

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

MISAEL TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA,

Petitioner,

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department  
of Homeland Security,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St.  
Paul Field Office Immigration and  
Customs Enforcement, and

Respondents.

Case No. 26-cv-263

**VERIFIED PETITION  
FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS**

Expedited Handling Requested

**INTRODUCTION**

1. Petitioner, Mr. MISAEL TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA, by and through the undersigned attorney hereby files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to release Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA from ICE detention, or in the alternative to enjoin his transfer to a facility outside of Minnesota

and to provide him with a bond hearing pending the completion of his immigration proceedings.

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, c. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver of sovereign immunity); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).

3. Federal question jurisdiction exists because Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA seeks to challenge his custody as a violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

4. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 516-17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018); and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-63 (2019).

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA is detained within the District of Minnesota.

6. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), because Respondents are operating in this district.

**PARTIES**

7. Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador and a resident of Brooklyn Center, Hennepin County, Minnesota, who is currently being held at the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building (“Whipple”), 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111. Petitioner is under the direct control of the respondents and has no scheduled release date.

8. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA.

9. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA’s detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA.

10. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner’s detention.

11. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA. The address for the Fort Snelling Field Office is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

**FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

12. Petitioner is a resident of Brooklyn Center, Minnesota, and a citizen of Ecuador. He has lived in the United States continuously since August 22, 2023.

13. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA entered the United States with his wife and two children, and asserted a claim of asylum, which proceedings are currently pending.

14. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA obtained a work permit. He works at a laundromat, and pays taxes to the U.S. and Minnesota governments.

15. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA lives in Brooklyn Center, MN, with his wife and two young children. He has close family and friends who live in Hennepin County, and attends a local Catholic Mass. Petitioner is very much a part of his community.

16. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA has no criminal history.

17. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA has been diligent about staying on top of his paperwork and court appearances for his pending asylum claim.

18. On January 13, 2026, at 10:30am, Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA was detained. As he was driving with his wife, Ms. Fanny Narciza Urtado Maiza, Mr.

TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA was surrounded by masked men, who are believed to be ICE agents. Agents used two vehicles to block his vehicle. He made no attempts to flee or evade. An agent told Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA to roll his window down or he would break the window. As Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA was rolling down the window, the agent proceeded to break the window. Agents removed Mr.

TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA and his wife from the vehicle. Mr.

TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA and his wife informed agents that they had two small children who were currently at school. Agents replied that “they would get the kids.” They also informed agents that they were asylum seekers.

19. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA’s children are presently in the care of a teacher. He has had no access to his children since his arrest.

20. This arrest is part of an operation in Hennepin and Ramsey counties called “Operation Metro Surge.” This operation has involved hundreds of masked, unidentified individuals in unmarked vehicles (many with illegally covered or mismatched license plates) holding themselves out as ICE agents but largely refusing to identify themselves by name or to present warrants, physically assaulting pedestrians, pepper spraying and arresting citizen observers, hitting passersby with vehicles, and generally attempting to take as many immigrants as possible into custody regardless of the constitutionality of their actions. *See, e.g., Compl., Tincher et. al. v. Noem*, No. 0:25-cv-04669. (D. Minn. 12/17/2025).

21. Since the operation began on December 1, 2025, the number of immigration officials in the twin city metro area has increased fourfold, and with them

these new agents have brought a similarly massive increase in unconstitutional, unlawful, and downright violent behavior towards citizens and non-citizens alike. Breaking Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA's window and leaving his children without both parents is exemplary of the casual cruelty that Minnesotans are experiencing in this moment. The people of Minnesota—of all races, nationalities, and citizenship status—are united in their shock and fear at the events of the past six weeks, and are begging for the attacks on their community to stop.

22. Given the massive volume of perceived non-citizens being taken off the streets, Respondents are running out of physical space to continue detaining people. Detainees are being held in cramped quarters at the federal building, before being quickly sent to remote locations across Minnesota or to facilities as far away as El Paso, Texas.

23. In Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA's case, he was detained and brought to the Whipple in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. **As of the time of this filing, he remains at this location.**

24. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA poses no risk to society and has strong connections to his community in Hennepin County, including children, a husband, extended family and friends.

25. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA has complied with all court dates in his asylum case, and has done everything asked of him by the Court.

26. Detaining Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA is an expensive and pointless endeavor. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA respectfully seeks the opportunity to return

to his home and children in Brooklyn Center and to continue following the legal processes set up by Congress and DHS for immigrants to seek status in this country.

27. Pending the adjudication of his Petition, Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA further seeks an order restraining the Respondents from transferring him to a location outside of the State of Minnesota, so that he may remain within the jurisdiction of this Court and accessible to family support networks.

### STANDARD OF LAW

28. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The “Great Writ” has been referred to by US Courts as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). A petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus when their custody violates the US Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 22441(c)(3), which should be granted if the petitioner meets their burden of proof—a preponderance of evidence. *Aditya W. H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).

29. The Court must grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause to the respondents “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

30. Detained immigrants petitioning under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 face no statutory exhaustion requirements. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Nor is a judicially imposed prudential exhaustion requirement appropriate where, as here: time is of the essence, facts are largely undisputed, and the parties' disagreement is based on a legal conclusion. *Id.* at 967-68.

31. Other courts in the Eighth Circuit have similarly declined to require prudential exhaustion when evaluating a detained immigrant's habeas corpus petition under similar circumstances—to address a question of statutory interpretation that does not require developing a factual record, and where the agency is demonstrably unlikely to reverse its course. *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, 2025 WL 2712427 at \*3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025).

32. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [immigrants], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

33. In July of 2025, Respondent DHS began ignoring the decades-long consensus of how 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) should be interpreted, which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) articulated in a subsequent ruling. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025). Respondents suddenly claim that individuals who have been residing within the United States for more than two years are somehow “seeking admission,” simply because they may have pending claims for asylum or other forms of status.

34. However, this Court and the majority around the country have made clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) only authorizes detention for noncitizens who are at the border seeking physical entry at the time of detention, not those who have lived within the United States for more than two years, and whose detention is discretionary and governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

35. Only under certain circumstances are immigrants subject to ongoing detention without a bond hearing. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (individuals with certain criminal convictions may be detained without a bond hearing for the pendency of removal proceedings<sup>1</sup>) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (authorizing mandatory detention of immigrants in expedited removal proceedings).

36. Otherwise, the “default rule” is that detention of immigrants already present in the United States and subject to pending removal proceedings is governed by 8

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<sup>1</sup> Even when detained under 1226(c), immigrants retain due process rights and are entitled to a hearing if the period of detention becomes unreasonable. *See, e.g., Pedro O v. Garland*, 543 F.Supp.3d 733 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding a year-long mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized hearing to violate an immigrant’s due process rights).

U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018).

37. Under this default rule, detained immigrants are constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. *R.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025). *See also Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260661 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (holding that an immigrant detained after entry while in asylum proceedings should be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that the recent DHS policy attempting to reclassify interior arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) so as to hold asylum seekers without a bond hearing is unlawful and unconstitutional).

38. Here, Respondents lack the authority to detain Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), since Petitioner has resided within the United States for more than two years and is thus not “seeking admission” into the United States.

## **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

### **COUNT ONE**

#### **Fifth Amendment Due Process**

*Petitioner is being deprived of an adequate and meaningful process to challenge his ongoing confinement.*

39. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained above.

40. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA has due process rights as a resident of the United States. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

41. Federal courts use the three-part test in *Matthews v. Eldridge* to determine whether civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The elements of this test are: (1) the private interest that the official action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest in following the existing procedures, both in achieving their objectives and in the potential burdens of an alternate procedure. *Id.* at 335.

42. Here, all three factors favor the petitioner.

43. First, Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA has a significant private interest at stake. A person's interest in freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA currently experiences the gambit of deprivations that come with physical detention, including separation from his two small children; and inhibitions to participate fully in his pending immigration proceedings.

44. Second, Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA will continue to be deprived of this interest if the current procedure (detaining Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA without a legal basis) is followed. With his lack of criminal record and demonstrated pattern of following instructions and appearing for court proceedings, there is no rational

explanation for detaining Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA. Even if he were detained properly under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), he has a strong likelihood of meeting the criteria for being released on bond. 8 CFR §§236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8) (2020); *In re Adeniji*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (BIA 1999).

45. Lastly, the Government has no legitimate interest in refusing to follow its own rules. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA poses no safety threats to the community. Releasing him, or holding a hearing to release him on bond, would in fact *save* the government the resources and expense of continuing to imprison her.

46. The placement of Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA in detention pending the resolution of his immigration proceedings violates his constitutional rights to due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.

## **COUNT TWO**

### **Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226**

*Petitioner's Ongoing Detention, without the Opportunity for a Bond Hearing, Violates his Statutory Right to a Hearing as Guaranteed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226*

47. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

48. Respondents violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by attempting to apply mandatory detention through 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), to Petitioner.

49. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA is detained, notwithstanding his pending asylum application, without being afforded an opportunity to advocate for release back into his community as the law requires.

**COUNT THREE**

**Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706**

*Detaining Petitioner Pursuant to an Unlawful Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) violates the Administrative Procedure Act*

50. Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

51. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

52. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

53. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens could properly be detained under § 1226(a), but would then be eligible for release on bond unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

54. Nonetheless, the Board has adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner and others in the same position.

55. Respondents through its recent administrative decision failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for new interpretation of the Act. The Board's decision represents a change in the agencies' policies and positions that negates the plain language of the Act, the will of Congress, and decades of administrative precedent.

56. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

### **REMEDY**

57. An available remedy for Respondents' unlawful conduct as outlined in this complaint is for Petitioner to be released.

58. Immigration detention is civil in nature, and as a result Congress must have expressly authorized it by statute, and the detention must be reasonably related to its statutory purpose. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).

59. A noncitizen seeking only to challenge the legality of their detention, not the substance of their removal proceedings in immigration court, may properly ask a federal court to find jurisdiction over such a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., *Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn. 2025).

60. Since Section 1225 does not apply to noncitizens who are in Petitioner's situation—who have been detained while residing within the United States for more than two years, as opposed to those who are detained while in the process of

physically entering the United States, the law that Respondents are using to detain Petitioner simply does not apply so as to authorize Petitioner's detention. *See Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

61. When a habeas petitioner's detention is without legal basis, the typical remedy is release. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the "typical remedy" for "unlawful executive detention").

62. Respondents will no doubt argue, as they have in similar cases before this Court, that if the Court rules that Petitioner should have been detained pursuant to § 1226, instead of § 1225, then the remedy is a bond hearing as opposed to outright release. *See, e.g., Ahmed A.* Civ. No. 25-4776, Doc. No. 9. at 9-10. However, this Court rejected this argument, saying that:

[A] bond hearing presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory authority as a mere procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect ... Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.

*Id.* at Doc. No. 10 at 6.

63. Here, where detention is unlawfully based on 8 U.S.C. 1225, which does not apply to Petitioner, release is an appropriate remedy.

**REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE**

64. Within three days, unless good cause for a delay is shown, “[a] court, justice or judge entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Mr. TOAPANTA-TOAPANTA prays that this Court grant the following relief;

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the District of Minnesota pending the duration of these proceedings;
- (3) Issue an Order requiring Respondents to show cause as to why Petitioner should not be released immediately, or in the alternative afforded a bond hearing;
- (4) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days; and
- (5) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.

Date: Jan. 14, 2026

/s/ Kira A. Kelley

Kira A. Kelley, Esq.  
P.O. Box 7040  
Minneapolis, MN 55407  
MN Bar ID: 402932  
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(802) 683-4086

**Verification by Someone Acting on  
Petitioner's Behalf Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of Petitioner because I am Petitioner's attorney. My assistants and I have discussed the factual assertions in this petition with Petitioner's family and friends, who are also acting on Petitioner's behalf and who I understand to have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein. I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, including the statements regarding Petitioner's detention status, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: January 14, 2026

/s/ Kira A. Kelley  
Kira Aakre Kelley, Esq.

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

Misael Toapanta-Toapanta

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Hennepin (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Kira Kelley; PO Box 7040; Minneapolis MN 55407; 802 683 4086

DEFENDANTS

Bondi et al

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant government (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

US Attorneys Office; 300 S 4th St Minneapolis MN 55415

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff, 2 U.S. Government Defendant, 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party), 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- Citizen of This State, Citizen of Another State, Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country, PTF DEF, 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 5, 6 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

Table with columns: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes various legal categories like Personal Injury, Contract, Labor, etc.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding, 2 Removed from State Court, 3 Remanded from Appellate Court, 4 Reinstated or Reopened, 5 Transferred from Another District, 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer, 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 8 USC 2241. Brief description of cause: habeas petition to address unlawful and unconstitutional confinement

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$ injunctive relief CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE Jan. 14 2026

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD /s/Kira Kelley

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE