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5  
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8 Doris Amanda VILLANUEVA-Ramirez

9 Petitioner,

10 v.

11 Cammilla WAMSLEY, Seattle Field Office  
12 Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations,  
United States Immigration and Customs  
13 Enforcement (ICE); Bruce SCOTT, Warden,  
Northwest ICE Processing Center; Kristi  
14 NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of  
Homeland Security; Pamela BONDI, United  
15 States Attorney General; UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND  
16 SECURITY;

17 Respondents.

**Case No. 2:25-cv-2739**

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2241

AGENCY FILE NO:



## INTRODUCTION

1  
2 1. This case challenges the unlawful re-detention of Ms. Doris Amanda Villanueva  
3 Ramirez (Ms. Villanueva) a 25-year-old native of Honduras who came to the United States to seek  
4 asylum in July of 2023.

5 2. Ms. Villanueva came to the United States with her partner and their six year old  
6 daughter. She was detained briefly at the border in July of 2023 and released to seek asylum in  
7 removal proceedings with the issuance of a Notice to Appear. She was placed on an alternative to  
8 detention program which included regular check-ins and uploading photos to the ICE app.

9 3. Ms. Villanueva applied for asylum with her prior attorney and was scheduled for a  
10 hearing with the Portland Immigration Court. She was arrested by ICE in early December, however.  
11 Officers told Ms. Villanueva that she had failed to properly upload her photo into the app, a charge  
12 which she denies. She remains in ICE custody at the Northwest Immigrant Processing Center in  
13 Tacoma, Washington.

14 4. Before re-detaining her, Respondents did not provide Ms. Villanueva with any  
15 written notice explaining the basis for detention, nor was a warrant or other evidence provided to  
16 counsel. The Respondents did not provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where ICE was  
17 required to justify the basis for re-detention or explain why Ms. Villanueva is a flight risk or danger  
18 to the community.

19 5. As this Court has recently held in multiple cases, due process demands a hearing *prior*  
20 to the government's decision to terminate a person's liberty. *See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d  
21 --- No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 2402130, at \*2-6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Tesara v.*  
22 *Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP-TLF, 2025 WL 2637663, at \*2-4 (W.D. Wash.  
23 Sept. 12, 2025); *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, No. 2:25-CV-01404-JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, at \*7-  
-9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Kumar v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-01772-JHC-BAT, 2025 WL 2677089,

1 at \*2–4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025); Report & Recommendation, *Lopez Reyes v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-  
2 cv-01868-JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2025), Dkt. 13. Many other courts have recently held the  
3 same.

4 6. By failing to provide such a hearing, Respondents have violated Ms. Villanueva’s  
5 constitutional right to due process.

6 7. Accordingly, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus  
7 and order her immediate release. *See E.A. T.-B.* 2025 WL 2402130, at \*6 (ordering immediate release  
8 because “a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is  
9 after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty”); *Ramirez Tesara*, at \*4 (similar);  
10 *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at \*3–4 (similar); *Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at \*9 (similar).

### 11 JURISDICTION

12 8. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration  
13 and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

14 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus),  
15 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution  
16 (Suspension Clause).

17 10. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241  
18 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.  
19 § 1651.

### 20 VENUE

21 11. Venue is proper because Ms. Villanueva is in Respondents’ custody at the NWIPC in  
22 Tacoma, Washington. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493–  
23 500 (1973), venue lies in the judicial district in which Ms. Villanueva currently is in custody.

12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western District of Washington.

### REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the Respondents “forthwith,” unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); *see also Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson*, 216 F.2d 735, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1954) (habeas corpus is “a speedy remedy, entitled by statute to special, preferential consideration to insure expeditious hearing and determination”).

### PARTIES

15. Ms. Villanueva is a 25-year-old native of Honduras. She is detained in Tacoma, Washington.

16. Respondent Cammilla Wamsley is the Field Office Director for ICE’s Seattle Field Office. The Seattle Field Office is responsible for local custody decisions relating to noncitizens charged with being removable from the United States. The Seattle Field Office’s area of

1 responsibility includes Alaska, Oregon, and Washington. Respondent Wamsley is a legal custodian  
2 of Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

3 17. Respondent Bruce Scott is employed by the private corporation The GEO Group,  
4 Inc., as Warden of the NWIPC, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of  
5 Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

6 18. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security  
7 (DHS). She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and  
8 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem  
9 has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

10 19. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States, and as such  
11 has authority over the Department of Justice. She is sued in her official capacity.

12 20. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security is the federal agency that has  
13 authority over the actions of ICE.

#### 14 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

15 21. Ms. Villanueva is a 25-year-old native of Honduras.

16 22. She came to the United States in July of 2023, fleeing threats against her and her  
17 family.

18 23. Ms. Villanueva has been overwhelmingly compliant with her custody supervision.  
19 She was accused after being arrested of failing to upload photos into the app, which she denies. Her  
20 asylum application remains pending with EOIR and her removal proceedings are ongoing.

21 24. Prior to Ms. Villanueva's re-arrest, she did not receive written notice of the reason  
22 for her re-detention.

23 25. Prior to her re-arrest, ICE did not assess whether Ms. Villanueva presented a flight  
risk or danger to the community, or whether her re-arrest was justified for some other reason.

1 26. Prior to Ms. Villanueva’s re-detention, she never received a hearing before a neutral  
2 decisionmaker to determine if her re-detention is justified.

### 3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

#### 4 Due Process Principles

5 27. Due process requires that if DHS seeks to re-arrest a person like Ms. Villanueva--  
6 who has lived in the United States without incident since his release from immigration custody in  
7 September of 2023, the government must afford a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to  
8 determine whether any re-detention is justified, and whether the person is a flight risk or danger to  
9 the community.

10 28. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other  
11 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”  
12 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As this Court recently recognized, this is the “the most  
13 elemental of liberty interests.” *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at \*3 (citation modified); *see also*  
14 *Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at \*3 (stating that the petitioner had “an exceptionally strong  
15 interest in freedom from physical confinement”).

16 29. Consistent with this principle, individuals released on parole or other forms of  
17 conditional release have a liberty interest in their “continued liberty.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S.  
18 471, 482 (1972).

19 30. Such liberty is protected by the Fifth Amendment because, “although indeterminate,  
20 [it] includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” such as the ability to be gainfully  
21 employed and live with family, “and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the [released  
22 individual] and often on others.” *Id.*

23 31. To protect against arbitrary re-detention and to ensure the right to liberty, due  
process requires “adequate procedural protections” that test whether the government’s asserted

1 justification for a noncitizen's physical confinement "outweighs the individual's constitutionally  
2 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified).

3 32. Due process thus guarantees notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral  
4 decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk before the revocation of an individual's release. *Goldberg*  
5 *v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the  
6 opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner." (citation modified)); *see*  
7 *also, e.g., Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 485 (requiring "preliminary hearing to determine whether there is  
8 probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed . . . a  
9 violation of parole conditions" and that such determination be made "by someone not directly  
10 involved in the case" (citation modified)).

11 33. Several courts, including this one, have recognized that these principles apply with  
12 respect to the re-detention of the many noncitizens that DHS has arbitrarily begun taking back into  
13 custody, often after such persons have been released for months and years.

14 34. For example, in *E.A. T.-B.*, this Court applied the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319  
15 (1976), framework to hold that even in a case where the government asserted that mandatory  
16 detention initially applied, a person's re-detention could not occur absent a hearing. The Court did  
17 the same in *Ramirez Tesara, Kumar, and Ledesma Gonzalez*. *See Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at  
18 \*2–3; *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at \*2–3; *Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at \*7–8.

19 35. In applying the three *Mathews* factors, the *E.A. T.-B.* court held that the petitioner  
20 had "undoubtedly [been] deprive[d] . . . of an established interest in his liberty," 2025 WL 2402130,  
21 at \*3, which, as noted, "is the most elemental of liberty interests," *id.* (citation modified). The Court  
22 further explained that even if detention was mandatory, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty  
23 without a hearing was high because a hearing serves to ensure that the purposes of detention—the  
prevention of danger and flight risk—are properly served. *Id.* at \*4–5. Finally, the Court explained

1 that “the Government’s interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously released without a hearing is  
2 low: although it would have required the expenditure of finite resources (money and time) to  
3 provide Petitioner notice and hearing on [ISAP] violations before arresting and re-detaining him,  
4 those costs are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.”  
5 *Id.* at \*5. As a result, this Court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at \*6.

6 36. This Court applied a similar analysis in *Ramirez Tesara*. There, the Court reasoned  
7 that the petitioner had a “weighty” interest in his liberty and was entitled to the “full protections of  
8 the due process clause.” 2025 WL 2637663, at \*3. When examining the value of additional  
9 safeguards, the Court also noted that despite the government’s allegations of ISAP violations, “the  
10 fact ‘that the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its  
11 obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process.’” *Id.* at \*4  
12 (quoting *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at \*4). Finally, the Court reasoned that any government  
13 interest in re-detention without a hearing was “minimal.” *Id.* Accordingly, there too, the Court  
14 ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at \*5.

15 37. The *Kumar* and *Ledesma Gonzalez* courts reached the same decision, again holding that  
16 all three factors weighed in favor of affording the petitioner a bond hearing. 2025 WL 2677089, at  
17 \*3–4; 2025 WL 2841574, at \*7–9; *see also* Report & Recommendation, *Lopez Reyes*, No. 2:25-cv-  
18 01868-JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2025), Dkt. 13 (same).

19 38. This Court’s decisions in *E.A. T.-B.*, *Ramirez Tesara*, *Kumar*, and *Ledesma Gonzalez* are  
20 consistent with many other district court decisions addressing similar situations. *See, e.g., Valdez v.*  
21 *Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering immediate  
22 release due to lack of pre-deprivation hearing); *Garro Pinchi v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 5:25-CV-  
23 05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (similar); *Maklad v. Murray*, No. 1:25-CV-



00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (similar); *Garcia v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01006 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2420068 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (similar).

39. The same framework and principles apply here and compel Ms. Villanueva's immediate release.

**CLAIM FOR RELIEF**  
**Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**  
**Procedural Due Process**

40. Ms. Villanueva restates and realleges all the prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

41. Due process does not permit the government to re-detain Ms. Villanueva and strip her of her liberty without written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether re-detention is warranted based on danger or flight risk. *See Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 487–88. Such written notice and a hearing must occur *prior* to any re-detention.

42. Respondents revoked Ms. Villanueva's release and deprived her of liberty without providing her written notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker prior to her re-detention.

43. Accordingly, Ms. Villanueva's re-detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Ms. Villanueva respectfully requests that this Court:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause within three days as to why this Petition should not be granted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and ordering that they not transfer Ms. Villanueva out of this district during the pendency of the court's adjudication of this petition;

- 1 (3) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to Villanueva from custody  
2 immediately and permanently enjoining his re-detention during the pendency of her  
3 removal proceeding absent written notice and a hearing prior to re-detention where  
4 Respondents must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is a flight risk or  
5 danger to the community and that no alternatives to detention would mitigate those  
6 risks;
- 7 (4) Declare that Ms. Villanueva's re-detention while removal proceedings are ongoing  
8 without first providing an individualized determination before a neutral decisionmaker  
9 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- 10 (5) Award Ms. Villanueva's attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,  
11 and on any other basis justified under law; and
- 12 (6) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

13 Dated: Tuesday, December 30, 2025

14 s/ Stephen C. Robbins  
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