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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION**

RUBEN VERDUZCO BENITEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

BRET BRADFORD, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Houston Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; MARTIN FRINK, Warden, Houston Contract Detention Facility (CDF)

Respondents.

Case No. 25-6178

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

1 INTRODUCTION

2 1. Petitioner, Ruben Verduzco Benitez, is in the physical custody of Respondents at
3 the Houston Contract Detention Facility (CDF). *See* Exhibit 1, Printout from ICE Online Detainee
4 Locator System showing Petitioner’s current detention. He now faces unlawful detention because
5 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review
6 (EOIR) have concluded that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

7 2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without
8 admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

9 3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS denied
10 Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8,
11 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone
12 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without
13 admission or inspection, to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore
14 ineligible to be released on bond.

15 4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board)
16 issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge
17 has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without
18 admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined
19 that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore,
20 ineligible to be released on bond.

21 5. Petitioner Ruben Verduzco Benitez also brings this petition for a writ of habeas
22 corpus to seek enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial Class certified in
23 *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) He faces unlawful
24

1 detention because DHS and the EOIR have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on
2 behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

3 6. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on
4 behalf of individual plaintiffs, and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and
5 extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-
6 CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025)
7 (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v.*
8 *Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D.
9 Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible
10 Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion
11 for Partial Summary Judgment).

12 7. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained
13 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
14 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

15 8. Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible class as he: a) does not have lawful
16 status in the United States and is currently detained at the Houston Contract Detention Facility in
17 Houston, Texas. He was apprehended by immigration authorities on November 7, 2025; b) entered
18 the United States without inspection over 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival; and
19 c) is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

20 9. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration
21 and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who
22 previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject
23 to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute
24

1 expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the
2 United States without inspection.

3 10. Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework
4 and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

5 11. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

6 12. Respondents are also bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the
7 full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents
8 continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful
9 detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class
10 member.

11 13. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have
12 been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not
13 controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the
14 agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

15 14. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory
16 judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day,
17 Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

18 15. Alternatively, the Court should order that, at a minimum, Petitioner be provided
19 with a prompt custody redetermination to provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven
20 days.

21 16. Upon granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus, this Court should enjoin ICE and/or
22 Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner based on the same underlying allegations, absent a
23 material change of circumstances and express leave of this Court. The Court should order that the
24

1 only legal permissible remedy is renewed, immediate release. *See Lopez-Tipaz v. Noem* et al, 4:25-
2 cv-04905 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025), *Granados V Noem* et al, 5:25-cv-01464 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26,
3 2025), *Ramos de Lara v. Noem* et al., 5:25-cv-01459 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025). ICE cannot
4 nullify or evade the Court’s habeas judgment through a release-and-re-detain tactic. Such conduct
5 is barred under long-established principles of habeas corpus, due process, and the voluntary
6 cessation doctrine.

7 **JURISDICTION**

8 17. Petitioner is in physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the
9 Houston Contract Detention Facility (CDF) in Houston, TX. *See* Exhibit 1, Printout from ICE
10 Online Detainee Locator System showing Petitioner’s current detention.

11 18. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration
12 and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

13 19. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the
15 Suspension Clause).

16 20. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment
17 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

18 **VENUE**

19 21. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because
20 Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States. At least one Respondent
21 is in this District, Petitioner is Detained in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving
22 rise to the claims in this action took place in this District. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §
23 2243 because the immediate custodians of Petitioner reside in this District.

1 22. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-
2 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the
3 judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

4 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

5 **ISSUANCE, RETURN, HEARING, AND DECISION**

6 23. The Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus “forthwith”, as the
7 legal issues have already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*.

8 24. The Court must also grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order
9 Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. §
10 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless
11 for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

12 25. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional
13 law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
14 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the
15 writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and
16 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208
17 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

18 **PARTIES**

19 26. Petitioner, Ruben Verduzco Benitez, is alleged to be a citizen of Mexico who has
20 been in immigration detention since November 07, 2025. *See* Exhibit 2, Notice to Appear. After
21 arresting Petitioner in Lavaca County, after a traffic violation, ICE did not set bond, and Petitioner
22 is unable to obtain a review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in *Matter of*
23 *Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

1 27. Respondent, Bret Bradford, is the Director of the Houston Field Office of ICE's
2 Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Bret Bradford is Petitioner's immediate
3 custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official
4 capacity.

5 28. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
6 She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act
7 (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate
8 custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

9 29. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency
10 responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of
11 noncitizens.

12 30. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is
13 responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review
14 and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official
15 capacity.

16 31. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency
17 responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody
18 redeterminations in bond hearings.

19 32. Respondent, Martin Frink, is the warden of the Houston Contract Detention Facility
20 in Houston, Texas, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner
21 and resides in the judicial district of the United States Court for the Southern District of Texas,
22 Houston Division. He is sued in his official capacity.

1 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

2 33. “In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
3 carefully limited exception.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

4 34. This fundamental principle of our free society is enshrined in the Fifth
5 Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which specifically forbids the Government to “deprive[]” any
6 “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” *U.S. Const. amend. V*.

7 35. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
8 including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas*
9 *v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212
10 (1953) (“[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only
11 after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
12 law”).

13 36. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
14 noncitizens in removal proceedings.

15 37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
16 proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally
17 entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d),
18 while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject
19 to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

20 38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
21 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
22 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

1 39. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered
2 removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

3 40. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

4 41. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
5 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
6 –208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a)
7 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat.
8 3 (2025).

9 42. The Laken Riley Act confirms Congress preserved § 236(a)’s discretionary bond
10 regime for most inadmissible entrants arrested in the interior by adding a narrow new mandatory
11 detention category under § 236(c)(1)(E) (pairing inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A),
12 (6)(C), or (7) with specified crimes). If § 235(b) already mandated detention for all inadmissible
13 entrants, § 236(c)(1)(E) would be redundant—an outcome courts must avoid. *See Corley v. United*
14 *States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); *Van Buren v. United States*, 593 U.S. 374, 393 (2021). Congress
15 legislated against decades of agency practice applying § 236(a) to interior arrests, and courts
16 presume amendments harmonize with that practice. *Monsalvo v. Bondi*, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct.
17 1232, 1242 (2025).

18 43. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining
19 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained
20 under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited
21 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum
22 Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

1 44. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection
2 and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal
3 history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with
4 many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were
5 entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994);
6 *See also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the
7 detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

8 45. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that
9 rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of
10 practice.

11 46. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
12 Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without
13 inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The
14 policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in
15 the United States for months, years, and even decades.

16 47. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision,
17 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States
18 without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for
19 IJ bond hearings.

20 48. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have
21 rejected their new interpretation of the INA’s detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected
22 *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

23 _____
24 ¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 49. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs stopped
2 providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who
3 have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Washington
4 found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies
5 to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v.*
6 *Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

7 50. Subsequently, Federal Courts, including this Court, addressing DHS's new theory
8 have rejected it and ordered relief, concluding § 1226(a) or INA § 236(a) governs noncitizens
9 "already in the country". Court after court adopted the same reading of the INA's detention
10 authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Buenrostro-Mendez v.*
11 *Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-3726, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Nov.06, 2025); *Padron Covarrubias v.*
12 *Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-00112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mejia Juarez v. Bondi*,
13 No. 4:25cv-3937 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27,2025); *Cruz Gutierrez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-cv-04965, 2025
14 WL 3187521 (S.D. Tex. Nov.14, 2025); *Cardenas Perez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-181, 2025 (S.D.
15 Tex. Nov.20, 2025); *Hernandez Hervert v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01763-RP, 2025 (W.D. Tex Nov.
16 14, 2025); *Lopez Baltazar v. Vasquez*, No. 5:25-cv-00160 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2025.); *Gomes v.*
17 *Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v.*
18 *Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025);
19 *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11,
20 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
21 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL
22 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025
23 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW

1 (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM,
2 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL
3 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL
4 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL
5 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL
6 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F.
7 Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-
8 cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*,
9 No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v.*
10 *Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro*
11 *Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v.*
12 *Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma*
13 *Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he
14 Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*,
15 No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio*
16 *v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025)
17 (same).

18 51. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it
19 defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the
20 statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

21 52. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether
22 the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under
23 § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”
24

1 53. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible,
2 including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s
3 reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing
4 under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates
5 ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute
6 generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic*
7 *Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299,
8 at *7.

9 54. Statutes must be read “with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,”
10 giving effect to every clause and word. *Gundy v. United States*, 588 U.S. 128, 141 (2019)
11 (quotation omitted); *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc.*, 599 U.S. 419, 432
12 (2023). DHS’s view collapses §§ 235 and 236, nullifies § 236(c)(1)(E), and contradicts the INA’s
13 structure.

14 55. Even under DHS’s classification, constitutional avoidance and due process require
15 meaningful review of whether mandatory detention actually applies (a Joseph-type inquiry), and
16 courts must preserve habeas for unlawful detention. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303; *Clark v.*
17 *Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 380– 82 (2005); *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001).

18 56. The equities here underscore the *Mathews v. Eldridge* balance: (1) Petitioner’s
19 profound liberty and family interests; (2) the high risk of erroneous deprivation from DHS’s
20 categorical no-bond stance (and the value of individualized hearings); and (3) minimal
21 governmental burden to provide the longstanding process Congress preserved. *See* 424 U.S. 319,
22 333, 335 (1976).

1 57. Petitioner Ruben Verduzco Benitez is a member of the Bond Denial Class certified
2 in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) He faces unlawful
3 detention because DHS and the EOIR have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on
4 behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

5 58. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on
6 behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and
7 extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-
8 CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025)
9 (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v.*
10 *Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D.
11 Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible
12 Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion
13 for Partial Summary Judgment).

14 59. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained
15 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
16 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

17 60. Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible class because he: a) does not have
18 lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Houston Contract Detention
19 Facility in Houston, Texas. He was apprehended by immigration authorities on November 7, 2025;
20 b) entered the United States without inspection over 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon
21 arrival; and c) is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

1 61. Section 1226, therefore, leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges
2 of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or
3 parole.

4 62. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who
5 recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at
6 the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme
8 applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether
9 a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281,
10 287 (2018).

11 63. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply
12 to people like Petitioner because he was arrested in the interior. To put it another way, Petitioner
13 had already entered and was residing in the United States at the time he was apprehended. DHS's
14 attempt to shoehorn him into INA § 235(b)(2) is contrary to the statutory text, structure, and
15 constitutional principles. He is entitled to release or, at a minimum, a prompt bond hearing before
16 an IJ applying the correct legal standard.

17 64. When a Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted, and Petitioner is released, if ICE and/or
18 Respondent's re-detain Petitioner, then the only legal permissible remedy is renewed, immediate
19 release. *See Lopez-Tipaz v. Noem et al*, 4:25-cv-04905 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025), *Granados V*
20 *Noem et al*, 5:25-cv-01464 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025), *Ramos de Lara v. Noem et al.*, 5:25-cv-
21 01459 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025). ICE cannot nullify or evade the Court's habeas judgment
22 through a release-and-re-detain tactic. Such conduct is barred under long-established principles of
23 habeas corpus, due process, and the voluntary cessation doctrine.

EXHAUSTION

1
2 65. Of ‘paramount importance’ to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent.
3 Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly
4 required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144,
5 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992); *Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith*, 676 F.2d 1023, 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (“the
6 exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a matter committed to the sound
7 discretion of the trial court”). Here, Congress has not specifically mandated exhaustion before
8 judicial review of custody determinations. Because exhaustion is not required by statute, sound
9 judicial discretion must govern this Court’s decision. There is an abundant body of law that
10 supports this Court’s jurisdiction over this case absent exhaustion.

11 66. First, exhaustion does not apply whereas here, a petition challenges only the agency
12 action collateral to removal proceedings, such as bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) applies only to
13 challenges to a “final order of removal.” Therefore, when a noncitizen files a habeas petition
14 challenging detention, bond, custody, or other collateral issues, the exhaustion requirement does
15 not apply. The Fifth Circuit held that a challenge to immigration bond proceedings is not a
16 challenge to a final order of removal, and therefore §1252(d)(1) does not require exhaustion. See
17 *Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales*, 496 F.3d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the petition does not
18 challenge a final order of removal and only seeks review of an IJ bond determination, the Court
19 retains jurisdiction without any statutory exhaustion barrier.

20 67. Second, exhaustion is not required where the petitioner challenges the legality of
21 the detention itself, a matter the agency lacks authority to remedy. *Roy v. Ashcroft*, 389 F.3d 132,
22 137 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, the IJ’s exercise of authority is clearly at odds - to deny Petitioner release
23 on bond on the ground that the IJ has no jurisdiction or statutory authority pursuant to *Matter of*
24

1 *Yajure Hurtado*, nor statutory authority to impose conditions other than monetary conditions
2 directly contravenes the specific language of INA § 236(a) codified in 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which
3 confers the IJ such authority.

4 68. Third, the court should find that any administrative exhaustion would be futile. BIA
5 decisions are binding on immigration judges, and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* thus precludes an IJ
6 from finding jurisdiction over noncitizens, like Petitioner, to hold a custody redetermination
7 hearing. Therefore, judicial intervention enjoining Respondents from preventing Petitioner from
8 having a bond hearing pursuant to the holding in *Yajure Hurtado* is necessary to enable Petitioner
9 to avail himself of his administrative remedies. Even if the IJ holds a custody redetermination
10 hearing and determines that he lacks jurisdiction pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* a remedy
11 of an appeal taken to the BIA from the determination would also be futile pursuant to *Matter of*
12 *Yajure Hurtado*.

13 69. Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile in this case because
14 the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues raised here. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*,
15 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976) (A constitutional challenge to administrative action does not require
16 exhaustion.); *Ramirez Osorio v. INS*, 745 F.2d 937, 939 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that “exhaustion
17 is not required when administrative remedies are inadequate”).

18 **FACTS**

19 70. Petitioner is a 48-year-old native and citizen of Mexico. He entered the United
20 States on or about September 2001 without inspection and has continuously resided in this country
21 for more than twenty-four years. *See Exhibit 3, Mr. Verduzco Benitez Declaration*. Prior to his
22 detention, Petitioner lived in Edna, Texas, where he worked and provided ongoing financial and
23 emotional support to his family.

1 71. Petitioner has been married to Lucia Macedonio since 1996, nearly thirty years.
2 Mrs. Macedonio currently lacks lawful immigration status. Together, they have raised three
3 children: Maria del Carmen Verduzco, age 27, a long-term DACA recipient; Sbeidy Verduzco,
4 age 20, a United States citizen; and [REDACTED], age 16, also a United States citizen. *See*
5 Exhibit 4, U.S. Birth Certificates of Petitioner's Children. Petitioner is a devoted husband and
6 father whose family depends on him for their economic stability, caregiving, and daily support.
7 *See* Exhibit 3, Mr. Verduzco Benitez Declaration. The Petitioner was diagnosed with asthma in
8 August 2025 and has a documented history of severe persistent asthma with frequent
9 exacerbations, as confirmed by his treating physician. *See* Exhibit 5, Letter from Petitioner's
10 Doctor.

11 72. On May 22, 2005, Petitioner was arrested for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). He
12 was not sentenced to incarceration and instead received 18 months of probation, which he
13 successfully completed. Petitioner has no subsequent criminal history, no arrests since 2005, and
14 no record of violence. *See* Exhibit 6, Criminal Background Check and Records.

15 73. On November 7, 2025, Petitioner was encountered and detained by ICE while he
16 was on his way to work. He was merely a passenger in the vehicle. Officers arrested him without
17 incident and transported him to immigration custody. Petitioner has remained detained since that
18 date, and is currently housed at the Houston Contract Detention Facility (CDF), far from his family
19 and community.

20 74. Following his arrest, DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.
21 § 1229a, charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for entering without
22 inspection; and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I): alleging that at the time of application for admission,
23 Petitioner was not in possession of a valid immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or
24

1 other valid entry document required by the Act, nor a valid unexpired passport or other suitable
2 travel document. These charges stem solely from Petitioner's manner of entry in 2001 and do not
3 involve any allegations of criminal or dangerous conduct.

4 75. Petitioner has lived in the United States for over two decades, built a family, and
5 maintained long-standing community ties. His wife and three daughters, all of whom depend on
6 him, have suffered severe emotional and financial hardship due to his sudden detention. Petitioner
7 has consistently maintained steady employment to support them. His rehabilitation following his
8 2005 probation, his decades-long law-abiding life, and his deep commitment to his U.S.-citizen
9 children demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community and that he poses no flight risk.

10 76. Despite these compelling equities, ICE issued a custody determination ordering
11 continued detention, refusing to release Petitioner on bond, parole, or any form of supervised
12 release.

13 77. Because Petitioner is detained under the classification interpreted in *Matter of*
14 *Yajure Hurtado*, the immigration judge lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's request for bond.
15 As a result, he has been denied any meaningful opportunity for release.

16 78. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces
17 the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and
18 community. On information and belief, Mr. Verduzco Benitez is eligible for relief from removal,
19 including Cancellation of Removal for Non-Lawful Permanent Residents under INA § 240(A)(b)
20 codified at 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b).

1 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

2 **COUNT I**
3 **VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT**

4 79. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding
5 paragraphs.

6 80. Petitioner was detained pursuant to “authority contained in section 236” of the INA;
7 section 236 is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Despite this, DHS finds that he is detained subject to 8
9 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and the IJ lacks jurisdiction under *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* on the same
10 basis.

11 81. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all
12 noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As
13 relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing
14 in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by
15 Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a) and are eligible for release on bond,
16 unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

17 82. Respondents have wrongfully adopted a policy and practice of arguing all
18 noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

19 83. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued
20 detention and violates the INA.

21 84. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for
22 release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

23 85. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that
24 Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class
members.

1 86. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that
2 “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same
3 declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

4 87. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s
5 declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. §
6 2201(a).

7 88. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is
8 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory
9 rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

10 **COUNT II**
11 **VIOLATION OF THE BOND REGULATIONS**

12 89. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding
13 paragraphs.

14 90. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-
15 Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA.
16 Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the
17 agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present
18 without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without
19 inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis
20 added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were
21 eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its
22 implementing regulations.

23 91. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice
24 of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

1 92. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued
2 detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

3 **COUNT III**
4 **VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF**
5 **THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION**

6 93. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
7 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

8 94. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due
9 process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
10 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause
11 protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Here, there is no question that the
12 government has deprived Petitioner of his liberty.

13 95. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

14 96. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing
15 to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

16 97. Respondents have deprived Petitioner of his liberty interest, protected by the Fifth
17 Amendment, by detaining him since November 07, 2025.

18 98. Petitioner's detention is improper because he shouldn't be detained at all, and the
19 government is depriving him of a bond hearing. A hearing is, if anything, a right to be heard, and
20 here the immigration judge is unable to consider whether he is even eligible for a bond, despite the
21 law or entertaining counsel’s arguments. Like the accused in criminal cases, habeas is proper. *See*
22 *Moore v. Dempsey*, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); *Johnson v. Zerbst*, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); *Burns v. Wilson*,
23 346 U.S. 137, 154 (1953).
24

1 99. Respondents' actions in detaining Petitioner without any legal justification violate
2 the Fifth Amendment.

3 100. The government's detention of Petitioner is unjustified. Respondents have not
4 demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding
5 immigration detention must further the twin goals of (1) ensuring the noncitizen's appearance
6 during removal proceedings and (2) preventing danger to the community). There is no credible
7 argument that Petitioner cannot be safely released back to his community and family.

8 101. For these reasons, Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the
9 Fifth Amendment.

10 **COUNT IV**

11 **FIFTH AMENDMENT – DUE PROCESS DENIAL OF OPPORTUNITY TO
12 CONTEST MIS-INCLUSION IN MANDATORY CATEGORY OF DETENTION**

13 102. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
14 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

15 103. Petitioner has a vested liberty interest in preventing his removal because he is
16 eligible for Cancellation of Removal for Non-Lawful Permanent Residents under INA § 240(A)(b)
17 codified at 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b) and is entitled to pursue that relief outside of detention by showing
18 he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a).

19 104. For all of the above reasons, Respondents' attempts to detain Petitioner without a
20 meaningful opportunity to be heard violate his Procedural Due Process rights under the Fifth
21 Amendment. Respondents' actions have caused Petitioner harm that warrants immediate relief.

22 **COUNT V**

23 **ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

24 105. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

1 106. Respondents’ continued efforts to deny him bond violate the INA, Administrative
2 Procedures Act (APA), and the U.S. Constitution.

3 107. As set forth in the previous Counts, federal regulations and case law provide the
4 procedure for a Respondent in removal proceedings like him to seek a bond redetermination by an
5 IJ.

6 108. In being denied the opportunity to return to his family and pursue Cancellation of
7 Removal for Non-Lawful Permanent Residents under INA § 240(A)(b) codified at 8 U.S.C.
8 §1229b(b) in a non-detained court setting where he is free to gather the necessary evidence,
9 Petitioner would be deprived of the right to freedom to lawfully pursue his rights in this civil
10 matter. The Government’s “no-review” provisions are a violation of his procedural and substantive
11 due process and without any statutory authority. There is no time-frame or procedure for requesting
12 DHS to itself review its custody decision, and removal proceedings in this case will proceed during
13 that time while Petitioner remains in custody.

14 109. The actions by Respondents would improperly alter the substantive rules
15 concerning mandatory custody status without the required notice-and-comment period and would
16 be in violation of the INA and its regulations. These actions by Respondents violate the APA.
17 Under the APA, this Court may hold unlawful and set aside an agency action which is “contrary
18 to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). The regulations at 8
19 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(h)(1)(B) and 1003.19(h)(2)(B) providing no review of DHS custody decision
20 for arriving aliens in removal proceedings are in violation of substantive and procedural due
21 process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is ultra vires
22 because it exceeds the authority granted to ICE by Congress at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For these
23 reasons, this Honorable Court should hold that Petitioner is detained under § 236(a), not § 235(b),
24

1 and order his immediate release or, in the alternative, direct the Immigration Court to conduct a
2 custody redetermination hearing under § 236(a) in which Petitioner has a meaningful opportunity
3 to show that he is not a danger or flight risk. Any contrary reliance on *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*
4 would unlawfully misapply the statute and deprive Petitioner of his rights under the INA, the APA,
5 and the Due Process Clause.

6 **COUNT VI**
7 **STAY OF REMOVAL CLAIM**

8 110. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
9 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

10 111. A denial of a bond hearing, followed by the removal of Petitioner from the United
11 States, would cause him irreversible harm and injury because he is misclassified by the
12 Government as subject to mandatory detention.

13 112. The Court should grant the stay of Petitioner's removal to protect his statutory rights
14 under the INA and the APA. In attempting to assert his rights, the Government has railroaded him
15 and deprived him of freedom and liberty to contest his removal while free on bond, or at the very
16 least, of his ability to prove he is not subject to mandatory detention and that he merits release on
17 bond.

18 **COUNT VII**
19 **SUSPENSION CLAUS CLAIM**

20 113. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
21 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

22 114. If 8 U.S.C. § 1252 stripped the Court's jurisdiction from this matter, it would be
23 unconstitutional as applied because it would deny Petitioner the opportunity for meaningful review
24 of the unlawfulness of his detention and removal.

1 115. To invoke the Suspension Clause, a petitioner must satisfy a three-factor test: “(1)
2 the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status
3 determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
4 place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”
5 *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008). Petitioner satisfies these three requirements and
6 may invoke the Suspension Clause.

7 116. First, although Petitioner is not a U.S. citizen or resident, he has lived here for over
8 twenty years, and he qualifies for Cancellation of Removal for Non-Lawful Permanent Residents
9 under INA § 240(A)(b) codified at 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b) because he has continuously lived in the
10 United States for at least 10 years before he was served with the Notice to Appear and has not
11 committed any crime that would stop the continuous physical presence, during the 10 year
12 statutory period he has demonstrated good moral character, he does not have any disqualifying
13 crime that would bar him for such relief and his removal would cause exceptional and extremely
14 unusual hardship to his U.S. Citizen children. All of which establishes a substantial legal
15 relationship with the United States.

16 117. Petitioner satisfies the second factor because he was apprehended by DHS and
17 remains detained in the United States.

18 118. Finally, there are no serious, practical obstacles to resolving this present matter.
19 This Court is equipped to decide whether Petitioner is entitled to the writ.

20 119. There is no adequate alternative to a habeas petition. The refusal of the immigration
21 court to grant Petitioner the right to show he is misclassified and that he is not subject to mandatory
22 detention, without proper notice or due process, deprives him of his constitutional rights. The BIA
23 cannot adequately and expeditiously review these issues.

1 **COUNT VIII**
2 **INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

3 120. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
4 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

5 121. This Court has the discretion to enter a temporary restraining order and a
6 preliminary injunction. *See Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson*, 872 F.2d 1555, 1561-1562 (11th
7 Cir.1989). “To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the applicants must show (1) a substantial
8 likelihood that they will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that they will suffer
9 irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) their substantial injury outweighs the
10 threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction
11 will not disserve the public interest.” *Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey*,
12 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012). All four elements must be demonstrated to obtain injunctive
13 relief. *Id.*

14 122. Respondents’ actions have caused Petitioner harm that warrants immediate relief.

15 **RELIEF SOUGHT**

16 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 17 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 18 b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Southern District of
19 Texas while this habeas petition is pending;
- 20 c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this
21 Petition should not be granted within three days;
- 22 d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in
23 the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
24 1226(a) within seven days;

- 1 e. Alternatively, issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause
2 why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- 3 f. Declare that ICE’s November 07, 2025, apprehension and detention of Petitioner
4 was unlawful exercise of authority because the ICE officer provided no reason that
5 he presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk;
- 6 g. Order Respondents to file with the Court a complete copy of the administrative file
7 from the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security;
- 8 h. Enjoin ICE and/or Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner based on the same
9 underlying allegations, absent a material change of circumstances and express leave
10 of this court. In this case, this court should order that the only legal permissible
11 remedy is renewed, immediate release.
- 12 i. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act
13 (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under
14 law; and
- 15 j. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

16 **PRAYER FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION** Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243,
17 Petitioner respectfully requests expedited consideration. Each day of unlawful detention inflicts
18 irreparable harm on Petitioner and his U.S. citizen children, depriving them of their father’s care,
19 stability, and support. Prompt judicial intervention is necessary to protect Petitioner’s
20 constitutional rights and his family’s well-being.

21 DATED this 20th of December 2025.

22 Respectfully submitted,
23 /s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez
24 XAVIER VICENTE CHAVEZ, OSB #1601193
State Bar # 24069495

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xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741
Counsel for Petitioner

/s/ Elva Lorena Gaona Krewson
ELVA GAONA KREWSON, SDTX #3947618
State Bar # 24140092
xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741

/s/ Nelly Carolina Sanchez Estrada
Nelly Sanchez Estrada, SDTX #3947576
State Bar # 24135331
xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741

Counsels for Petitioner

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Ruben Verduzco Benitez, and submit this verification on his behalf.

I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 20th day of December 2025.

/s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez
Counsel for Petitioner
xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741(281) 296-3741

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 20, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and all accompanying exhibits to be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the following:

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas
USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov
Attn: Civil Process Clerk
1000 Louisiana St., Suite 2300,
Houston, TX 77002.

Warden, Houston Contract Detention Facility
Martin Frink
15850 Export Plaza Dr,
Houston, TX 77032

Service on the United States Attorney constitutes service on all named federal Respondents in this matter, and service has also been made directly on the Warden as Petitioner’s immediate custodian.

Dated this 20th day of December 2025.

/s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez
Counsel for Petitioner
xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741(281) 296-3741

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION**

RUBEN VERDUZCO BENITEZ,

Petitioner,

Case No.25-6178

v.

BRET BRADFORD, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Houston Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; MARTIN FRINK, Warden, Houston Contract Detention Facility (CDF)

Respondents.

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