

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Naveen Naveen,

Petitioner,

v.

Gregory J. Archambeault, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; **Kristi Noem**, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; **Pamela Bondi**, U.S. Attorney General; **Jeremy Casey**, Facility Administrator, Imperial Regional Detention Facility,

Respondents.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

Case No. **'25CV3728 AGS AGS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Naveen Naveen is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. Petitioner entered the United States on April 18, 2023, from Mexico without inspection. He was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) shortly thereafter and ultimately he was released on an Order of Release on Recognizance (OREC).

3. On that same date, he was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) in Immigration Court, charging him as being an alien present in the United States without admission or parole (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)).

4. Thereafter, Petitioner filed an I-589, Application for Asylum with the Immigration Court. That application remains pending. As an asylum applicant, Petitioner has work

authorization and a social security number. Since his entry into the United States, he has lived productive and law-abiding life.

5. On November 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE at his pre-scheduled ICE check-in. As previously mentioned, petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

6. Based on this allegation, DHS has denied or will deny Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

7. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

8. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

9. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

10. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be immediately released.

JURISDICTION

11. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California.

12. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

13. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

14. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

15. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Southern District of California.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

16. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an

order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

17. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

18. Petitioner Naveen Naveen is a citizen of India who has been in immigration detention since November 3, 2025. After arresting Petitioner while he was at his pre-scheduled ICE check-in, ICE did not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

19. Respondent Gregory J. Archambeault is the Acting Director of the San Diego Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Respondent Archambeault is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

20. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner’s detention. Secretary Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review

and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

22. Respondent Jeremy Casey is employed as the Facility Administrator of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

23. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

24. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

25. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

26. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

27. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

28. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a)

was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

29. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

30. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

31. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

32. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and it affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

33. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

34. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities in hundreds of District Court decisions. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

35. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

36. There have been hundreds district court decisions addressing the legal issues presented in the underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. *Demirel v. Federal Detention Center Philadelphia, et al.*, No. 25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (provided full list of cases as of November 18, 2025). Court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025

WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

37. Indeed, within the Southern District of California, there have been numerous decisions rejecting ICE and EOIR’s new interpretation. *See Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Valdovinos v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-2439 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2025); *Esquivel-Ipina v. Larose*, 2025 WL 2998361 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); *Castellanos Lopez*

v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 3005346 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); *Martinez Lopez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); *Perez-Gonzalez v. LaRose*, 3:25-cv-02727 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); *Beltran v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3078837 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); *Garcia Magadan v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3090089 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025); *Maravilla Amaya v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3182998 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025); *Pelico Calel v. Larose*, 2025 WL 3171898 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025); *Faizyan v. Casey*, 2025 WL 3208844 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); *Mancilla Ruiz v. Larose*, 2025 WL 3214975 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025); *Cruz Vega v. Larose*, 2025 WL 3247778 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025); *Godinez Sales v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center*, 2025 WL 3625867 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2025); *Arias Hernandez v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3633040 (S.D. Ca. Dec. 15, 2025).

38. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

39. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

40. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

41. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

42. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

43. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended.

FACTS

44. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-6, *supra*.

45. Following Petitioner's arrest and transfer to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, ICE presumptively issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

46. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the immigration judge is unable to consider Petitioner's bond request.

47. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS WARRANTED

48. The Supreme Court has recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure *release* from unlawful detention.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 107, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020) (emphasis in original). Several decisions from the Eastern District have ordered immediate release in similar cases. *See eg. Bhatia v. O’Neill, et al.*, No. 25-6809, Dkt. 8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); *Rodrigues Pereira v. O’Neill, et al.* No. 25-6543, Dkt. 11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025); *Morocho v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 25-05930, 2025 WL 3296300, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025); *Diallo v. O’Neill, et al.*, 25-06358, Dkt. 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025); *Patel v. McShane, et al.*, 25-05975 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025). The Court should not depart from this norm.

49. As noted above, several hundred district court decisions addressing the legal issues presented in the underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and rejected the government’s position. *Barco Mercado v. Francis et al.*, No. 25-06582, ECF No. 28 at *9-10, *35-40 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025). Those Courts have roundly rejected Government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); the interpretation that is part of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond; and the interpretation is part of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) September 5, 2025 precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),

which determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

50. Many of these decisions have found that Respondents' erroneous application of the law violates the respective detainees constitutional right to Due Process. *See eg. Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill*, No. 25-6338, 2025 WL 317639 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025); *Sanchez Ballestros v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2880831 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 9, 2025); *Hernandez-Alonso v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 3083920 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2025); *Rodriguez Serrano v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3122825 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025); *Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem*, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); *Rosales Ponce v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3049785 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025); *Loza Valencia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3042520 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *Cuevas Guzman v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); *Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *E.C. v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2916264 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025); *Garcia Domingo v. Castro*, 2025 WL 2941217 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025); *Artiga v. Genalo*, 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).

51. Despite this *overwhelming rejection* of Respondents' new policies and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, and hundreds of decisions finding that Respondents are violating the constitutional rights, **Respondents refuse to relent and continue act in defiance of the law and the Constitution. It has been reported that ICE agents inform detainees that they** "have to sue us [ICE] to get out."

52. Petitioner is now one of the approximately 61,000 people detained by Respondents.² Respondents' unlawful behavior is pervasive and defies decision after decision from the Courts. As Petitioner's arrest and detention were blatantly unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and appropriate equitable remedy to even partially restore Petitioner is to immediate release him and enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions. *See eg. Martinez v. McAleenan*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I **Violation of the INA**

53. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

54. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country, were apprehended by ICE or CBP, and were then released on their own recognizance. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

55. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II **Violation of the Bond Regulations**

56. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

² *See* ICE's publicly available detention data, available at: <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management>

57. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

58. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner.

59. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

60. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

61. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

62. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

63. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Southern District of California while this habeas petition is pending;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents to release Petitioner immediately;
- e. Declare that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful and in violation of his due process rights;
- f. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,

Date: December 22, 2025

s/ Curtis Lee Morrison

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