


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
San Antonio Division

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MELVIN EDUARDO GIRON CHELEY,)
)
<i>Petitioner,</i>)
)
v.)
)
KRISTI NOEM, <i>Secretary, U.S. Department of</i>)
<i>Homeland Security,</i>)
)
TODD LYONS, <i>Acting Director, U.S. Immigration</i>)
<i>and Customs Enforcement,</i>)
)
MIGUEL VERGARA, <i>Director, San Antonio ICE</i>)
<i>Field Office</i>)
)
PAMELA BONDI, <i>Attorney General, U.S.</i>)
<i>Department of Justice</i>)
)
WARDEN, <i>Karnes County Immigration Processing</i>)
<i>Center,</i>)
)
<i>Respondents.</i>)
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Civil Action No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Melvin Eduardo Giron Cheley () is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection between ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border in 2013, and was encountered by immigration officials at that time and later released from custody. Nearly 13 years later, Petitioner has been re-arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) under facts and circumstances that place him squarely within ICE’s general detention authority 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under that statute, Petitioner is eligible to seek discretionary release on bond from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). However, due to a new policy

announced by ICE in July 2025, and now a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that overturns decades of settled law, Respondents contend that Petitioner is actually detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). However, while § 1225 requires mandatory detention and does not allow release on bond, it only applies to noncitizens apprehended at the border “seeking admission.” Petitioner therefore brings this action for a declaratory judgment from this Court that he is properly detained (if at all) only pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and seeking an order that Respondents schedule him for a discretionary bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) before an Immigration Judge within 15 days.


JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Federal Question Jurisdiction. In addition, the individual Respondents are United States officials. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).

2. This Court has federal question jurisdiction, through the APA, to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). APA review of a final agency action may proceed, absent a special statutory review proceeding, by “any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. § 703.

3. Venue lies in this District because Petitioner is currently detained within the territorial jurisdiction of this division of this District; and each Respondent is an agency or officer of the United States sued in their official capacities. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

THE PARTIES

4. Petitioner Melvin Eduardo Giron Cheley () is a citizen and native of

Guatemala and is currently detained by Respondents at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

5. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She is the cabinet-level secretary responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States.

6. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He is the head of the federal agency responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States.

7. Respondent Miguel Vergara is the Director of the San Antonio ICE Field Office in San Antonio, Texas. He is the head of the ICE office that is unlawfully detaining Petitioner, and such detention is taking place under his direction and supervision. He is the immediate legal custodian of Petitioner.

8. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States, head of the U.S. Department of Justice. She oversees the Executive Office for Immigration Review, including all Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals who decide removal cases and applications for bond and relief from removal, and do so as her designees.

9. The warden of the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, TX. He is the immediate custodian who is currently holding Petitioner in physical custody. He is sued in his official capacity.

10. All government Respondents are sued in their official capacities.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Immigration Detention Legal Framework

11. When a noncitizen is alleged to have violated immigration laws, they are generally placed into traditional removal proceedings, during which an immigration judge will determine whether they are removable and then whether they have a legal basis to remain in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

12. Detention is authorized for “certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under § 1226(a) and 1126(c).” *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). The statute provides that an individual may be subject to either discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) generally, or mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) if they have been arrested or convicted of certain crimes. Discretionary detention under § 1226(a) has been described as the “default” provision for immigration detention for those subject to traditional removal proceedings. *Id.* at 288. Under § 1226(a), “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) of this section,’ the Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained under § 1226(a) ‘on ...bond’ or ‘conditional parole.’” *Id.*

13. Alternatively, mandatory detention is authorized for “certain aliens *seeking admission* into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1225(b)(2),” [emphasis added]. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. Individuals inspected under § 1225(b) and determined to be “applicants for admission” may be subject to mandatory detention under two separate subsections. Applicants for admission include someone:

“present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for the purposes of this chapter to be an applicant for admission.”

§ 1225(a)(1).

14. The first subset, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), may be subject to expedited removal and mandatory detention if they are determined to be an “arriving alien,” and if they have not been physically present in the United States continuously for a two-year period immediately prior. Regulations define an “arriving alien” as:

“an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport.”

8 C.F.R. § 1.2.

15. Otherwise, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) provides for the detention of “applicant for admission” specifically when “the examining immigration officer determines that an alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title,” i.e. for traditional removal proceedings [emphasis added].

16. An “arriving alien” or an applicant for admission “seeking admission” may only be released from detention on parole (which is a form of release on recognizance), under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288. There is no bond available to an arriving alien or applicant for admission seeking admission. *Id.* There is no such thing as a “parole bond” – a release must be either parole under § 1182(d)(5) or a bond (conditional parole) under § 1226(a). *Id.*

17. For a noncitizen subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), ICE makes an initial custody determination to either set a bond or hold the individual at no bond. The noncitizen may then seek a review of ICE’s initial custody determination before the IJ (a “custody review hearing”), who has the authority to modify ICE’s custody determination and set bond in a

case in which ICE has designated no bond, lower bond when ICE has set a cash bond amount, or deny bond completely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

18. Custody review hearings are separate from hearings in the underlying removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). If a noncitizen is granted bond by the IJ, she must still appear in immigration court for the IJ to determine her removability and hear any claim for relief from removal. At a custody review hearing, once jurisdiction over bond is established, the IJ's inquiry is limited to whether the detainee is a danger to the community or a flight risk, and bond may only be granted when an IJ has determined that the detainee meets his burden of proof that he is neither. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).

19. For decades, it has been Respondents' practice to afford § 1226(a) discretionary bond hearings and custody review hearings to those individuals who have been encountered neither at a point of entry nor seeking admission to the United States. *See Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099, at *10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025) ("Respondents' proposed application of § 1226 is also belied by the Department of Homeland Security's 'longstanding practice' of treating noncitizens taken into custody while living in the United States, including those detained and found inadmissible upon inspection and then released into the United States with the government's acquiescence, who have committed no crime after release, as detained under § 1226(a)." citing *Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)).

B. New ICE memo reinterpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

20. On July 8, 2025, Respondent ICE issued new interim guidance that announced a breathtakingly broad interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *See* ICE memorandum "Interim

Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission.”¹ This memo concerns the detention of “applicants for admission” as defined by § 1225(a)(1). “Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)].” *Id.* DHS is explicit that this new policy is a marked deviation from prior interpretation and treatment of affected noncitizens. *Id.* (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that “arriving aliens” have historically been treated.”)

21. In addition to the announcement re-interpreting § 1225(b)(2), the memo further clarifies that “[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond or other conditions under [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under [8 U.S.C. § 1227], with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].” *Id.*

22. Moreover, ICE maintains that “DHS does not take the position that prior releases of applicants for admission pursuant to INA § 236(a) were releases on parole under INA § 212(d)(5) based on this change in legal position.” *Id.* ICE fails to clarify under what legal authority, then, those prior releases were effectuated. Rather, ICE signals the resulting lack of “correct” paperwork is nonetheless permissible. *Id.* (“Accordingly, ERO and HIS are not required to ‘correct’ the release paperwork by issuing INA § 212(d)(5) parole paperwork.”)

23. Nationwide implementation of the ICE § 1225(b)(2) mass detention policy ensued.

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission> (last visited November 10, 2025).

C. Recent BIA decision *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*

24. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which oversees all appeals of IJ decisions including custody redeterminations, upheld ICE’s re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2). *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

25. The BIA held that the respondent was an “applicant for admission” within the scope of § 1225(b), and therefore subject to mandatory detention.

26. The BIA characterized the issue before it as “one of statutory construction: Does the INA require that *all* applicants for admission, even those like the respondent who have entered without admission or inspection and have been residing in the United States for years without lawful status, be subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration proceedings, and thus the Immigration Judge lacks authority over a bond request filed by an alien in this category?” [emphasis added]. *Id.* at 220.

27. The BIA reasoned that individuals “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer.” *Id.* at 228.

28. The BIA acknowledged the decades of precedent preceding its decision that authorized release of individuals present without having been inspected and admitted or paroled under § 1226(a). *Id.* at 225, FN6 (“We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for aliens who entered the United States without inspection. However, we do not recall either DHS or its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously raising the current issue that is before us. In fact, the supplemental information for the 1997 Interim Rule titled ‘Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures,’ 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar.

6, 1997), reflects that the Immigration and Naturalization Service took the position at that time that ‘[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.’”)

29. Ultimately, the BIA upheld the decision that the IJ lacked jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to consider the respondent for discretionary bond. *Id.* at 229. The BIA decision is binding on all immigration judges nationwide.

30. Respondents’ new policy and interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) stand to sweep millions of noncitizens into mandatory detention, without any consideration for release on bond (regardless of their ties to their community or lack of dangerousness or flight risk). *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *11 (“It has been estimated that this novel interpretation would require the detention of millions of immigrants currently residing in the United States.”)

D. Class Action In *Maldonado Bautista*

31. In the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, a class brought suit against the July 2025 policy to apply § 1225(b)(2) to individuals who previously entered the U.S. without inspection. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20 2025). On November 20, 2025, summary judgment was partially granted in favor of the putative class in *Maldonado Bautista*, holding that ICE’s July 2025 policy was unlawful. *Id.* at *10 (“Thus, Respondents’ expansive interpretation of ‘applicants for admission’ would effectively nullify a portion of the INA through the DHS’s legislative or interpretive exercise of power. Neither is appropriate under the separation of powers.”). The court held that § 1226(a) applies to the putative class. *Id.* at 11. The court declined to issue a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b), as the motion for class certification was still pending. *Id.* On November 25, 2025, the court

certified “Bond Eligible Class” of:

“All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.”

Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). The *Maldonado Bautista* court then set a status conference for early 2026. *Id.*

32. Since the decisions in *Maldonado Bautista*, immigration judges nation-wide have continued to bar access to bond hearings citing § 1225(b)(2), stating that *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20 2025), is not a final judgment and therefore does not bind them to its holding. Accordingly, immigration judges have continued to follow *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec.216 (BIA 2025). *See e.g.* Ex. 6. Order of the Immigration Judge, issued December 5, 2025.

33. On December 18, 2025, the court granted the motion to reconsider, in light of the fact that immigration judges nationwide were refusing to follow the court’s prior summary judgment decision, and granted a final judgment. *Maldonado Bautista*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). “A notice of appeal was then filed by the *Bautista* defendants on December 18, 2025, ECF No. 95.” *Engonga v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-03479-FWS-MAA, 2025 WL 3764077, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). “However, the Ninth Circuit has held the filing of an appeal does not suspend the preclusive effect of a lower court judgment.” *Osuna v. Casey*, No. 25CV3668-LL-MMP, 2026 WL 50755, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026) citing *Hawkins v. Risley*, 984 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1993).

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FACTS

34. Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. In 2013 (at around 18 years old), he entered the United States without inspection between ports of entry, across the U.S.-Mexico. *See* Ex. 1, Expedited Removal Records.

35. Petitioner was encountered by immigration officials shortly after entry. *Id.* Petitioner passed a Credible Fear Interview on December 9, 2013, whereupon his expedited removal order was vacated and he was placed into full Immigration Judge removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and he was later released on an immigration bond. *See* Ex. 2, Immigration bond.

36. Petitioner then made his way to Ridgefield, New Jersey, where he established a life. He is married and the father of two children, including a 16-year-old stepson and a 7-year-old U.S. citizen daughter.


37. Upon information and belief, Petitioner's removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a were scheduled for a merits hearing on October 6, 2023, and, upon information and belief, were terminated upon agreement with ICE in their prosecutorial discretion. *See* Ex. 3, EOIR Individual Hearing Notice and Order.

38. On September 9, 2025, the Petitioner was detained in Ridgefield, New Jersey, while he was on his way to work, when bounty hunters blocked his path and apprehended him. He was taken into custody without prior notice, abruptly interrupting his employment and daily responsibilities.

39. Following his re-arrest, ICE issued a new Notice to Appear, to commence new removal proceedings against Petitioner. *See* Ex. 4, Form I-862 Notice to Appear.

40. Petitioner has requested a bond hearing on two occasions, both of which were denied. The first request was denied by the Immigration Judge on October 23, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction. *See* Ex. 5, Order of the Immigration Judge, issued October 23, 2025. The second request was denied on December 5, 2025, after the Immigration Court found no material change in circumstances and determined that it lacked authority to grant bond due to the Petitioner's entry without inspection, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). *See* Ex. 6, Order of the Immigration Judge, issued December 5, 2025.

41. Petitioner is currently detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas. *See* ICE Detainee Locator information, (*available at* <https://locator.ice.gov/> (last visited January 12, 2026)):



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Facility Page

Detention Information For:

MELVIN EDUARDO GIRON-CHELEY
Country of Birth: Guatemala
A-Number: 

Current Detention Facility:

KARNES COUNTY IMMIGRATION PROCESSING CENTER
409 FM 1144
NA
KARNES CITY, TX 78118
Visitor Information: (830) 254-2000

42. Petitioner has pending removal proceedings (his Master Calendar Hearing is scheduled for January 21, 2026), and he is not subject to a final order of removal. *See also* EOIR Automated Case Information, (*available at* <https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/> (last visited January 12, 2026)):

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying "acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation". The page title is "Automated Case Information". Below the title, the case details are: "Name: GIRON CHELEY, MELVIN EDUARDO | A-Number: [REDACTED] | Docket Date: 9/9/2025". The page is divided into four sections:

- Next Hearing Information:** "Your upcoming MASTER hearing is on January 21, 2026 at 8:30 AM. JUDGE Crossan, Thomas G., JR. COURT ADDRESS 566 Veterans Drive PEARSALL, TX 78061".
- Court Decision and Motion Information:** "This case is pending." (with a loading icon).
- BIA Case Information:** "No appeal was received for this case." (with a checkmark icon).
- Court Contact Information:** "If you require further information regarding your case, or wish to file additional documents, please contact the immigration court. COURT ADDRESS 566 VETERAN DRIVE., SUITE 101 PEARSALL, TX 78061. PHONE NUMBER (210) 368-5700".

43. The Petitioner’s continued detention has caused severe and escalating hardship to his family, who are entirely dependent on him for financial and emotional support. Prior to his detention, the Petitioner owned and operated his own construction company and served as the

primary provider for his household. Although his spouse has been attempting to keep the family financially afloat, their savings are rapidly diminishing and are expected to be exhausted in the near future. The Petitioner's spouse is responsible for caring for their 16-year-old stepson and their 7-year-old U.S. citizen daughter, both of whom rely on the Petitioner for stability and support. Since the Petitioner's detention, their daughter has begun experiencing recurring nightmares and frequently asks when her father will return home. The Petitioner's spouse is under extreme emotional strain and, according to those who interact with her regularly, is on the verge of a breakdown, relying primarily on her faith to endure the situation. There is no nearby family available to assist her.

44. All Respondents consider that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216. Accordingly, it would be futile for Petitioner to request a bond from an Immigration Judge. Exhaustion of administrative remedies would therefore be futile.

**FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
No-Bond Detention in Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

45. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs 1-44.

46. Since Petitioner is not an applicant for admission "seeking admission" or "an arriving alien" subject to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2), and has no disqualifying criminal arrests or convictions subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he is entitled to a bond redetermination hearing by an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

47. Petitioner was encountered upon entry in 2013 and passed a credible fear interview. He was released in 2014 on an immigration bond. His removal proceedings were thereafter terminated. And when ICE re-arrested Petitioner in 2025, they issued a fresh NTA, commencing new removal proceedings against Petitioner. *Jennings* was clear, § 1225(b) mandatory detention

authority ends when those removal proceedings end: “In sum, [8 U.S.C.] §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those proceedings begin,” (emphasis added). 583 U.S. at 302. Based on these facts, Petitioner could no longer be subject to either §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) when he was encountered in 2025, because his initial removal proceedings had been completed in approximately 2023.

48. Moreover, ICE previously granted Petitioner a bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ICE’s prior election to release Petitioner on bond, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), is strong evidence of Respondents’ current detention authority. *Luna Sanchez v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-CV-018888-MSN-IDD, 2025 WL 3191922, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2025), citing *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sep. 30, 2025) (“Petitioner’s prior release on bond carries legal significance. As this Court explained in *Quispe-Ardiles*, DHS’s decision to release an individual on bond, as opposed to humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), constitutes strong evidence that DHS intended to detain the individual under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a) and not under § 1225(b).”)

49. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents’ actions, as set forth herein, violate Petitioner’s statutory right to a bond redetermination hearing in front of an immigration judge.

**SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Detention in Violation of Due Process**

50. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs 1-44.

51. Immigration detention is civil, not criminal, in nature. There are only two permissible reasons for immigration detention: to avoid flight risk, and to avoid danger to the community.

52. After entering the United States unlawfully, Petitioner went on to develop ties to the community over the course of several decades. Petitioner is therefore a “person” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and he has a liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.

53. Respondents’ actions in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing before a neutral and detached magistrate deprives him of his rights without due process of law.]

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

54. Petitioner prays for judgment against Respondents and respectfully requests that the Court enters an order:

- a) Issuing an Order to Show Cause, ordering Respondents to justify the basis of Petitioner’s detention in fact and in law, forthwith;
- b) Enjoin Respondents from holding Petitioner subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and denying him a bond hearing on that basis;
- c) Enjoin Petitioner’s transfer outside of this judicial district pending this litigation;
- d) Enjoin Respondents from re-arresting Petitioner subject to § 1225(b)(2);
- e) Order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody;
- f) Order, in the alternative, Petitioner’s immediate release and that Respondents conduct a bond hearing for Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 15 days;
- g) Grant the writ of habeas corpus and order Respondents to release Petitioner forthwith, upon payment of the bond as ordered by the Immigration Judge;
- h) Award Petitioner his costs of suit; and
- i) Grant any other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: January 12, 2026

/s/ Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg
Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg, Esq.
Virginia State Bar no. 77110
Murray Osorio PLLC
4103 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 300
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
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Facsimile: 703-763-2304
ssandoval@murrayosorio.com

Counsel for Petitioner

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- Ex. 1. Expedited Removal Records;
- Ex. 2. DHS Immigration bond;
- Ex. 3. EOIR Individual Hearing Notice;
- Ex. 4. ICE Form I-862 Notice to Appear;
- Ex. 5. EOIR Order of the Immigration Judge, issued October 23, 2025;
- Ex. 6. EOIR Order of the Immigration Judge, issued December 5, 2025.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this date, I uploaded the foregoing, with all attachments thereto, to this court's CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all case participants. I furthermore will send a copy by certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, to:

Civil Process Clerk
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western
District of Texas
601 NW Loop 410, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216

Todd Lyons, ICE Acting Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
500 12th Street SW, Mail Stop 5900
Washington, DC 20536-5900

Office of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW, Mail Stop 0485
Washington, DC 20528-0485

Warden, Karnes County Immigration
Processing Center
409 FM 1144,
Karnes City, TX 78118

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the
United States
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Respectfully submitted,

Date: January 12, 2026

/s/ Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg
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