

JUDGE LEON SCHYDLOWER

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION**

YIRANDY ROSALES ALMARAL

Petitioner,

v.

PAM BONDI

Attorney General;

KRISTI NOEM

Secretary of Department of
Homeland Security;

U.S. ICE Field Office Director For

The Western District of Texas Field Office.

Warden ERO EL Paso E. Montana Detention Facility.

Respondent(s)

EP 26 CV 0041

Civil Action No:

EMERGENCY

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241, BY A PERSON
SUBJECT TO INDEFINITE IMMIGRATION
DETENTION.**

AND

**MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3006A**

Petitioner, **YIRANDY ROSALES ALMARAL**, hereby petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to remedy Petitioner's unlawful detention by Respondents, and to enjoin Petitioner's continued unlawful detention by the Respondents. In support of this petition and complaint for injunctive relief, Petitioner alleges as follows:

BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed a previous Habeas Corpus with the Middle District of Georgia, but was deliberately transferred out of the Jurisdiction so that he could not prevail on Habeas relief.

Petitioner is a Citizen of CUBA, detained and in the Custody of DHS/ICE in the United States, but has been **ordered removed** to CUBA by an Immigration Judge on **2-27-2018**.

Petitioner's removal order is Final, but the Petitioner cannot be removed to CUBA, thus Petitioner remains detained in DHS/ICE custody, and has been confined for a period far longer than the law mandates, as he has been detained over 90-days in the past, been on supervision with DHS for over 7-years and now has been detained again over 60-days and recognized on October 2, 2025 in **Perez v. Noem**, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195132 11th Circuit that the 180-day detention period ended years ago not at the new date detained, any other reading would allow indefinite detention or a life long sentence.

CUSTODY

1. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Petitioner is detained at the El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility where DHS/ICE has contracted the institution to house Immigration detainees such as Petitioner. Petitioner is

in the direct control of Respondents and their agents.

JURISDICTION

2. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, 28 U.S.C. §2241 (c)(1), and to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. This Court has subject matter Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2241, Art IS9. cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (" Suspension Clause"); and 28 U.S.C. §1331, as Petitioner is Presently in custody under color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (We conclude that §2241 Habeas Corpus proceedings remain available as a form for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.") *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("at it's historical core, the writ of Habeas Corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive detention, and it is in that context that it's protections have been strongest.") *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (holding that *Zadvydas* applies to aliens found inadmissible as well as removable.)

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

4. Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and his only remedy is by way of this judicial action. After the Supreme Court decision in *Zadvydas*, the Department of justice issued regulations governing the custody of aliens removed. *See* 8 C.F.R. §241.4. Petitioner received a final order of removal on 2-27-2018. Petitioner was apprehended again by DHS/ICE on 10-29-2025, and was never formally given notice that his supervision order was being terminated nor was he given an opportunity to contest his detention which violates his due process rights. **"NO DECISION WAS EVER MADE TO PETITIONER"** nor was he given notice or an opportunity to contest his detention. Like *Zavvar v. Scott*, 2025 U.S. Dist LEXIS 175897 Respondents have not been able to obtain any travel documents or find a country to accept him, not to mention that he has never been given notice of which Country they have tried to get to accept him. He is entitled to **"Seek Fear based relief from that Country"**, which would require additional proceedings as well. *CF. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. At 537. ICE's Headquarters Post-order Detention Unit ("HQPDU") **has not** informed Petitioner that it would release or continue to keep him in custody despite having been detained for over 6-months after a final order of removal. **The office of Inspector general recognizes that Cuba is a Country that is un-cooperative in repatriation.**(See Exhibit A) **The custody review regulations do not provide for appeal from a HQPDU custody review decision.** *See* 8 C.F.R. §241.4(d). Especially when it has never been made or given to the Petitioner.

5. No statutory exhaustion requirements apply to Petitioner claim of unlawful detention. Petitioner remains detained without any indication from the United States Government or the Government of Cuba that the Petitioner's repatriation is reasonably foreseeable. A Habeas Corpus petition is proper in light of these facts.

PARTIES

6. Petitioner is a Citizen of Cuba, detained and in the custody of DHS/ICE in the United States,

7. Respondent Pam Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Naturalization Act(INA). As such, Ms. Bondi has ultimate custodial authority over the petitioner.

8. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation and enforcement of the (INA), as such Ms. Noem is the legal custodian of the Petitioner.

9. Respondent ICE field office director for the Middle District of Georgia for the Stewart Detention center in Lumpkin, Georgia field office of ICE and is Petitioner's immediate custodian, *See Vasquez v. Reno*, 233F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. Denied. 122 S. Ct. 43 (2001).

10. **Warden** at the El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility where the Petitioner is currently detained under the authority of ICE, alternatively may be considered to be petitioner's immediate custodian.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

11. Petitioner was born in Cuba on  and fled the country to the United States and arrived on **11-27-2013** as a Political Refugee.

12. Petitioner was a Permanent Resident until he was ordered removed on **2-27-2018**.

13. Petitioner agreed to the charges of Human Trafficking which caused his removal order.

14. Petitioner was released after a final order of removal on supervision after his 90-days which gave him a credit of **90+** days plus the **7-years** on Supervision and now **60-days** detained yet again to use in a Habeas Corpus petition and is recognized by various Court's decision's and the instant case dated **October 2, 2025** under **Perez v. Noem**, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195132, 11th Circuit, to apply for a Habeas Corpus, any other reading will allow for indefinite detention or cruel & unusual punishment.

15. Petitioner was detained by DHS/ICE this time on **10-29-2025** and brought to the Stewart Detention Center and then transferred to the El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility where he has remained detained ever since.

16. To date however, ICE has not released the petitioner.

17. As of today ICE has been unable to remove the petitioner to Cuba or any other Country. Petitioner knows for sure that Cuba will deny and has denied any and all request for travel documents.

18. Petitioner has cooperated fully with all efforts of ICE to remove Petitioner from the United States, even though all parties acknowledge that Cuba will not accept him back to Cuba.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIEF SOUGHT

19. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678(2001), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 8.U.S.C. §1231(a)(6), when “read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-order removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's removal from the United States.” 533 U.S. At 689. a “Habeas Court must[first] ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Id. at 699 if the individual's removal “is not reasonably foreseeable, the Court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by the statute.” Id. at 699-700. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371(2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Zadvydas applies to all aliens.

20. In determining the length of a reasonable removal period, the Court adopted a “preemptively reasonable period of detention.” After 90 days, DHS has the discretion to release the detainee under reasonable conditions of supervision. The Government bears the Burden of disproving an alien's “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zhou v. Farquharson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18239, 2-3 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2001) (quoting and summarizing Zadvydas). Moreover, “for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-order removal grows, what counts as the reasonably foreseeable future' conversely have to shrink.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. At 701. ICE's admin regulations also recognize that the HQPDU has a maximum six-month period for determining whether there is a significant likelihood of a alien's removal in the reasonable foreseeable future. See 8 C.F.R. §241.4(k)(2)(ii).

21. An alien who has been detained beyond the presumptive period should be released where the government is unable to present documented confirmation that the foreign government at issue will agree to accept the particular individual in question. See Agbada v. Hohn Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15797(D. Mass. August 22, 2002) (court “will likely grant” after ICE is “unable to present document confirmation that the government has agreed to [petitioner's] repatriation.” ; Zhou, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19050 at *7(W.D. Wash February 28, 2002) (government's failure to offer specific information regarding how or when it expected to obtain the necessary documentation or cooperation from the foreign government indicated that there is no significant likelihood of petitioner's removal in the reasonably foreseeable future). (See Exhibit A) DHS Inspector general Report,

(Exhibit B OIG 19-28 PG 7-8, (Exhibit C OIG 19-28 PG 29

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

STATUTORY VIOLATION

22. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 above.

23. Petitioner's continued detention by respondents is unlawful and contravenes 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas. Petitioner's 90-day statutory period of detention for continued removal efforts have passed and the 180-day removal proceeding while detained by DHS/ICE since being ordered removed by an Immigration Court and Judge on 2-27-2018. Respondent's are unable to remove the Petitioner to Cuba, because there is no repatriation agreement between the United States and Cuba for Political Refugees such as the Petitioner, and Cuba will not accept Political Refugee Cubans from the era that the Petitioner arrived to the United States who have been ordered removed. In the instance of Clark v. Martinez, the Supreme Court held that the continued indefinite detention of someone like the petitioner under such circumstances is unreasonable and not authorized by U.S.C. §1231(a)(6).

COUNT TWO

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

24. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 above.

25. Petitioner's continued detention violates his right to substantive due process through a deprivation of the core liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint. See e.g., Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d. 1184 (E.D. Cal 1998) (Alien's retain substantive due process rights).

26. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment require that the deprivation of Petitioner's liberty be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. While Respondents would have an interest in detaining Petitioner's in order to effectuate removal, that interest does not justify the indefinite detention of petitioner, who is not significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. The United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas thus interpreted 8 U.S.C. §1231(a) to allow continued detention only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal, because any other reading would go beyond the government's articulated interests to effect the alien's removal. See Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d. 546, 551 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (granting writ of Habeas Corpus, because petitioner's due process rights were violated, and noting that "If deportation can never occur, the government's primary legitimate purpose in detention-executing removal-is nonsensical."). Because Petitioner is unlikely to be removed to Cuba, his continued indefinite

detention violates substantive due process.

27. In Alba v. Campell. The Eleventh Circuit held that ICE must prove that removal is likely; otherwise, release is required.

28. **“Detention is now not driven by legitimate interest of removal at all, but rather detention for the sake of detention, motivated by animus towards, or ill will against the individual, or even a desire to inflict suffering.”** C.F. Riverside, 500 U.S. At 56

29. Respondents are taking Cuban such as Petitioner to the El Paso Detention Center and forcing them to cross the border illegally in the middle of the night, providing no safe guard, protections or legal documents against their will.

30. If the non-citizen satisfies the initial burden then the Government **“must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”** Id. If the Government fails to meet its burden, then the non-citizen must be released from detention. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 299 (2018)

COUNT THREE

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

31. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30.

32. Under the Due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, an alien is entitled to a timely and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he/she should not be detained. Petitioner in this case has been denied that opportunity. **There is no administrative mechanism in place for the petitioner to obtain a decision from a neutral arbiter or appeal a custody decision and that violates Martinez.** See generally 8 C.F.R. §212.12 The custody review procedures for Cubans are Constitutionally insufficient both as written and as applied. A number of courts have identified a substantial bias within ICE towards the continued detention of aliens. raising the risk or erroneous deprivation to constitutionally high levels. See, e.g., Phan v. Reno. 56 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1999). (“INS does not meaningfully and impartially review the petitioner's status.”); St. John v. McElroy, 917 F. Supp. 243, 251(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Due to community and political pressure, INS, an executive agency, has though they have served their sentences. on the suspicion that they may continue to pose a danger to the community.”); See also Rivera v. Demore. No. C99-3042 THE, 199WL521177, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 1999) (Procedural due process requires that aliens release determination be made by impartial adjudicator due to policy bias.)

32. Detainees in Petitioners position are not required to show **“the absence of any prospect of removal” to be eligible for relief.** Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702(Emphasis in the original).

Their detention does not remain lawful just because their custodians act in good faith. Id

COUNT FOUR

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

33. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 32.

Respondent's failure to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard to contest his removal to a nation that is not his country of origin violates the Due process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, and the INA and its implementing regulations.

Like in the Southern District of Florida Zavvar v. Scott, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175897 where ICE had not met its Burden it was ordered to release the petitioner with instructions. The petitioner in this case seeks the same order directing Respondents to provide him with notice and an opportunity to contest removal to a third country on the basis of fear or likelihood of persecution in such a third country. Petitioner fled from a Communist country given asylum and C.A.T. comparable to that sought in D.V.D. See D.V.D., 2025 WL 1142968, at *24 (enjoining the Government from removing non-citizens to third-party countries without providing various procedural safeguards, including a "meaningful opportunity for the alien to raise a fear of return for eligibility for [Convention Against Torture ("CAT")] protections"). If granted the Habeas relief petitioner asks that it be ordered just as the case of Alic v. Dept of Homeland Security, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193793 that Respondents and all their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and persons acting on their behalf or in concert with them be prohibited from removing Petitioner to a third country without a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings with hearing before an immigration Judge.

The question as to whether Petitioner's detention is in violation of the Laws of the United States and the 4th and 5th Amendment is one for a Federal Habeas Court to hear. 28 U.S.C. §2241. Accordingly, Petitioner request that this Court appoint Counsel to represent Petitioner in this Habeas action if he is not immediately released.

See Memorandum of Law attached *Exhibit A*

See Office of Inspector General attached *B, C, D, E*

stating Cuba is a uncooperative Country in Repatriation or removal

CERTIFICATE OF OATH

I Swear under Penalty of Perjury from the United States of America if this Motion is found to be false, frivolous, or made in bad faith. I also swear that this motion is true to the best of my knowledge.

I further state that this motion is not a copy of a motion that has been ruled on nor has it been deposed of by this Court.

I Swear that this motion has been prepared by an agent at Immigration Connection and everything that is said in the following motion is true.

x *Yirandy Rosales Almaral*

December- 25 -2025

YIRANDY ROSALES ALMARAL



El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility
8915 Montana Ave. Suite 100
El Paso, TX 79925

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Swear, that a true and correct copy of the following Motion has been placed in the hands of an institution official to be furnished and forwarded by first class mail to the following parties listed below on December 25, 2025

1. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

For the Western District of Texas

El Paso Division

525 Magoffin Ave, Suite 105

El Paso, TX 79901

2. Office Of Chief Counsel DHS/ICE

El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility

8915 Montana Ave. Suite 100

El Paso, TX 79925

x *Yirandy Rosales Almaral*

December-25-2025

YIRANDY ROSALES ALMARAL

DETAINED



El Paso E. Montana Detention Facility

8915 Montana Ave. Suite 100

El Paso, TX 79925

Yirandy Rosales Almaral

DHS Inspector General Report:
Cuba's Non-Cooperation in Deportation Proceedings

Supporting Habeas Corpus or Custody Review Under *Zadvydas v. Davis*

Summary of Evidence

The following excerpts are taken directly from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General Report OIG-19-28, issued in April 2019, (attached). This report formally documents that Cuba is categorized as "Uncooperative" in facilitating the repatriation of its nationals between 2015 and 2018.

This classification directly supports the legal argument that removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable, which meets the legal threshold established in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), requiring the release of individuals in immigration custody when removal cannot occur within the reasonably foreseeable future.

Key Findings from the DHS Report:

Appendix D -- Countries' Cooperation with Repatriation (FY 2015–2018) Page 29:

- Cuba is listed as "Uncooperative" in FY 2015, FY 2016, FY 2017, and FY 2018

This means DHS recognized Cuba's consistent refusal to issue travel documents or accept the return of its citizens during that time, which remains relevant due to ongoing diplomatic tension and the absence of any active repatriation agreement.

Report Page 8 (Case Review Summary):

"Our case review indicates that ICE eventually released 287 Cubans — detainees from countries considered uncooperative."

This confirms ICE has historically acknowledged that prolonged detention of Cuban nationals is untenable due to the inability to effectuate removal, further justifying release under *Zadvydas*.

Conclusion:

These findings from DHS's own oversight body provide clear, credible, and compelling evidence that:

- Cuba is an uncooperative nation for deportation purposes
- Removal is not reasonably foreseeable
- Continued ICE detention violates the principles of due process under *Zadvydas v. Davis*

(Exhibit 3)



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL


Department of Homeland Security

diplomatic engagement has improved cooperation on removals, some foreign governments still fail to provide flight approvals or travel documents in time, causing removal cancellations or delays. In some cases, countries simply do not have the resources or infrastructure to assist ICE with required document requests. Despite these factors lying outside of ICE's control, they do not stop the 90-day clock for removals.

Inability to Obtain Travel Documents from Foreign Governments Obstructs Repatriation

Although a combination of increased diplomatic engagement with uncooperative governments and a demonstrated willingness of the United States to impose visa sanctions has increased foreign governments' cooperation, some countries remain unwilling to provide travel documents. This lack of cooperation, in essence, prohibits ICE removals to such countries. Other countries lack bureaucratic infrastructure and resources to make citizenship determinations quickly and issue travel documents for repatriation. In other cases, the citizenship of detainees cannot even be established.¹⁵ These barriers to removals result in ICE releasing detainees, which in some cases can endanger public safety, as our previous work has shown.¹⁶

Figure 3: Travel Documents



Travel Documents: (948 Cases)
Source: OIG

As figure 3 indicates, 948 of the 3,053 detainees (31 percent) in our case review could not be removed because their travel document requests were still pending. With limited exceptions, if ICE is unable to obtain a travel document for a detainee within 6 months and there is no prospect of obtaining one in the near future, the

¹⁵ For example, some detainees, such as Palestinians, were born stateless, and others became stateless when countries such as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Sudan fragmented.

¹⁶ A Haitian national, Jean Jacques, previously convicted of attempted murder and subject to a final order of removal, was released from ICE custody after repeated attempts to secure a travel document from Haiti and killed another individual. See DHS OIG, *Release of Jean Jacques from ICE Custody*, June 16, 2016.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

~~detainee must be released.~~¹⁷ Our case review indicates that ICE eventually released 22 Chinese, 287 Cubans, 34 Eritreans, 21 Laotians, and 10 Vietnamese — detainees from countries considered uncooperative.

Foreign governments, with limited exceptions, require a passport or temporary travel permit to accept their nationals back into the country.¹⁸ Hence, ICE needs to obtain such travel documents to repatriate aliens. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, issue travel documents through an online ICE data system known as eTD (electronic Travel Document), and Mexico does not require travel documents for repatriations on the land border. In FY 2017, removals to these five countries accounted for 205,540 of ICE's 226,119 removals (91 percent). Other foreign government requirements for travel documents vary widely and the travel document issuance can be cumbersome. For example, some countries require:

- an in-person consular interview with the detainee, at the country's consulate in the United States;¹⁹
- identification documents, such as a national identity card or an expired passport; or
- additional checks of paper-based records, such as birth certificates or baptismal records, typically buried in immigration files or only available at the detainee's place of birth.

Because foreign governments do not issue travel documents without confirming the identity and citizenship of the alien, ICE works with the detainees to collect evidence of their citizenship to prepare a request for a travel document. Although we heard that generally detainees disclose who they are, ICE deportation officers described some cases when detainees provide numerous identities or are unsure of their country of origin. Establishing identities of such detainees complicates preparations for their repatriation. Examples from our electronic case file review of removals delayed due to travel document issues include:

¹⁷ *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that an alien with a final removal order cannot be detained longer than 6 months unless there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future); see also *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (extending *Zadvydas* to inadmissible aliens). See DHS/OIG's prior report *ICE's Compliance With Detention Limits for Aliens With a Final Order of Removal From the United States*, OIG-07-28, for information on the limited exceptions to this release requirement for public health and national security cases.

¹⁸ ICE maintains country-specific guidelines on its intranet, which are based on the laws of these governments and any formal and informal agreements between the United States and the foreign government.

¹⁹ Some consulates are hours away from detention facilities and require ICE to make long trips with detainees to facilitate those interviews.



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Department of Homeland Security

Appendix D
Countries' Cooperation with Repatriation

Country	July 2015	September 2016	September 2017	May 2018
Afghanistan	Other	Other	Other	Other
Albania	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Algeria	Other	Other	Other	ARON
Angola	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Antigua Barbuda	ARON	ARON	Other	Other
Armenia	ARON	Other	Other	ARON
Azerbaijan	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Bahamas	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Bangladesh	ARON	ARON	Other	Other
Barbados	ARON	Other	ARON	Other
Belarus	ARON	ARON	Other	Other
Bermuda	ARON	Other	ARON	Other
Bhutan	Other	Other	Other	ARON
Bolivia	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Bosnia And Herzegovina	ARON	ARON	Other	Other
Brazil	ARON	ARON	ARON	ARON
British Virgin Islands	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Bulgaria	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Burkina Faso	Other	Other	ARON	ARON
Burma	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Burundi	Other	ARON	ARON	ARON
Cambodia	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Cameroun	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Cape Verde	Other	Other	Other	Other
Chad	ARON	ARON	Other	Other
China	Other	Other	Other	Other
Comoros	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Cuba	Other	Other	Other	Other
Czech Republic	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Democratic Republic Of The Congo	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Dominica	ARON	ARON	ARON	ARON
Egypt	Other	ARON	ARON	ARON
Eritrea	Other	Other	Other	Other
Estonia	Other	ARON	ARON	ARON
Ethiopia	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Fiji	Other	Other	Other	Other
Gambia	Other	Other	Other	Other
Georgia	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Ghana	Other	ARON	ARON	ARON
Greece	ARON	Other	Other	Other
Grenada	Other	ARON	Other	Other
Guinea	Other	Other	ARON	Other