

The Honorable Jamal Whitehead

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Son Truong VO,) Civil Case No. 26-cv-135-JNW
)
Petitioner,)
) **PETITIONER'S TRAVERSE ON WRIT**
v.) **OF HABEAS CORPUS**
)

Bruce SCOTT, Warden, Northwest ICE)
Processing Center; Laura HERMOSILLO,)
Enforcement and Removal Operations, Seattle)
Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and)
Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM,))
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland)
Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF)
HOMELAND SECURITY; Todd LYONS,))
Acting Director and Senior Official)
Performing Duties of Director of ICE;)
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS)
ENFORCEMENT,)

Respondents.

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has detained Petitioner Vo for
 3 more than a month and a half with no lawful authority. The Government recycles the same
 4 arguments the courts in this district have repeatedly rejected in attempting to justify its re-
 5 detention of a pre-1995 Vietnamese refugee who has always complied with his Order of
 6 Supervision (“OSUP”), who has now spent cumulatively more than six months in immigration
 7 custody, and for whom there is no travel document and no evidence Vietnam will accept him.
 8 It defends its failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and a hearing as stemming from
 9 decisions from the courts of this district that it “disagrees” with. It has demonstrated its callous
 10 regard for the lives of those subject to its unrestrained abuse of authority and the rule of law.
 11 This Court should order Petitioner’s immediate release because there was no authority to re-
 12 detain him, just as there is no authority to continue to detain him. And it should order an
 13 equitable remedy—reopening of removal proceedings—necessary to address the government’s
 14 misconduct and protect against the arbitrary deprivation of Petitioner’s life and liberty after
 15 more than two decades of living with a “dormant” removal order.

16 **II. ARGUMENT**

17 **A. This Court Should Order Petitioner’s Immediate Release from Custody**
 18 **on Procedural Due Process Grounds.**

19 When the Government releases a person from custody, that individual has a protected
 20 liberty interest in their freedom that cannot be taken away without due process. *Morrissey v.*
 21 *Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972). Here, where Petitioner Vo did not violate the conditions
 22 of his supervision,¹ the government could not take away his release on conditions of
 23 supervision without prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. *See* Dkt 1 at 16-20. No such
 24 notice or hearing was provided here.

25 _____
 26 ¹ The Government’s Return appears to have factual content referencing someone else on page 9. Dkt. 10.
 Petitioner has never violated his order of supervision and has only one criminal conviction (the conviction that led
 to his removal order).

1 The Government acknowledges that “courts in this District have found that noncitizens
2 have a liberty interest in their release on OSUP” but states it “disagree[s] with those decisions.”
3 Dkt. 10 at 8, n.3. It makes no effort to argue that Petitioner Vo’s case is different from every
4 other case decided by courts in this district to justify ICE’s actions. Instead, it argues that it
5 does not need to follow the decisions of the district court. *See* Dkt. 10 at 13-14 (arguing that
6 “district court decisions do not freeze the law or require universal acquiescence by the
7 government”). The Government may dislike the decisions of this district court, but unless it
8 appeals and the Ninth Circuit rules differently, it is expected to adhere to the law as
9 pronounced and interpreted by the federal courts. To preserve judicial economy and protect the
10 rights of litigants, the Government should be collaterally estopped from continuing to relitigate
11 the same issue in successive habeas cases involving re-detention of individuals previously
12 released on orders of supervision. *See Wang v. Noem, et al.*, 2026 WL 258442, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
13 Jan 29, 2026) (collaterally estopping government from opposing the merits of habeas petitions
14 brought by bond eligible litigants); *id.* (“Despite the clarity of the Court’s previous orders and
15 legal doctrines that preclude Respondents from relitigate issues at the heart of these requests,
16 Respondents continue to manufacture arguments for sake of opposition.”).

17 The Government attempts to fault Petitioner for not citing a case involving a post-
18 removal order person, while simultaneously acknowledging that courts in our district have held
19 that procedural due process requires pre-deprivation notice and a hearing before revoking the
20 OSUP of a post-removal order person. Dkt. 10 at 13 (“Federal Respondents acknowledge that
21 some opinions in this District have recently found that the Due Process Clause requires a pre-
22 deprivation hearing before revocation of an OSUP.”). Nonetheless, the Government argues that
23 due process does not require a pre-deprivation hearing where the government detains a person
24 to effectuate a removal order, but it provides no authority for this position. *See* Dkt. 10 at 13-
25 14. It does not explain what legally distinguishes a post-removal order person from a pre-
26 removal order person under a procedural due process analysis, following *Morrissey* and its

1 progeny. Nor can it. “Perhaps the most basic of due process’s customary protections is the
 2 demand of fair notice. . . Without an assurance that the laws supply fair notice, so much else of
 3 the Constitution risks becoming only a ‘parchment barrie[r]’ against arbitrary power.” *Sessions*
 4 *v. Dimaya*, 584 U.S. 148, 177 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (quoting the J. Madison,
 5 The Federalist Papers No. 48). Absent a pre-deprivation hearing, ICE would have unilateral
 6 authority to re-detain without any neutral check, and, as its conduct has proven over the last
 7 year, it would be given license to re-detain individuals “without a valid reason.” *Trejo v.*
 8 *Warden of ERO El Paso East Montana*, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2992187, at *9 (W.D. Tex.
 9 Oct. 24, 2025). *See also Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1034 (N.D. Cal.
 10 2025); Dkt. 1 at 18-19 (discussing same).

11 This Court should order Petitioner’s immediate release with an order that he may not be
 12 re-detained absent notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before this Court. *See, e.g., Lecky v.*
 13 *Bondi, et al.*, 2026 WL 266066 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2026) (ordering same); *Singh v. Noem*,
 14 2026 WL 265670 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2026) (same); *Tsyamba v. Hermosillo, et al.*, 2026 WL
 15 237514 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2026) (same); *Saelee v. Bondi, et al.*, 2026 WL 221513 (W.D.
 16 Wash. Jan. 28, 2026) (same); *Somsanuk v. Bondi*, 2026 WL 221139 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28,
 17 2026) (same).

18 **B. This Court Should Order Petitioner’s Immediate Release from Custody**
 19 **on Substantive Due Process Grounds.**

20 The Government relies solely on factual and legal arguments already rejected by the
 21 courts of this district numerous times in pre-1995 Vietnamese re-detention cases. It makes no
 22 effort to distinguish Petitioner Vo’s case from every other case, or to further substantiate its
 23 factual claims. Instead, its “ill-conceived and incompetently-implemented government pursuit
 24 of daily deportation quotas,” *Arias v. Noem*, 26-cv-415-FB, 2026 WL 255706 (W.D. Texas Jan.
 25 31, 2026), leads it to recycle the same vague and unsubstantiated arguments that removal to
 26 Vietnam for a pre-1995 arrival is now “significantly likely in the reasonable foreseeable future”

1 because of “Vietnam’s newfound willingness to issue travel documents for its citizens in the
2 United States.” Dkt. 10 at 5.

3 The Government’s pursuit of detention and disregard for legal order confirm Petitioner’s
4 claim that his re-detention is punitive and without any lawful purpose. “[P]unitive measures
5 [can]not be imposed upon [noncitizens] ordered removed.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678,
6 694 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S.
7 228, 238 (1896)). Mr. Vo is not a flight risk or a danger (the only reasons that may justify
8 immigration detention). *Id.*; Dkt. 1 at 22. The Government makes no claim that he is.

9 The Government confirms that Petitioner has already been cumulatively detained beyond
10 the presumptively reasonable period of six months in unsuccessful bids by the Government to
11 remove him. Dkt. 10 at 11 (calculating Petitioner’s total time in post-order detention as of the
12 time of the Government’s Return as 192 days). It has not demonstrated (or rebutted Petitioner’s
13 showing) that it is significantly likely, let alone imminent, that it will remove Petitioner in the
14 reasonably foreseeable future.

15 To the contrary, it has proven that it does not have a travel document and made no effort
16 to even initiate the process until well after it detained Petitioner. As of the date of the
17 Government’s return, it still had not submitted a travel document request to Vietnam, despite
18 holding Petitioner in custody, away from his family and livelihood, for a month and a half. Dkt.
19 10 at 5. The Government also had not even sent the request to the unit within ICE that transmits
20 travel document requests to Vietnam. *Id.* (“Such request is now being sent” to the ICE unit). This
21 alone is evidence that his removal was not imminent, let alone foreseeable, at the time he was
22 arrested and detained.

23 Further, the Government again makes no individualized assessment of the likelihood that
24 Vietnam will accept Petitioner given his circumstances. It provides no evidence to support its
25 ICE officer’s conclusory statements that Vietnam will issue travel documents within 30 days of
26 the request, nor that ICE has received no denials of travel document issuance from Vietnam. Dkt.
10 at 12. It claims that 327 pre-1995 Vietnamese individuals were removed in FY 2025, but it

1 characteristically does not say how many pre-1995 Vietnamese individuals it sought travel
 2 documents for. Dkt. 10 at 5, 12. The courts have resoundingly rejected these factual assertions
 3 over recent months. *See, e.g., Van Huynh v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3534210, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
 4 10, 2025) (noting failure to “state any factual basis” for claim that Vietnam will issue a travel
 5 document within 30 days, to provide the criteria for Vietnam’s acceptance, to clarify its statistical
 6 data, etc.); *Duong v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3628631, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2025) (same); *Huynh*
 7 *v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3718991, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2025) (same); *Tran v. Scott*, 2025 WL
 8 2898638, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2025) (noting government provided “no data” on number
 9 of requests submitted to Vietnam nor substantiated the assertions in ICE officer declaration); *Do*
 10 *v. Scott*, 2025 WL 3496909, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025) (noting government could only
 11 offer one example of a pre-1995 person in this district who was issued a travel document by
 12 Vietnam and could not show the amount of time it took for that to happen). The Government
 13 does not defend its actions with better evidence; it just keeps recycling the same unsubstantiated
 14 assertions.

15 The facts tell a different story than the one the Government tells. Advocates monitoring
 16 pre-1995 Vietnamese individuals detained in ICE custody nationwide have identified 516
 17 individuals currently detained by ICE nationwide, 97% of whom are post-order. Dkt. 9 ¶8 (Decl.
 18 of J. Dan). This number is necessarily underinclusive. *Id.* ¶7. Vietnam does not communicate to
 19 the U.S. government that it is denying the issuance of a travel document, creating the appearance
 20 that the request is still pending. *Id.* ¶11. Therefore, ICE may claim that it has received no denials,
 21 but that does not mean that Vietnam grants all the requests ICE makes. Clearly, it still does not
 22 grant most requests. Moreover, “[t]he refusal or inability of Vietnam to issue a travel document
 23 to many pre-1995 Vietnamese nationals has resulted in lengthy detention for a significant
 24 number of detainees.” Dkt. 9 ¶13 (two re-detained individuals have been held in ICE custody for
 25 nearly a year). In the Tacoma facility, one pre-1995 re-detained Vietnamese individual has been
 26 detained there since June 30, 2025 without a travel document or removal. Dkt. 6 ¶5 (Decl. of J.
 Valencia). And despite the government’s attempts to create allusions that Vietnam is granting its

1 travel document requests, out of 25 pre-1995 Vietnamese cases being monitored by the Federal
2 Public Defender's office in Tacoma since March 2025, only three have been issued travel
3 documents. Dkt. 6 ¶2.

4 Despite these circumstances, and the chorus of district court rulings, ICE continues to re-
5 detain individuals without making any effort to obtain a travel document from Vietnam first.
6 Dkt. 9 ¶10. Very often, it does not bother to even begin the process to initiate the travel document
7 request until a habeas petition is filed or well into a person's detention, "creat[ing] the impression
8 that ICE's main purpose in re-detaining these individuals is their incarceration, not their
9 deportation." Dkt. 6 ¶4; Dkt. 9 ¶10. Even in circumstances around the country where ICE has
10 called people back in after their release on habeas, claiming that ICE now has the travel
11 document, advocates report that they are again being held for prolonged periods without being
12 put on a flight. Dkt. 9 ¶14.

13 For all these reasons it is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future that Petitioner
14 will be removed. As briefed previously, Dkt. 1 at 23, the government is not permitted to re-detain
15 "indefinitely while it waits for travel documents from Vietnam." *Tran v. Bondi*, 2025 WL
16 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025).

17 This Court should order Petitioner's immediate release with an order that he may not be
18 re-detained unless the Government first obtains a travel document to Vietnam, provides him that
19 document, and permits him the opportunity to leave on his own, consistent with other relief
20 granted by this Court. Courts in this district have issued similar orders. *See Do v. Scott*, 2025
21 WL 3470327, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2025) (order on TRO); *Do v. Scott*, 2025 WL 3496909,
22 at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025) (order on habeas petition) ("Respondents may not re-detain
23 petitioner unless. . . b. The government (1) obtains a valid travel document to Vietnam for her,
24 (2) provides the valid travel document to her and counsel, (3) offers petitioner the opportunity to
25 leave on her own within two months, and (4) petitioner does not leave"); *Tang v. Bondi*, 2025
26 WL 3551381, at *3 (same). *See also Nguyen v. Bondi*, 2026 WL 183819, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan.

23, 2026) (prohibiting any re-detention without ICE first obtaining a valid travel document);
Somsanuk v. Bondi, 2026 WL 221139, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2026) (same).

**C. This Court Should Order Immediate Release Because ICE Has Violated
 Binding Regulations in Revoking Petitioner’s Supervised Release.**

The Government has not demonstrated compliance with the regulations that govern ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release. First, the Government has not established that there was a lawful basis under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1) and (2) to revoke Petitioner’s supervision. To the contrary, Petitioner has never violated his OSUP, § 241.13(i)(1), nor has the Government demonstrated “changed circumstances” such “that there is a significant likelihood that [Petitioner Vo] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” § 241.13(i)(2). Second, the Government has failed to comply with the revocation procedures. § 241.13(i)(3). It claims it provided Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release, which states only that “[a] determination was made that there is now significant likelihood of your removal from the U.S. in the foreseeable future” without any detail or explanation. Dkt. 12-7. Petitioner does not recall receiving this Notice and was not given a copy. Dkt. 1 ¶22 at 6; Dkt. 2 ¶5. Moreover, the Government has at no point provided him the required “initial informal interview,” nor has it provided Petitioner an opportunity to respond or conducted the required evaluation of contested facts. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). The Government makes no claim that it has.

For these and the reasons provided in Petitioner’s Petition, Dkt. 1 ¶¶80-85 at 25-26, this Court should order Petitioner’s immediate release.

**D. This Court Should Order Other Equitable Measures to Protect
 Petitioner’s Rights and as a Sanction for the Government’s Misconduct.**

“The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and

1 procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
2 lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
3 flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
4 corrected.” *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).

5 Petitioner Vo has suffered several overlapping “miscarriages of justice” that require an
6 equitable remedy beyond his release from custody. First, Petitioner Vo, like so many others, is
7 the victim of the Government’s mandatory detention policy, which apparently seeks to arrest
8 and detain maximum numbers without regard to its legal authority. The government has
9 wielded this arbitrary and barbaric excess of power throughout the country, and in violation of
10 court orders. In this district, the Government has made no effort to cure the constitutional,
11 statutory, or regulatory violations called out by the courts, and instead persists in that conduct.
12 Indeed, in this case, the Government acknowledges the orders of the courts of this district, but
13 explains that it disagrees with those orders to justify its noncompliance. In short, it has
14 demonstrated that it has turned away from the rule of law.

15 Second, as described in the Petition, Petitioner Vo has lived in the United States for 32
16 years, entering lawfully as a refugee. He was ordered deported 23 years ago, but the United
17 States has been unable to deport him through no fault of Petitioner’s. That substantial delay in
18 execution of Petitioner’s removal order means that Petitioner was permitted to live his life,
19 build a family and a business, and invest in his community. The record in this case—including
20 numerous letters of support, Dkt. 2 ¶2—reflects that Petitioner is a model member of his
21 community and loved by many. The Government, in carrying out its maximum detention
22 campaign, has not only unlawfully denied Petitioner his liberty for the past month and a half,
23 but it suddenly and arbitrarily threatened him with removal to Vietnam or some unknown third
24 country, when for 23 years it has failed to remove him.

25 Due process requires more. In this case, Petitioner Vo would be eligible to apply to
26 readjust his status as a lawful permanent resident and for other relief against removal based on

1 his marriage to a U.S. citizen, if his removal case were reopened. As addressed previously,
2 substantial procedural barriers to reopening make that nearly impossible as a unilateral motion
3 and because “[t]he immigration judge has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the
4 moving party has established a prima facie case for relief.” Dkt. 1 ¶88 at 27. *See* 8 C.F.R. §
5 1003.23(b). Jointly filed motions by the government and the respondent are exceptions to the
6 procedural bars to a motion to reopen. *Id.* §1003.23(b)(4)(iv).

7 Here, due process requires that the Government be enjoined from pursuing Petitioner
8 Vo’s removal without first reopening his removal case to permit him to claim relief.
9 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
10 individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
11 Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Under the
12 familiar *Mathews* test, Petitioner’s substantial liberty and property interests, which have only
13 deepened over the 23 years since his removal order was issued, outweigh any government
14 interest in his expeditious removal. Moreover, the government cannot reasonably claim that it
15 is in the public interest to remove a person who has legal claims to stay. The risk of error,
16 without such a protection, is substantial as Petitioner could be removed, when the law provides
17 him a path to stay. In *Chhoeun v. Marin*, 442 F.Supp.3d 1233, 1251 (C.D. Cal. 2020), a class
18 action involving the government’s sudden detention and removal of Cambodian nationals with
19 long “dormant” removal orders, the Court concluded that the “extraordinary circumstances of
20 this case—including the long-dormant removal orders, changes in the law and in Petitioners’
21 lives, the sudden and unexpected threat of removal, and the barriers to accessing attorneys and
22 documents while in detention—have undermined Petitioners’ ability to avail themselves of the
23 administrative procedures in place to protect them from erroneous removals.” *Id.* In earlier
24 stages of the *Chhoeun* litigation, the Court issued stays of removal, in addition to release from
25 custody. *See Chhoeun v. Marin*, 306 F.Supp.3d 1147, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2018).

1 Petitioner Vo does not seek a stay of removal, and therefore the Government's
2 objection that his requested relief is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is misplaced. Petitioner Vo
3 seeks only to ensure that if the Government seek to execute his long-dormant removal order,
4 that it do so in a constitutionally compliant manner, by permitting him to seek relief now
5 available to him by reopening his removal case. "§1252(g) does not prohibit challenges to
6 unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders."
7 *Ibarra-Perez v. United States*, 154 F.4th 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2025). Petitioner's proposed remedy
8 would not stop the government from pursuing his removal, but it would critically ensure that
9 he has the opportunity to claim relief, given his change in circumstances and the life he has
10 built in the United States.

11 In the Ninth Circuit, the doctrine of laches and estoppel may be asserted against the
12 government "upon a showing that (1) the government engaged in 'affirmative misconduct'
13 causing a 'serious injustice,' and (2) the public's interest will not suffer undue damage." *In re*
14 *Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 517 F. Supp. 3d 994,
15 999 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting *Watkins v. U.S. Army*, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1989)). *See*
16 *Perez v. Holder*, 411 Fed. Appx. 43, 36 (9th Cir. 2010) (traditional rule is that laches is not
17 available against the government, but "[e]ven if there were some allowance for laches against
18 the government, there is no reason why that doctrine should not be subject to at least the same
19 strictures as estoppel."). "There is no single test for detecting the presence of affirmative
20 misconduct; each case must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances."
21 *Watkins*, 875 F.2d at 707. "Affirmative misconduct" includes "an affirmative misrepresentation
22 or affirmative concealment of a material fact by the government." *Id.* Here, the Government's
23 affirmative misconduct is demonstrated by its failure to adhere its conduct to the law. It
24 continues to arrest and detain in the very manner the courts have said consistently violate the
25 law. And it has returned to court every time with the same legal arguments already refuted and
26 factual assertions already disproven, in countless cases. It has affirmatively ignored the laws

1 that constrain its authority and protect the people of the United States from arbitrary abuses of
 2 power. There can be no greater “affirmative misconduct” or “serious injustice” than the
 3 Government’s own deliberate disobedience to the law and our system of government.

4 Where affirmative misconduct is shown, “the government cannot be estopped unless its
 5 acts also threaten to work a serious injustice and the public’s interest will not be unduly
 6 damaged by the imposition of estoppel.” *Id.* at 708. *See also Johnson v Williford*, 682 F.2d
 7 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (where prisoner was erroneously paroled, government estopped
 8 from redetaining him, where his successful reintegration into the community showed that his
 9 continuation on parole release did not seriously threaten the public interest); *id.* at 873-74
 10 (holding that due process also prohibited his return to prison). Deporting Petitioner Vo after
 11 decades of acquiescence to Petitioner Vo remaining here, allowing him to build a nested,
 12 productive life, to deport him to a country with which he had no remaining connection, would
 13 “work a serious injustice.” No public interest is served by abruptly ripping him from his family
 14 and community. Indeed, “[a]ny disruption of the nation’s immigration policies that might
 15 result” by reopening Petitioner’s removal proceedings to allow him to at least seek relief before
 16 being banished from the country “would, in short, be miniscule in comparison to the hardship
 17 to which he would be subjected by a failure to estop the Service.” *Gustavo v. District Dir. of*
 18 *U.S. INS*, 337 F.Supp. 1093, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Indeed, failure to estop the Government
 19 would only cause ripples of harm.

20 For these reasons, the Court should enjoin the Government from re-detaining him and
 21 seeking to remove him, unless it first moves to reopen Petitioner’s removal proceedings,
 22 allowing Petitioner to file claims for relief from removal.

23 **E. This Court Need Not Reach Petitioner’s Third Country Removal Claims,**
 24 **as the Parties Agreed to Hold them in Abeyance.**

25 The parties agreed to hold Petitioner’s third country removal claims in abeyance unless
 26 or until the Government notifies Petitioner that they intend to seek removal to a third country

1 or until the Court rules on Petitioner's other claims. Dkt. 8 at 3. As a result, the Court need not
2 reach these claims, unless or until the parties notify the Court in a joint status report of the need
3 to address those claims and provide briefing on the matter. *Id.*

4 **III. Conclusion**

5 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Vo respectfully requests that this Court
6 order his immediate release from custody under the conditions explained herein and in his
7 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

8
9 Dated: February 3, 2026.

10
11 Respectfully submitted,

12 /s/ Jennifer Pasquarella

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19 I certify that this memorandum contains 4,032 words, in compliance with the Local Civil
20 Rules.
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