

1 Rene L. Valladares
 Federal Public Defender
 2 Nevada State Bar No. 11479
 3 *Megan Hopper-Rebegea
 Assistant Federal Public Defender
 4 New York Bar No. 5329453
 *Sylvia Irvin
 5 Assistant Federal Public Defender
 6 CA Bar No. 230302; FL Bar No. 15379
 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 250
 7 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
 (702) 388-6577
 8 Megan_Hopper-Rebegea@fd.org
 9 Sylvia_Irvin@fd.org

10 *Attorneys for Petitioner Wahid Masud Siddiqi

11
 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 13 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

14 Wahid Masud Siddiqi,
 15
 16 Petitioner,
 17
 18 v.
 19 John Mattos, NSDC Warden; Michael
 20 Bernacke, Field Director, Salt Lake City
 Field Office of ICE ERO; Todd Lyons, ICE
 Acting Director; Kristi Noem DHS
 Secretary; Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney
 General
 21
 22 Respondents.

Case No. 2:25-cv-02614-JAD-BNW
**Motion for Temporary Restraining
 Order**

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Petitioner Wahid Masud Siddiqi faces immediate irreparable harm: (1) revocation of his release on immigration supervision, despite ICE’s failure to follow its own revocation procedures; (2) indefinite immigration detention with no reasonable prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to the country designated by the immigration judge (IJ); and (3) potential removal to a third country never considered by an IJ. Therefore, this Court should grant temporary relief to preserve the status quo.

The statements in the following paragraph are made on information and belief, unless otherwise specifically noted. Petitioner has lived in the United States since he arrived at ten years old from Afghanistan with his parents and two sisters. In 2006, an IJ ordered Mr. Siddiqi removed. Since then, the government has proved unable to remove him, and Mr. Siddiqi has been out of custody on an Order of Supervision (OSUP) from ICE. Yet on November 26, 2025, the government re-detained him. ICE gave him no opportunity to contest his re-detention, and there are no apparent changed circumstances justifying it. ICE does not appear to have a travel document in hand. Worse yet, ICE’s own policies allow ICE to remove him to a third country, despite never before considered by an IJ, with either 6-to-24-hour notice or no notice at all.

Mr. Siddiqi is therefore facing both unlawful detention and the threat of removal to a dangerous third country without due process. The requested temporary restraining order (TRO) would preserve the status quo while Mr. Siddiqi litigates these claims by (1) reinstating Mr. Siddiqi’s release on supervision, (2) prohibiting the government from revoking his OSUP without first following the required statutory procedures and (3) prohibiting the government from removing him to a third country without an opportunity to file a motion to reopen with an IJ.

1 In granting this motion, this Court would not break new ground. Several
2 courts have granted TROs or preliminary injunctions mandating release for post-
3 final-removal-order immigrants like Petitioner. *See Rodriguez-Gutierrez v. Noem*,
4 No. 25-cv-02726-BAS-SBC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); *Phetsadakone v. Scott*, No. 2:25-
5 CV-01678-JNW, 2025 WL 2579569, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025); *Hoac v.*
6 *Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16,
7 2025); *Phan v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *7 (E.D.
8 Cal. July 16, 2025); *Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *29
9 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025).

10 Several more have ordered release for petitioners whose immigration cases
11 are still pending.¹ *See, e.g., Hiestroza v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-07559-JD, 2025 WL
12 2606983, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK,
13 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *R.D.T.M. v. Wofford*, No. 1:25-
14 CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025). These
15 courts have determined that, for these long-term releasees, liberty is the status quo,
16 and only a return to that status quo can avert irreparable harm.

17 Several courts have likewise granted temporary restraining orders
18 preventing third-country removals without due process. *See, e.g., J.R. v. Bostock*,
19 25-cv-01161-JNW, 2025 WL 1810210 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 30, 2025); *Vaskanyan v.*
20 *Janecka*, 25-cv-01475-MRA-AS, 2025 WL 2014208 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2025); *Ortega*
21 *v. Kaiser*, 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025); *Hoac v.*
22 *Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 16,
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¹ Because immigration detainees whose cases have not been adjudicated are
entitled only to a bond hearing-not to outright release-some of these TROs require
release unless ICE provides that hearing. But because *Zadvydas* requires outright
release on supervision, a TRO fitted to Petitioner's claims should order that relief.

1 2025); *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *7 (E.D.
2 Cal. July 16, 2025).

3 In this District, courts have recently granted habeas relief on this very basis.
4 *See Barka v. Mattos*, No. 2:25-cv-01781-GMN-MDC, 2025 WL 3723998, at *8 (D.
5 Nev. Dec. 23, 2025); *Gomez v. Mattos*, No. 2:25-CV-00975-GMN-BNW, 2025 WL
6 3101994, at *6–7 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2025); *Perez v. Bondi*, No. 2:25-cv-02390-CDS-
7 BNW (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2026), ECF No. 18; *In Re Pueblas Rojas*, No. 2:25-cv-02548-
8 RFB-BNW, 2026 WL 125152, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 16, 2026). Mr. Saddiqi therefore
9 respectfully requests that this Court grant this TRO.

10 STATEMENT OF FACTS

11 Concurrent with this motion, Mr. Saddiqi files his amended § 2241 petition.
12 He incorporates by reference the statement of facts set forth in those pleadings.

13 ARGUMENT

14 To obtain a TRO, a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
15 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
16 relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
17 public interest.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *accord*
18 *Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 & n.7 (9th
19 Cir. 2001) (noting that a TRO and preliminary injunction involve “substantially
20 identical” analysis). A “variant[] of the same standard” is the “sliding scale”: “if a
21 plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a
22 lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary
23 injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips *sharply* in the plaintiff’s
24 favor, and the other two *Winter* factors are satisfied.” *Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v.*
25 *Noem*, 145 F.4th 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
26 this approach, the four *Winter* elements are “balanced, so that a stronger showing of
27 one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” *All. for the Wild Rockies v.*

1 *Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO may be granted where there
2 are “serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance ... tips sharply
3 toward the plaintiff,” so long as the other *Winter* factors are met. *Id.* at 1132.

4 Here, this Court should issue a temporary restraining order because
5 “immediate and irreparable injury . . . or damage” is occurring and will continue in
6 the absence of an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Not only have Respondents re-
7 detained Mr. Saddiqi in violation of his due process, statutory, and regulatory
8 rights, ICE policy also allows them to remove him to a third country in violation of
9 his due process, statutory, and regulatory rights. This Court should order Mr.
10 Saddiqi’s release and enjoin removal to a third country with no or inadequate
11 notice.

12 **I. Petitioner will likely succeed on the merits, or at a minimum,**
13 **Petitioner raises serious merits questions.**

14 In his amended § 2241 petition, Mr. Saddiqi raises five claims that he has
15 been unconstitutionally detained and that he cannot be removed to a third country.
16 Mr. Saddiqi addresses the merits of each claim below:

17 **A. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that**
18 **his detention violates *Zadvydas* and the Immigration and**
19 **Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). (Grounds 1 and 2).**

20 In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court considered a
21 problem impacting people like Mr. Saddiqi: federal law requires ICE to detain an
22 immigrant during the “removal period,” which spans the first 90 days after the
23 removal order becomes final. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2). After the 90-day removal
24 period expires, ICE may detain the noncitizen while continuing to try to remove
25 them. *Id.*, § 1231(a)(6). However, if that subsection were understood to allow for
26 “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” it would pose “a serious constitutional
27 threat.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court avoided this
constitutional concern by interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to incorporate implicit limits. *Id.*

1 at 689. As an initial matter, *Zadvydas* held that detention is “presumptively
2 reasonable” for six months after the removal order becomes final. *Id.* at 701.

3 After six months, detention ceases to be presumptively reasonable. Courts
4 use a burden-shifting framework to decide whether detention remains authorized.
5 First, the petitioner must prove that there is “good reason to believe that there is no
6 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* If he does
7 so, the burden shifts to “the Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to
8 rebut that showing.” *Id.* Ultimately, then, the burden of proof rests with the
9 government: The government must prove that there is a “significant likelihood of
10 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” or the immigrant must be released.
11 *Id.*

12 Here, Petitioner was ordered removed more than six months ago, almost
13 twenty years in fact, after his removal order became final in 2006.² He then was re-
14 detained on November 26, 2025, and has remained in immigration custody. On
15 information and belief, Mr. Siddiqi was previously detained for the initial 90-day
16 removal period in 2006. Petitioner’s continued detention is unreasonable and his
17 removal is not reasonably foreseeable. As of the filing date of this Amended
18 Petition, almost 20 years have passed since Mr. Siddiqi was issued an order of
19 removal in immigration proceedings. Thus, this Court will likely find that
20 Petitioner warrants *Zadvydas* relief.

21 **B. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that**
22 **ICE violated its own regulations (Ground 3).**

23 In addition to *Zadvydas*’s protections, 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i) provide
24 extra process for re-detentions. These regulations permit an official to “return[s]
25 [the person] to custody” because they “violate[d] any of the conditions of release.” 8
26

27 ² See P. Ex. 1 in concurrently filed § 2241 Petition; ECF No. 1-1.

1 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1); *accord id.* § 241.4(l)(1). Otherwise, they permit revocation of
2 release only if the appropriate official (1) “determines that there is a significant
3 likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
4 future,” and (2) makes that finding “on account of changed circumstances.” *Id.*, §
5 241.13(i)(2).

6 No matter the reason for re-detention, the re-detained person is entitled to
7 “an initial informal interview promptly,” during which they “will be notified of the
8 reasons for revocation.” *Id.* §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i)(3). The interviewer must
9 “afford[] the [person] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation,”
10 allowing them to “submit any evidence or information” relevant to re-detention and
11 evaluating “any contested facts.” *Id.*

12 ICE is required to follow its own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi v.*
13 *Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); *see Alcaraz v. INS*, 384 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th
14 Cir. 2004) (“The legal proposition that agencies may be required to abide by certain
15 internal policies is well-established.”). A court may review a re-detention decision
16 for compliance with the regulations. *See Gomez v. Mattos*, No. 2:25-CV-00975-GMN-
17 BNW, 2025 WL 3101994, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2025); *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-
18 CV-01757, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Nguyen v. Hyde*, 788
19 F. Supp. 3d 144 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st
20 Cir. 2023)).

21 Here, there are no changed circumstances that justify re-detaining Mr.
22 Siddiqi. Respondents’ intent to eventually complete a travel document request to
23 remove Mr. Siddiqi does not constitute a “changed circumstance” under 8 C.F.R. §
24 241.13(i)(2). *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4
25 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (citing *Liu v. Carter*, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526,
26 at *2 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025)). Indeed, upon information and belief, ICE admitted
27 to Mr. Siddiqi that they did not have the ability to deport him to Afghanistan. ICE

1 failed to provide Mr. Siddiqi with “reasons for revocation,” they failed to allow Mr.
2 Siddiqi an “opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation,” and Mr. Siddiqi
3 was not allowed to “submit any evidence or information” relevant to re-detention
4 and evaluating “any contested facts.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i)(3).

5 “[B]ecause officials did not properly revoke Mr. Siddiqi’s release pursuant to
6 the applicable regulations,” this Court will likely find that “petitioner is entitled to
7 his release” on an order of supervision. *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3.

8 **C. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he**
9 **is entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard**
10 **prior to any third country removal (Grounds 4 and 5).**

11 Finally, Mr. Siddiqi is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he may
12 not be removed to a third country absent adequate notice and an opportunity to be
13 heard.

14 U.S. law enshrines protections against dangerous and life-threatening
15 removal decisions. By statute, the government is prohibited from removing an
16 immigrant to any third country where a person may be persecuted or tortured, a
17 form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
18 The government “may not remove [a noncitizen] to a country if the Attorney
19 General decides that the [noncitizen's] life or freedom would be threatened in that
20 country because of the [noncitizen's] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
21 particular social group, or political opinion.” *Id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16,
22 1208.16. Withholding of removal is a mandatory protection.

23 Similarly, Congress codified protections enshrined in the Convention Against
24 Torture (CAT) prohibiting the government from removing a person to a country
25 where they would be tortured. *See* FARRA 2681-822 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231
26 note) (“It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
27 otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there
are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being

1 subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
2 United States.”); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; *id.* § § 208 .16-208.18, 1208.16-1208.18. CAT
3 protection is also mandatory.

4 To comport with the requirements of due process, the government must
5 provide notice of the third country removal and an opportunity to respond. Due
6 process requires “written notice of the country being designated” and “the statutory
7 basis for the designation, i.e., the applicable subsection of § 1231(b)(2).” *Aden v.*
8 *Nielsen*, 409 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2019); *accord D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't*
9 *of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May
10 21, 2025); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).

11 Due process also requires the following: “[A]sk[ing] the noncitizen whether
12 they fear persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and
13 memorialize in writing the noncitizen’s response. This requirement ensures DHS
14 will obtain the necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with section
15 1231(b)(3) and avoids [a dispute about what was said].” *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at
16 1019. “Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have
17 the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of
18 deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS
19 regulations and the constitutional right to due process.” *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at
20 1041.

21 If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the
22 noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an
23 immigration judge reopened removal proceedings. The amount and type of notice
24 must be “sufficient” to ensure that “given [a noncitizen’s] capacities and
25 circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his
26 claim for withholding of deportation.” *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (citing
27 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) and *Kossov v. I.N.S.*, 132 F.3d 405,

1 408 (7th Cir. 1998)); *cf. D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring a minimum of 15
2 days' notice).

3 “[L]ast minute” notice of the country of removal will not suffice, *Andriasian*,
4 180 F.3d at 1041; *accord Najjar v. Lunch*, 630 Fed. App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2016), and
5 for good reason: To have a meaningful opportunity to apply for fear-based protection
6 from removal, immigrants must have time to prepare and present relevant
7 arguments and evidence. Merely telling a person where they may be sent, without
8 giving them a chance to look into country conditions, does not give them a
9 meaningful chance to determine whether and why they have a credible fear.

10 Respondents’ third country removal policy skips over these statutory and
11 constitutional procedural protections. According to ICE’s July 9, 2025 guidance,
12 individuals can be removed to third countries “without the need for further
13 procedures,” so long as “the [U.S.] has received diplomatic assurances.”³ Petitioner
14 is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim on this fact alone, because the policy
15 instructs officers to provide no notice or opportunity to be heard of any kind. The
16 same is true of the minimal procedures ICE offers when no diplomatic assurances
17 are present. The policy provides no meaningful notice (6–24 hours), instructs
18 officers not to ask about fear, and provides no actual opportunity to see counsel and
19 prepare a fear-based claim (6-24 hours), let alone reopen removal proceedings. In
20 sum, it directs ICE officers to violate the rights of those whom they seek to subject
21 to third country removal.

22 Faced with similar arguments, several courts have recently granted
23 individual TROs against removal to third countries. See *Rodriguez-Gutierrez*, No.
24 25-cv-02726-BAS-SBC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) *J.R.*, 2025 WL 1810210; *Vaskanyan*,

27 ³ P. Ex. 3–4 in concurrently filed § 2241 Petition

1 2025 WL 2014208; *Ortega*, 2025 WL 1771438; *Hoac*, 2025 WL 1993771, at *7; *Phan*,
2 2025 WL 1993735, at *7.

3 Because ICE's new policies for third country removal fail to comply with
4 existing law, they also violate the Administrative Procedures Act. Furthermore,
5 given the unlawfulness and unconstitutionality of ICE's policies, Mr. Siddiqi's
6 detention under the color of those policies is unlawful.

7 **II. Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.**

8 Mr. Siddiqi also meets the second factor, irreparable harm. "It is well
9 established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 'unquestionably constitutes
10 irreparable injury.'" *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)
11 (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Where the "alleged deprivation
12 of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of
13 irreparable injury is necessary." *Warsoldier v. Woodford*, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th
14 Cir. 2005) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal Practice and Procedure*,
15 § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)). Further, unlawful detention itself "constitutes extreme or
16 very serious damage, and that damage is not compensable in damages." *Hernandez*
17 *v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).

18 Third-country deportations pose that risk and more. Recent third-country
19 deportees have been held, indefinitely and without charge, in hazardous foreign
20 prisons.⁴ They have been subjected to solitary confinement.⁵ They have been
21 removed to countries so unstable that the U.S. government recommends making a
22 _____

23 ⁴ Edward Wong et al., *Inside the Global Deal-Making Behind Trump's Mass*
24 *Deportations*, N.Y. Times (Jun. 25, 2025), available at
25 [https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-immigrants-](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-immigrants-deportations.html)
[deportations.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-immigrants-deportations.html)

26 ⁵ Gerald Imray, *Men deported by US to Eswatini in Africa will be held in*
27 *solitary confinement for undetermined time*, Associated Press (Jul. 18, 2025),
available at [https://apnews.com/article/eswatini-united-states-trump-deportation-](https://apnews.com/article/eswatini-united-states-trump-deportation-immigrants-a5853b16b7b275cbe6caff87d0bb8)
[immigrants-a5853b16b7b275cbe6caff87d0bb8](https://apnews.com/article/eswatini-united-states-trump-deportation-immigrants-a5853b16b7b275cbe6caff87d0bb8)

1 will and appointing a hostage negotiator before traveling to them.⁶ These and other
2 threats to Mr. Siddiqi’s health and life independently constitute irreparable harm.

3 **III. The balance of hardships and the public interest weigh heavily in**
4 **Petitioner’s favor**

5 The final two factors for a TRO—the balance of hardships and public
6 interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556
7 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). That balance tips decidedly in Mr. Siddiqi’s favor.

8 The government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally
9 cognizable sense” by being compelled to follow the law. *Zepeda v. I.N.S.*, 753 F.2d
10 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, it is always in the public interest to prevent
11 violations of the U.S. Constitution and ensure the rule of law. *See Nken*, 556 U.S. at
12 436 (describing public interest in preventing noncitizens “from being wrongfully
13 removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm”);
14 *Moreno Galvez v. Cuccinelli*, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (when
15 government’s treatment “is inconsistent with federal law, ... the balance of
16 hardships and public interest factors weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction.”).

17 Mr. Siddiqi also faces weighty hardships: unlawful, indefinite detention and
18 removal to a third country where he is likely to suffer imprisonment and serious
19 harm. The balance of equities favors preventing the violation of “requirements of
20 federal law,” *Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir.
21 2014), by granting emergency relief to protect against unlawful detention and third
22 country removal.

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⁶ *See Wong*, *supra*.

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 For these reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court grant this motion and
3 issue a temporary restraining order.

4
5 Dated January 27, 2026

6 Respectfully submitted,

7
8 Rene L. Valladares
9 Federal Public Defender

10 */s/ Megan Hopper-Rebegea*
11 Megan Hopper-Rebegea
12 Assistant Federal Public Defender


13 */s/ Sylvia Irvin*
14 Sylvia Irvin
15 Assistant Federal Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been filed on January 27, 2026. I personally served a true and correct copy of the foregoing index and exhibits in support of the first amended petition by CM/ECF to the following individuals:

Summer Allegra Johnson US Attorney's Office District of Nevada 501 Las Vegas Blvd. South Las Vegas, NV 89101 Email: summer.johnson@usdoj.gov	Sigal Chattah First Assistant, District of Nevada 501 Las Vegas Blvd, Ste 1100 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Email: Sigal.Chattah@usdoj.gov
Virginia Tomova DOJ-USAO 501 Las Vegas Blvd., S. Suite 1100 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Email: virginia.tomova@usdoj.gov	

I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered electronic filing system users. I have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, or have dispatched it to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within three calendar days, to the following person:

Wahid Masud Siddiqi,  Nevada Southern Detention Center 2190 E Mesquite Avenue Pahrump, NV 89060	Todd Lyons 500 12th St SW Washington, DC 20536
Pam Bondi Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC, 20530	John Mattos, Warden Nevada Southern Detention Center 2190 E Mesquite Avenue Pahrump, NV 89048
Kristi Noem Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE, Washington, DC 20528	Michael Bernanke Salt Lake City ICE Field Office Director 2975 Decker Lake Drive, Ste 100 West Valley City, UT 841179-6096

/s/ Victoria Lenzi

An Employee of the
 Federal Public Defender