accardi* doctrine by failing to adhere to established agency regulations and procedures. The *Accardi* doctrine mandates that federal agencies must follow their own rules and regulations, particularly when these rules are designed to protect individual rights.

141. By reclassifying individuals who entered without inspection apprehended in the interior of the United States as “applicants for admission” or as “arriving aliens” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), ICE and EOIR have disregarded the procedural safeguards and discretionary bond provisions outlined in § 1226(a). ICE’s and EOIR’s reclassification policy effectively nullifies § 1226(a)’s statutory provision by subjecting all noncitizens to mandatory detention, regardless of their actual circumstances. This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the INA and disrupts decades of settled law, which recognized the distinct legal status and rights of noncitizens apprehended in the interior. This departure from established regulations and legal standards not only contravenes the statutory framework of the INA but also undermines the procedural rights and protections intended to ensure fair and consistent treatment of noncitizens, warranting immediate judicial intervention.
142. The issuance of the ICE memorandum without public notice or comment further exemplifies a breach of procedural norms, as it was implemented in a manner that bypassed the transparency and accountability required by the APA. Consequently, these actions represent an arbitrary and capricious exercise of agency power, infringing upon the rights of noncitizens and violating the principles enshrined in the *Accardi* doctrine.
143. The policy’s blanket application denies noncitizens the due process rights afforded under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees fair procedures before depriving individuals of their liberty. By eliminating bond eligibility, ICE’s policy strips noncitizens of the opportunity to meaningfully contest their detention. This issue is further exacerbated by EOIR’s decision in *Yajure Hurtado*, which entrenches this

denial of due process by reclassifying noncitizens who entered without inspection as “arriving aliens,” thereby subjecting them to mandatory detention without the possibility of bond from immigration judges. Together, these agency actions undermine the statutory and constitutional protections afforded to noncitizens, and therefore, this Court should declare these actions unlawful and set them aside.

**COUNT EIGHT**  
**Violation of the Final Judgment in *Maldonado Bautista***  
**and Continued Unlawful Detention**

144. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.
145. As a member of the nationwide “Bond Eligible Class,” Petitioner is a party to the Final Judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*. That Final Judgment is a binding, dispositive adjudication of Petitioner’s rights.
146. The *Maldonado Bautista* Final Judgment **DECLARES** that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); **VACATES** the DHS policy that Respondents rely on to detain him; and was certified as a final, appealable judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
147. The court entered this Final Judgment expressly because Respondents were refusing to comply with the court’s prior orders and to “ensure [their] compliance.”. Respondents’ continued detention of Petitioner based on a vacated policy and in direct defiance of a binding Final Judgment is unlawful. This conduct renders Petitioner’s detention unlawful *ab initio* and independently warrants Petitioner’s immediate release.

**COUNT NINE**  
**Unlawful Arrest**

148. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.
149. Petitioner's initial arrest and continued detention by Respondents constitutes unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and applicable regulations.
150. Petitioner was arrested in the interior of the United States without a warrant, without probable cause, and without exigent circumstances, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) authorizes immigration officers to arrest a noncitizen without a warrant only if the officer has reason to believe the person is in the United States in violation of law and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. The corresponding regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2), sets forth the procedural and substantive requirements for such warrantless arrests. It requires that: (1) An immigration officer must have "reason to believe" based on "specific facts and circumstances" that the person is in violation of immigration law and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained; (2) The regulation further requires that the officer's actions be based on individualized, articulable facts—not on generalized assumptions or stereotypes.
152. The government's actions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the INA and their own regulations in the manner Petitioner was arrested. There was no justification to arrest Petitioner without a warrant.

## XII. REMEDIES

### **THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR PETITIONER'S UNLAWFUL DETENTION IS IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

153. Given the egregious constitutional and statutory violations underlying Petitioner's arrest and continued detention, the only effective and constitutionally sufficient remedy is immediate and unconditional release. Federal courts possess broad authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require," which includes ordering immediate release when detention is found to be unlawful. See *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025).

154. Even though some cases cited in the Exhibit 2 of the favorable Federal Court cases granted bond hearings to noncitizens who won TROs, PIs and habeas relief, many of those cases and a growing number of decisions granted immediate and unconditional release relief to petitioner in similar circumstances. In addition, there are several important reasons that include new developments since those cases were decided that warrant a different relief now in this case. This remedy is warranted in this case since Petitioner was detained without a proper warrant.

In *Javier De Jesus Aguilar v. English*, No. 3:25-CV-898 DRL-SJF, 2025 WL 3280219 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 25, 2025), the Court granted immediate release without bond to a Petitioner detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) who has been in the country for 19 years and twice bonded in immigration proceedings in the past. "All this begs the question whether the court should order immediate release or a hearing. The court is uninclined to order a hearing consistent with the procedures under §1226(a) and give the government a pass for not securing a warrant before Mr. De Jesús Aguilar's arrest,

particularly when the government has not asserted this a basis for his continued detention” ... [where there is no] “basis for his continued detention today or extraordinary circumstances or some likelihood of his escape (perhaps a tough position when he has been in the country for 19 years and twice bonded in immigration proceedings).” ... “The simple matter is this: the government has not established a lawful basis for detention— or, otherwise put, Mr. De Jesús Aguilar has established his detention is today unlawful— and the government must live by the rules that Congress has instituted.” ... “These cases demonstrate that federal courts are exercising their equitable habeas powers to grant the only meaningful remedy for a fundamentally unlawful detention: unconditional release, which is the appropriate remedy in this case due to the unlawful arrest and lack of any legitimate reason for Petitioner’s detention.”

155. Although other cases in this district granted a bond hearing in similar circumstances as the Habeas relief, this case involved unique circumstances of an unlawful arrest ab initio therefore the relief should be different and tailored specifically to cure that violation.

**Bond Hearing Will Require More Detention Time**

156. If the Court orders a bond hearing before an immigration judge, it will take several more days or weeks to schedule a bond hearing, at additional costs to Petitioner, while he remains detained, in a situation where Respondents have not even alleged, yet alone proven, that he is a danger or flight risk. Respondents have not produced a single shred of evidence why he should not be released.

**Bond Hearing Cannot Cure Unlawful Arrest**

157. Petitioner’s arrest and continued detention are unlawful from the outset because he was not arrested pursuant to a warrant under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, as required for interior apprehensions, but was instead detained as a purported “applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)—a provision that, by its terms and longstanding practice, applies only to individuals encountered at the border or a port of entry, not to long-term residents apprehended in the interior. This is not a mere technicality; it is a fundamental statutory violation.
158. In analogous contexts, such as an unlawful arrest without probable cause or a search conducted without a warrant, courts have consistently held that the only effective remedy is suppression of evidence or outright release from custody. The government cannot retroactively cure an unlawful deprivation of liberty by later manufacturing a post hoc justification or issuing a belated warrant.
159. The same principle applies here: if ICE were to issue a warrant now, or attempt to reclassify the basis for detention after the fact, it would not remedy the original statutory violation as they arrested petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Therefore, the only appropriate remedy for an arrest and detention made under the wrong statutory authority is immediate and unconditional release. Allowing the government to “fix” its error after the fact would undermine statutory and constitutional protections, incentivize unlawful government conduct, and deprive individuals of meaningful remedies for violations of their liberty interests.

**XIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

160. The continued detention of Petitioner violates due process rights. But for intervention by this Court, Petitioner has no means of release from ICE custody. Petitioner faces ongoing and irreparable harm as a result of unlawful detention, including deprivation of liberty, loss of employment, and separation from family. These injuries cannot be remedied by monetary damages and will continue absent immediate judicial intervention. The balance of equities and the public interest strongly favor expedited consideration and equitable relief, including immediate release or a prompt bond hearing. Without such relief, Petitioner will continue to suffer irreparable harm, and the constitutional and statutory violations at issue will persist.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief. Petitioner respectfully requests expedited consideration of this Petition due to the ongoing deprivation of liberty and irreparable harm:

- (1) **Assume** jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 1331 and the Suspension Clause;
- (2) **Issue** an Order to Show Cause, ordering Respondents to justify why this writ should not be granted to Petitioner and the basis of Petitioner's detention in fact and law, **within the 3 days authorized by the statute**;
- (3) Grant the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody;
- (4) Issue an order requiring Respondents to immediately and unconditionally release Petitioner from custody. This remedy is required because:

- (a) Petitioner’s detention was unlawful ab initio. As numerous courts have held, a subsequent administrative bond hearing is “wholly inadequate to remedy that unlawful detention” and cannot cure the initial constitutional violation of depriving Petitioner of liberty without due process of law; and
  - (b) Adopting the precise reasoning of the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island in *Armando De Macedo Mendes v. Hyde*, C.A. No. 25-cv-627-JJM-AEM, 2025 WL 3274606 (D.R.I. Dec. 5, 2025), where the government has initiated an unlawful detention and, as in that case, has “put forth no evidence to suggest that [the petitioner] poses a flight risk or is a danger to the community,” the only just and appropriate remedy is immediate release.
- (5) **Declare**, consistent with the Final Judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, that Petitioner’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is contrary to law and that Petitioner’s custody is governed exclusively by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and must adhere to all regulatory and due process requirements;
- (6) **ENJOIN** Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or the DHS policy vacated by the Maldonado Bautista court;
- (7) **Award** Petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees and costs;
- (8) **Grant** such other and further relief as this Court deems just, proper or equitable under the circumstances.

Respectfully Submitted,

This 15<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2026.

/s/ Karen Weinstock

Karen Weinstock

Attorney for Petitioner

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**28 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with Petitioner's family members and have reviewed various documents for Petitioner. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that I have reviewed the foregoing Petition and that the facts and statements made in this Petition and Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge or belief pursuant to 28 USC § 2242.

This 15<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2026.

/s/ Karen Weinstock  
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