

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 28 U.S.C. §2241


**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION**

JOSE LAZARO BRITO ROSALES,
Petitioner,

v.


KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
MIGUEL VERGARA, in his official capacity as Director of the San Antonio Field Office of ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations;
RAYMOND E. THOMPSON, Warden of the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center; and
DAREN K. MARGOLIN, Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-1872

Immigration No. 

**PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
AND REQUEST FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner JOSE LAZARO BRITO ROSALES (A  hereinafter referred to as "*Petitioner*" or "*Mr. Brito*," is a native and citizen of Cuba who has resided in the United States for over four years. He is currently subject to indefinite detention after her apprehension by ICE in Texas and is detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas. *See* Petitioner Ex. 1, ICE Detainee Locater search results.

2. Mr. Brtio has been placed in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. *See* Petitioner Ex. 2, Documentation of Petitioner's Immigration Proceedings.

3. In recent months, immigration judges have routinely denied requests for a individualized custody redetermination requests to individuals in situations substantially similar to that of Mr. Brito, due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction. These denials have relied on recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) precedent in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). However, numerous federal district courts, including courts within the Western District of Texas San Antonio Division, and others from within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have made clear that similarly situated noncitizens, who are detained under 236(a), are entitled to individualized bond hearings.

4. Despite this posture, immigration judges continue to refuse to provide noncitizens such as Mr. Brito with an individualized custody redetermination hearing, asserting a lack of jurisdiction based on erroneous Board of Immigration Appeals precedent. The refusal to provide such a hearing violates the INA, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the APA, because detention in § 240 proceedings is governed by INA § 236(a), which clearly provides that noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings.

5. Mr. Rosales therefore petitions this Court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and seeks immediate injunctive relief, including a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction directing Respondents to release him under reasonable conditions without delay, or alternatively, provide him an individualized custody hearing.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants federal district courts authority to hear

habeas petitions filed by persons held in custody in violation of federal law or the Constitution. This action also invokes the Court’s authority under the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

7. The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do not bar this suit. Petitioner does not challenge a final order of removal, nor seek class-wide relief. Detention-based habeas claims are not channeled by Section 1252(b)(9). *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839–42 (2018). Section 1252(g) is narrowly construed and does not foreclose review of unlawful custody or *ultra vires* attempts to switch a non-final INA § 240 case into expedited removal. *See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999) (hereinafter also referred to as “*Reno v. AADC*”). Individual injunctive relief is not barred by Section 1252(f)(1). *See Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065–66 (2022).

8. Venue is proper in this District, and in the San Antonio Division, because Petitioner is detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas, within this Court’s jurisdiction, whereas Petitioner’s immigration detention is controlled by the San Antonio Office of ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations. *See* Petitioner Ex. 1.

III. PARTIES

9. Petitioner, Jose Lazao Brito Rosales (“Mr. Brito”), is a citizen and national of Cuba who has lived in the United States for over four years, having arrived to the United States on or about September 24, 2021. On or about September 17, 2025, Mr. Brito was detained while attending a routine ICE check-in appointment and was transferred to the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, where he remains detained. *See* Petitioner Ex. 1.

10. Respondent KRISTI NOEM is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She is sued in her official capacity.

11. Respondent TODD LYONS is the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an executive branch agency within the Department of Homeland Security. He is sued in his official capacity.

12. Respondent MIGUEL VERGARA is the Acting Director of the San Antonio Field Office of ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”), and therefore, he oversees the Karnes Sub-Office of ERO San Antonio, which has jurisdiction over Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity as Petitioner’s local custodian and DHS’s local decisionmaker.

13. Respondent, RAYMOND THOMPSON, Warden of the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, is responsible for housing noncitizens from various regions of Texas in ICE custody pending the completion of their removal proceedings. The Karnes County Immigration Processing Center is located at 409 FM 1144, Karnes City, TX 78118. Respondent is sued in his official capacity as Petitioner’s immediate physical custodian as of the filing of this petition.

14. Respondent, DAREN K. MARGOLIN, is Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. As such, he is responsible for directing and coordinating policy for the United States Immigration Court system, including policies relating to immigration bond applications and requests for custody redeterminations in immigration court. He is sued in his official capacity.

15. Respondents Noem and Lyons, who represent DHS and ICE, are properly included herein as the executives of federal agencies within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

16. Mr. Brito, a citizen and national of Cuba, has built his life in the United States since his entry on or about September 24, 2021 when he was processed by immigration officials at the southern border near San Luiz, Arizona and released on recognizance. *See* Petitioner Ex. 2. Since then, he has continuously resided in Texas, where he is married to his legal permanent resident spouse, Larian Santana Medina. Mr. Brito has complied with all the conditions of his release including attending ICE check-in appointments and immigration court hearings. His commitment to seeking relief from removal is evidenced by presenting his I-485 application for permanent residency pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act, and his I-589 application for asylum, withholding on removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture. *See* Petitioner Ex. 3, Notice of Filing of I-485 Application for Adjustment of Status pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act and Notice of Filing of Respondent's Form I-589 application.

17. Mr. Brito filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal (Form I-589) before the Immigration Court on May 13, 2022, thereby complying with the one-year filing deadline required under INA § 208(a)(2)(B). *See* Petitioner Ex. 3. Mr. Brito filed his application for adjustment of status pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act with the Immigration Court on October 29, 2025. *Id.* Both applications for relief were denied by an immigration judge on November 21, 2022. *See* Petitioner Ex. 4, Decision of Immigration Judge. Mr. Brito, through counsel, filed an appeal of the decision of the immigration judge with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on December 19, 2022, within the 30-day filing deadline for submitting a notice of appeal. *See* Petitioner Ex. 5, EOIR-26, Notice of Appeal and email confirmation of filing with the BIA.

18. Since his initial release from immigration custody on October 07, 2021, Petitioner has not only complied with all conditions of his supervision but has also taken proactive steps to demonstrate his commitment to legal obligations. Mr. Brito promptly reported to the ICE Field Office located at 3523 Crosspoint Drive, San Antonio, Texas, as scheduled. He completed each appointment without incident, and he took the initiative to return for future compliance checks on time. His actions reflect a conscious and voluntary adherence to his supervision requirements.

19. On or about September 17, 2025, Petitioner dutifully appeared for his scheduled ICE appointment. He expected a routine compliance check-in, having no criminal record or pending violations. However, what should have been routine turned into abrupt incarceration. Without warning or explanation, ICE officers detained him on the spot and refused to release him. ICE officers informed Mr. Brito that he would now be detained, despite his history of appearing at ICE check-ins while in removal proceedings for the previous years.

20. Mr. Brito was transferred to the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas. The facility is operated under contract with the Karnes Sub-Field Office of the San Antonio Field Office of ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”). The ICE Detainee Locator confirms Petitioner’s custody in Karnes City, Texas, as of December 24, 2025. *See* Petitioner Ex. 1.

21. Until his transfer into a remote immigration facility in Karnes City, Texas, Mr. Brito had lived and worked in Texas for over about four years, where he developed close ties to his community. Mr. Brito has no history of violence and no criminal record whatsoever that would justify treating him as a danger to society—no arrests or convictions

— since entering the United States. To the contrary, he has demonstrated continuous residence, stable employment, and community ties in San Antonio, Texas. Mr. Brito's detention was not the result of any criminal act or immigration violation but rather a routine compliance visit that ICE converted into an arbitrary arrest

22. As of the filing of this petition, Petitioner remains detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center. Although ICE filed its Notice to Appear with EOIR, Mr. Brito is ineligible for any bond hearing or opportunity for review under INA § 236(a) under the current policies of ICE and EOIR. The government's arbitrary arrest of Mr. Brito, coupled with agency policy, renders his detention ultra vires, indefinite, and constitutionally infirm. He has been held for over three months contrary to the immigration statutes, and without being afforded judicial oversight or administrative review.

23. On the morning of December 24, 2025, a DHS/ICE-ERO officer informed Mr. Brito that he would need to sign documents to effectuate his removal from the United States. Mr. Brito refused to sign the documentation. The DHS/ICE-ERO officer informed Mr. Brito that regardless of his refusal to sign the documentation he would be removed from the United States on December 25, 2025. This imminent threat of removal is notwithstanding the timely appeal of the Decision of the Immigration Judge filed by Mr. Brito, through counsel, with the BIA on December 19, 2025. Petitioner Ex. 5.

24. Given Respondents' failure to justify continued custody or provide him with a bond hearing, Petitioner respectfully seeks a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction ordering his immediate release, or alternatively, requiring Respondents to promptly provide him with an individualized custody determination before an immigration judge.

25. On or about September 24, 2021, immigration officials apprehended Mr. Brito upon his entry into the United States through the Arizona border. Following this, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Mr. Brito with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), formally charging him as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] for entry without inspection near San Luis, Arizona before he was eventually released on recognizance. *See* Petitioner Ex. 2, Documentation of Immigration History.

26. Although ICE filed the NTA with the immigration court after serving it on Mr. Brito, placing him into § 240 removal proceedings, ICE’s detention of Mr. Brito ignores his lengthy history in this country, as well as the fact that he has avenues for removal relief. For this reason, Mr. Brito is entitled to the due process guaranteed by the INA, including an individualized custody redetermination hearing under § 236(a), and not merely a summary expulsion.

27. Despite this case history, current immigration policy treats Mr. Brito, for custody purposes, as though he were subject to the harshest form of “arriving alien” detention, even though he has been properly placed in § 240 proceedings. Instead of being allowed to seek release on bond before an immigration judge, ICE has categorically denied him any chance to demonstrate that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. This blanket denial is not based on any individualized finding, but on the government’s insistence on applying the Board of Immigration Appeals’ recent decisions in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Those decisions—issued without notice-and-comment rulemaking, and in direct tension with the

plain language of the statute—purport to strip immigration judges of authority to hold custody redetermination hearings for individuals like Mr. Brito.

28. As a result of this, as well as ICE’s arbitrary arrest, Mr. Brito finds himself detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes, Texas, a remote facility far from his community. *See* Petitioner Ex. 1. He is held under conditions indistinguishable from those reserved for dangerous criminals, despite the absence of any criminal conviction that would bar his release under Section 236(c) of the INA. Each day of confinement exacerbates the harm—separating him from family and community support, impeding his ability to consult with counsel, and inflicting the psychological strain that prolonged and unnecessary detention inevitably produces.

29. In sum, Mr. Brito is a man with roots in the United States, a claim for adjustment of status to permanent residency pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act, political asylum and humanitarian protection, and no disqualifying criminal record. He has been thrust into seemingly indefinite civil detention solely because of the government's reliance on recent, non-binding BIA decisions that contravene the plain language of the INA and the recent decisions of multiple federal district courts. Mr. Brito’s continued detention, absent the possibility of an individualized bond hearing, is unlawful, arbitrary, and profoundly unjust. A favorable ruling in his case would reaffirm the principle that due-process protections do not turn on bureaucratic labels, but rather uphold the foundational rights guaranteed under the Constitution, signaling a commitment to justice and fairness in the immigration system.

V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Statutory Framework for Immigration Custody Determinations.

30. Immigration detention is governed primarily by two provisions of the INA: Section 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]. Whereas Section 236(a) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to release noncitizens on bond pending removal proceedings, in contrast, Section 235(b) applies to certain categories of “arriving aliens” and mandates detention pending completion of expedited or threshold screening.

31. Congress designed § 236(a) to govern the detention of individuals who, like Petitioner, are in regular removal proceedings under § 240. The statutory text expressly provides for release on bond, subject only to conditions ensuring appearance and protecting the community.

32. The Supreme Court has confirmed the distinction between these statutory schemes. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018) (explaining differences between § 235(b) mandatory detention and § 236(a) discretionary custody). The Board of Immigration Appeals itself recognized for decades that individuals in § 240 proceedings after entry without inspection were eligible for custody redeterminations. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).

33. Despite this clear statutory scheme, DHS has invoked recent BIA decisions (*i.e.*, *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025); *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)) to strip immigration judges of bond authority in cases such as those of Petitioner. Those decisions, however, cannot override the plain language of the statute.

34. In recent weeks, multiple district courts in 2025 have directly addressed the Government’s efforts to expand § 1225(b)(2)(A) beyond its intended scope by assessing habeas petitions for noncitizens in similar circumstances and have repeatedly concluded that the clear and unambiguous language of Section 236 of the INA permits noncitizens

who arrived without inspection—persons in precisely the same legal circumstances as Mr. Brito—are eligible to request bond hearings before the immigration court.

35. For example, in *Santos v. Noem*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183412 (W.D. La. Sept. 15, 2025), the court emphasized that habeas relief is proper to correct statutory misclassification and to preserve the petitioner’s due process rights. In *Kostak v. Trump*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167280 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025), the court ordered bond eligibility under § 1226(a), rejecting the Government’s assertion that § 1225(b) applied. Likewise, in *Salazar v. Dedos*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183335 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025), the district court ordered an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days, holding that prolonged detention without such a hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

36. Additionally, Petitioner’s position is reinforced by the recent decision in *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al. v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr et al*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.), where the federal court granted partial summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that mandatory detention without individualized bond hearings violates due process and exceeds statutory authority under INA § 236(a). In that class action, the Court rejected the government’s expansive interpretation of INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and emphasized that noncitizens in regular removal proceedings are entitled to custody review. This ruling, supported by multiple amicus briefs, underscores the growing judicial consensus against blanket denial of bond hearings. *Cf.* *Maldonado Bautista*, Order of Nov. 20, 2025 (granting partial summary judgment).

37. Similarly, recent decisions from district courts within the Fifth Circuit, such as *Lopez v. Hardin*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188368 (N.D. Tex. 2025), and *Lopez-Arevelo v.*

Ripa, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188232 (S.D. Tex. 2025), further confirm that courts are rejecting agency efforts to apply 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to individuals who are properly subject to INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]. See also *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-3726, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-00112, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) (reviewing new detention policy). This Court should follow suit in this case.

38. These holdings reflect a growing consensus that district courts retain jurisdiction to intervene where detention rests on a statutory misapplication and results in ongoing constitutional harm. The cumulative weight of these decisions underscores that Mr. Brito is entitled to release from custody under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)].

VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count I – Violation of INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]

39. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-asserts them as though stated fully herein.

40. Respondents' refusal to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody redetermination hearing violates the INA and the recent decisions of multiple federal district courts from around the country, including courts within Western District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit.

41. INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” and that the Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested alien” or “may release the alien on—(A) bond of at least

\$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole.”

42. By its plain text, 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] applies to all noncitizens arrested and detained pending removal proceedings unless mandatory detention under § 236(c) applies.

43. In interpreting the plain language of Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], various federal district courts confirmed that noncitizens detained under Section 236(a) are statutorily eligible for individualized bond determinations before an immigration judge. Thus, the Attorney General must consider bond applications by detained aliens pending the outcome of their removal proceedings, since immigration judges retain jurisdiction to conduct custody redetermination hearings under that provision.

44. Petitioner was served an NTA indicating his placement into removal proceedings under Section 240 of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1229a]. Mr. Brito remains detained at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, with his case placed on the detained docket of the Pearsall Immigration Court with an appeal filed at the BIA. Because Petitioner has been detained for removal proceedings, and because he has now lived in the United States for several years and applied for relief from removal affirmatively, his custody is governed by § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], not § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)].

45. By adopting a policy refusing to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody redetermination that comports with INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], Respondents have acted contrary to statutory authority requiring consideration of such an application. This policy supports the conclusion that the filing of a request for custody redetermination with the immigration courts is currently a futile endeavor. Petitioner’s continued detention

without access to an individualized custody redetermination violates the INA and must be corrected through habeas relief.

46. Accordingly, this Court should grant the writ and order that Petitioner released from DHS custody, or alternatively, receive an individualized bond hearing under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], as recently made clear by the decisions of multiple federal district courts to examine these issues around the country.

Count II – Fifth Amendment Due Process Violation

47. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-reassert them as though stated fully herein.

48. Petitioner’s continued detention without access to an individualized custody redetermination hearing also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Prolonged detention without bond review is arbitrary, punitive, and unconstitutional.

49. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Immigration detention is civil in nature, but it nonetheless implicates this fundamental liberty interest.

50. Because Petitioner is detained by ICE at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center, he is categorically barred from presenting evidence that she is not a danger to the community and that he poses no flight risk. The blanket denial of access to a custody redetermination strips Petitioner of the individualized determination required by due process and by the plain language of Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)].

51. Unlike noncitizens subject to mandatory detention for serious criminal offenses under Section 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)], Petitioner has no qualifying convictions that justify a categorical denial of release. *See* Petitioner Ex. 6, Criminal Conviction Search Results for Petitioner. The government has no legitimate basis to insist that Petitioner's detention be mandatory, yet he remains confined with no opportunity for release.

52. Denying Petitioner any access to a custody determination deprives him of procedural protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, prolonged detention without meaningful review violates the substantive limits of due process, as articulated in *Zadvydas* and *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

53. By adopting a policy refusing to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody hearing that comports with INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], Respondents have acted contrary to statutory authority requiring consideration of such an application.

54. Petitioner is a resident of the United States, with over 4 years of continuous presence. He has strong family and community ties in Texas. There has been no finding that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Yet, solely because of recent, erroneous BIA decisions—decisions not binding in this Circuit—he has been categorically denied the process to which he is entitled. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

55. Accordingly, the Court should grant habeas relief on constitutional grounds and order that Petitioner be released from custody pending the final outcome of her Section 240 [8 U.S.C. § 1229a] removal proceedings, or alternatively be afforded an immediate custody determination hearing.

Count III – Unlawful Agency Action (APA)

56. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-asserts them as though stated fully herein.

57. Respondent's continued detention of Petitioner without affording him a bond hearing also constitutes unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. The abrupt departure from longstanding precedent without reasoned explanation violates the Administrative Procedure Act.

58. For decades, immigration judges exercised custody redetermination jurisdiction over individuals detained under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], including those who entered without inspection. *See Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). That framework allowed for individualized custody determinations consistent with both statutory text and constitutional principles. These cases include, without limitation, the following:

- *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) (establishing criteria of danger to the community and flight risk as factors for immigration bond requests);
- *In re L-E-V-H-*, AXXX-XXX-504 (BIA, Dec. 21, 2018) (despite noncitizen's testimony that he had "turned himself in to officials at the border," held noncitizen had entered without inspection and was therefore not "arriving alien");
- *In re A-R-S-*, AXXX-XXX-161 (BIA, June 25, 2020) (remanding to develop record where noncitizen who had DACA alleged he had entered without inspection but had been misclassified as "arriving alien");
- *In re M-D-M-*, AXXX-XXX-797 (BIA, Aug. 24, 2020) (despite recent arrest, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 20 years); and

- *In re F-P-J-*, AXXX-XXX-699 (BIA, Oct. 22, 2020) (where noncitizen had a pending circuit court appeal and IJ failed to consider alternatives to detention, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 17 years).

59. In 2025, the BIA issued *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which held that certain noncitizens who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)]. These decisions abruptly stripped immigration judges of bond authority for a large class of detainees, including Petitioner, without notice-and-comment rulemaking and without reasoned explanation for abandoning prior precedent.

60. The APA requires agencies to engage in reasoned decision-making and prohibits arbitrary or capricious action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The BIA's reversal of decades of established law without acknowledging or adequately explaining its departure is the very definition of arbitrary and capricious action. *See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 579 U.S. 211, 221–22 (2016).

61. Although Petitioner has not filed a custody redetermination application since entering ICE custody on or about September 17, 2025, doing so would be futile, as immigration judges refuse to exercise jurisdiction, expressly relying on this recent BIA policy shift. By treating individuals such as Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under Section 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)], Respondents have applied an unlawful, arbitrary interpretation of the statute that is inconsistent with the plain language of Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] and unsupported by reasoned analysis.

62. Accordingly, Respondents' refusal to provide Petitioner an individualized custody redetermination hearing constitutes unlawful agency action under the APA, and this Court should grant habeas relief to remedy the violation.

VII. REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

63. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction directing Respondents to not remove him from the United States, to not transfer him to a jurisdiction outside the San Antonio division of the Western District of Texas, to release him under reasonable conditions of supervision, or alternatively, to provide him with an immediate individualized custody redetermination hearing under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] within seven (7) days. Petitioner intends to seek a Temporary Restraining Order through a separate motion that is forthcoming. Upon a final hearing, Petitioner asks for permanent injunctive relief as appropriate.

64. The Supreme Court has made clear that such extraordinary relief depends on a four-factor test: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434–35 (2009). As explained below, Petitioner satisfies each of these factors.

A. Mr. Brito Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of His Petition.

65. Mr. Brito has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. As explained more fully hereinabove, numerous district courts, including some from within the Fifth Circuit, have already determined that noncitizens in circumstances substantially similar to those of Mr. Brito, who are detained under Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], are entitled to release from custody, or alternatively, individualized bond hearings before an immigration judge.

66. Current BIA policy prohibiting immigration judges from exercising jurisdiction over any immigration bond request that Mr. Brito might file—due to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ recent decisions in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)—cannot override the clear and unambiguous language of Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]. This conclusion is further supported by the recent ruling in *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.), which invalidated similar policies denying bond hearings to noncitizens in regular removal proceedings.

67. Additionally, Mr. Brito raises a constitutional claim under the Fifth Amendment, as prolonged detention without any opportunity for individualized custody review violates due process.

68. Taken together, these statutory and constitutional grounds present not merely a plausible claim, but a compelling one. Under *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), likelihood of success is the most critical factor in evaluating interim relief. Here, Petitioner’s claim is exceptionally strong.

B. Mr. Brito Wil Suffer Irreparable Harm If a Temporary Restraining Order Does Not Issue.

69. If this Court does not grant immediate relief, Mr. Brito will continue to suffer irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Constitution. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Everyday Mr. Brito remains confined without access to the procedures guaranteed by law constitutes a grave and irreversible injury. Moreover, DHS/ICE ERO

officers have threatened Mr. Brito with removal from the United States on December 25, 2025, despite him filing a timely appeal with the BIA on December 19, 2025.

70. Even if Mr. Brito were eventually granted a bond hearing after protracted litigation, the harm inflicted by the period of unlawful detention—loss of liberty, disruption of family life, psychological strain, and reputational damage—could never be undone. As *Nken* instructs, irreparable harm cannot be speculative; it must be actual and concrete. 556 U.S. at 435. Mr. Brito’s ongoing imprisonment and imminent threat of removal without a lawful hearing meets that standard.

C. Balance of Equities Weighs in favor of Mr. Brito.

71. The balance of equities tips decisively in Petitioner’s favor. On his side lies the interest in safeguarding one of the most fundamental rights recognized in our legal system—the right not to be arbitrarily detained without process. On the government’s side, the only asserted interest is administrative convenience in applying the BIA’s recent, and in this Circuit nonbinding, precedents.

72. There is no evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight and has no criminal history. *See* Petitioner Ex. 6. In contrast, every additional day of unlawful confinement inflicts significant harm on Petitioner. When weighed against each other, the equities clearly support granting immediate relief.

73. Additionally, the undersigned Counsel for Petitioner has undertaken to contact Counsel for the Department of Homeland Security by emailing the Office of Principal Legal Advisor and ICE – ERO for Houston, Texas, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas, in a good faith effort to notify Respondents of Petitioner’s

intent to obtain a hearing on this TRO request as soon as practicable. *See* Petitioner Ex. 7, Email Correspondence to DHS and AUSA offices regarding intent to seek injunctive relief.

D. There Is Strong Public Interest In Maintaining the Pre-2025 Status Quo.

74. Finally, the public interest strongly supports the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The Supreme Court in *Nken* explained that when the government is the opposing party, the balance of equities and the public interest merge. *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 435. The public has no interest in perpetuating unlawful detention; rather, the public's interest is served by ensuring that government agencies act within the bounds of statutory and constitutional authority

75. Granting Petitioner an individualized bond hearing promotes confidence in the integrity of the immigration system, reinforces respect for the rule of law, and prevents the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Protecting fundamental due process rights is not just in Petitioner's interest, but in the interest of the public at large.

76. Each factor of the equitable test weighs heavily in Mr. Brito's favor. He has shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits based on the interpretation of Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] by various federal district courts and the Due Process Clause; he faces irreparable harm each day he remains detained without lawful process; the equities tilt overwhelmingly toward protecting his liberty; and the public interest is best served by ensuring that immigration detention is consistent with statutory and constitutional limits.

77. For these reasons, this Court should issue a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at the earliest possible opportunity, requiring Respondents to release Mr. Brito from custody, or alternatively with an immediate bond hearing.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

78. For the above and foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court take the following actions:

- a. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, or alternatively provide him with an individualized bond hearing under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] within seven (7) days of the Court's order;
- b. Grant a preliminary injunction requiring Petitioner's immediate release, or alternatively such a hearing;
- c. Grant a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Respondents from removing the Petition from the United States or transferring Petitioner from the current detention center where he is being held in custody or outside the jurisdiction of this Court;
- d. Issue a declaration that the plain language of INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] permits immigration judges to consider bond requests of noncitizens who are present without admission and are not classified as arriving aliens;
- e. Grant permanent injunctive relief as appropriate;
- f. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), and any other applicable provision of law; and
- g. Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATE: December 24, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 24, 2025, a true copy of the above document was filed via the Court's CM/ECF and that a copy will be sent automatically to all counsel of record.

December 24, 2025

/s/Guillermo M. Hernandez, III

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