JUDGE LEON SCHYDLOWER

AO 242 (12/11) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Western District of Texas

DANIEL FERNANDO CHAJON MONROY

Petitioner

v.

WARDEN OF ERO EL PASO EAST MONTANA, Todd M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Pamela Bondi US Attorney General;

Respondent
(name of warden or authorized person having custody of petitioner)

Case No. EP25CV0755
(Supplied by Clerk of Court)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Personal Information

1. (a) Your full name: DANIEL FERNANDO CHAJON MONROY
   (b) Other names you have used: N/A
2. Place of confinement:
   (a) Name of institution: UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
   (b) Address: ERO EL PASO CAMP EAST MONTANA
   6920 Digital Road, El Paso, TX 79936
   (c) Your identification number: A# [redacted]
3. Are you currently being held on orders by:
   ☑ Federal authorities ☐ State authorities ☐ Other - explain:
   Immigration and Customs Enforcement
4. Are you currently:
   ☐ A pretrial detainee (waiting for trial on criminal charges)
   ☐ Serving a sentence (incarceration, parole, probation, etc.) after having been convicted of a crime
   If you are currently serving a sentence, provide:
   (a) Name and location of court that sentenced you:
   (b) Docket number of criminal case:
   (c) Date of sentencing:
   ☑ Being held on an immigration charge
   ☐ Other *(explain)*:

Decision or Action You Are Challenging

5. What are you challenging in this petition:

☐ How your sentence is being carried out, calculated, or credited by prison or parole authorities (for example, revocation or calculation of good time credits)

☐ Pretrial detention

☑ Immigration detention

☐ Detainer

☐ The validity of your conviction or sentence as imposed (for example, sentence beyond the statutory maximum or improperly calculated under the sentencing guidelines)

☐ Disciplinary proceedings

☐ Other *(explain)*: _____

6. Provide more information about the decision or action you are challenging:

(a) Name and location of the agency or court: El Paso Texas Immigration Court and Board of Immigration Appeals.

(b) Docket number, case number, or opinion number: Matter of Jonathan Javier YAJURE HURTADO

(c) Decision or action you are challenging *(for disciplinary proceedings, specify the penalties imposed)*:

Based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to alien who are present in the United States without admission. Petitioner no longer eligible for bond, IJ took no action.

(d) Date of the decision or action: September 5, 2025

Your Earlier Challenges of the Decision or Action

7. **First appeal**

Did you appeal the decision, file a grievance, or seek an administrative remedy?

☐ Yes ☑ No

(a) If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of the authority, agency, or court: _____

(2) Date of filing: _____

(3) Docket number, case number, or opinion number: _____

(4) Result: _____

(5) Date of result: _____

(6) Issues raised: _____

(b) If you answered "No," explain why you did not appeal:

8. **Second appeal**

After the first appeal, did you file a second appeal to a higher authority, agency, or court?

☐ Yes ☑ No

(a) If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of the authority, agency, or court:

(2) Date of filing:

(3) Docket number, case number, or opinion number:

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(6) Issues raised:

(b) If you answered "No," explain why you did not file a second appeal:

9. **Third appeal**

After the second appeal, did you file a third appeal to a higher authority, agency, or court?

☐ Yes ☑ No

(a) If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of the authority, agency, or court:

(2) Date of filing:

(3) Docket number, case number, or opinion number:

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(6) Issues raised:

(b) If you answered "No," explain why you did not file a third appeal:

10. **Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255**

In this petition, are you challenging the validity of your conviction or sentence as imposed?

☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," answer the following:

(a) Have you already filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that challenged this conviction or sentence?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of court:

(2) Case number:

(3) Date of filing:

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(6) Issues raised:

(b) Have you ever filed a motion in a United States Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), seeking permission to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion to challenge this conviction or sentence?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of court:

(2) Case number:

(3) Date of filing:

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(6) Issues raised:

(c) Explain why the remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to challenge your conviction or sentence:

11. **Appeals of immigration proceedings**

Does this case concern immigration proceedings?

☑ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," provide:

(a) Date you were taken into immigration custody: July 30, 2025

(b) Date of the removal or reinstatement order: N/A

(c) Did you file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals?

☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," provide:

(1) Date of filing:

(2) Case number:

(3) Result:

(4) Date of result:

(5) Issues raised:

(d) Did you appeal the decision to the United States Court of Appeals?

☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," provide:

(1) Name of court:

(2) Date of filing:

(3) Case number:

(4) Result:

(5) Date of result:

(6) Issues raised:

12. **Other appeals**

Other than the appeals you listed above, have you filed any other petition, application, or motion about the issues raised in this petition?

☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," provide:

(a) Kind of petition, motion, or application:

(b) Name of the authority, agency, or court:

(c) Date of filing:

(d) Docket number, case number, or opinion number:

(e) Result:

(f) Date of result:

(g) Issues raised:

Grounds for Your Challenge in This Petition

13. State every ground (reason) that supports your claim that you are being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Attach additional pages if you have more than four grounds. State the facts supporting each ground.

GROUND ONE: VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

(a) Supporting facts *(Be brief. Do not cite cases or law.)*:

Mandatory detention under INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), applies only to noncitizens who have been convicted of certain enumerated on the INA. Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime. Mandatory detention under INA § 235(b) applies top arriving aliens or those deemed application for admission. Petitioner was apprehended within the interior of the United States, not at a port of entry, and therefore not fall within § 235 (b). SEE ARGUMENT ATTACHED.

(b) Did you present Ground One in all appeals that were available to you?

☐ Yes ☑ No

GROUND TWO: The Immigration Judge Has Jurisdiction to Conduct a Bond Hearing Under INA § 236(a)

(a) Supporting facts *(Be brief. Do not cite cases or law.)*:

Petitioner's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discrtionary detention and expressly provides for custody redetermination by an Immigration Judge. Because petitioner is not subject to mandatory under § 236(c) and is not an arriving alien subject to § 235(b), the Immigration Judge retains jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing. SEE ARGUMENT ATTACHED.

(b) Did you present Ground Two in all appeals that were available to you?

☐ Yes ☑ No

GROUND THREE: Unlawful Prolonged Detention (Due Process) without any hearing.

(a) Supporting facts *(Be brief. Do not cite cases or law.)*:

The Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to contest detention before a neutral decision-maker where detention becomes prolonged and no longer reasonably related to its purported purpose. Petitioner has been in ICE custody since July 30, 2025 and has not been before an Immigration Judge. His Master Hearing continues to be postponed. FIRST master hearing is scheduled for Feb 10, 2026. By this date he would be deained for 195 days without a hearing. SEE ARGUMENT ATTACHED.

(b) Did you present Ground Three in all appeals that were available to you?

☐ Yes ☑ No

GROUND FOUR: N/A

(a) Supporting facts *(Be brief. Do not cite cases or law.)*:

(b) Did you present Ground Four in all appeals that were available to you?

☐ Yes ☑ No

14. If there are any grounds that you did not present in all appeals that were available to you, explain why you did not: Appeal would be frutile due to the recent decision from the BIA, Matter of Yajure Hurtado. The Fifth Circuit excuses exhaustion where an agency cannot grant the requested relief or where the outcome is predetermined as a matter of law.

Request for Relief

15. State exactly what you want the court to do: Grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order Petitioner's immediate release or, in the alternative, establish jurisdiction and order immigration judge to hold a hearing under 236(a).

Declaration Under Penalty Of Perjury

If you are incarcerated, on what date did you place this petition in the prison mail system:

I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the petitioner, I have read this petition or had it read to me, and the information in this petition is true and correct. I understand that a false statement of a material fact may serve as the basis for prosecution for perjury.

Date: 11-21-2025

Signature of Petitioner

Signature of Attorney or other authorized person, if any

Daniel Fernando Chajon Monroy
A# [redacted]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to remedy unlawful custody and/or unlawful restraints on liberty arising from immigration detention or orders affecting detention.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Petitioner is in custody within this District.
2. Petitioner is detained at ERO EL PASO CAMP EAST MONTANA, 6920 Digital Road, El Paso, TX 79936.
3. Jurisdiction is proper notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) because this petition challenges the legality or duration of detention, not the validity of a final order of removal.
4. Venue is proper in this District because Petitioner is detained here.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Petitioner entered the United States without being inspected or admitted on December 18, 2022. He was not apprehended at the border.
2. On May 9, 2023, an Asylum application was filed with USCIS. Employment card and social security were received.
3. On July 30, 2025, Petitioner was detained and then placed in ICE custody and transferred to Alligator Alcatraz Detention Center. He was then transferred to El Paso East Camp Montana Detention Center.
4. On August 14, 2025, counsel filed a Pre-NTA Bond Redetermination.
5. On August 19, 2025, there was a bond hearing before Immigration Judge Stephen Ruhle. He took no action on the bond due to the fact that the Notice to Appear ("NTA") was not filed. Counsel explained to the Judge that ICE has not issued an NTA, and no deportation officer has been assigned. The immigration judge specified we needed the NTA. *See* **Exhibit 1 (Immigration Judge's Bond Order).**

6. Petitioner and counsel, several ways to get in contact with his deportation officer or any ICE officer to receive an NTA.
7. On September 5, 2025, the BIA came out with a new ruling regarding bonds for individuals who entered without inspection. This new precedence now precluded Petitioner to request bond. *See* **Exhibit 2 (Matter of YAJURE HURTADO, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).**
8. Finally, on September 16, 2025, an NTA was served. NTA was served 48 days after the Petitioner was detained. Because of their delay, now Petitioner not ineligible for bond request. *See* **Exhibit 3 (Notice of Appear Dated September 16, 2025).**
9. First master hearing with the immigration court was scheduled for October 23, 2025, before Immigration Judge Dean Tuckman. During this hearing he decided to proceed only with cases in which the detainees were taking voluntary departure. Since Petitioner was not taking voluntary departure, he rescheduled the case to December 16, 2025. *See* **Exhibit 4 (Case Notice).**
10. On December 16, 2025, waited for about three hours for a master before Immigration Judge Dean Tuckman. The immigration judge ran out of time and rescheduled 11 cases, and I was one of those.
11. First master hearing was scheduled for February 10, 2026. *See* **Exhibit 5 (Case Notice).**
12. As of today, December 18, 2025, Petitioner has not been before an Immigration Judge.
13. As of today, Petitioner has been detained for 141 days without a proper hearing.
14. By the time the first master hearing occurs, Petitioner would be in detention for 195 days without being offered a proper hearing in court.
15. Therefore, Petitioner is seeking alternative relief to the detention without bond, without a master hearing, merits hearing, and without any proper due process.

IV. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

In the Fifth Circuit, exhaustion of administrative remedies in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas actions is prudential rather than jurisdictional and may be excused where exhaustion would be futile, inadequate, or would cause irreparable harm. See *Fuller v. Rich*, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994).

Petitioners raise a purely legal challenge to DHS's authority to detain him without access to an Immigration Judge bond hearing. Such legal questions do not require agency fact-finding and are appropriate for immediate habeas review.

In *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, 28 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2025), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings where DHS retains exclusive custody authority, including cases in which the noncitizen's custody status is controlled by DHS rather than by INA § 236(a).

Following *Yajure Hurtado*, Immigration Judges in the Western District of Texas routinely decline to exercise bond jurisdiction where DHS classifies the detainee as outside § 236(a). As a result, no meaningful administrative remedy exists by which Petitioner could obtain an Immigration Judge bond hearing.

The Fifth Circuit excuses exhaustion where an agency cannot grant the requested relief or where the outcome is predetermined as a matter of law. See *Fuller*, 11 F.3d at 62. Requiring Petitioner to request a bond hearing that the Immigration Judge is legally barred from adjudicating would be futile.

DHS has made a final custody determination denying Petitioner access to an Immigration Judge bond hearing based on its interpretation of *Yajure Hurtado*. There is no statutory or regulatory mechanism permitting Petitioner to administratively appeal DHS's refusal to classify him as a § 236(a) detainee or to calendar a bond hearing.

Where agency action is final and no further administrative review is available, exhaustion is deemed satisfied. See *Darby v. Cisneros*, 509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993).

After *Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado*, requiring exhaustion would elevate form over substance by compelling detainees to pursue relief that Immigration Judges are legally barred from granting. Because exhaustion is prudential and excused—or, alternatively, satisfied—this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. The Court should order DHS to provide an Immigration Judge bond hearing under INA § 236(a) or release Petitioner from custody.

V. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

GROUND ONE
VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Petitioner Is Not Subject to Mandatory Detention Under INA § 236(c) Because He Was Apprehended Inside the United States

Mandatory detention under INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), applies only to noncitizens who are "taken into custody" upon release from criminal custody for enumerated offenses. The statute does not authorize mandatory detention for individuals who are apprehended inside the United States without a qualifying criminal release.

Here, Petitioner was apprehended inside the United States, not taken into ICE custody upon release from criminal incarceration for a covered offense. Accordingly, § 236(c) does not apply. Instead, Petitioner's detention is governed by INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and provides for a bond determination by an Immigration Judge.

Mandatory detention under INA § 235(b) applies to arriving aliens or those deemed applicants for admission. Petitioner was apprehended within the interior of the United States, not at a port of entry, and therefore does not fall within § 235(b).

Once DHS initiates removal proceedings before the Immigration Court and lodges the NTA, custody determinations are governed by § 236, not § 235. Because § 236(c) does not apply, Petitioner must be treated as a § 236(a) detainee eligible for bond. Petitioner is not an arriving alien.

GROUND TWO
The Immigration Judge Has Jurisdiction to Conduct a Bond Hearing Under INA § 236(a)

Petitioner's detention is governed by INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and expressly provides for custody redetermination by an Immigration Judge. Because Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 236(c) and is not an

arriving alien subject to § 235(b), the Immigration Judge retains jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing.

Under § 236(a), DHS may either detain the noncitizen or release the individual on bond or conditional parole pending removal proceedings. Implementing regulations confirm that Immigration Judges have authority to review custody determinations and to order release on bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (authorizing Immigration Judge custody redetermination hearings); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a) (granting Immigration Judges jurisdiction over bond determinations except in limited circumstances not applicable here).

Where a noncitizen is detained under § 236(a), denial of access to a bond hearing is contrary to the statute and regulations. Federal courts have consistently recognized that § 236(a) detainees are entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847 (2018) (distinguishing discretionary detention under § 236(a) from mandatory detention under § 236(c) and acknowledging availability of bond hearings under § 236(a)).

DHS cannot unilaterally strip the Immigration Court of its jurisdiction by misclassifying a detainee as subject to mandatory detention or by refusing to calendar a bond hearing. When mandatory detention does not apply, jurisdiction automatically vests with the Immigration Judge to conduct a bond hearing under § 236(a).

Moreover, continued detention without access to an Immigration Judge bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. An individual detained under § 236(a) must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to seek release before a neutral decision-maker. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (civil immigration detention is subject to constitutional limitations).

Because Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 236(a), the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing, and DHS's failure to provide such a hearing renders Petitioner's detention unlawful. Habeas relief is therefore warranted, and the Court should order DHS to provide an Immigration Judge bond hearing within a specific timeframe or release Petitioner from custody.

GROUND THREE
Unlawful Prolonged Detention (Due Process) without any hearing.

The Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to contest detention before a neutral decision-maker where detention becomes prolonged and no longer reasonably related to its purported purpose. See *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

On July 30, 2025, Petitioner was detained and then placed in ICE custody and transferred to Alligator Alcatraz Detention Center and then transferred to El Paso East Camp Montana Detention Center. On August 14, 2025, counsel filed a Pre-NTA Bond Redetermination. On August 19, 2025, Petitioner had a bond hearing before Immigration Judge Stephen Ruhle. He took no action on the bond due to the fact that the NTA was not filed. Counsel explained to the Judge that ICE has not issued an NTA and had not been assigned a deportation officer as of now. The immigration judge specified we needed the NTA.

Finally, on September 16, 2025, an NTA was served. Petitioner received an NTA 48 days after detention. Because of their delay, he was now ineligible for bond request. First master hearing with the immigration court was scheduled for October 23, 2025, before Immigration Judge Dean Tuckman. During this hearing he decided to proceed only with cases in which the detainees were taking voluntary departure.

Master was rescheduled for December 16, 2025. Waited for about three hours for a master before immigration judge Dean Tuckman. The immigration judge ran out of time and rescheduled 11 cases, and Petitioner was one of those. Masters is now scheduled for February 10, 2026. By the time a next master hearing, Petitioner would be in detention for 195 days without being offered a proper hearing in court.

Therefore, Petitioner is seeking alternative relief to his detention without bond, without a master hearing, merits hearing, and without any proper due process. Petitioner prolonged detention without a proper hearing is a violation of Due Process.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus;

B. Order Petitioner's immediate release; **or,** in the alternative,

C. Order a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an immigration judge under 236(a) and establish jurisdiction.

D. Enjoin Respondents from further unlawful detention; and

E. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

VII. INDEX OF EXHIBITS

VIII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 24, 2025, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using priority mail and it included three copies for each Respondent.

I certify that on 24th day of December, 2025 a true and correct copy of this Petition was served to each Respondent by regular mail.

U.S. Attorney General's Office
Western District of Texas
601 N.W. Loop 410, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Todd M. Lyons
Acting Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536

Wardon/Field Office Director
ERO El Paso Camp East Montana
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
11541 Montana Avenue, Suite E
El Paso, TX 79936

/S/ Daniel Fernando Chajon Monroy

EXHIBIT 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
EL PASO SPC IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:
CHAJON MONROY, DANIEL FERNANDO

To:
ORSI, ELENA FLORENCIA
2131 Hollywood Blvd.
Suite 205
Hollywood, FL 33020

A-Number:
[redacted]

Riders:
In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:
08/19/2025

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☐ Denied, because

☐ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:
- ☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.
- ☐ released from custody under bond of $
- ☐ other:

☑ Other:
No Action.

SMR

Immigration Judge: RUHLE, STEPHEN 08/19/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☑ waived ☐ reserved
Respondent: ☑ waived ☐ reserved
Appeal Due:

Certificate of Service

This document was served:
Via: [M] Mail | [P] Personal Service | [E] Electronic Service | [U] Address Unavailable
To: [ ] Alien | [ ] Alien c/o custodial officer | [E] Alien atty/rep. | [E] DHS
Respondent Name : CHAJON MONROY, DANIEL FERNANDO | A-Number : [redacted]
Riders:
Date: 08/20/2025 By: Soto, Cynthia, Court Staff

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4125

Matter of Jonathan Javier YAJURE HURTADO, Respondent

Decided September 5, 2025

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

Based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Gabriel Harrison, Esquire, Bellingham, Washington

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Cassidy A. Cloninger, Associate Legal Advisor

BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and MONTANTE, Appellate Immigration Judges; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The respondent, a native and citizen of Venezuela, appeals from the Immigration Judge's April 18, 2025, order denying his request for a redetermination of his custody status.[1] The Immigration Judge determined that he lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent's bond request because the respondent was subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (2018) and, in the alternative, that the respondent is a flight risk.[2] This case presents an issue that the Board has not previously addressed in a precedential decision—the Immigration Judge's authority to hold a bond hearing for an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted after inspection.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The respondent crossed the border into the United States without inspection in November 2022 near El Paso, Texas. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services granted him temporary protected status in 2024,

[1] Throughout the remainder of this decision, we will use the term "bond hearing" to reference any hearing in which the Immigration Judge considers any aspect of an alien's detention or conditions of release.

[2] On April 30, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued a written memorandum in support of the bond order.

but that status expired on April 2, 2025. The respondent was apprehended by immigration officials, and on April 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued a notice to appear charging the respondent as inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018), for being "[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General."

The respondent requested a bond hearing before the Immigration Judge. At the hearing, the Immigration Judge determined he had no jurisdiction to set bond under the facts of the respondent's case. Alternatively, the Immigration Judge stated he would have denied bond because the respondent is a flight risk. The respondent timely appealed to the Board.

On July 18, 2025, the Board issued a request for supplemental briefing, asking the parties to specifically address whether the Immigration Judge has the authority to conduct a bond hearing for an alien who is present in the United States without admission. Both parties filed supplemental briefs.

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

We review de novo whether an Immigration Judge has the authority to consider the bond request of an alien who entered the United States without admission and who has been present in the United States for at least 2 years. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2025). The authority of an Immigration Judge to adjudicate any matter, including a request for a bond, is limited to the authority that is delegated to the Immigration Judge by the INA and the Attorney General through regulation.[3] *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2025); *see also Matter of A-W-*, 25 I&N Dec. 45, 46 (BIA 2009); *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 575 (A.G. 2003).

[3] The authority of an Immigration Judge to consider a bond request is impacted by legal authorities which generally define that authority in the negative. For example, the Immigration Judge is without authority to conduct a custody redetermination hearing for aliens in exclusion proceedings. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(A) (2025). An Immigration Judge is also without authority to conduct a custody redetermination hearing for an arriving alien, including an alien paroled after arrival pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B); *see also Matter of Oseiwusu*, 22 I&N Dec. 19, 20 (BIA 1998). Various other sections of the INA and the regulations further prohibit the Immigration Judge from considering custody redetermination under certain circumstances. *See* INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A); INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c) (West 2025); 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b)(1), 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(A)–(E) (2025).

A. Detention Under Section 235

The inspection, detention, and removal of aliens who have not been admitted is governed by section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. There, Congress defined an applicant for admission as "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)." INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

Under section 235, Congress created three different categories of applicants for admission. The first two categories are covered by section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). They include: (1) arriving aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and (2) aliens not admitted or paroled into the United States who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and "who ha[ve] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [they] ha[ve] been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility." INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1) (2025). The INA explicitly requires that aliens who fall into either of these two categories are subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration proceedings. *See* INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii). Thus, an Immigration Judge lacks authority to hear a bond request filed by an applicant for admission in either of these two categories. *See Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 515–19 (A.G. 2019).

The third category of applicants for admission subject to the inspection, detention, and removal procedures set forth in section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, are those aliens who are seeking admission and who an immigration officer has determined are "not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This category is a "catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by [section 235(b)(1)]." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Like with the first two categories of applicants for admission, the INA explicitly requires that this third "catchall" category of applicants for admission be mandatorily detained for the duration of their

immigration proceedings.[4] *See* INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299 (interpreting the "plain meaning" of sections 235(b)(1) and (2) to mean that applicants for admission be mandatorily detained for the duration of their immigration proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii).

B. Detention Under Section 236

Section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226 (West 2025), provides additional direction for the apprehension and detention of aliens "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a). Section 236 "generally governs the process of arresting and detaining" aliens who are deportable under section 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018), including "aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing INA § 237(a)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1), (2)).

The detention provisions of section 236, distinguish between two groups of aliens. The first group consists of aliens arrested on a warrant issued by DHS, who, subject to certain restrictions, may be detained or released on bond or conditional parole. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a). The regulatory provision at 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2025) authorizes Immigration Judges to "exercise the authority in section 236 of the [INA] . . . to detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the respondent may be released, as provided in § 1003.19 of this chapter." The second group of aliens identified in section 236 are certain defined categories of "criminal aliens" subject to mandatory detention under section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c). An Immigration Judge is without authority to consider a bond request filed by an alien falling into this category.

Section 236 does not purport to overrule the mandatory detention requirements for arriving aliens and applicants for admission explicitly set forth in section 235(b)(1) and (2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2). Thus, while an inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been

[4] While these aliens might be subject to parole by the Attorney General or DHS, that is not an issue that the Immigration Judge has authority to consider. *See* INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(a) (2025) (designating who may exercise authority to grant parole); *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300 (noting that the Attorney General may grant aliens detained under sections 235(b)(1) and (b)(2) temporary parole into the United States "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit" (quoting INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

present in the United States for over 2 years is not subject to the expedited removal process, the alien nevertheless "shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240." INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

III. APPLICATION OF THE RESPONDENT

The issue presented on appeal is one of statutory construction: Does the INA require that all applicants for admission, even those like the respondent who have entered without admission or inspection and have been residing in the United States for years without lawful status, be subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration proceedings, and thus the Immigration Judge lacks authority over a bond request filed by an alien in this category? In addressing this issue, the Board must begin with the "plain language" of the INA. *See Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) ("As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.").

"The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); *see also Beecham v. United States*, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994) ("The plain meaning that we seek to discern is the plain meaning of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences."). The Board does not "view the language of statutory provisions in isolation but instead . . . read[s] the words 'in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'" *Matter of C-T-L-*, 25 I&N Dec. 341, 345 (BIA 2010) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)); *see also Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning.").

Under the plain reading of the INA, we affirm the Immigration Judge's determination that he did not have authority over the bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 300 (holding that the INA "unequivocally mandates that aliens falling within the scope [of section 235(b)(1) and (2)] 'shall' be detained," and that "[u]nlike the word 'may,' which implies discretion, the word 'shall' usually connotes a requirement" (quoting *Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States*, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016))).

The respondent concedes that he is an "applicant for admission" under section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), by virtue of his entry without inspection. The respondent also contends, however, that because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years (since his November 2022 entry without inspection), he cannot be considered as "seeking admission" as the phrase is used in section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The respondent's argument is not supported by the plain language of the INA, and actually creates a legal conundrum. If he is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not "seeking admission" (as he contends), then what is his legal status? The respondent provides no legal authority for the proposition that after some undefined period of time residing in the interior of the United States without lawful status, the INA provides that an applicant for admission is no longer "seeking admission," and has somehow converted to a status that renders him or her eligible for a bond hearing under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a). *See Matter of Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 & n.6 (BIA 2012) (noting that "many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense [including aliens present in the United States who have not been admitted] are nevertheless deemed to be 'seeking admission' under the immigration laws"). The respondent's argument also leaves unanswered which applicants for admission would be covered by section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), if, as he argues, applicants for admission who have been living for years in the United States without admission and without lawful status are somehow exempt from section 235(b)(2)(A) and instead fall under section 236.

The respondent also contends that the Immigration Judge's interpretation of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), as applying to aliens who are present in the United States without inspection renders superfluous sections 236(c)(1)(A), (D), and (E), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E), which bar certain categories of inadmissible aliens from requesting bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a). According to the respondent, Congress would not have enacted the provisions of sections 236(c) and also amended the provision as it did with the recent passage of the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025), if those aliens were already subject to mandatory custody under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).[5] The respondent's argument is

[5] The Laken Riley Act amended section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c), to require that the Attorney General take into custody certain criminal aliens who are deemed inadmissible, including for being "present in the United States without being admitted or

unavailing, however, because nothing in the statutory text of section 236(c), including the text of the amendments made by the Laken Riley Act, purports to alter or undermine the provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), requiring that aliens who fall within the definition of the statute "shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240."

The respondent's interpretation would, in fact, render section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), superfluous. Interpreting the provisions of section 236(c) as rendering null and void the provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) (or even the provisions of section 235(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)), would be in contravention of the "cardinal principle of statutory construction," which is that courts are to "'give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' rather than to emasculate an entire section." *United States v. Menasche*, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (citations omitted).

Further, the fact that section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c), mandates detention of a subset of the category of aliens that are also subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), is not a basis on which to determine that section 235(b)(2)(A) is null and void. *See Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020) (holding that because "redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication,"—"[r]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text").

The respondent also argues that the relevant legislative history of the INA supports an interpretation of the INA that authorizes bond and bond hearings under section 236(a) for aliens present in the United States without admission. On the contrary, the legislative history supports the interpretation the Board is taking here. The statutory definition of an "applicant for admission" at section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), was added to the INA in 1996, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579. Before the passage of IIRIRA, the INA provided for inspection of aliens only when they were arriving at a port of entry. *See* former INA § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1994) (discussing "aliens arriving at ports of the United States"); *see also*

paroled," under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes, including theft.

former INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (discussing the detention of aliens by "the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival"). Aliens who were "seeking admission" at a port of entry under former section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, or who had been paroled into the United States and were determined to be excludable were placed in exclusion proceedings and subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a grant of parole under section § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994). *See also* former INA §§ 212(a), 235(a)–(b), 236, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1225(a)–(b), 1226 (1994); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(a)–(c) (1995).

At the same time, aliens who were "in the United States" and within certain classes of deportable aliens, including those "who entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General" were deemed deportable under former section 241(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994), and placed in deportation proceedings. Those aliens were entitled to request release on bond. *See* former INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c)(1) (1995). Thus, the placement of an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings before the 1996 passage of IIRIRA depended on whether the alien had made an "entry" within the meaning of the INA. *See* former INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining "entry" as "any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession").

In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which, among other things, substituted the term "admission" for "entry," and replaced deportation and exclusion proceedings with removal proceedings. *See Martinez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) ("Prior to the 1996 amendment, the INA assessed status on the basis of 'entry' as opposed to 'admission.'"). Congress acted, in part, to remedy the "unintended and undesirable consequence" of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered without inspection "could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings," including the right to request release on bond, while aliens who had "actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection were restrained by 'more summary exclusion proceedings,'" and were subject to mandatory custody. *Id.* (quoting *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

The legislative history of IIRIRA explains that in replacing the definition of "entry" with a definition for "admission" and "admitted," Congress:

> intended to replace certain aspects of the current "entry doctrine," under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and

> privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. Hence, the pivotal factor in determining an alien's status will be whether or not the alien has been lawfully admitted.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996). The House Judiciary Committee Report for what would become IIRIRA further explains:

> Currently, aliens who have entered without inspection are deportable under section 241(a)(1)(B). Under the new "admission" doctrine, such aliens will not be considered to have been admitted, and thus, must be subject to a ground of inadmissibility, rather than a ground of deportation, based on their presence without admission. (Deportation grounds will be reserved for aliens who have been admitted to the United States.).

Id. at 226.

Thus, after the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA, aliens who enter the United States without inspection or admission are "applicants for admission" under section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), and subject to the inspection, detention, and removal procedures of section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The legislative history confirms that, under a plain language reading of section 235(b)(1) and (2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2), Immigration Judges do not have authority to hold a bond hearing for arriving aliens and applicants for admission. *See Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rts. Org.*, 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (noting that the Supreme Court's "task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve."); *see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno*, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) ("The starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" (quoting *Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.*, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))).

The respondent contends that the statement in the House Judiciary Committee Report that "[s]ection 236(a) restates the current provisions in section 242(a)(1) regarding the authority of the Attorney General to arrest, detain, and release on bond an alien who is not lawfully in the United States" demonstrates that Congress intended to retain the same discretionary detention scheme for aliens unlawfully in the United States that was in place prior to the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229. The respondent's argument is unavailing, however, because nothing in the portion of the report cited by the respondent suggests that it was intended to undermine or alter the earlier statements, in the same report, that aliens present in the United States without inspection will be considered "seeking

admission." *See id.* at 225. The House Judiciary Committee Report makes clear that Congress intended to eliminate the prior statutory scheme that provided aliens who entered the United States without inspection more procedural and substantive rights than those who presented themselves to authorities for inspection. *See id.*; *see also Martinez*, 693 F.3d at 413 n.5. Interpreting the provisions of the INA in the manner the respondent argues would essentially repeal the statutory fix that Congress made with the 1996 passage of IIRIRA.

As the legislative history reflects, the Immigration Judge's interpretation of the respondent as an applicant for admission under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore subject to mandatory detention and ineligible for a bond hearing is supported by the plain language of the INA. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 ("Read most naturally, [sections 235(b)(1)] and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. Section [235(b)(1)] aliens are detained for 'further consideration of the application for asylum,' and [section 235(b)(2)] aliens are in turn detained for '[removal] proceeding[s].'" (last two alterations in original)). Thus, we affirm the Immigration Judge's interpretation, and hold, under a plain language reading of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like the respondent, who are present in the United States without admission.

Citing *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the respondent also contends in his supplemental brief that DHS' "longstanding practice" of treating aliens who are present in the United States without inspection as detained under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a), and therefore eligible for a bond, supports his argument that he is likewise detained under section 236(a). *See Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 386 ("'[T]he longstanding "practice of the government"'—like any other interpretive aid—'can inform [a court's] determination of "what the law is."'" (citation omitted)).[6] Somewhat similarly, the respondent contends that Congress did

[6] We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for aliens who entered the United States without inspection. However, we do not recall either DHS or its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously raising the current issue that is before us. In fact, the supplemental information for the 1997 Interim Rule titled "Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures," 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997), reflects that the Immigration and Naturalization Service took the position at that time that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination."

not intend the provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to apply to aliens who are arrested after having lived in the United States for more than 2 years, as reflected in DHS' practice of treating those aliens as detained under section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

The respondent's argument is unavailing, however, because the Supreme Court in *Loper Bright* made that statement specifically with respect to judicial interpretation of a "doubtful and ambiguous law." *Id.* at 385–86. As explained above, the statutory text of the INA is not "doubtful and ambiguous" but is instead clear and explicit in requiring mandatory detention of all aliens who are applicants for admission, without regard to how many years the alien has been residing in the United States without lawful status. *See* INA § 235(b)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2). The Supreme Court in *Loper Bright* did not hold that the long-standing practice of the government can somehow change, or even eviscerate, explicit statutory text that is contrary to that practice. *See* 603 U.S. at 385–86; *see also Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021) (stating that "no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command").

Likewise, the respondent's citation to *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025), does not support his arguments. The Board's statement in that decision that the respondent's custody determination was governed by section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a), even though the respondent was present in the United States without inspection, *Matter of Akhmedov*, 29 I&N Dec. at 166, does not somehow eviscerate or nullify section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), or vest the Immigration Judge with authority over the respondent's bond request. Whether the respondent was subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and whether the Immigration Judge had authority to hear the bond request, were not issues presented to the Board in that case.

The respondent also argues that because DHS issued an arrest warrant in conjunction with the Notice to Appear and a Notice of Custody Determination, DHS has detained the respondent pursuant to section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a), and the Immigration Judge therefore has statutory and regulatory authority to consider his request for a bond. The respondent cites *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), in support of his argument. *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. at 69, held:

> [A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. at 69, further stated that "[s]ubject to certain exceptions contained in section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), aliens detained under section 236(a) may be eligible for discretionary release on bond pursuant to section 236(a)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)."

Our conclusion in *Matter of Q. Li* that aliens detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States are mandatorily detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, is consistent with our holding in the present case. While the respondent reads *Matter of Q. Li* as suggesting that aliens present in the United States who are detained with a warrant of arrest are detained under section 236(a), that issue was beyond the scope of our decision in that case. Our acknowledgement that "aliens detained under section 236(a) may be eligible for discretionary release on bond" does not mean that *all* aliens detained while in the United States with a warrant of arrest are detained under section 236(a) and entitled to a bond hearing before the Immigration Judge, regardless of whether they are applicants for admission under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

In short, the mere issuance of an arrest warrant does not endow an Immigration Judge with authority to set bond for an alien who falls under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Matter of A-W-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 46 (discussing the limits on Immigration Judge authority); *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. at 575 (same); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii). If it did, it would render meaningless the many prohibitions cited above on the authority of an Immigration Judge to set bond.

Ultimately, this issue of statutory interpretation is complicated by a patchwork of statutes implemented at different times and intended to address different issues. The INA is a complex set of legal provisions created at different times and modified over a series of years. Where these provisions impact one another, they cannot be read in a vacuum. *See Matter of C-T-L-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 345 (BIA 2010) (explaining that the Board does not "view the language of statutory provisions in isolation but instead [is] charged with reading the words 'in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme'" (citation omitted)). Additionally, the fact that a statute specifically prohibits an Immigration Judge from doing a particular act cannot be read as authorizing the Immigration Judge to perform acts that are not otherwise specifically prohibited.

"'[A]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted . . . ' is deemed 'an applicant for admission.'" *DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020) (quoting INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)); *see also Matter of Lemus*, 25 I&N Dec. at 743 ("Congress has defined the concept of an 'applicant for admission' in an unconventional sense, to include not just those who are expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who are present in this country without having formally requested or received such permission . . . ."). Applicants for admission remains such unless an immigration officer determines that they are "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Failing to clearly and beyond a doubt demonstrate that they are entitled to admission, such aliens "shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240." *Id.*; *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288.

Aliens, like the respondent, who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an "admission." *See* INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2018) (defining "admission"). Likewise, being arrested pursuant to a warrant and placed into removal proceedings does not constitute an admission. Therefore, just as Immigration Judges have no authority to redetermine the custody of arriving aliens who present themselves at a port of entry, they likewise have no authority to redetermine the custody conditions of an alien who crossed the border unlawfully without inspection, even if that alien has avoided apprehension for more than 2 years.

Holding otherwise would require reading the INA to conclude that Congress intended that aliens unlawfully entering the United States without inspection, particularly those who successfully evaded apprehension for more than 2 years, be rewarded with the opportunity for a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, whereas aliens who present themselves to officers at a port of entry are ineligible for a bond hearing. This is an incongruous result which is not supported by the plain language or any reasonable interpretation of the INA.[7]

[7] Violations of the INA and the regulations often have consequences for aliens seeking relief and protection from removal. *See, e.g.*, Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 31314, 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003 and 1208) (establishing a "rebuttable presumption of asylum ineligibility" for certain aliens who did not "avail themselves of a lawful, safe, and orderly pathway to the United States" or "seek asylum or other protection in a country through which they travel[ed]"). For example, aliens who have not been "inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States" are ineligible for

IV. CONCLUSION

The Immigration Judge properly held that he lacked authority to hear the respondent's request for a bond as the respondent is an applicant for admission and is subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii).[8] Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2018). *See also Sanchez v. Mayorkas*, 593 U.S. 409, 414 (2021). Likewise, an applicant for asylum will, absent extraordinary or changed circumstances, be ineligible for relief if he or she did not file the application within 1 year of his or her last arrival in the United States. *See* INA § 208(a)(2)(B), (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D).

[8] As we are dismissing the respondent's appeal on the grounds that the Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent's motion for a bond, we need not address the Immigration Judge's alternative holding denying bond because the respondent did not meet his burden of proving that he is not a flight risk, or the respondent's appellate arguments contesting that alternative holding. *See INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").

EXHIBIT 3

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NOTICE TO APPEAR

DOB: [redacted]
Event

In removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

Subject ID: [redacted]

File No: 232 573 383

In the Matter of:

Respondent: DANIEL FERNANDO CHAJON MONROY currently residing at:

8915 Montana Ave El Paso, TEXAS 799251212 (915) 225-1941
(Number, street, city, state and ZIP code) (Area code and phone number)

☐ You are an arriving alien.

☒ You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.

☐ You have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.

The Department of Homeland Security alleges that you:

1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States;
2. You are a native of GUATEMALA and a citizen of GUATEMALA;
3. You entered the United States at or near unknown place, on or about unknown date;
4. You were not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

☐ This notice is being issued after an asylum officer has found that the respondent has demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture.

☐ Section 235(b)(1) order was vacated pursuant to: ☐ 8CFR 208.30 ☐ 8CFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv)

YOU ARE ORDERED to appear before an immigration judge of the United States Department of Justice at:

8915 MONTANA AVE, EL PASO, TEXAS 79925. EOIR SPC El Paso, TX
(Complete Address of Immigration Court, including Room Number, if any)

on October 23, 2025 *(Date)* at 8:30 am *(Time)* to show why you should not be removed from the United States based on the charge(s) set forth above.

H.Gonzalez H 6420 GONZALEZ - (A) SDDO
(Signature and Title of Issuing Officer)

Date: September 16, 2025 El Paso, Texas
(City and State)

This Notice to Appear Supersedes the Notice to Appear issued on August 1, 2025

EOIR - 1 of 3

Exh. 1 - Adm.
DHS Form I-862 (6/22)

37

Notice to Respondent

Warning: Any statement you make may be used against you in removal proceedings.

Alien Registration: This copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are in removal proceedings. You are required to carry it with you at all times.

Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other individual authorized and qualified to represent persons before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.16. Unless you so request, no hearing will be scheduled earlier than ten days from the date of this notice, to allow you sufficient time to secure counsel. A list of qualified attorneys and organizations who may be available to represent you at no cost will be provided with this notice.

Conduct of the hearing: At the time of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents that you desire to have considered in connection with your case. If you wish to have the testimony of any witnesses considered, you should arrange to have such witnesses present at the hearing. At your hearing you will be given the opportunity to admit or deny any or all of the allegations in the Notice to Appear, including that you are inadmissible or removable. You will have an opportunity to present evidence on your own behalf, to examine any evidence presented by the Government, to object, on proper legal grounds, to the receipt of evidence and to cross examine any witnesses presented by the Government. At the conclusion of your hearing, you have a right to appeal an adverse decision by the immigration judge. You will be advised by the immigration judge before whom you appear of any relief from removal for which you may appear eligible including the privilege of voluntary departure. You will be given a reasonable opportunity to make any such application to the immigration judge.

One-Year Asylum Application Deadline: If you believe you may be eligible for asylum, you must file a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. The Form I-589, Instructions, and information on where to file the Form can be found at www.uscis.gov/i-589. Failure to file the Form I-589 within one year of arrival may bar you from eligibility to apply for asylum pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Failure to appear: You are required to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in writing, with your full mailing address and telephone number. You must notify the Immigration Court and the DHS immediately by using Form EOIR-33 whenever you change your address or telephone number during the course of this proceeding. You will be provided with a copy of this form. Notices of hearing will be mailed to this address. If you do not submit Form EOIR-33 and do not otherwise provide an address at which you may be reached during proceedings, then the Government shall not be required to provide you with written notice of your hearing. If you fail to attend the hearing at the time and place designated on this notice, or any date and time later directed by the Immigration Court, a removal order may be made by the Immigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detained by the DHS.

Mandatory Duty to Surrender for Removal: If you become subject to a final order of removal, you must surrender for removal to your local DHS office, listed on the Internet at http://www.ice.gov/contact/ero, as directed by the DHS and required by statute and regulation. Immigration regulations at 8 CFR 1241.1 define when the removal order becomes administratively final. If you are granted voluntary departure and fail to depart the United States as required, fail to post a bond in connection with voluntary departure, or fail to comply with any other condition or term in connection with voluntary departure, you must surrender for removal on the next business day thereafter. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you will be ineligible for all forms of discretionary relief for as long as you remain in the United States and for ten years after your departure or removal. This means you will be ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of nonimmigrant status, registry, and related waivers for this period. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you may also be criminally prosecuted under section 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

U.S. Citizenship Claims: If you believe you are a United States citizen, please advise the DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.

Sensitive locations: To the extent that an enforcement action leading to a removal proceeding was taken against Respondent at a location described in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(e)(1), such action complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1367.

Request for Prompt Hearing

To expedite a determination in my case, I request this Notice to Appear be filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review as soon as possible. I waive my right to a 10-day period prior to appearing before an immigration judge and request my hearing be scheduled.

Before: _____

(Signature of Respondent)

_____ Date: _____

(Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)

Certificate of Service

This Notice To Appear was served on the respondent by me on September 16, 2025, in the following manner and in compliance with section 239(a)(1) of the Act.

☒ in person ☐ by certified mail, returned receipt # _____ requested ☐ by regular mail

☒ Attached is a credible fear worksheet.

☐ Attached is a list of organization and attorneys which provide free legal services.

The alien was provided oral notice in the SPANISH language of the time and place of his or her hearing and of the consequences of failure to appear as provided in section 240(b)(7) of the Act.

Refused to sign MAP MARTHA PEDREGON - Deportation Officer

(Signature of Respondent if Personally Served) *(Signature and Title of officer)*

EOIR - 2 of 3

Exh. 1 - Adm.

Privacy Act Statement

Authority:
The Department of Homeland Security through U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are authorized to collect the information requested on this form pursuant to Sections 103, 237, 239, 240, and 290 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended (8 U.S.C. 1103, 1229, 1229a, and 1360), and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

Purpose:
You are being asked to sign and date this Notice to Appear (NTA) as an acknowledgement of personal receipt of this notice. This notice, when filed with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), initiates removal proceedings. The NTA contains information regarding the nature of the proceedings against you, the legal authority under which proceedings are conducted, the acts or conduct alleged against you to be in violation of law, the charges against you, and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated. The NTA also includes information about the conduct of the removal hearing, your right to representation at no expense to the government, the requirement to inform EOIR of any change in address, the consequences for failing to appear, and that generally, if you wish to apply for asylum, you must do so within one year of your arrival in the United States. If you choose to sign and date the NTA, that information will be used to confirm that you received it, and for recordkeeping.

Routine Uses:
For United States Citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, or individuals whose records are covered by the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (5 U.S.C. § 552a note), your information may be disclosed in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), including pursuant to the routine uses published in the following DHS systems of records notices (SORN): DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, DHS/USCIS-007 Benefit Information System, DHS/ICE-011 Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records (CARIER), and DHS/ICE-003 General Counsel Electronic Management System (GEMS), and DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records (BPER). These SORNs can be viewed at https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns. When disclosed to the DOJ's EOIR for immigration proceedings, this information that is maintained and used by DOJ is covered by the following DOJ SORN: EOIR-001, Records and Management Information System, or any updated or successor SORN, which can be viewed at https://www.justice.gov/opcl/doj-systems-records. Further, your information may be disclosed pursuant to routine uses described in the abovementioned DHS SORNs or DOJ EOIR SORN to federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement agencies for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

For all others, as appropriate under United States law and DHS policy, the information you provide may be shared internally within DHS, as well as with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement; other government agencies; and other parties for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

Disclosure:
Providing your signature and the date of your signature is voluntary. There are no effects on you for not providing your signature and date; however, removal proceedings may continue notwithstanding the failure or refusal to provide this information.

EOIR - 3 of 3

Exh. 1 - Adm.
DHS Form I-862 (6/22)

39

EXHIBIT 4

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
EL PASO IMMIGRATION COURT

LEAD FILE: [redacted]
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
DATE: Oct 23, 2025
EAD Clock: 898 days elapsed

TO: Law Office of George Giosmas
Giosmas, George
2131 Hollywood Boulevard
Suite 205
Hollywood, FL 33020

RE: [redacted] CHAJON MONROY, DANIEL FERNANDO

Notice of In-Person Hearing

Your case has been scheduled for a MASTER hearing before the immigration court on:

Date: Dec 16, 2025
Time: 09:30 A.M. MT
Court Address: 8915 MONTANA AVENUE, EL PASO, TX 79925

Representation: You may be represented in these proceedings, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other representative of your choice who is authorized and qualified to represent persons before an immigration court. If you are represented, your attorney or representative must also appear at your hearing and be ready to proceed with your case. Enclosed and online at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/list-pro-bono-legal-service-providers is a list of free legal service providers who may be able to assist you.

Failure to Appear: If you fail to appear at your hearing and the Department of Homeland Security establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that written notice of your hearing was provided and that you are removable, you will be ordered removed from the United States. Exceptions to these rules are only for exceptional circumstances.

Change of Address: The court will send all correspondence, including hearing notices, to you based on the most recent contact information you have provided, and your immigration proceedings can go forward in your absence if you do not appear before the court. If your contact information is missing or is incorrect on the Notice to Appear, you must provide the immigration court with your updated contact information within five days of receipt of that notice so you do not miss important information. Each time your address, telephone number, or email address changes, you must inform the immigration court within five days. To update your contact information with the immigration court, you must complete a Form EOIR-33 either online at https://respondentaccess.eoir.justice.gov/en/ or by completing the enclosed paper form and mailing it to the immigration court listed above.

Internet-Based Hearings: If you are scheduled to have an internet-based hearing, you will appear by video or telephone. If you prefer to appear in person at the immigration court named above, you must file a motion for an in-person hearing with the immigration court at least fifteen days before the hearing date provided above. Additional information about internet-based hearings for each immigration court is available on EOIR's website at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing.

In-Person Hearings: If you are scheduled to have an in-person hearing, you will appear in person at the immigration court named above. If you prefer to appear remotely, you must file a motion for an internet-based hearing with the immigration court at least fifteen days before the hearing date provided above.

For information about your case, please call **1-800-898-7180** (toll-free) or **304-625-2050**.

The Certificate of Service on this document allows the immigration court to record delivery of this notice to you and to the Department of Homeland Security.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY:MAIL[M] PERSONAL SERVICE[P] ELECTRONIC SERVICE[E]
TO: [ ] Noncitizen | [ ] Noncitizen c/o Custodial Officer |
[E] Noncitizen ATT/REP | [E] DHS
DATE: 10/23/2025 BY: COURT STAFF D. Antunez
Attachments:[ ] EOIR-33 [ ] Appeal Packet [ ] Legal Services List [ ] Other NH

Use a smartphone's camera to scan the code on this page to read the notice online.

Usa la cámara de un teléfono inteligente para escanear el código de esta página y leer el aviso en línea.

Use a câmara do smartphone para digitalizar o código nesta página e ler o manual de instruções online.

使用智能手机摄像头扫描本页面的代码，即可在线阅读该通知。

ਨੋਟਿਸ ਨੂੰ ਔਨਲਾਈਨ ਪੜ੍ਹਨ ਲਈ ਇਸ ਪੰਨੇ 'ਤੇ ਕੋਡ ਨੂੰ ਸਕੈਨ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਸਮਾਰਟਫੋਨ ਦੇ ਕੈਮਰੇ ਦੀ ਵਰਤੋਂ ਕਰੋ।

অনলাইনে নোটিশ পড়ার জন্য এই পৃষ্ঠার কোডটি স্ক্যান করতে স্মার্টফোনের ক্যামেরা ব্যবহার করুন

सूचना अनलाइनमा पढ्न यस पृष्ठमा कोड स्क्यान गर्न स्मार्टफोनको क्यामेरा प्रयोग गर्नुहोस्।

Sèvi ak kamera yon telefòn entèlijan pou eskane kòd ki nan paj sa a pou li avi a sou entènèt.

استخدم كاميرا الهاتف الذكي لمسح الرمز الموجود في هذه الصفحة لقراءة الإشعار على الإنترنت

Чтобы прочитать уведомление онлайн, отсканируйте код на этой странице с помощью камеры вашего смартфона.

Utilisez l'appareil photo d'un téléphone intelligent pour scanner le code sur cette page afin de lire l'avis en ligne.

EXHIBIT 5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
EL PASO IMMIGRATION COURT

LEAD FILE: [redacted]
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
DATE: Dec 16, 2025
EAD Clock: 898 days elapsed

TO: Law Office of George Giosmas
Giosmas, George
2131 Hollywood Boulevard
Suite 205
Hollywood, FL 33020

RE: [redacted] CHAJON MONROY, DANIEL FERNANDO

Notice of In-Person Hearing

Your case has been scheduled for a MASTER hearing before the immigration court on:

Date: Feb 10, 2026
Time: 09:30 A.M. MT
Court Address: 8915 MONTANA AVENUE, EL PASO, TX 79925

Representation: You may be represented in these proceedings, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other representative of your choice who is authorized and qualified to represent persons before an immigration court. If you are represented, your attorney or representative must also appear at your hearing and be ready to proceed with your case. Enclosed and online at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/list-pro-bono-legal-service-providers is a list of free legal service providers who may be able to assist you.

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TO: [ ] Noncitizen | [ ] Noncitizen c/o Custodial Officer |
[e] Noncitizen ATT/REP | [e] DHS
DATE: 12/16/2025 BY: COURT STAFF lechuga
Attachments:[ ] EOIR-33 [ ] Appeal Packet [ ] Legal Services List [ ] Other NH

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অনলাইনে নোটিশি পড়ার জন্য এই পেজের কোডটি স্ক্যান করতে স্মার্টফোনের ক্যামেরা ব্যবহার করুন

सूचना अनलाइनमा पढ्न यस पृष्ठमा कोड स्क्यान गर्न स्मार्टफोनको क्यामेरा प्रयोग गर्नुहोस्।

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استخدم كاميرا الهاتف الذكي لمسح الرمز الموجود في هذه الصفحة لقراءة الإشعار على الإنترنت

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Generated: Dec 29, 2025 4:15PM

U.S. District Court

Texas Western - El Paso

Receipt Date: Dec 29, 2025 4:15PM

Daniel Fernando Chajon Monroy
6920 Digital Road
El Paso, TX 79936

Rcpt. No: 3925 Trans. Date: Dec 29, 2025 4:15PM Cashier ID: #DACa (6582)

CD	Purpose	Case/Party/Defendant	Qty	Price	Amt
202	Writ of Habeas Corpus		1	5.00	5.00

CD	Tender			Amt
MO	Money Order	#19-798315009	12/22/2025	$5.00
			Total Due Prior to Payment:	$5.00
			Total Tendered:	$5.00

Comments: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 3:25CV755-LS Chajon Monroy v. Warden et all.