

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JIANGFEI GU,	)	CASE NO.: 3:26CV36
	)	
Petitioner,	)	JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department	)	<u>RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF</u>
of Homeland Security, KEVIN RAYCRAFT ¹ ,	)	<u>HABEAS CORPUS</u>
Acting Field Office Director, Detroit Field	)	
Office, Immigration and Customs	)	
Enforcement, DENNIS SULLIVAN,	)	
Executive Director of Corrections Center of	)	
Northwest Ohio,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	

¹ Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Respondent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Acting Director Kevin Raycraft is substituted for Robert Lynch.

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether this Court has jurisdiction to Order release or a bond hearing at Immigration Court when 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and (g) strips this Court of jurisdiction; the Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies; and the Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court does not have jurisdiction to order the relief sought because the decision to detain is part of the decision to commence removal proceedings. Furthermore, any question of interpretation and application of statutory provisions as applied to Petitioner is only available in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Furthermore, Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, so, if this Court were to have jurisdiction, the Petition should be denied on that basis. Finally, as an applicant for admission, Petitioner is properly denied.

Petitioner Jiangfei Gu (“Petitioner”) is lawfully detained. He is an inadmissible alien who entered the United States without admission or parole. Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his continued detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and seeing, *inter alia*, immediate release or in the alternative, a bond hearing within five days. (Pet. ECF No. 1, PageID # 14.) Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, his petition must be denied.²

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a native of the Peoples Republic of China, alleges that he has been present in the United States since April 2024. (Pet. ECF No. 1, PageID # 1.) Petitioner “initially entered the United States at San Ysidro, CA, without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer at a port of entry.” *See* Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, Oct. 28, 2025, attached hereto as Exhibit A. On May 24, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). *Id.* The NTA is the charging document used to initiate removal proceedings before an immigration judge under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, in lieu of expedited removal.

On October 14, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody after he was apprehended on the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit, Michigan, and Canada. Ex. A. On October 22, 2025,

² A writ of habeas corpus may only be issued by the person having custody of the detainee. In the ICE habeas context, that person is the Field Office Director for ICE. *Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Secretary Noem and Executive Director Sullivan are not proper respondents. *Mendoza v. Raycraft*, No. 4:25cv2183, 2025 WL 3157796, *8 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025).

Petitioner filed a request for bond redetermination. *Id.* After a redetermination hearing on October 28, 2025, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s request for redetermination and cited two bases for his denial. *Id.* First, the IJ found that he lacked the authority to redetermine the respondent’s detention status because Petitioner was being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *Id.* Second, the IJ found that Petitioner had not met his burden of establishing that he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community. *Id.* The IJ noted that Petitioner entered the United States in California, admitted that he had been working in Arizona at a marijuana farm, and was apprehended on the Ambassador Bridge between Michigan and Canada. *Id.* Additionally, Petitioner’s phone contained photographs of firearms. *Id.*

On January 6, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant action on seeking, *inter alia*, immediate release or in the alternative, a bond hearing within five days. Pet. ECF No. 1, PageID # 15. Petitioner is scheduled for an immigration hearing on January 26, 2026. Ex. B. Petitioner is currently detained at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio in Stryker, Ohio. Pet. ECF No. 1 PageID # 1.

II. ARGUMENT

A. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 12(B)(1)

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars review of Petitioner’s claims.

Section 1252(g) categorically bars jurisdiction over “*any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.*” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). The Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to *commence removal proceedings*, includes the decision to detain an alien pending such removal proceedings. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars

us from questioning ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal” and also to review “ICE’s decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings”); *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 975 F.3d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 2020); *Valencia-Mejia v. United States*, No. CV 08–2943 CAS (PJWx), 2008 WL 4286979, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008); *Wang v. United States*, No. CV 10-0389 SVW (RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) (citing *Khorrami v. Rolince*, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Ill. 2007); *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. CV 08-2941 DSF (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008) (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007))). Judicial review of the Petitioner’s claim, therefore, is barred by § 1252(g).

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars review of Petitioner’s claims.

Under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the appropriate court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final removal order. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause” that “channels judicial review of all [claims arising from deportation proceedings]” to a court of appeals in the first instance. *Id.* Moreover, § 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) [concerning aliens not admitted to the United States].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean that any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any removal-related activity can be reviewed only through the [petition-for-review] process.” *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.

2016) (emphasis in original); *accord Ruiz v. Mukasey*, 552 F.3d 269, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (only when the action is “unrelated to any removal action or proceeding” is it within the district court’s jurisdiction); *cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 434 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (a “primary effect” of the REAL ID Act is to “limit all aliens to one bite of the apple” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Critically, “[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” *See also Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review process before the court of appeals ensures that aliens have a proper forum for claims arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.” *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*, 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [INA] to obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of “nondiscretionary” BIA determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of law.”).

In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v. Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018) (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien] in the first place or to seek removal[.]”).

Here, Petitioner challenges the decision and action to detain her, which arises from DHS's decision to commence removal proceedings, and is thus an "action taken . . . to remove [her] from the United States." *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *see also, e.g., Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024). As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. The reasoning in *Jennings* outlines why the Petitioner's claims cannot be reviewed by the Court.

The fact that the Petitioner is challenging the basis upon which she is detained is enough to trigger § 1252(b)(9) because "detention is an 'action taken . . . to remove' an alien." *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 319 (Thomas, J., concurring); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Court should dismiss the Petitioner's claims for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9). The Petitioner must present her claims before the appropriate court of appeals because she challenges the government's decision or action to detain her, which must be raised before a court of appeals, not this Court. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

Congress severely limited this Court's jurisdiction to three narrowly tailored issues: whether petitioner is an alien; whether the petitioner was ordered removed; and whether petitioner has been lawfully admitted and such status has not been terminated. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). Petitioner is not challenging any of those three things in the Petition; therefore, the statute does not confer this Court with jurisdiction.

B. PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Court should dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction as Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. A habeas petitioner must normally exhaust administrative remedies before seeking federal court intervention. The exhaustion requirement "aims to provide the agency with a chance to correct its own errors, 'protect[] the

authority of administrative agencies,’ and otherwise conserve judicial resources by ‘limiting interference in agency affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.’ *Beharry v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J.).

In similar habeas petitions filed in this district, other judges have dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. *Monroy Villalta v. Greene*, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528 (N.D. Ohio 2025); *Mendoza v. Raycraft*, No. 4:25cv2183, 2025 WL 3157796 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025); *Ba v. Dir. of Detroit Field Office, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t.*, No. 4:25-cv-02208, 2025 WL 2977712 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025); *Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Office, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t.*, No. 4:25-cv-02107, 2025 WL 2878173 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025); *Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25-cv-01621, 2025 WL 2444114 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025).

Here, Petitioner has not availed himself of the administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner is still in removal proceedings and has a hearing on January 26, 2026. Ex. B. This hearing may moot out the case sub judice.

C. PETITIONER IS PROPERLY DETAINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1225

1. Applicants for admission are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

“As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.” *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (citing *Lamie v. U.S. Tr.*, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); see *Matter of Velasquez-Cruz*, 26 I&N Dec. 458, 463 n.5 (BIA 2014). Accordingly, by its very definition, the term “applicant for admission” includes two categories of aliens: (1) arriving aliens, and (2)

aliens present without admission. *See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission’” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)); *Matter of Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“Congress has defined the concept of an ‘applicant for admission’ in an unconventional sense, to include not just those who are expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who are present in this country without having formally requested or received such permission”); *Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 520, 523 (BIA 2011). An arriving alien is defined, in pertinent part, as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry [“POE”]]” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q).

All aliens who are applicants for admission “shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a). An applicant for admission seeking admission at a United States POE “must present whatever documents are required and must establish to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not subject to removal . . . and is entitled, under all of the applicable provisions of the immigration laws . . . to enter the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(1); *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (describing the related burden of an applicant for admission in removal proceedings). “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled or an alien who seeks entry at other than an open, designated [POE] . . . is subject to the provisions of [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)] and to removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] or [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(2).

Here, Petitioner did not present himself at a POE. He admits that he entered the United States without admission or inspection. Ex A. Petitioner is, therefore, an alien present without admission and, consequently, an applicant for admission. *Id.*

Both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission, as applicants for admission, may be removed from the United States by, inter alia, expedited removal procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or removal proceedings before an IJ under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), 1229a; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (describing how “applicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)”).

2. Applicants for admission in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Applicants for admission, such as Petitioner, whom DHS places in § 1229a removal proceedings are subject to detention and ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ. Specifically, aliens present without admission placed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings are both applicants for admission as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and aliens “seeking admission,” as contemplated in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Such aliens are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287; *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), (B). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a]” “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(3) (providing that an alien placed into 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings in lieu of expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 “shall be detained” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (providing that “any arriving alien . . . placed in

removal proceedings pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1229a] shall be detained in accordance with [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)]” unless paroled pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)).

Thus, according to the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants for admission in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings “shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). “The ‘strong presumption’ that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances,’” *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991) (quoting *Rubin v. United States*, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); see *Lamie*, 540 U.S. at 534 (“It is well established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (quotation marks omitted)). As the Supreme Court observed in *Jennings*, nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.” 583 U.S. at 297. Further, there is no textual basis for arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to arriving aliens. The distinction the Attorney General drew in the 1997 Interim Rule (addressed in detail below) between “arriving aliens,” see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q), and “aliens who are present without being admitted or paroled,” Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997), finds no purchase in the statutory text. No provision within 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) refers to “arriving aliens,” or limits that paragraph to arriving aliens, as Congress intended for it to apply generally “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Where Congress means for a rule to apply only to “arriving aliens,” it uses that specific term of art or similar phrasing. See, e.g., *id.* §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), 1225(c)(1).

On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a published decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In its decision, the BIA affirmed “the Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.” *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 220.

The BIA concluded that aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’” *Id.* at 228. To hold otherwise would lead to an “incongruous result” that rewards aliens who unlawfully enter the United States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for number of years. *Id.*

In so concluding, the BIA rejected the alien’s argument that “because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years . . . he cannot be considered as ‘seeking admission.’” *Id.* at 221. The BIA determined that this argument “is not supported by the plain language of the INA” and creates a “legal conundrum.” *Id.* If the alien “is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not ‘seeking admission’ (as he contends), then what is his legal status?” *Id.* (parentheticals in original). The BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is consistent with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in *Jennings* and other caselaw issued subsequent to *Jennings*. Specifically, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies to all applicants for admission, noting that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is “quite clear” and “unequivocally mandate[s]” detention. 583 U.S. at 300, 303 (explaining that “the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a

requirement” (quoting *Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States*, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016))).

Similarly, relying on *Jennings* and the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a), the Attorney General, in *Matter of M-S-*, unequivocally recognized that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a) do not overlap but describe “different classes of aliens.” 27 I&N Dec. at 516. This ongoing evolution of the law makes clear that all applicants for admission are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). *Cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021) (“no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command”); *see generally Florida v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (explaining that “the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit”). *Florida*’s conclusion “that § 1225(b)’s ‘shall be detained’ means what it says and . . . is a mandatory requirement . . . flows directly from *Jennings*.” *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.

Given 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is the applicable detention authority for all applicants for admission—both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission alike, regardless of whether the alien was initially processed for expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or placed directly into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a—and “[b]oth [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)] mandate detention . . . throughout the completion of applicable proceedings,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 301–03, IJs do not have authority to redetermine the custody status of an alien present without admission.

Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien present without admission), placed directly into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. He is therefore subject to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible for a custody

redetermination hearing before an IJ. “It is well established . . . that the Immigration Judges only have the authority to consider matters that are delegated to them by the Attorney General and the [INA].” *Matter of A-W-*, 25 I&N Dec. 45, 46 (BIA 2009). “In the context of custody proceedings, an Immigration Judge’s authority to redetermine conditions of custody is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) . . .” *Id.* at 46. The regulation clearly states that “the [IJ] is authorized to exercise the authority in [8 U.S.C. § 1226].” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d); *see id.* § 1003.19(a) (authorizing IJs to review “[c]ustody and bond determinations made by [DHS] pursuant to 8 C.F.R. part 1236”); *see id.* § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (“[A]n IJ may not redetermine conditions of custody imposed by [DHS] with respect to . . . [a]rriving aliens in removal proceedings, including aliens paroled after arrival pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).]”). “An [IJ] is without authority to disregard the regulations, which have the force and effect of law.” *Matter of L-M-P-*, 27 I&N Dec. 265, 267 (BIA 2018).

Aliens present without admission in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings are both applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and aliens seeking admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As discussed above, such aliens placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a are applicants for admission as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing before the IJ. Such aliens are also considered “seeking admission,” as contemplated in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). To be sure, “many people who are not actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. at 743; *see Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 221; *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 68 n.3 (BIA 2025); *see also Matter of Valenzuela-Felix*, 26 I&N Dec. 53, 56 (BIA 2012) (explaining that “an application for admission [i]s a continuing one”).

In analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), the Supreme Court in *Jennings* equated “applicants for admission” with aliens “seeking admission.” See *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. As noted above, the Supreme Court stated that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* at 287. In doing so, it specifically cited 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—and thus did not appear to consider aliens “seeking admission” to be a subcategory of applicants for admission. *Id.* The Supreme Court also stated that “[a]liens who are instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process . . . [and] ‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’” *Id.* at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The Supreme Court considered all aliens covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to be subject to detention under subparagraph (A)—not just a subset of such aliens. Moreover, *Jennings* found that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States (‘applicants for admission’ in the language of the statute).” *Id.* at 297 (emphases added). The Court therefore considered aliens seeking admission and applicants for admission to be virtually indistinguishable; it did not consider them to be merely a subcategory of applicants for admission.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner, as an alien present without admission in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings, is an applicant for admission and an alien seeking admission and is therefore subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing before an IJ.

3. Applicants for admission may only be released from detention on an 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) parole.

Importantly, applicants for admission may only be released from detention if DHS invokes its discretionary parole authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). DHS has the exclusive authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien applying for admission to the United States”

on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court placed significance on the fact that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) is the specific provision that authorizes release from detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), at DHS’s discretion. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300. Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[r]egardless of which of those two sections authorizes . . . detention, [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2)(A)], applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole” *Id.* at 288.

Parole, like an admission, is a factual occurrence. *See Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010); *Matter of Roque-Izada*, 29 I&N Dec. 106 (BIA 2025) (treating whether an alien was paroled as a question of fact). The parole authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) is “delegated solely to the Secretary of Homeland Security.” *Matter of Castillo-Padilla*, 25 I&N Dec. 257, 261 (BIA 2010); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a). Thus, neither the BIA nor IJs have authority to parole an alien into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Castillo-Padilla*, 25 I&N Dec. at 261; *see also Matter of Arrabally*, 25 I&N Dec. 771, 777 n.5 (BIA 2002) (indicating that “parole authority [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] is now exercised exclusively by the DHS” and “reference to the Attorney General in [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] is thus deemed to refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security”); *Matter of Singh*, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 434 (BIA 1996) (providing that “neither the [IJ] nor th[e] Board has jurisdiction to exercise parole power”). Further, because DHS has exclusive jurisdiction to parole an alien into the United States, the manner in which DHS exercises its parole authority may not be reviewed by an IJ or the BIA. *Castillo-Padilla*, 25 I&N Dec. at 261; *see Matter of Castellon*, 17 I&N Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1981) (noting that the BIA does not have authority to review the way DHS exercises its parole authority).

4. Section 1226 does not impact the detention authority for applicants for admission.

Section 1226(a) is the applicable detention authority for aliens who have been admitted and are deportable who are subject to removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1227(a), and 1229a, and does not impact the directive in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) that “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceedings under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a],” *id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A). As the Supreme Court explained, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “applies to aliens already present in the United States” and “creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the [Secretary] to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289, 303; *Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25cv831, 2025 WL 3628229, *9 (S.D. Ohio December 15, 2025) (1226 is inapplicable because petitioner was not arrested on a warrant and is an applicant for admission); *Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 70; *see also M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 516 (describing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as a “permissive” detention authority separate from the “mandatory” detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225).

Generally, such aliens may be released on bond or their own recognizance, also known as “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303, 306. Section 1226(a) does not, however, confer the right to release on bond; rather, both DHS and IJs have broad discretion in determining whether to release an alien on bond as long as the alien establishes that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8); *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 39 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Adeniji*, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999). Further, ICE must detain certain aliens due to their criminal history or national security concerns under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), (c)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(1)(i),

1236.1(c)(1)(i); *see also id.* § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D). Release of such aliens is permitted only in very specific circumstances. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).

Notably, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) references certain grounds of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D)-(E), and the Supreme Court in *Barton v. Barr*—after issuing its decision in *Jennings*—recognized the possibility that aliens charged with certain grounds of inadmissibility could be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 590 U.S. 222, 235 (2020). However, in interpreting provisions of the INA, the Board does not view the language of statutory provisions in isolation but instead “interpret[s] the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and fit[s], if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” *Matter of C-T-L*, 25 I&N Dec. 341, 345 (BIA 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). As the Supreme Court in *Barton* also noted, “redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.” *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239. “Redundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text” *Id.*; *see also Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 222 (“Interpreting the provisions of section [1226(c)] as rendering null and void the provisions of section [1225](b)(2)(A) (or even the provisions of section... 1225(b)(1)), would be in contravention of the ‘cardinal principle of statutory construction,’ which is that courts are to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, rather than to emasculate an entire section.” (quoting *United States v. Menasche*, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955))). The statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)—including the most recent amendment pursuant to the Laken

Riley Act, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), merely reflects a “congressional effort to be doubly sure” that certain aliens are detained. *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239.

III. THE BAUTISTA DECLARATORY JUDGMENT HAS NO IMPACT ON THIS CASE

While not raised by Petitioner, undersigned counsel is compelled to advise this Court that on December 18, 2025, the Central District of California issued a final judgment that a nationwide class of members, such as Petitioner, were unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226(a). *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV1873 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). For three reasons, this judgment, however, does not have preclusive effect and should not be considered as a basis to grant the Petition. First, the judgment cannot have effect outside the district and over custodians located outside the district. Second, the judgment is on appeal. Third, even if issue preclusion is appropriate in habeas, which is doubtful, the government is not situated like a private party which counsels against applying issue preclusion.

The Supreme Court has imposed two fundamental limits on federal court jurisdiction over core habeas claims. *First*, “jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004); *see also Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). *Second*, a habeas petitioner must name the petitioner’s *immediate* custodian—*i.e.*, the custodian who has actual custody over the petitioner and can produce the “corpus.” *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 435. “Failure to name the petitioner’s custodian as a respondent deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction” needed to issue relief. *Stanley v. Cal. Sup. Ct.*, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994); *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 444. Given that a challenge to the legality of detention is a core habeas claim, class-wide declaratory relief is inappropriate in the habeas context. *Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (declaratory judgment action not appropriate to address “validity of a defense the State may, or may not, raise in a habeas proceeding” in part because

“the underlying claim must be adjudicated in a federal habeas proceeding”); *Fusco v. Grondolsky*, No. 17-1062, 2019 WL 13112044, at *1 (1st Cir. June 18, 2019) (declaratory judgment action must be dismissed when habeas available). Indeed, a class-wide declaratory judgment imposed from outside the district of confinement cannot be squared with the district-of-confinement requirement of habeas, where the relief is an order of release, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), not a declaration of legal rights that can later be enforced. *See Calderon*, 523 U.S. at 747 (1998); *Fusco*, 2019 WL 13112044, at *1; *LoBue v. Christopher*, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the “availability of a habeas remedy in another district ousted us of jurisdiction over an alien’s effort to pose a constitutional attack . . . by means of a suit for declaratory judgment”); *Monk v. Sec’y of Navy*, 793 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“In adopting the federal habeas corpus statute, Congress determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a prisoner who claims that he is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States,’ This specific determination must override the general terms of the declaratory judgment . . . statute.”). Here, the *Bautista* class members include individuals, such as Petitioner, who are confined *outside* of the Central District of California by immediate custodians, such as proper respondent Raycraft, who are also *outside* the Central District of California and have not been named in the lawsuit. Indeed, another federal district court has already held that the *Bautista* declaratory judgment does not have preclusive effect. Order, *Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-00226 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 12 (attached as Ex. C).

Even if the *Bautista* declaratory judgment could have preclusive effect outside the Central District of California, that judgment has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, *Bautista, et al. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, et al.*, No. 25-7958 (9th Cir.), and this

Court should not afford preclusive effect to that judgment or to any underlying legal issues in deciding whether to grant habeas relief in this case. Courts should exercise significant caution before giving preclusive effect to declaratory judgments that are on appeal. *Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc.*, 505 F.3d 874, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Wright & Miller § 4433). In the circumstances here—and particularly given the constraints of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)—it would not be proper to impose res judicata effect on a class-wide basis while the declaratory judgment is pending on appeal. *See* 9 A.L.R.2d 984 (the “only one safe way of avoiding conflicting judgments on the same cause . . . [is for] the final decision on the merits of the second suit should be delayed until the decision on appeal has been rendered”).

Finally, even if issue preclusion is available in the habeas context³, it should not be applied to the government. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that ‘the Government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant,’ *INS v. Hibi*, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam), both because of the geographic breadth of government litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the issues the government litigates.” *United States v. Mendoza*, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984). “Government litigation frequently involves legal questions of substantial public importance.” *Id.* at 160. Thus, although the Supreme Court has held the

³ It is doubtful that issue preclusion is ever appropriate in the habeas context. For instance, in *Griffin v. Gomez*, the Ninth Circuit held that a prior “class action has no preclusive affect in habeas proceedings.” *Griffin v. Gomez*, No. 95-16684, 1998 WL 81336 at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998). The court later explained that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to habeas proceedings. *See Clifton v. Att’y Gen.*, 997 F.2d 660, 663 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that because “conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place” in habeas and the inapplicability of res judicate to habeas is “inherent in the very role and function of the writ.”) (quoting *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)); *see also Hardwick v. Doolittle*, 558 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he doctrines of res judicate and collateral estoppel are not applicable in habeas proceedings.”); *Hierens v. Mizell*, 729 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984) (“a decision in another case is not res judicata as to a habeas proceeding.”) (quoting *Warren v. McCall*, 709 F.2d 1183, 1184 n.4 (7th Cir. 1983)).

federal government “may be estopped . . . from relitigating a question when the parties to the lawsuits are the same,” *id.* at 163, 164 (citations omitted), it is not so precluded in cases where the party seeking to offensively use preclusion was not a party to the initial litigation, *see id.* at 162. This is because allowing “nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government . . . would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.” *Id.* at 160. This Court should also decline to give the *Bautista* declaratory judgment preclusive effect given the existence of several inconsistent judgments from district courts around the country, suggesting that reliance on the adverse judgment in *Bautista* would be unfair. *See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979) (citing the existence of prior inconsistent judgments as indicium of unfairness of applying issue preclusion); *see, e.g., Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, No.2:25-cv-09785, 2025 WL 3199872, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-168, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); *Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437, 2025 WL 3033967, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, 4:25-cv-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Topal v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01612, 2025 WL 3486894 (W.D. La. Dec. 3, 2025); *Xiaoquan Chen v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-8350, 2025 WL 3484855 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); *Candido v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-867, 2025 WL 3484932 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025).

IV. CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner’s habeas petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(F)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, the undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that this Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is twenty (20) pages in length and complies with the page limitations for a matter assigned to the standard track.

/s/ Kimberly L. Lubrani

KIMBERLY L. LUBRANI