

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
Abilene Division**

|                                  |   |                               |
|----------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| Sahand Yousefinasrabadi,         | ) |                               |
|                                  | ) |                               |
| <i>Petitioner,</i>               | ) |                               |
|                                  | ) | Civ. Action No. 1:26-CV-015-H |
| v.                               | ) |                               |
|                                  | ) |                               |
| Marcello Villegas, <i>et al.</i> | ) |                               |
|                                  | ) |                               |
| <i>Respondents.</i>              | ) |                               |
|                                  | ) |                               |

**REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States to Iran on October 21, 2013. Well-established Supreme Court caselaw prevents the government from detaining an individual for more than 180 days after a final order of removal, absent a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). For this reason, Respondents released Petitioner from detention in early 2015 precisely because they correctly determined that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Over ten years later, Respondents decided to rearrest Petitioner and throw him into a jail, without any articulable reason to believe that Iran was now willing to accept him for removal. Petitioner was detained for 199 days (in other words, the entire 180-day *Zadvydas* period had already passed) before Respondents even *asked* the government of Iran to issue travel documents; that request is still pending, with no way to know whether Iran will answer (if at all) in “ten days, ten months, or ten years.” *Singh v. Whitaker*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2019). To the extent that Iran has responded to the Respondents’ request, that response was negative, just as when Petitioner requested travel documents from Iran in September 2025.

In sum, nothing has changed with regards to Respondents' *ability* to remove Petitioner in the reasonably foreseeable future; the only thing that has changed is that Respondents now have a greater *desire* to do so. This does not meet their burden under *Zadvydas*. Respondents have not demonstrated a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the writ of habeas corpus should issue.

### **Procedural History**

Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States to his native Iran on October 21, 2013. Dkt. 1-1. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), the government was required to attempt to remove him during the following 90-day removal period. But the government was not able to do so. Despite this, Petitioner was detained for 6 days after the 90-day removal period expired, Respondents released Petitioner from detention on an Order of Supervision. Dkt. No. 1-1 (“Because the agency has not effected your deportation or removal during the period prescribed by law, it is ordered that you be placed under supervision and permitted to be at large under the following conditions . . . .”); Dkt. No. 12 at 5 ¶ 9 (“Since removal was not likely, he was released on an Order of Supervision.”).

On June 23, 2025, Respondents re-detained Petitioner; he has been detained at the Bluebonnet Detention Center in Anson, Tex. ever since. *id.* at 6 ¶ 10. As of the date of filing, Petitioner has been re-detained for a total of 248 days.

On July 15, 2025, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas alleging ICE's non-compliance with federal regulations revoking his Order of Supervision. *See Nasrabadi v. Villegas, et al.*, Civ. No. 1:25-cv-129-H (N.D. Tex., filed July 15, 2025). The habeas petition did not raise a claim under *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), that his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) was unlawful because there existed no significant likelihood of removal within the

reasonably foreseeable future. The first petition instead focused on challenging the government's procedures to remove noncitizens to third countries (i.e. countries other than those designated in the order of removal); and challenging the government's revocation of Petitioner's Order of Supervision under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l). On October 28, 2025, this Court denied that petition. *Id.*, Dkt. No. 16.

On January 8, 2026, Respondents sent the government of Iran a travel document request. At the time of the request, Petitioner had been detained for 199 days.

On January 20, 2026, Respondents allegedly conducted a file review of Petitioner's custody (not a personal interview). *See* Dkt. No. 12 at 6. Respondents decided not to release Petitioner for one reason only: "Your removal is expected to be effectuated within the reasonable foreseeable future." Dkt. No. 12 at 13.

Petitioner filed this second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 11, 2026. Dkt. No. 1. On January 12, 2026, this Court found good cause to order Respondents to show cause, and ordered that an answer be filed by February 2, 2026, showing why the petition should not be granted. Dkt. No. 4. Respondents timely filed their Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. No. 11, along with an Appendix in support thereof, Dkt. No. 12. The Appendix did not contain any records or original documents pertaining to Respondents' attempts to remove Petitioner to Iran, just a declaration from an ICE Deportation Officer. *Id.* at 2-4.

As of the date of this filing, Petitioner has been detained for a total of 344 days (96 days in 2013-2014 and 248 days since he was redetained in 2025.)

### **Argument**

- 1. Petitioner has shown good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.**

The basic responsibility of the habeas court is to “ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). In so doing, the habeas court “should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” *Id.* at 699-700.

In any event, Petitioner has now been detained for well over 180 days after the entry of his removal order (96 days in 2013-14, plus 248 days since he was redetained in 2025). Unlike Petitioner’s first habeas petition, the instant petition for writ of habeas was filed after Petitioner had already been detained for over six months. Respondents concede, as they must, that Petitioner has been detained under the requisite period of time under *Zadvydas*. Dkt. 11 at 6. Respondents contend, however, that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Under *Zadvydas*, once the six-month post-removal period has elapsed, a noncitizen bears the initial burden of production to show “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” 533 U.S. at 702. What constitutes the reasonably foreseeable future is a shrinking window of time: “for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

Petitioner submits he has met his initial burden by providing his Order of Supervision, Dkt. No. 1-1, at 1, which demonstrates that as of July 15, 2015, the government found that it was unable to remove him from the United States. In addition, Petitioner was repeatedly issued Employment Authorization Documents, Dkt. 1-2, with category “C18.” C18 is the category for Order of

Supervision, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18). Pursuant to that regulation, “[a]n alien against whom a final order of deportation or removal exists and who is released on an order of supervision under the authority contained in section 241(a)(3) of the Act may be granted employment authorization in the discretion of the district director only if the alien cannot be removed due to the refusal of all countries designated by the alien or under section 241 of the Act to receive the alien, or because the removal of the alien is otherwise impracticable or contrary to the public interest.” *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7) (same). Accordingly, the government still understood that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. They have repeatedly found so since 2017, and most recently in 2024. Dkt. 1-2. Nothing has changed since that date.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, Iran has now refused to issue travel documents to Petitioner. Dkt. 1-3 at 2. Petitioner’s wife, acting on his behalf, attempted to obtain travel documents from the Iranian embassy. *Id.* On September 9, 2025, the government of Iran stated that they “would not be able to issue him a travel document,” thus eliminating any hope of a significant likelihood of removal within the reasonably foreseeable future. *Id.* at 2.

Furthermore, the United States officially recognizes that Iran often does not accept deportees from our country. *See Executive Order, Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety*

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<sup>1</sup> If anything, diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran have only worsened. *See* “Trump gives Iran 10-day ultimatum, but experts signal talks may be buying time for strike” Fox News (Feb. 20, 2026) *available at* <https://www.foxnews.com/world/trump-gives-iran-10-day-ultimatum-experts-signal-talks-may-buying-time-strike> (“‘They’re using the diplomatic process to sharpen the choices of the Iranian leadership and to buy time to make sure that we have the appropriate military assets in the region,” Brodsky said.”); “Nations around the world react to U.S. strikes on Iran, with many calling for diplomacy,” PBS News (June 22, 2025), *available at* <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/nations-around-the-world-react-to-u-s-strikes-on-iran-with-many-calling-for-diplomacy> (after the United States bombed nuclear facilities in Iran, quoting Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as saying that “the time for diplomacy was over and Iran had the right to defend itself.”).

*Threats* (June 4, 2025), at § 2(h)(i) (suspending the entry of Iranian nationals because “Iran . . . has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.”).<sup>2</sup> As the Fifth Circuit held in the *Zadvydas* case on remand from the Supreme Court, a “finding that Zadvydas will never be deported because there is no place to send him plainly and necessarily includes a finding that he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 285 F.3d 398, 404 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002). Surely here, the shrinking window of time of reasonability has become very short indeed: Petitioner has been detained for 140% longer than what is presumed reasonable under *Zadvydas*. *See* 533 U.S. at 701.

Petitioner has accordingly provided “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”—and, indeed, Respondents themselves so found in 2015, 2017, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. As the Fifth Circuit recognized, *Zadvydas* itself was a case in which “the Government had thrice failed to secure the transfer of an alien subject to a final order of removal, and could offer no promise of future success[.]” *Andrade v. Gonzales*, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006). The facts here are the same: the government has failed over the course of over ten years to remove Petitioner (finding at least six times that he “cannot be removed due to the refusal of all countries designated by the alien or under this section to receive the alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7)), and offers no promise or even suggestion of why it will be more successful now. *See also Singh*, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 101 (“[N]othing in the record suggests that DHS is now any closer to obtaining the necessary documents than it was when Singh first was taken into custody.”); *Senor v. Barr*, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420, 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The government has not given this Court any reason to believe that removal is significantly likely to

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<sup>2</sup> Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/restricting-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-other-national-security-and-public-safety-threats/>.

occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. . . . So there is a real question about when—or even whether—that removal will occur.”); *Agabada v. Ashcroft*, 2002 WL 1969660, at \*1 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2002) (“The affidavit of the deportation officer supporting the motion to dismiss gives the court no assurance that removal will occur ‘in the reasonably foreseeable future.’ . . . . The respondent’s submission gives the court no confidence as to when, or even whether, the petitioner will ever be repatriated.”).

For this reason, the instant case is functionally identical to *Yaghoubi Yeganeh v. Warden*, No. 1:25-cv-00121-H, Dkt. No. 21 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2025). There, the petitioner was a Lawful Permanent Resident until he was ordered removed in 2014 to Iran, the only country in which he could claim citizenship. *Id.* at 1. The government was unable to remove him and, thus, he was released on an Order of Supervision that he followed without incident until he was re-detained at a routine ICE check in on March 18, 2025. *Id.* There, the government did not request travel documents until after the petitioner had been detained for four months. *Id.* at n.1. Then, exactly as occurred here, the Iranian government refused to provide travel documents to the petitioner. *Id.* at 3. Respondents began attempting to locate a third country for removal but informed the court that efforts would have to be “ongoing” and would require “some time” to effectuate. *Id.* at 4. When the court granted his habeas petition and ordered his release, the petitioner had been detained 272 days.

While the Court recognized “the importance of deferring to the Executive Branch on immigration matters (hence why it gave the respondents significant time to initiate third country removal),” the Court also recognized that “deference has its limits” *Id.* at 9. Respondents in *Yaghoubi Yeganeh* kept the petitioner detained for three months after Iran refused to issue travel documents. Comparatively, Petitioner in this instant case received a refusal from Iran to issue

travel documents in September 2025, nearly five months ago, *see* Dkt. No. 1-3. Petitioner here received the denial from the Iranian government and provided it to Respondents well before Respondents even gathered together their own travel document request. Dkt. No. 12 at 6.

**II. Respondents have failed to rebut Petitioner’s showing.**

Petitioner has, therefore, made a sufficient showing to shift the burden of proof onto Respondents under *Zadvydas*: "Once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with *evidence* sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (emphasis added). Here, since Petitioner has now been detained for 344 days, the window of time that constitutes the “reasonably foreseeable future” has shrunk considerably.

To be clear, Petitioner does not argue that Respondents must have travel documents in hand in order to re-detain him for removal. But Respondents must have some *articulable* reason, which they present to the court through evidence, to believe that Iran will issue such travel documents. Here, there is none. As the Fifth Circuit explained in the *Zadvydas* case on remand from the Supreme Court, a noncitizen with a final order of removal can be returned to immigration custody “upon a showing that. . . there has then become a substantial likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” *Zadvydas*, 285 F.3d at 404. Here, Respondents have made no such showing.

Ultimately, Respondents argue that they have shown repeated efforts to remove Petitioner to Iran and obtain travel documents. Dkt. No. 11 at 6. However, despite having Petitioner redetained for over 248 days, Respondents are still unable to provide a timeline for if or when

Petitioner might receive travel documents from Iran, and if or when they will be able to remove him. The most Respondents have provided is a hopeful, self-serving statement that the affiant, a Deportation Officer without access to direct communication to the Iranian government, “believe[s]” that removal is significantly likely in the foreseeable future. Dkt. No. 12 at 6. Comparatively, Petitioner has provided documentary evidence that Iran has refused to issue him travel documents. Dkt. No. 1-3. To meet its burden under *Zadvydas*, “the government cannot succeed merely by showing it has made good faith efforts for which the outcome is not impossible.” *Surovtsev v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-160-H, 2025 WL 3264479, \*7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025) (internal citations omitted)

Respondents’ efforts align exactly with the government’s attempts in *Sharifi v. Gillis*, wherein Iran refused to issue travel documents to the petitioner, even after an interview. No. 5:20-CV-5-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 7379211 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2020), *R&R adopted*, 2020 WL 7364984 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2020). There, as here, Iran also interviewed the petitioner, refused to issue a travel document, and the respondents could not articulate exactly when the petitioner was expected to be removed. *Id.* at \*2-3. A “theoretical possibility of eventually being removed does not satisfy the government’s burden once the removal period has expired.” *Kane v. Mukasey*, No. CV B-08-037, 2008 WL 11393137 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2008), *superseded*, 2008 WL 11393094 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2008), *R&R adopted*, 2008 WL 11393148 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2008). “If DHS has no idea of when it might reasonably expect [the petitioner] to be repatriated, this Court certainly cannot conclude that his removal is likely to occur—or even that it *might* occur—in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Singh*, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 102.

Respondents here also inform the Court that the government has increased the removals to Iran “400%,” a mere 131 people. Dkt. No. 11 at 6. Courts, in similar habeas cases, have questioned

the government's numbers when they are presented without context, exactly as the government has presented them here. *See, e.g., Nguyen v. Hyde*, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151-52 (D. Mass. 2025); *Phouvieng K. v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01512-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3265504, \*6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); *Vu v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-01366-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3114341, \*7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025); *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025). After reading Respondents' submission, the Court is left with few answers: How many travel documents has the United States government requested from Iran? How many have been provided? How many noncitizens has Iran declined to accept? How many of those noncitizens were provided with interviews with the Iranian government? Instead of providing this evidence, Respondents offer a few sentences that are insufficient to meet their burden of proof and show that Petitioner's substantial likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government "fails to meet its burden where it provides only conclusory statements as to the likelihood of removal." *Abuelhawa v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2937692, at \*8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025). Respondents have failed to meet their burden of proof here.

**III. Petitioner has cooperated with ICE and the government to the fullest extent possible.**

Respondents furthermore allege that Petitioner has not cooperated in providing documentation to Iran and is therefore himself to blame for his continued stay in detention. Dkt. No. 11 at 6. This is demonstrably false. Of course, it is true that "a petitioner who fails to cooperate with his removal fails to establish that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under *Zadvydas*." *Kallon v. Holder*, 2014 WL 5343307, at \*3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014); *Sotero v. Garland*, 2023 WL 12068902 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 2023); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). However, the government must illustrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner has not cooperated in order to prevail on their assertions. *See Glushchenko v. U.S. Dep't*

*of Homeland Sec.*, 566 F. Supp. 3d 693, 709 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (holding that “the government must demonstrate a lack of cooperation by clear and convincing evidence to justify extended detention”).

The government has not done so and cannot do so: Petitioner has cooperated at every opportunity.

Petitioner has cooperated repeatedly and continuously in attempting to obtain travel documents—after he was detained, he himself requested travel documents in September 2025 from the government of Iran. He communicated with them through his wife, and was told the government of Iran “would not be able to issue him a travel document.” *See* Dkt. No. 1-3. Iran asked for original copies of his passport or birth certificate—neither of which Petitioner nor his wife had access to. *See* Ex. 1, Affidavit of Petitioner’s Wife; *see also* Dkt. 1-3. Petitioner attended an interview with Iranian officials on February 9, 2026, at the behest of Respondents, where Iran questioned him as to whether he possesses any original Iranian identity documents. *See* Ex. 1. Petitioner does not have originals. *Id.* Petitioner has repeatedly cooperated in good faith to best of his ability, both himself and through his wife.

The Iranian government has failed to issue travel documents for Petitioner and there is no indication that they will in the foreseeable future. Despite this, the government insists that Petitioner is at fault for failing to obtain a travel document. Throughout, Petitioner has communicated with the government continuously and to the best of his ability.

#### **IV. Respondents’ Plans for Petitioner’s Third Country Removal Does Not Support Continued Detention**

Respondents’ affiant states that if they are unable to remove Petitioner to Iran, they will pursue his removal to a third country. Dkt. No. 12 at 7. Respondents do not state which third country, nor do they provide a timeline upon which they will designate one. *Id.* This single sentence does not meet Respondents’ burden to provide evidence sufficient to rebut the Petitioner’s showing, as it does not articulate any reason to believe that any *particular* third country would be

willing to accept an Iranian deportee with a felony conviction. Respondents do not even state *whether* they have asked any particular third country to accept Petitioner, much less which country or countries. Nor do Respondents make a meaningful legal argument that this evidence meets the legal standard: they cite no case in which a District Court held that the mere *intention* to remove a noncitizen to a third country constituted “evidence sufficient to rebut” a petitioner’s showing under *Zadvydas*. Indeed, boiled down to its essence, Respondents’ argument is that the mere *existence* of a government program of third-country removal is sufficient to defeat a *Zadvydas* claim. This cannot be correct.

As the Southern District of Texas recently held:

[T]he Scroggins declaration demonstrates that during the 8-year period since [the petitioner] was ordered removed, the government’s efforts to remove him—sparse and sporadic as they may have been—have been unsuccessful. The declaration contains no information tending to show that circumstances have changed to the point that [the petitioner’s] removal is now reasonably foreseeable when it was not before. Further, any efforts to remove [the petitioner] to a third country would likely be delayed by proceedings contesting his removal to the third country finally identified. . . . The Court is mindful that the government has the right to enforce [the petitioner’s] Order of Removal. But the government may not detain [the petitioner] for an indefinite and undetermined period of time while it tries to effect that removal when the circumstances are such that his removal is not reasonably likely in the foreseeable future. Such an action violates the Due Process Clause, as explained in *Zadvydas*. The government points to no evidence showing that disputed issues of fact exist material to this determination.

*Villanueva Herrera v. Tate*, 2025 WL 2774610, at \*10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025), citing, *inter alia*, *Zavvar v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2592543, at \*8 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2025). The *Zavvar* case is instructive: where the government could not remove a noncitizen to his native Iran, it designated two other countries for third-country removal, Australia and Romania, seemingly at random. *Id.* at \*7. The court held that “[t]he lack of any sign that Australia or Romania is actively considering accepting *Zavvar* further demonstrates that removal is not likely in the foreseeable future.” *Id.* The case at bar is significantly *less* advanced towards removal than *Zavvar*: here, the government has

not even *identified* any countries of removal, much less sent requests to those countries. *See also Yaghoubi Yeganeh*, No. 1:25-cv-00121-H, Dkt. No. 21 at 10 (“Put simply, the respondents have “brought forward nothing to indicate that a substantial likelihood of removal subsists despite the passage of six months.””); *Tadros v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1678501, at \*3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2025) (“Respondents’ sole statement that ‘ICE has been making efforts to facilitate Petitioner’s removal to a country other than Egypt’ is insufficient to rebut the presumption established by *Tadros*.”); *Escalante v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2206113, at \*4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“Thus far, Respondents have only made conclusory statements that they are taking steps to remove Petitioner to Mexico or perhaps Canada. A remote possibility of an eventual removal is not analogous to a significant likelihood that removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Internal citations omitted.)); *Agabada v. Ashcroft*, 2002 WL 1969660, at \*1 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2002) (“The affidavit of the deportation officer supporting the motion to dismiss gives the court no assurance that removal will occur ‘in the reasonably foreseeable future.’ . . . . The respondent’s submission gives the court no confidence as to when, or even whether, the petitioner will ever be repatriated.”).

Releasing Petitioner from detention does not prevent the government from continuing to work to identify a third country for removal. Petitioner must be released on an Order of Supervision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), under which the government can keep track of his whereabouts, and which the government can revoke on prior notice if they find a third-country willing to accept him, 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii).

### **Conclusion**

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that Petitioner’s continued detention is not permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), issue a writ of habeas corpus, and order Petitioner’s release on an Order of Supervision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

Respectfully submitted,

Date: February 26, 2026

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**Certificate of Service**

I, Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg, hereby certify that on this date, I uploaded the foregoing, with all attachments thereto, to this court's CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all case participants.

Respectfully submitted,

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