

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SIARHEI VIANTSKO,

Petitioner,

v.

CRAIG A. LOWE, *in his official capacity as the Warden of Pike County Jail*, MICHAEL T. ROSE, *Acting Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement*; Kristi NOEM, *Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security*; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela BONDI, *U.S. Attorney General*; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,

Respondents.

Case No.:

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Siarhei Viantsko is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Pike County Correctional Facility (“PCCF”). He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, contrary to the law.

2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond. On May 15, 2025, the BIA previously issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who was released from detention pursuant to a grant of parole under section 212(d)(5)(a). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).

The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

7. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released.

JURISDICTION

8. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at PCCF in Lords Valley, Pike County, Pennsylvania.

9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

10. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

11. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

15. Petitioner Siarhei Viantsko is alleged to be a native and citizen of Belarus who has been in immigration detention since August 20, 2025. After arresting Petitioner in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ICE did not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decisions in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).

16. Respondent Craig Lowe is employed by Pike County as Warden of PCCF, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

17. Respondent Michael T. Rose is the Acting Director of the Philadelphia Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Michael Rose is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

18. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

19. Respondent Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

22. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

23. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

24. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

25. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

26. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

27. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119–1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

28. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

29. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

30. On May 15, 2025, the BIA issued a precedent decision, binding on all IJs, holding that IJ has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who was released from detention pursuant to a grant of parole under section 212(d)(5)(a). *See Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

31. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

32. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

33. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts, including many in the Third Circuit and in this District, have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. These courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. *See e.g., Quispe v. Lowe*, No. 3:25-CV-02276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); *Patel v. O'Neill*, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025); *Calzado Diaz v. Noem et al.*, No. 3:25-CV-00458, 2025 WL 3628480 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025); *Cantu Cortes v. O'Neill et al.*, No. 25-CV-6338-CFK, 2025 WL 3171639 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) ("ICE's mandatory detention of Petitioner under U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the laws of the United States and Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause."); *Kashranov v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (same); *Morocho v. Jamison et al.*, No. 5:25-CV-05930-JMG, 2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025) (same); *Del Cid v. Bondi et al.*, No. 3:25-CV-00304, 2025 WL 2985150 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (finding Special Immigrant Juvenile Status applicant was not detained under section 1225, but rather under section 1226(a)); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto et al.*, 1:25-CV-16200 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (similar).

34. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

35. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025

WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

36. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

37. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

38. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

39. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

40. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme

applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

41. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were apprehended by DHS *after* their entry.

42. Furthermore, the statutory basis for initial detention notwithstanding, once released, due process requires that a person like Petitioner receive a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether any re-detention is justified, and whether the person is a flight risk or danger to the community.

43. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As several courts have recently recognized, this is the “most elemental of liberty interest.” *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3 (citation modified); *see also Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at *5 (stating that the petitioner had “an exceptionally strong interest in freedom from physical confinement”).

44. Consistent with this principle, individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest in their “continued liberty.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

45. Such liberty is protected by the Fifth Amendment because, “although indeterminate, [it] includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” such as the ability to be gainfully employed and live with family, “and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the [released individual] and often on others.” *Id.*

46. To guarantee against arbitrary re-detention and to guarantee the right to liberty, due process requires “adequate procedural protections” that ensure the government’s asserted justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified).

47. Due process thus guarantees notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk before the revocation of an individual’s release. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.” (citation modified)); *see also, e.g., Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 485 (requiring “preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed . . . a violation of parole conditions” and that such determination be made “by someone not directly involved in the case” (citation modified)).

48. Several courts have recognized that these principles apply with respect to the re-detention of the many noncitizens, whom DHS has recently begun taking back into custody, merely to meet its daily arrest quotas. Such arbitrary re-arrests and re-detentions occur often after such persons have been released for months and years.

49. For example, in *E.A. T.-B.*, the court applied the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), framework to hold that even in a case where the government argued mandatory detention applied, a person’s re-detention nevertheless required a hearing.

50. In applying the three *Mathews* factors, the court held that the petitioner had “undoubtedly [been] deprive[d] . . . of an established interest in his liberty,” *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3, which, as noted, “is the most elemental of liberty interests,” *id.* (citation modified). The court further explained that even if detention was mandatory, the risk of erroneous deprivation

of liberty without a hearing was high because a hearing serves to ensure that the purposes of detention—the prevention of danger and flight risk—are properly served. *Id.* at *4–5. Finally, the Court explained that “the Government’s interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously released without a hearing is low: although it would have required the expenditure of finite resources (money and time) to provide Petitioner notice and hearing on [ISAP] violations before arresting and re-detaining him, those costs are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.” *Id.* at *5. As a result, the court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at *6.

51. Another court in the same district applied a similar analysis in *Ramirez Tesara*. There, the court reasoned that the petitioner had a “weighty” interest in his liberty and was entitled to the “full protections of the due process clause.” 2025 WL 2637663, at *3. When examining the value of additional safeguards, the court also noted that despite the government’s allegations of ISAP violations, “the fact ‘that the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process.’” *Id.* at *4 (quoting *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *4). Finally, the court reasoned that any government interest in re-detention without a hearing was “minimal.” *Id.* Accordingly, there too, the court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at *5. The *Kumar* and *Ledesama Gonzalez* courts reached the same decision, again holding that all three factors weighed in favor of affording the petitioner a bond hearing. 2025 WL 2677089, at *3–4; 2025 WL 2841574, at *7-9.

52. These courts’ decisions in *Ledesama Gonzalez*, *E.A. T.-B.*, *Ramirez Tesara* and *Kumar* are consistent with many other district court decisions addressing similar situations. *See, e.g., Valdez v. Joyce*, 2025 WL 1707737 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering immediate release

due to lack of pre-deprivation hearing); *Pinchi v. Noem*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2084921 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (similar); *Maklad v. Murray*, 2025 WL 2299376 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (similar); *Garcia v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2420068 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (similar); *Rodriguez v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2855193 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2025), at *6 (similar); *Orellana v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2402780 (E.D.N.Y. August 19, 2025) (ordering immediate release due to violation of Administrative Procedure Act when petitioner was not provided hearing upon revocation and re-detention of his parole); *Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock*, 792 F.Supp.3d 1123, (D.Or. July 9, 2025) (similar).

53. The same framework and principles apply here and compel Petitioner's immediate release.

FACTS

54. Petitioner has resided in the United States since November 6, 2022, and lived in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania up until his arrest and re-detention by ICE in August 2025.

55. On August 20, 2025, Petitioner was on his way to work, when four unmarked cars surrounded his car. ICE officers exited the unmarked vehicles and questioned Petitioner regarding his identity, nationality and status in the United States. Petitioner was then instructed to exit his vehicle, and ICE officers placed handcuffs on him and transported him to the ICE Philadelphia Field Office. ICE officers subsequently entered Petitioner's car and drove it back to Petitioner's house, without Petitioner.

56. Petitioner was not provided a particular reason or prior notice for his arrest. Petitioner was then transferred to the Federal Detention Center ("FDC") in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he was held temporarily, until his transfer to PCCF, where he remains detained today.

57. Petitioner was briefly detained following his entry to the United States on November 6, 2022. DHS subsequently released him and his family on humanitarian parole, determining he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Petitioner then timely filed his I-589, Application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), based past torture and fear of future political persecution by the



58. Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner was not provided with written notice of the reason for his re-detention.

59. Prior to Petitioner’s re-detention, Respondents did not assess whether Petitioner presented a flight risk or a danger to the community, or whether his arrest was justified for some other reason.

60. Prior to Petitioner’s re-detention, Petitioner never received a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine if his re-detention is justified.

61. DHS has now placed Petitioner in detained removal proceedings before the Elizabeth, New Jersey pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Petitioner with, *inter alia*, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

62. Petitioner is a married father of three children—two of whom are in the United States. His youngest is a U.S. citizen and was three weeks old when Petitioner was re-detained by ICE in August 2025. His older daughter is 17 years old. Petitioner served as the primary financial provider for his wife and daughters, through his own thriving auto-mechanic business in Northeast Philadelphia. He obtained lawful work authorization and maintained a fixed residence in Philadelphia, prior to his detention. On March 15, 2025, he was charged with a summary offense

in Berks County, Pennsylvania: “Statement Under Penalty” under 18 Pa. § 4904 §§ B. The charges were brought due to Petitioner’s denial of his application to purchase a firearm at a Berks County recreational gun show, where Petitioner had misinterpreted the question on the application regarding his legal status. As he was paroled in by DHS at the border and had timely filed his asylum application, Petitioner believed that he had “legal status” and filled out the application as such. Given Petitioner’s genuine misunderstanding and lack of intent to deceive, on October 28, 2025, the charge was withdrawn, and he pled guilty to a summary offense of “Disorderly Conduct” under 18 Pa. § 5503 §§ A4, for which he paid a \$100 fine and was sentenced to time served at PCCF while in immigration custody. Petitioner has no other arrests or contacts with the criminal legal system in the United States. As such, Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.

63. Following Petitioner’s arrest and transfer to PCCF, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

64. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this Honorable Court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I **Violation of the INA**

65. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

66. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As

relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and were already in the United States, prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

67. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II
Violation of the Bond Regulations

68. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

69. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

70. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure* and *Hurtado Matter of Q.Li*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

71. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III

**Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process
Procedural Due Process**

72. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

73. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

74. Due process does not permit the government to strip Petitioner of his liberty without written notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether re-detention is warranted based on danger or flight risk. *See Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 487-88. Such written notice and a hearing must occur *prior* to any re-detention.

75. Respondents revoked Petitioner's release and deprived him of liberty without affording him any written notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker prior to his re-detention.

76. Accordingly, Petitioner's re-detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle District of Pennsylvania while this habeas petition is pending;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- d. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;

- e. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner. *See e.g., Martinez v. McAleenan*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 366, at 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“As Petitioner’s arrest and detention were blatantly unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and appropriate equitable remedy to even partially restore [Petitioner] is to immediate release him and enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions.”).
- f. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this Twenty-Fourth Day of December 2025.

s/ Mana Aliabadi, Esq.

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