

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

_____)	
MIGUEL HUMBERTO RAMIREZ ESCALANTE,)		
)		
Petitioner,)		
)		
v.)	Civ. No.	
)		
PAMELA JO BONDI,)		
United States Attorney General;)		
)		
TODD LYONS,)		
Acting Director of Immigration and Customs)		
Enforcement)		
)		
KRISTI LYNN NOEM,)		
Secretary of Homeland Security;)		
)		
SYLVESTER M. ORTEGA,)		
San Antonio Acting Field Office Director)		
For Detention and Removal, U.S.)		
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;)		
and,)		
)		
BOBBY THOMSON,)		
Warden South Texas Detention Center;)		
)		
in their official capacities;)		
)		
Respondents.)		
_____)	

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner MIGUEL HUMBERTO RAMIREZ ESCALANTE files this petition for a writ of habeas requesting the Court’s intervention because Respondents are wrongfully detaining him. Petitioner has been residing in the United States for 12 years. On 12/13/2013, he entered without

being inspected or admitted. He was detained by border patrol and subsequently and released. That case was dismissed by the immigration judge on or about 8/3/2022. He was arrested in January 9, 2026 on a routine traffic stop. Shortly after his detention, agents of the Department of Homeland Security placed him in the South Texas Detention Center.

Under Matter of Jonathan Javier YAJURE HURTADO, Petitioner cannot ask to be released on bond as he entered without inspection 12 years ago. The detention is premised on a misreading of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Respondents maintain that Mr. RAMIREZ ESCALANTE is arriving in the United States and applying for admission. This is so even though he entered 12 years ago and released.

Respondent's interpretation and application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is wrong and violates Mr. RAMIREZ ESCALANTE'S rights under the Due Process Clause, the INA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Petitioner seeks a writ from this Court ordering his release.

CUSTODY

1. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondent MIGUEL VERGARA, Field Office Director for Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), DHS, and Respondent BOBBY THOMSON, Warden of the South Texas Detention Center in Pearsall City, Texas. At the time of the filing of this petition, Petitioner is detained at the South Texas Detention. GEO Group which owns and operates this facility, contracts with the DHS to detain noncitizens, such as Petitioner, pending their removal proceedings. Petitioner is under the direct control of Respondents and their agents.


JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The Court also has jurisdiction over this petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1) and (c)(3), Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (“Suspension Clause”).

3. Venue properly lies within the Western District of Texas because all of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B).

4. No petition for habeas corpus has previously been filed in any court to review Petitioner’s case.

PARTIES

5. MIGUEL HUMBERTO RAMIREZ ESCALANTE  is a national and citizen of Honduras. He is currently detained at the South Texas Detention Center located at 566 Veteran’s Drive, Pearsall, TX 78061.

6. Respondent PAMELA JO BONDI is the Attorney General of the United States and the most senior official in the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). She has the authority to interpret the immigration laws and adjudicate removal cases. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). The Attorney General delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which administrates the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”). Respondent is named in her official capacity. Respondent’s address is 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

7. Respondent TODD LYONS is Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent’s address is 500 12th St SW Washington, DC 20536

8. Respondent KRISTI LYNN NOEM is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), an agency of the United States. Respondent is responsible for the administration of immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). The Secretary is a legal

custodian of the Plaintiff-Petitioner. Respondent is named in her official capacity. Her address is Department of Homeland Security, 207 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave., SE, Washington, D.C. 20528.

9. Respondent SYLVESTER ORTEGA is the Field Office Director for Detention and Removal (ERO), ICE, DHS, for the San Antonio ERO Office. He is a custodial official acting within the boundaries of the judicial district of the United States Court for the Western District of Texas. Pursuant to Respondent's orders, Petitioner remains detained. Respondent is sued in his official capacity. Respondent can be served with process at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of the Principal Legal Advisory, 500 12th St., SW, Mail Stop 5900, Washington, DC 20536-5900.

10. Respondent BOBBY THOMSON is the Warden of the SOUTH TEXAS DETENTION CENTER. He is Petitioner's immediate custodian and resides in the judicial district of the United States Court for the Western District of Texas. Respondent is named in his official capacity. Respondent Collins can be served with process at ZENBUSINESS INC., 5511 PARKCREST DR. SUITE 103, AUSTIN, TX 78731.

FACTS

11. On or about December 13, 2021 Mr. Ramirez-Escalante arrived in the United States without being admitted or paroled through Laredo, TX.

12. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante was released by ICE around the early part of 2014. He was issued Notice to Appear dated February 6, 2014. See Exhibit 1. This case was terminated on August 3, 2022.

13. He resides and works in Texas. He is married and has 2 children.

14. On or about January 9, 2026, ICE took custody of Mr. Ramirez-Escalante at a routine traffic stop and transferred him to the South Texas Detention Center.

15. While in immigration detention, Mr. MENDEZ alerted his attorney Juan Angel Gomez assist him with his removal proceedings as he had been detained.

16. Under the current regulations requesting a bond hearing before an immigration judge would be futile. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante was detained although he committed no crime.

17. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante's removal case was terminated and he has been detained for no reason.

18. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) has made it impossible for anyone who entered without inspection to be granted a bond. Mr. MENDEZ entered without inspection about 12 years ago.

19. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante remains detained. There continues to be no evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Ramirez-Escalante is a flight risk, or that allowing him to be released would present a danger to public safety.

20. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante maintains that the BIA erred in concluding that *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li* bar the immigration court from hearing and granting his request for bond pending his removal proceedings.

21. Mr. Ramirez-Escalante has no other remedy at law but to seek relief from this Court.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

DHS'S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURAL ELECTIONS

22. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) broadly empowers the DHS to detain and initiate removal proceedings against noncitizens. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

23. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in regular removal proceedings before an immigration judge. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Persons detained under § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention until their removal proceedings are concluded, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

24. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals “seeking admission” referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

25. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have a final order of removal, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

26. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

27. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

28. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, the Department of Justice drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination”).

29. In the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were thereafter arrested and placed in standard removal proceedings were considered for release on bond or their own recognizance. They also received bond hearings before an IJ, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who had entered the United States, even if without inspection, were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. In contrast, those who were stopped at the border were only entitled to release on parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

30. When a noncitizen is detained upon arrival in the United States, DHS elects whether to exercise its arrest authority under § 1226(a) or § 1225(b). This procedural election constrains the noncitizen’s subsequent relief options and creates binding legal consequences. When DHS chooses to detain and release someone under § 1226(a), the agency must follow that statute’s detention and release procedures.

31. The procedural safeguards for persons detained under § 1225(b)(2) are much more limited. The person is subject to mandatory detention and can only be released under the DHS's parole authority in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The limited procedural safeguards for persons detained under § 1225(b)(2) are found in 8 C.F.R. § 235.3.

32. In recent months, Respondents have adopted an entirely new interpretation of the statute. On May 22, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a published decision holding that noncitizens detained upon arrival in the United States are applicants for admission and subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). The DHS does not have authority to exercise its detention and release power under § 1226(a). Release is only available through the grant of parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A).

33. *Matter of Q. Li* requires mandatory detention only if the DHS elects to detain under § 1225(b) persons arriving in the U.S. for expedited removal proceedings or regular removal proceedings. The decision, however, creates no authority for applying mandatory detention where: (a) DHS elected alternative processing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or (b) DHS failed to complete formal requirements necessary to invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

34. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ)," announced a corresponding policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory and regulatory framework and reversed decades of practice. *See Ex. 2*. The new policy claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be deemed subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Id.*

35. The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades. Further, the policy

applies even to those noncitizens to whom DHS elected to arrest under § 1226(a) and released them pursuant to that provision.

36. Subsequently the BIA decided *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). There, the BIA formally adopted the ICE and DOJ’s unreasonable interpretation of § 1225(b). The noncitizen in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* entered in November 2022 without being inspected or paroled. He obtained Temporary Protected Status (TPS) but that status terminated. In April 2025, the DHS arrested him in the interior of the United States and initiated removal proceedings. He requested a bond hearing from an immigration judge but the judge concluded that they lacked jurisdiction because the noncitizen was an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). This was so even though the noncitizen was not arriving in the country, had made no application to be admitted, and had resided in the United States for more than two years.

37. The BIA held that all persons who are not inspected or admitted, whether arriving in the United States or not and regardless of the length of residence in this country, remained “applicants for admission” and subject to § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention provision if placed in removal proceedings. As a result, immigration judges all over the country are now denying bond to all noncitizens who entered without inspection and admission.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION – DENIAL OF A BOND HEARING

38. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

39. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. That

provision applies to noncitizens who “arrive” in the United States. Application of the new interpretation of § 1225(a)(1) and (b)(2) to persons who are not “arriving” contradicts the plain language of the statute.

40. By denying him a bond hearing as required by § 1226(a), Respondents denied him procedural rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

COUNT II
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS – IMPERMISSIBLE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF *MATTER OF YAJURE HURTADO* AND *MATTER OF Q. LI*

41. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

42. The Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government and its agents from depriving persons of life, liberty and property without observing certain procedures. The right to fair notice is essential to procedural due process. Retroactive application of administrative decisions implicates “due process interests in fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” *Monteon-Camargo v. Barr*, 918 F.3d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting *De Niz Robles v. Lynch*, 803 F.3d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 2015)).

43. Respondents adopted a new interpretation of the INA and its regulations in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li, supra*. Prior to these, Respondents interpreted and applied the INA detention and release scheme to empower Respondents to detain and release or afford a bond hearing before an immigration judge to most people who entered without inspection, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. This was accomplished under § 1226(a).

44. As recently as 2023, the BIA interpreted the INA to empower the DHS to choose whether to detain and release persons who entered without inspection either under § 1226(a) or

§ 1225(b). *Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I&N Dec. 747, 748 (BIA 2023). There, the noncitizens entered without inspection or admission and were detained shortly after entering the United States. The DHS detained and released them under § 1226(a). The noncitizens argued that their release constituted a parole because their detention (and release) could only have been accomplished through § 1225(b). The BIA firmly rejected that reading of the statute.

45. “For applicants for admission charged as inadmissible, DHS has authority to determine whether to initiate expedited removal proceedings under...8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), or removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.”). The BIA explained:

This authority is illustrated in the Attorney General’s decision in *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 572–76 (A.G. 2003), which involved a similar fact pattern. In that case, DHS apprehended a respondent shortly after he entered the United States without admission or parole and charged him with the same ground of inadmissibility at issue here [having entered without inspection or admission]. The Attorney General reviewed his eligibility for release from custody under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Cf. Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 510–13 (A.G. 2019) (addressing the detention and release of respondents whom DHS initially elects to place in expedited removal proceedings, but who are later transferred to section 240 removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear of persecution or torture).

Id. at 748-49.

46. And the BIA reiterated this reading of the INA’s detention and release statutory scheme again in *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025). There, the noncitizen entered without inspection or admission in January 2022 and was subsequently detained in the interior of the United States in January 2025. The immigration judge granted the noncitizen’s request for bond. In reviewing the DHS’s appeal of the bond decision, the BIA made the uncontroversial observation that the noncitizen’s bond request was “governed by the provision of section [§ 1226(a)] of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. at 166.

47. About 12 years ago, Mr. Ramirez-Escalante entered the United States without being inspected and admitted or paroled. Respondents took custody of Respondent and detained him. This was on January 9 of 2026. Respondents now claim that Mr. Ramirez-Escalante is “arriving” in the United States and is “making an application.”

48. Respondents seek to turn back the clock and impose a different legal regime, one where Mr. Ramirez-Escalante is subject to mandatory detention and has no right to be released.

49. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado and Matter of Q.Li*, as interpreted by the immigration judge and Respondents, is a sea change in immigration law. Retroactive application of this new interpretation of the law to Petitioner’s case however is unfair and unlawful.

50. Retroactivity is greatly disfavored in the law. *Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.*, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). The Supreme Court has been emphatic that this aversion to retroactive rulemaking

is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

51. The Fifth Circuit too has instructed the BIA and immigration courts that it is patently unfair to subject noncitizens to new interpretations of immigration laws. This is a matter of due process and fair notice. The Court explained:

“The leading case on administrative retroactivity’ instructs that any disadvantages from the ‘retroactive effects’ of deciding a ‘case of first impression . . . must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles.’ To apply that instruction, this court ‘balances the ills of retroactivity against the disadvantages of prospectivity.’ If that mischief of prospectivity is

greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law.’

Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

52. Thus, if application of the new rule is significant and changes the legal landscape by updating an agency’s earlier position, then retroactive application of the new rule alters basic presumptions of this administrative system. *Id.* at 431. “A ‘presumption of prospectivity attaches to Congress’s own work,’ and it should generally attach when an agency ‘exercises delegated legislative....authority.’” *Id.* (internal citation omitted).

53. The change here is significant. Mr. Esparza’s right to be free from detention is eliminated and he is now subject to mandatory detention.

54. The retroactive application of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li* is unfair and unreasonable and violates his due process rights.

COUNT III
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT – DENIAL OF BOND HEARING

55. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

56. The DHS detained Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under that statute, Petitioner has the right to request to be released on bond by an immigration judge.

57. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) *will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.*” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis

added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

58. Nonetheless, Respondents have adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to noncitizens like Petitioner who are not “arriving” in the United States. Such noncitizens have been living in the United States for many years, decades for some.

59. To date, numerous courts have ruled in favor of noncitizens challenging the denial of a bond hearing based on *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b). *Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-07492-RFL, 2025 WL 2741654 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); *Roa et al. v. Albarran et al.*, No. 25-CV-07802-RS, 2025 WL 2732923 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025); *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Singh v. Lewis*, No. 4:25-CV-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); *Barrera v. Tindall et. Al.*, No. 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565, (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); *Chafla et al., v. Scott et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025); *Carlton v. Kramer*, No. 4:25CV3178, 2025 WL 2624386 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2025); *Vazquez v. Feeley et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); *Guzman v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01015-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025). In the present case, Petitioner has been in the United States over 20 years, since 2005.

60. The unlawful application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner mandates his continued detention and violates the INA and its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1232.1 and 1003.19.

61. Respondents’ disregard of Petitioner’s right to a bond hearing violates the INA.

COUNT IV
Violation of the APA
Contrary to Law and Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Policy

62. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

63. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

64. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those noncitizens who are not arriving in the United States, who are not making an application for admission, and are detained far from the international border. Noncitizens are detained (and released) under § 1226(a) and are eligible for release on bond, unless they were initially detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) or (b), or were detained under § 1226(c) or § 1231.

65. Nonetheless, Respondents have adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to noncitizens like Petitioner who is not arriving in the United States, was not arrested near the international border, and has made no application for admission.

66. Respondents have failed to articulate reasoned explanations for their decisions, which represent changes in the agencies’ policies and positions; have considered factors that Congress did not intend to be considered; have entirely failed to consider important aspects of the problem; and have offered explanations for their decisions that run counter to the evidence before the agencies.

67. The application of § 1225(b)(2) and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* to Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Further, their refusal to provide him with a bond hearing violates § 706(1) of the APA.

COUNT V
Violation of the APA --
Impermissible Retroactive Application of New Legal Interpretation

68. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

69. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

70. Respondents adopted a new interpretation of the INA and its regulations in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). Prior to these BIA decisions, Respondents interpreted and applied the INA detention and release scheme to empower Respondents to detain and release or afford a bond hearing before an immigration judge to most people who entered without inspection, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. This was accomplished under § 1226(a).

71. The retroactive application of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

COUNT VI
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
Contrary to Law and Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Policy
Failure to Adhere to Prior Published Precedent

72. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

73. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

74. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is an adjudicatory body that functions much like the federal court system. The immigration court renders decisions on legal issues concerning a noncitizens removability, eligibility for relief and fitness for bond. The BIA reviews decisions and from time-to-time issues precedential decisions.

75. The parties expect the BIA and the immigration courts to apply faithfully Supreme Court, circuit court, and BIA precedent as well as decision-making principles that ensure consistency and predictability in deciding cases. The rule of orderliness is one such principle that circuit courts and district courts apply. Under the rule of orderliness, “one panel of [the circuit] court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or [the] en banc court.” *Mercado v. Lynch*, 823 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2016). This rule is also applied by the district courts. *See Silo Rest. Inc. v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 420 F. Supp. 3d 562, 575-76 (W.D. Tex. 2019).

76. The EOIR has acknowledged that it does not abide by the rule of orderliness. The EOIR calls it the “prior-panel-precedent” rule. *See* EOIR Policy Memoranda (PM) 25-34 (July 3, 2025) found at <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1406956/dl?inline>. The EOIR acknowledges that the functional equivalent of the rule of orderliness exists in its regulations and in narrow circumstances, one panel can overrule an earlier panel if a majority of the permanent Board members vote to reject the earlier decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3). Nevertheless, there is no rule or guidance for immigration courts for resolving conflicts between prior BIA precedents or which BIA precedent to follow. EOIR PM 25-34 at 2.

77. Instead, EOIR instructs immigration judges to essentially “try their best.” *Id.* at 4. “Until the Board or the Attorney General resolves any conflicts in Board precedent... or adopts a clear rule regarding which precedent should control when there is a conflict, Immigration Judges will have to apply their best judgment and traditional legal tools or methods of analysis in order to adjudicate cases before them where Board precedent is in conflict.” *Id.* The rule of orderliness thus does not control.

78. Prior BIA precedent requires application of *Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 2023) and *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025).

79. The disregard of the rule of orderliness and application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner are agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, they violate the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) and (2).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

1. Issue an Order declaring that Mr. Ramirez-Escalante is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
2. Issue an Order declaring that application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) Mr. Ramirez-Escalante is unlawful, arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law;
3. Issue an Order declaring that application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Ramirez-Escalante violates the INA;
4. Issue an Order declaring that application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Ramirez-Escalante violates his due process rights;
5. Issue an order instructing Respondents to release Petitioner.

6. Award Petitioner reasonable costs and attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412.; and,
7. Grant any other relief which this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 14, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Juan Angel Gomez
Juan Angel Gomez
Texas Bar No. 24056753
Law Office of Juan Angel Gomez
118 Broadway Suite 521
San Antonio, TX 78205
(210) 251-4526 (phone)
juanangel@jagfirm.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER

VERIFICATION OF COUNSEL

I, Juan Angel Gomez, hereby certify that I am familiar with the case of the named Petitioner and that the facts as stated above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Juan Angel Gomez
Juan Angel Gomez