

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMAR JEIREB,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMAL L. JAMISON, in his official capacity as
the Warden of the Philadelphia Federal
Detention Center, MICHAEL T. ROSE, Acting
Field Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

Respondents.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Case No. 2:26-cv-70

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Amar Jeireb is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center (“FDC”). He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, contrary to the law.

2. Petitioner entered the United States around February 1, 2024, without inspection.

3. After his entry, he was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) within the United States, near Otay Mesa, California. Thereafter, on or about February 2, 2024, he was released on an Order of Release on Recognizance (OREC). *Id.* At that time, Petitioner was also issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) and placed in removal proceedings, wherein he was charged as having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); *see also*, Exhibit A, containing NTA. He was not charged as an “arriving alien.” *Id.* He thereafter timely filed an I-589, application for asylum. That application remains pending. As an asylum applicant, Petitioner has work authorization and social security number.

4. On January 2, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE near his home.

5. Based on the allegations and charges in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS has denied or will deny Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all ICE employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

6. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an

immigrant judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond or even submit a bond request to the immigration judge. On May 15, 2025, the BIA previously issued a precedent decision, binding on all IJs, holding that an IJ has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who was released from detention pursuant to a grant of parole under section 212(d)(5)(a). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

7. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

8. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

9. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released immediately.

JURISDICTION

10. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

12. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

16. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and

receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

17. Petitioner Amar Jeireb is alleged to be a native and citizen of Mauritania who has been in immigration detention since January 2, 2026. After arresting Petitioner in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ICE did not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an immigration judge, pursuant to the Board’s decisions in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).

18. Respondent Jamal L. Jamison is employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons as Warden of the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

19. Respondent Michael T. Rose is the Acting Director of the Philadelphia Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Michael Rose is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

20. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

21. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

22. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

23. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

24. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

25. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119–1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

26. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

27. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

28. On May 15, 2025, the BIA issued a precedent decision, binding on all IJs, holding that IJ has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who was released from detention pursuant to a grant of parole under section 212(d)(5)(a). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

29. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

30. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

31. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA’s detention authorities in over 1,600 decisions. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. In over 1,600 cases² decided by over 300 different judges across the United States, the policy

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

² A January 6, 2026, Politico article notes that “More than 300 federal judges, including appointees of every president since Ronald Reagan, have now rebuffed the administration’s six-month-old

and/or *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* have been completely rejected. *Barco Mercado v. Francis et al.*, No. 25-06582, ECF No. 28 at *9-10, *35-40 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025). *See also, Demirel v. Federal Detention Center Philadelphia, et al.*, No. 25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (provided full list of cases as of November 18, 2025). Court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025);

effort to expand its so-called "mandatory detention" policy, according to a POLITICO analysis of court dockets from across the country. Those judges have ordered immigrants' release or the opportunity for bond hearings in more than 1,600 cases." *See <https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/05/trump-administration-immigrants-mandatory-detention-00709494>* (Last accessed January 6, 2026).

Vasquez Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

32. Indeed, within the Third Circuit, the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the District of New Jersey have all rejected ICE and EOIR’s new interpretation. *See Rios Porras v. O’Neill*, 2025 WL 3708900 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (Beetlestone, C.J.); *Pereira v. O’Neill*, 2025 WL 3516665 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Marston, J.); *Conde v. Jamison*, 2025 WL 3499256 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025) (Brody, J.); *Suspes v. Rose*, 2025 WL 3492820 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025) (Brody, J.); *Hidalgo et al. v. O’Neill*, No. 25-cv-6775 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025) (Diamond, J.); *Delgado Villegas v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-6143 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2025) (Diamond, J.); *Nogueira-Mendes v. McShane*, 2025 WL 3473364 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025) (Slomsky, J.); *Juarez v. O’Neill*, 2025 WL 3473363 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025) (Henry, J.); *Yilmaz v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia*, 2025 WL 3459484 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (Rufe, J.); *Soumare v. Jamison*, 2025 WL 3461542 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (Henry, J.); *Flores Obando v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3452047 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025) (Brody, J.); *Wu v. Jamison*, No. 25-cv-6469 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025) (J. Gallagher); *Valdivia Martinez v. FDC*, No. 25-cv-6568 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025) (J. Savage); *Morocho v. Jamison*, 2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26,

2025) (Gallagher, J.); *Diallo v. O'Neill*, 2025 WL 3298003 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025) (Savage, J.); *Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia*, 2025 WL 3294726 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.); *Espinal Rosa v. O'Neill*, No. 25-cv-6376 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Weilheimer, J.); *Patel v. McShane*, 2025 WL 3241212 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025) (Brody, J.); *Ndiaye v. Jamison*, 2025 WL 3229307 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2025) (Sánchez, J.); *Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia*, 2025 WL 3218243 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (Diamond, J.); *Kashranov v. Jamison*, 2025 WL 3188399 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (Wolson, J.); *Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill*, 2025 WL 3171639 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.). *Del Cid v. Bondi*, 3:25-cv-00304, 2025 WL 2985150 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025); *Zumba v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025); *Bethancourt Soto v. Louis Soto, et al.*, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL 2976572 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025); *Lomeu v. Soto, et al.*, No. 25CV16589 (EP), 2025 WL 2981296, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025).

33. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. Finding that the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

34. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

35. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). "When Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*,

779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

36. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

37. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

38. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered the United States and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

FACTS

39. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-6, *supra*.

40. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center, ICE presumptively issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

41. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li*, the immigration judge is unable to consider Petitioner's bond request.

42. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS WARRANTED

43. The Supreme Court has recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure *release* from unlawful detention.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 107, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020) (emphasis in original). Several decisions from the Eastern District have ordered immediate release in similar cases. *See eg. Bhatia v. O’Neill, et al*, No. 25-6809, Dkt. 8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); *Rodrigues Pereira v. O’Neill, et al*. No. 25-6543, Dkt. 11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025); *Morocho v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 25-05930, 2025 WL 3296300, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025); *Diallo v. O’Neill, et al.*, 25-06358, Dkt. 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025); *Patel v. McShane, et al.*, 25-05975 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025). The Court should not depart from this norm.

44. As noted above, over a thousand district court decisions addressing the legal issues presented in the underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and rejected the government’s position. *Barco Mercado v. Francis et al.*, No. 25-06582, ECF No. 28 at *9-10, *35-40 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025). Those Courts have roundly rejected Government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); the interpretation that is part of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond; the interpretation is part of the BIA’s precedential decisions, holding that an immigration

judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered without admission or the BIA's precedential decision holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who anyone who was encountered after an entry without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025); *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).

45. Many of these decisions have found that Respondents' erroneous application of the law violates the respective detainees constitutional right to Due Process. *See eg. Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill*, No. 25-6338, 2025 WL 317639 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025); *Sanchez Ballestros v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2880831 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 9, 2025); *Hernandez-Alonso v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 3083920 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2025); *Rodriguez Serrano v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3122825 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025); *Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem*, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); *Rosales Ponce v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3049785 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025); *Loza Valencia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3042520 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *Cuevas Guzman v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *E.C. v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2916264 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025); *Garcia Domingo v. Castro*, 2025 WL 2941217 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025); *Artiga v. Genalo*, 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).

46. Despite this *overwhelming rejection* of Respondents' new policies and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li*, and hundreds of decisions finding that Respondents are violating the constitutional rights, **Respondents refuse to relent and continue act in defiance of the law and the Constitution.** It has been reported that ICE agents inform detainees that they "have to sue us [ICE] to get out."

47. Petitioner is now one of the approximately 61,000 people detained by Respondents.³ Respondents' unlawful behavior is pervasive and defies decision after decision from the Courts. As Petitioner's arrest and detention were blatantly unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and appropriate equitable remedy to even partially restore Petitioner is to immediately release him and enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions. *See, eg. Martinez v. McAleenan*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I Violation of the INA

48. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

49. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and were already in the United States, prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

50. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II Violation of the Bond Regulations

³ See ICE's publicly available detention data, available at: <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management>

51. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

52. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

53. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q.Li*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

54. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

55. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

56. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

57. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

58. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. **Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Eastern District of Pennsylvania while this habeas petition is pending;**
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents **immediately release Petitioner;**
- e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 7th day of January 2026.

s/ Caitlin Costello, Esq.
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