

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION**

GALINDO MARTINEZ-ORDONEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 3:26-cv-00069

Garrett RIPA, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Miami, Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; Ronnie WOODALL, Warden of Florida Baker Correctional Institution,

Respondents.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner GALINDO MARTINEZ-ORDONEZ is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Florida Baker Correctional Institution. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of

Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner's removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such

individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

7. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION

8. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Florida Baker Correctional Institution, in Sanderson, Florida.

9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

10. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

11. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Florida.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the

petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

15. Petitioner GALINDO MARTINEZ-ORDONEZ is a citizen of Honduras who has been in immigration detention since November 19, 2025. After arresting Petitioner in Jacksonville, Florida, ICE did not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

16. Respondent Garrett Ripa is the Director of the Miami Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Mr. Ripa is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

17. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

18. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

19. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

21. Respondent Ronnie Woodall is the Warden of Florida Baker Correctional Institution and is the Chief Correctional Officer of the Florida Baker Correctional Institution, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

22. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

23. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

24. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

25. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)-(b).

26. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

27. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104--208, Div. C, §§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

28. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal*

of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

29. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

30. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

31. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and

affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

32. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

33. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

34. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

35. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g.,* *Gil-Paulino v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 25-cv-24292 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2025), ECF 41 at 10; *see also* *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) ("Finally, the BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes' detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory interpretation."); *see also* *Puga v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., Krome North Serv. Processing Ctr.*, 25-cv-24535, 2025 WL 2938369, at *3-6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); *Merino v. Ripa*, No. 25-cv-23845, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); *Lopez v. Hardin*, No. 25-cv-830, 2025 WL 2732717, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2025); *Harsh Patel v. Crowley*, No. 25-11180, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209958, at *9-12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025); *Esquivel-Ipina v. Larose*, No. 25-cv-2672, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210275, at *9-12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); *Carmona v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1131, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209629, at *14-17 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); *Lopez v. Hyde*, 25-12680, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 209916, at *4–5 (D. Mass. Oct. 24, 2025); *Guerra v. Joyce*, No. 25-cv-00534, 2025 WL 2986316, at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 23, 2025); *Lomeu v. Soto*, 25-cv-16589, 2025 WL 2981296, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025); *Maldonado v. Cabezas*, No. 25-13004, 2025 WL 2985256, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025); *Aparicio v. Noem*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208898, at *12–13 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2025); *Loa Caballero v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03120, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5–6 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025); *Soto v. Soto*, No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207818, at *16–19 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025); *Garcia v. Noem*, 25-cv-02771, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209286, at *10–15 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025); *Aguiar v. Moniz*, No. 25-cv-12706, 2025 WL 2987656, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025); *Rivera v. Moniz*, 25-cv-12833, 2025 WL 2977900, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025); *Avila v. Bondi*, No. 25-3741, 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025); *Contreras-Lomeli v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12826, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207162, at *22 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025); *Maldonado de Leon v. Baker*, No. 25-3084, 2025 WL 2968042, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025); *Casio-Mejia v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13032, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207165, at *12, 16–17 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025); *Miguel v. Noem*, 25-11137, 2025 WL 2976480, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025); *Pineda v. Simon*, No. 25-cv-01616, 2025

WL 2980729, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2025); *Matheus Araujo DA Silva v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-12672, 2025 WL 2969163, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025); *Barahona v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-12551, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205964, at *4–5 (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2025); *H.G.V.U. v. Smith*, No. 25-cv-10931, 2025 WL 2962610, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2025); *Gonzalez v. Hyde*, No. 25-8250, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208578, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025); *Polo v. Chestnut*, No. 25-cv-01342, 2025 WL 2959346, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); *Sanchez v. Minga Wofford, Warden, Mesa Verde Immigr. Processing Ctr.*, No. 25-cv-01187, 2025 WL 2959274, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); *Gutierrez v. Juan Baltasar, Warden, Denver Cont. Det. Facility*, No. 25-cv-2720, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208448, at *12–27 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025); *Alvarez v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Zamora v. Noem*, No. 25-12750, 2025 WL 2958879, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2025); *Pacheco Mayen v. Raycraft*, 25-cv-13056, 2025 WL 2978529, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Diaz Sandoval v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12987, 2025 WL 2977517, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13073, 2025 WL 2952796, at *6–8 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Ochoa v. Noem*, No. 25-10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill.

Oct. 16, 2025); *Castillo v. Crawford*, No. 25-cv-01565, 2025 WL 2940702, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2025); *Piña v. Stamper*, No. 25-cv-00509, 2025 WL 2939298, at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 16, 2025); *Tut v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02701, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204616, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); *Sequen v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-06487, 2025 WL 2935630, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025); *Teyim v. Perry*, No. 25-cv-01615, 2025 WL 2950184, at *2–3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2025); *Singh v. Lyons*, 25-cv-01606, 2025 WL 2932635, at *2–3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2025); *Alejandro v. Olson*, 25-cv-02027, 2025 WL 2896348, at *7–9 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); *Rico-Tapia v. Smith*, No. 25-00379, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206547, at *21 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025); *Chavez v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06984, 2025 WL 2909526, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); *Donis v. Chestnut*, No. 25-01228, 2025 WL 287514, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, No. 25-3381, 2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Covarrubias v. Vergara*, No. 25-cv-112, 2025 WL 2950097, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *S.D.B.B. v. Johnson*, No. 25-cv-882, 2025 WL 2845170, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); *Gonzalez v. Bostock*, 25-cv-01404, 2025 WL 2841574, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Hyppolite v. Noem*, No.

25-4304, 2025 WL 2829511, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); *Artiga v. Genalo*, No. 25-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); *Cordero Pelico v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-07826, 2025 WL 2822876, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); *Orellana v. Moniz*, 25-cv-12664, 2025 WL 2809996, at *5 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Elias Escobar v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-12620, 2025 WL 2823324, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); *Silva v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enft*, No. 25-cv-284, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191101, at *6–7 (D.N.H. Sep. 29, 2025); *Barrios v. Shepley*, No. 25-cv-00406, 2025 WL 2772579, at *10 (D. Me. Sep. 29, 2025); *Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2025); *Chogllo Chafra v. Scott*, Nos. 25-cv-00437, 25-cv-00438, 25-cv-00439, 2025 WL 2688541, at *6–9 (D. Me. Sep. 22, 2025); *Barrera v Tindall*, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 19, 2025); *Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06487, 2025 WL 2650637, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2025); *Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-06924, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8–12 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025); *Lopez Santos v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-01193, 2025 WL 2642278, at *3–5 (W.D. La. Sep. 11, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin*, No. 25-cv-326, 2025 WL 2639390,

at *5–10 (D.N.H. Sep. 8, 2025); *Doe v. Moniz*, 25-cv-12094, 2025 WL 2576819, at *5 (D. Mass. Sep. 5, 2025); *Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-01180, 2025 WL 2549431, at *5–7 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2025); *Francisco v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-03219, 2025 WL 2629839, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5–8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Diaz v. Mattivelo*, No. 25-cv-12226, 2025 WL 2457610, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 25-1093, 2025 WL 2472136, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Benitez v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02190, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171945, at *8–12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631, 2025 WL 2403827, at *11–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *11–12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *dos Santos v. Noem*, 25-cv-12052, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–8 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *4–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. 25-12157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) report and recommendation adopted by, 2025 WL 2349133 (Aug. 13, 2025); *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 25-cv-01873, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171364, at *13–16 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. 25-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *5–

9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256–61 (W.D. Wash. 2025)¹.

36. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

37. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

38. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded

¹ Undersigned counsel is unable to remain current on all new case authority supporting the conclusion by these courts, given the continued onslaught of litigation being generated by Respondents’ widespread illegal detention practices. Consequently, this string citation is not exhaustive.

a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

39. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

40. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

41. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have

already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

FACTS

42. Petitioner has resided in the United States since on or about December 25, 2015, when he entered the United States as an Unaccompanied Alien Child and lives in Jacksonville, Florida. (Attached hereto and incorporated herein is Petitioner's Verification of Release form as Exhibit "A").

43. On November 19, 2025, Petitioner was arrested while traveling to work in Duval County, Florida. Petitioner was not alleged to have committed a traffic infraction, or to have committed any other act that could have provided law enforcement reasonable articulable suspicion that Petitioner was committing a crime, attempting to commit a crime, or had just committed a crime. Petitioner has valid authorization for employment, and is licensed to drive in Florida. Petitioner is now detained at the Florida Baker Correctional Institution.

44. DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Miami Krome Immigration Court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Petitioner with, inter alia, being inadmissible under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without admission or inspection.

45. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez has every reason to return to the Immigration Court, as he is pursuing fear-based claims related to Withholding of Removal and/or CAT protection. (Attached hereto and incorporated herein is Petitioner's I-589 Documentation as Exhibit "B"). More importantly, Mr. Martinez-Ordonez is a class member of J.O.P., *et al*, for which an Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement was entered on November 25, 2024 by the District of Maryland, Southern Division. *see* 8:19-CV-01944-SAG, District of Maryland, Southern Division. Petitioner's removal proceedings should be terminated in accordance with this settlement agreement, and pursuant the "Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings," 89 Fed. Reg. 46742, and 8 CFR § 212.7(e)(4)(iii), previously relying on *Matter of Coronado Acevedo* 28 I&N 648 (A.G. 2022). Mr. Martinez-Ordonez has secured custodial sponsors, who have pledged to provide support and assistance as needed throughout the immigration proceedings. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez has a fixed address to stay, should he be released on a monetary bond. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez intends to comply with

any terms of release on monetary bond. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez will be represented by the undersigned during these proceedings. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez has friends and family that have pledged to provide transportation for him. Mr. Martinez-Ordonez has no criminal history.

46. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to Florida Baker Correctional Institution, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

47. Petitioner subsequently requested a bond redetermination hearing before an IJ.

48. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the immigration judge denied Petitioner bond on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's bond request. (Attached hereto and incorporated herein is the December 30, 2025, "Order of the Immigration Judge" as Petitioner's Exhibit "C").

49. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and the community.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of the INA

50. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

51. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

52. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II

Violation of the Bond Regulations

53. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

54. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

55. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner.

56. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III

Violation of Due Process

57. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

58. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

59. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

60. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle District of Florida while this habeas petition is pending;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 13th day of January, 2026.

By: /s/Joel Alexis Caminero
Joel Alexis Caminero, Esq.
Florida Bar # 127294
Caminero Law, PLLC
5728 Major Blvd, STE 750
Orlando, FL 32819
Tel. (407) 409-2529
Email: joel@caminerolawfirm.com
Attorney for Petitioner

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of electronic filing to all counsel in this case on January 13th, 2026.

/s/Joel Alexis Caminero
Joel Alexis Caminero, Esq.
Florida Bar # 127294
Attorney for Petitioner