

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF COLORADO

**ABDERRAHMANE MAMADOU GUEYE,**

*Petitioner,*

v.

**KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of  
Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, U.S.  
Attorney General; ROBERT HAGAN,  
Field Office Director, Denver Field Office,  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and  
JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of Denver  
Contract Detention Facility,**

*Respondents.*

Case No. 1:26-cv-94

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS PURSUANT TO  
28 U.S.C. § 2241**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. Petitioner Abderrahmane Mamadou Gueye (“Mr. Gueye”) is a native and citizen of Mauritania who entered the United States on May 27, 2018, was placed in removal proceedings, and sought asylum. An immigration judge denied his application for asylum, and his appeal is currently pending at the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). On May 15, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Mr. Gueye at his scheduled check-in and placed him in immigration custody pending completion of removal proceedings. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have concluded that he is subject to mandatory immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), as an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” to the United States.

2. DHS’s interpretation of its detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) marks a complete reversal of the interpretation of the statute that the government has embraced since its

inception three decades ago, its prior practice, Supreme Court precedent, and the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).

3. This Court should therefore intervene and grant Mr. Gueye’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order his release from immigration custody, or, alternatively, order EOIR to conduct a bond hearing at which 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) cannot be applied.

#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

4. Mr. Gueye is detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, and is in physical custody of Respondents. *See* Ex. 1, ICE Detainee Locator.

5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (declaratory relief). Mr. Gueye’s detention by Respondents is a “severe restraint” on his individual liberty. *See Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Jud. Dist.*, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).

6. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

7. Venue is proper because Mr. Gueye’s immediate custodian at Denver Contract Detention Facility is located in this District and a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

#### **PARTIES**

8. Petitioner Abderrahmane Mamadou Gueye is a native and citizen of Mauritania. As of the filing of this Petition, ICE is detaining him at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado.

9. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA and oversees ICE, which is

responsible for Mr. Gueye's detention. Secretary Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Mr. Gueye and is sued in her official capacity.

10. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

11. Respondent Robert Hagan is the Field Office Director of the ICE Denver Field Office and is responsible for ICE's operations in Colorado where Mr. Gueye is held. He is sued in his official capacity.

12. Respondent Juan Baltazar is the Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility and is the immediate custodian of Mr. Gueye. He is sued in his official capacity.

**REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

13. The Court must grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

14. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

15. Mr. Gueye requests the Court issue an Order to Show Cause, and direct Respondents to file a response within three days, in light of the significant restraint on his liberty and clear Constitutional violations in this case.

**TRANSFER OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT; ALL WRITS ACT**

16. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), empowers the federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

17. Courts both in and outside this district have recently invoked the All Writs Act to prevent the transfer of individuals detained within the judicial district. *See Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, No. 25cv2205-WJM-STV, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2280357, at \*15-16 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025) (listing cases); *see also Guevara Gomez v. Crawford*, No. 1:25-cv-1781-PTG-LRV (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2025).

18. Mr. Gueye requests that this Court invoke the All Writs Act to prevent any transfer out of the District of Colorado during the pendency of his habeas action, given the likelihood that he will be ordered to appear at a bond hearing shortly after this Court rules upon the habeas petition. Mr. Gueye lives in Colorado, and his counsel’s law firm operates primarily in Colorado. He will need to participate in the preparation for and attend his bond hearing should the Court order one, and he will incur additional, unnecessary expenses and difficulty in returning to his residence in Colorado should he be granted a bond hearing after being transferred elsewhere. *See Ozturk v. Trump*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 462, 497 (D. Vt. 2025) (noting that presence in the judicial district where an action is pending “facilitate[s]” the petitioner’s “ability to work with [his or] her attorneys, coordinate the appearance of witnesses,” and generally present claims related to detention); *Suri v. Trump*, 785 F. Supp. 3d 128, 148 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2025).

**EXHAUSTION**

19. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not bar Mr. Gueye’s claim unless “Congress specifically mandates” exhaustion. *Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 351 (4th Cir. 2022) (1993) (quoting *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).

20. Moreover, because detaining Mr. Gueye without a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future violates his right to due process, administrative exhaustion is excused. *See Guitard v. U.S. Sec’y of the Navy*, 967 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when . . . a plaintiff has raised a ‘substantial constitutional question.’”).

21. Although the Court may impose exhaustion requirements as a prudential matter, it should not do so in this case because further administrative exhaustion would be futile. Upon information and belief, many immigration judges across the country are determining that noncitizens like Mr. Gueye are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and ineligible for bond in light of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). *But see Bautista v. Santacruz*, 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at \*12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (concluding that the interpretation in *Yajure Hurtado* “is no longer controlling.”).

**STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS**

22. Mr. Gueye applied for admission to the United States on May 27, 2018. At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained him, and on May 28, 2018, provided him with a credible fear interview.

23. DHS initiated removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear with the immigration court on July 18, 2018, charging Mr. Gueye with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien who, at the time of application for admission, was not in possession of a valid entry

document, valid travel document, or document of identity an nationality as required by the government.<sup>1</sup> Ex. 2, Notice to Appear.

24. On December 17, 2018, an immigration judge granted Mr. Gueye bond after conducting a bond hearing pursuant to the *Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), class action. Ex. 3, Bond Grant.

25. On March 11, 2021, an immigration judge denied Mr. Gueye's application for asylum. Mr. Gueye timely appealed this decision to the Board, where it remains pending. Ex. 4, EOIR Case Status.

26. Upon information and belief, Mr. Gueye was again detained by ICE in 2021.

27. On March 22, 2021, after a custody determination, ICE released Mr. Gueye on an Order of Release on Recognizance ("ROR"). Ex. 5, Notice of Custody Determination. The notice of custody determination states, "Pursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and part 236 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, I have determined that, pending a final administrative determination in your case, you will be: Released under other conditions." *Id.*

28. The ROR also states, "You have been arrested and placed in removal proceedings. In accordance with section 236 of the INA and the applicable provision of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own recognizance provided you comply with" the conditions as listed. Ex. 6, Order of Release on Recognizance.<sup>2</sup> One of the conditions of the ROR was that Mr. Gueye would report to an ICE duty officer regularly. *Id.*

29. Upon information and belief, Mr. Gueye moved to Denver, Colorado in December 2024

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<sup>1</sup> Although Mr. Gueye was given a credible fear interview, it does not appear as though he was processed for expedited removal. *See* Ex. 2 (the boxes relating to the issuance of proceedings after the vacatur of a Section 235(b)(1) order are not checked).

<sup>2</sup> The copy of the ROR submitted with this filing is missing page 4.

and reported weekly to ICE via his phone and appeared at the ICE officer when requested.

30. On May 15, 2025, ICE detained Mr. Gueye at his scheduled in-person check-in. He has been detained since that time at the Denver Contract Detention Facility. Ex. 1, ICE Detainee Locator.

31. On May 29, 2025, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services granted Mr. Gueye's Form I-797, Application for Employment Authorization, which is valid until May 28, 2030. Ex. 7, Form I-797 approval.

### **LEGAL BACKGROUND**

#### *Immigration Detention Authority (8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226)*

32. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. 104-208, which set forth separate procedures for the removal and detention of arriving or recently arrived noncitizens and those who have entered and established a presence in the United States, even those who have done so in violation of the immigration laws. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225 ("Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing"), with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 ("Apprehension and detention of aliens"), 1229a ("Removal proceedings"). For those individuals with an established presence in the United States, the INA mandates that "an immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of a [noncitizen]." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). Removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure from the United States" unless otherwise specified in the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).

33. During the pendency of standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, § 1226 provides for the detention of noncitizens already in the United States, even those who entered illegally or without inspection. While § 1226(c) mandates the detention of certain classes of criminal noncitizens, § 1226(a) sets forth the rule for noncitizens subject to discretionary detention

under § 1226. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). After an arrest, the noncitizen may continue to be detained, released on conditional parole, or released on a bond of at least \$1,500. *Id.*

34. Once a noncitizen is detained, DHS makes an initial custody determination. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). The noncitizen may have the initial custody determination reviewed by an immigration judge, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), and ultimately by the Board, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3).

35. As part of IIRIRA, Congress created an expedited removal process to be implemented during inspection at the border for certain “applicants for admission” deemed to be “arriving aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The INA defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including a [noncitizen] who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters).” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further clarifies that the term “application for admission” has “reference to the application for admission *into* the United States,” making clear that the term applies to those applying to enter into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4) (emphasis added). Notably, individuals subject to expedited removal are not eligible for bond pending completion of their removal hearings. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018); *see id.* at 303 (distinguishing individuals subject to § 1225(b) from those “already present in the United States”).

36. Critically, expedited removal proceedings do not apply to all “applicants for admission.” Instead, they may be applied only to: (1) individuals who are arriving in the United States at a port of entry without valid documents; and (2) those without valid documents who have been in the

United States for less than two years and have not been admitted or paroled. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II); *see Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020). Further, this second subset of individuals—noncitizens who have been in the United States for less than two years and have not been admitted or paroled—only become subject to expedited removal if so designated by DHS. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (granting discretionary authority to apply expedited removal to any or all noncitizens described in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)); *See* Notice, Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139, 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025) (designating the entire subset of noncitizens described in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) subject to expedited removal: noncitizens “determined to be inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7)] who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not affirmatively shown . . . that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for if so designated by DHS.”).

37. Noncitizens placed in expedited removal proceedings are referred to standard removal proceedings under § 1229a if they establish a credible fear of persecution if removed. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Otherwise, the noncitizen is ordered removed “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). Further, any noncitizen “subject to the procedures under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv).

38. Finally, § 1225(b)(2) mandates the detention of certain “applicants for admission” not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Yet in keeping with the statute’s focus on arriving aliens, the statute does not mandate detention for all applicants for admission. Instead, § 1225(b)(2)(A) only mandates the detention of “an applicant for admission” when “the examining immigration officer determines” that the noncitizen who “seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.”

39. Courts and the U.S. Government have consistently taken the position that noncitizens who have entered without inspection and are encountered in the United States years after their initial entry are entitled to removal proceedings under § 1229a and subject to detention under § 1226. *See, e.g., Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303 (“While the language of §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) is quite clear, §1226(c) is even clearer. As noted, § 1226 applies to aliens *already present in the United States.*”) (emphasis added); IIRIRA Implementing Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”). This is because these individuals are not “seeking admission.” *See Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that a noncitizens who has been residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be classified as an “alien seeking admission”); *Martinez v. Hyde*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211 (D. Mass. 2025); (rejecting the Government’s “novel interpretation” that 1225(b) applies to noncitizens detained while present in the United States).

40. Despite amending the INA numerous times since passing IIRIRA, *see, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005*, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, Congress has never seen fit to clarify or alter this universally accepted interpretation of the statute.

41. Yet in July 2025, the Government abruptly rejected the reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) it had embraced when IIRIRA was first enacted and over three decades since. In a complete reversal, “DHS, in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ) . . . revisited its legal position on detention and release authorities,” and issued guidance instructing all ICE employees that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 rather than § 1226 “is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for

admission.” Ex. 8, ICE Memorandum: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission. This policy has since been vacated. *Bautista*, 2025 WL 3713987.

42. And in September 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted DHS’s novel statutory reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board found no distinction between the statutory terms “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission,” and concluded that § 1225(b)(2) must be read to include all noncitizens who have not been inspected and admitted at any point. *Id.* at 221-22. Further, the Board asserted that legislative history supported its construction, although it did not cite any legislative history addressing the detention statutes. *Id.* at 223-25.

43. Courts that have reviewed this issue have almost universally rejected Respondents’ new reading of the statute. *See, e.g., Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar*, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025); *Hernandez Vazquez v. Baltazar*, 1:25-cv-3049 (D. Colo. Oct. 23, 2025); *Loa Caballero v. Baltazar*, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025); *Moya Pineda v. Baltazar*, No. 1:25-cv-2966 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025); *Mendoza Gutierrez*, 2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025); *Garcia Cortes v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); *Ortiz Ventura v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01429-MSN-WBP (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2025); *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025); *Salazar v. Dedos*, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Galdamez Martinez v. Noem, et al.*, 2025 WL 3471575 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025); *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025).

44. Notwithstanding the resounding rejection of DHS and DOJ’s policy, Respondents continue to defend the policy. Yet this policy deprives Mr. Gueye of any process by subjecting him—with limited criminal history and with many years residence in the United States—to the same

mandatory detention provisions as applicants at the border seeking to initially enter the United States.

*Parole Release Provisions*

45. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), on a warrant issued by the government, “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. . . .

[The government] may release the alien on. . . (B) conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B).

46. Under 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8), “any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)], under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) and (3)]; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”

47. This provision includes the agency’s ability to release a noncitizen on their own recognizance through conditional parole.

48. “Release on recognizance constitutes a form of conditional parole from detention housed in the provisions of § 1226’s discretionary detention.” *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-CV-04836 (OEM), 2025 WL 2772765, at \*6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (citing *Cruz-Miguel v. Holder*, 650 F.3d 189, 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between being paroled into the United States and being released on recognizance, noting that they serve “distinct functions”); *see also Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 484–86 (where petitioner was initially arrested under § 236 and later released on recognizance, finding that petitioner was detained under § 1226); *Martinez*, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 215 (where a petitioner was released on her own recognizance, concluding that it “does not indicate that she was examined or detained under section 1225 but instead explicitly premises

her release on section 1226 (“[i]n accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act’”); *Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales*, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a noncitizen released on an “Order of Release on Recognizance” necessarily must have been detained and released under § 1226, including because he was not an “arriving alien” under the regulations governing § 1225 examinations); *Gomes v. Hyde*, 25-CV-11571 (JEK), — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 1869299, \*5 (D. Mass July 7, 2025) (noting that “the government may release a noncitizen detained under Section 1226(a) on an Order of Recognizance, which is a form of conditional parole”); *Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez*, 28 I. & N. Dec. 747, 747 (B.I.A. 2023) (“The respondents were ... released on their own recognizance pursuant to DHS’ conditional parole authority under ...8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)(2)(B)[.]”).

49. Mr. Gueye’s custody determination and ROR fell under the authority provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

### **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

#### **COUNT ONE**

#### ***Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act Arbitrary Detention; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226***

50. Mr. Gueye realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

51. This Court should rule that Mr. Gueye is subject to detention under § 1226(a), and not detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Although DHS initially detained and released Mr. Gueye under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 in 2018, three years later, DHS arrested, re-detained and subsequently released Mr. Gueye subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), as evidenced by his ROR.

52. Release on an ROR is only permitted through 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and the attendant regulations. Thus, DHS converted Mr. Gueye’s status through its actions.

53. Because Mr. Gueye is not detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, the Court should order that Respondents cannot subject him to mandatory detention and order his release. In the alternative to ordering release, the Court should order that Mr. Gueye can only be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and therefore order the government to conduct a bond hearing to determine whether he is a danger to society or a flight risk.

**COUNT TWO**  
*Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act*  
*Arbitrary Detention; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226*

54. Mr. Gueye realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

55. Despite the overwhelming authority across the country concluding to the contrary, Respondents continue to argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) permits mandatory detention of individuals who have historically been understood to be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This contrary reading of the statute has been overwhelmingly rejected in more than two hundred district courts decisions that have ruled on the issue and on a class-wide basis. *See supra* ¶ 43; *see also Morales Rodriguez v. Arnott*, No. 6:25-cv-836-MDH (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2025); *Singh v. Lyons*, No. 1:25-cv-1606, 2025 WL 2932635 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2025); *S.D.B.B. v. Johnson*, No. 1:25-cv-882 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-2428, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299; *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

56. As the Supreme Court recognized in *Jennings*, § 1225(b) focuses on individuals arriving at the border and ports of entry and thus are in the process of “seeking admission.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297, 303; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (addressing noncitizens who are geographically “coming or attempting to come into the United States.”). Conversely, § 1226(a) focuses on individuals who

are in the United States and the government is seeking to remove through removal proceedings. *Id.* at 303. The INA further clarifies that the term “application for admission” has “reference to the application for admission into the United States,” making clear that the term applies to those applying to enter into the United States physically. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4). Mr. Gueye cannot reasonably be described as “seeking admission” to a country he has resided in for years. The titles of the two statutory sections make this distinction clear. *Compare* 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing”), *with* 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (“Apprehension and detention of aliens”).

57. Furthermore, equating the term “applicant for admission” with “seeking admission,” as EOIR has concluded in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, would render the phrase “seeking admission” superfluous because it violates principle that Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in choosing different words in a statute, such that different words and phrases should be accorded different meanings.” *Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 489; *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[N]o clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”); *accord Mendoza Gutierrez*, 2025 WL 2962908, at \*7. Section 1225’s mandatory detention regime applies to noncitizens who meet three criteria; first, the noncitizen must be “an ‘applicant for admission’ (a ‘term of art’ in the INA that includes noncitizens who ‘arrive[] in the United States,’ as well as those already ‘present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted,’” second, the noncitizen must be “actively ‘seeking admission’ to the country,” and third, the noncitizen must be “one whom an examining immigration officer determines ‘is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” *Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 488 (quoting *Martinez*, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 214).

58. The ordinary meaning of the terms “seeking” and “admission” do not apply to noncitizens, like Mr. Gueye, who are not actively seeking inspection to enter the United States but instead have

been residing in the country for years. *Jose Alejandro v. Olson*, 2025 WL 2896348 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025). In 2021, the government made the determination to no longer treat Mr. Gueye as an arriving alien, but rather as an applicant for admission when it issued the ROR.

59. Additionally, applying § 1225(b)(2) to all noncitizens except those who have been admitted could not have been Congress's intent because it would render other mandatory detention provisions, such as § 1226(c)(1)(E), unnecessary. *Sampiao*, 2025 WL 2607924, at \*8; *Rodriguez Vasquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at \*7. Section 1225(c) requires mandatory detention for individuals who are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and who are subject to specific criminal conduct criteria. *Sampiao*, 2025 WL 2607924, at \*8. If all noncitizens who are inadmissible are subject to mandatory detention, there would be no reason for Congress to have enumerated which inadmissible noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). *Id.* If Congress intended § 1225(b) detention to extend to all noncitizens who have not been admitted, the recent amendments would be surplusage. *Sampiao*, 2025 WL 2607924, at \*8 (citing *Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp.*, 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“The canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”)). For these reasons, the plain language of § 1225(b)(2)(A) demonstrate that an individual, such as Mr. Gueye, is not an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” to the United States.

60. Thus, this Court must find that to subject Mr. Gueye to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) would be a clear violation of the INA.

**COUNT THREE**  
*Violation of Substantive Due Process*  
*Arbitrary Detention; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226*

61. Mr. Gueye realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

62. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Indeed, the liberty interest in freedom from detention “is the most elemental of liberty interests.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).

63. Mr. Gueye has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint, and the government’s new, erroneous classification of him as an “arriving alien” who is “seeking admission” to the United States and thus subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without any avenue to challenge that detention violates his substantive right to due process.

64. Respondents’ insistence that Mr. Gueye remain in immigration custody pursuant to these policies is a violation of his due process rights.

**COUNT FOUR**  
*Violation of Procedural Due Process*  
*Arbitrary Detention; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226*

65. Mr. Gueye realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

66. The Supreme Court has been clear that for noncitizens “on the threshold of initial entry . . . [w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process.” *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (emphasis added). However, Mr. Gueye—after having been released on his own recognizance pursuant to § 1226(a)—is no longer on the threshold of initial entry. Indeed, it is well established that noncitizens like Mr. Gueye who “once passed through our gates, even illegally” are entitled to greater constitutional protections. *Id.*; see also *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693 (“It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to [noncitizens] outside of our geographic

borders.”). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Because Mr. Gueye is not properly detained under § 1225(b)(2), his detention does not comply with due process.

67. Mr. Gueye has a strong private interest in remaining free from detention. Indeed, the Supreme Court has affirmed that even for noncitizens, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. And the Supreme Court, recognizing the strong private interest in remaining free from detention, has held “that detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and narrow non-punitive circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

68. While the government has an interest in ensuring Mr. Gueye’s appearance at his removal proceedings and protecting the community, the government cannot plausibly justify denying a bond hearing based on “administrative burdens” when it has twice released Mr. Gueye from immigration custody and he has never been convicted of a crime or missed an ICE check-in.

69. Finally, this case demonstrates the high risk of erroneous deprivation that would result from allowing DHS to detain noncitizens like Mr. Gueye without any opportunity to challenge his detention. Without an order from this Court, there is a high probability that Mr. Gueye would be detained even though his continued detention serves no non-punitive purpose as it is unnecessary to protect the community or to ensure his appearance at his removal proceedings.

70. In Respondents' contrasting version of the INA, as espoused in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, Mr. Gueye may be stripped of any mechanism to require the government to justify his detention. Such a lack of any process, necessarily leading to an erroneous deprivation of liberty, cannot be supported by the Constitution.

#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Gueye requests that this Court:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Order under the All Writs Act that Mr. Gueye not be removed from this District while this petition is pending;
- (3) Issue an order requiring Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- (4) Declare that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Mr. Gueye detention by U.S. immigration authorities;
- (5) Order that Mr. Gueye be released from immigration custody with all of his personal belongings under the reporting and monitoring conditions of his prior release;
- (6) Alternatively, order a bond hearing as authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at which 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) cannot be applied, DHS bears the burden of proof, and the immigration judge considers Mr. Gueye's ability to pay bond as part of the factors in setting bond; and
- (7) Grant any other and further relief this Court deems just and proper.
- (8) Grant attorneys' fees and costs of this suit under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(2), *et seq.*;
- (9) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 9, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sarah L. Vuong  
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**VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF PURSUANT  
TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am Petitioner's attorney. I have reviewed documents provided by Petitioner and his sponsor and spoken with Petitioner's sponsor relating to the events described in this Petition. Based on those discussions and documents Petitioner's sponsor has provided to me, I hereby verify that the statements made in this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: January 9, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sarah L. Vuong  
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