Chief Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

DELADDO FERNADO LECKY, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI, *et al.*,[1] Respondents.	Case No. 2:25-cv-02637-TLF FEDERAL RESPONDENTS' RETURN Noted for Consideration: January 12, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court should deny Petitioner Deladdo Fernando Lecky's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. No. 2 ("Pet."). The United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") detained Petitioner in September 2025 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) to facilitate execution efforts of a final order of removal. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is actively working to effectuate Petitioner's lawful removal to an available third country removal and Petitioner will receive advance notice and an opportunity to raise a fear-based claim if Petitioner is found to have a credible fear of removal to such third country.

[1] Respondent Bruce Scott is not a Federal Respondent and is not represented by the U.S. Attorney's Office.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

Accordingly, Federal Respondents respectfully request the Court deny the Petition. This return is supported by the pleadings and documents on file in this case, the Declaration of Deportation Officer Sheldon Benjamin ("Benjamin Decl.") and the Declaration of Jennifer Wong ("Wong Decl."), with accompanying exhibits. Federal Respondents do not believe an evidentiary hearing is necessary.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background

1. Post-Order Detention

The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") governs the detention and release of noncitizens during and following their removal proceedings. *See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 527-29 (2021). The general detention periods are commonly referred to as "pre-order" (meaning before the entry of a final order of removal) and, relevant here, "post-order" (meaning after the entry of a final order of removal). *Compare* 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (authorizing pre-order detention) *with* § 1231(a) (authorizing post-order detention).

When a final order of removal has been entered, a noncitizen enters a 90-day "removal period." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). Congress has directed that the Secretary of Homeland Security "shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States." *Id.* To ensure a noncitizen's presence for removal and to protect the community from noncitizens who may present a danger, Congress mandated detention during the "removal period," which is the 90-day period following the issuance of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). During the removal period, ICE is charged with attempting to effectuate removal of a noncitizen from the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).

Section 1231(a)(6) authorizes ICE to continue detention of noncitizens after the expiration of the removal period. Unlike Section 1231(a)(2), Section 1231(a)(6) does not mandate detention

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700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

and does not place any temporal limit on the length of detention under that provision. Although there is no statutory time limit on detention pursuant to Section 1231(a)(6), the Supreme Court has held that a noncitizen may be detained only "for a period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen's] removal from the United States." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). The Supreme Court has further identified six months as a presumptively reasonable time necessary to bring about a noncitizen's removal. *Id.* at 701. Once it is determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, noncitizens may be released on an Order of Supervision ("OSUP"). 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h).

2. Third Country Removal

When the government seeks to remove an individual, it may do so through removal proceedings involving an evidentiary hearing before an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. In removal proceedings, the IJ determines both whether the individual may be removed from the United States and, if so, designates a country or countries to which they will be removed, subject to DHS's statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2). *Id.*; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f). The INA sets out the process for determining the country of removal.

First, the alien may select a country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f). If the alien declines, the IJ will designate one and may also designate alternative countries. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C)-(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f). In selecting an alternative country of removal, the IJ must first select the "country of which the alien is a subject, national, or citizen[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(D). If removal to that country is impossible, the IJ may remove the alien to "any of the following countries" listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E):

> (i) The country from which the alien was admitted to the United States.
> (ii) The country in which is located the foreign port from which the alien left for the United States or for a foreign territory contiguous to the United States.

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(206) 553-7970

(iii) A country in which the alien resided before the alien entered the country from which the alien entered the United States.
(iv) The country in which the alien was born.
(v) The country that had sovereignty over the alien's birthplace when the alien was born.
(vi) The country in which the alien's birthplace is located when the alien is ordered removed.

Finally, Section 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii) provides that "[i]f impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to remove the alien to each country" described above, the statute permits removal to any "country whose government will accept the" noncitizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii).

The government is prohibited from removing a person to a third country where they may be persecuted or tortured, a form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Similarly, the government cannot remove a person to a country where they would be tortured, a form of protection known as protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). *See* Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ("FARRA"), Public Law 105–277, div. G, sec. 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2631–822 (8 U.S.C. § 1231 note); 28 C.F.R. §§ 200.1, 208.16–208.18, 1208.16-1208.18. Withholding of removal and CAT protection are mandatory, but "only restrict *where* the Government may remove a noncitizen to, not *whether* the noncitizen is subject to removal." *Kumar v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-cv-02055-KKE, 2025 WL 3204724, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025). "Thus, even if the IJ grants such protection, the removal order remains valid and enforceable, albeit not to the identified country or countries of risk." *Id.* (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f); *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 536 (2021); *Lanza v. Ashcroft*, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004).

3. *D.V.D. v. Dep't of Homeland Security*

In March 2025, three plaintiffs instituted a putative class action suit challenging their third country removals in the District of Massachusetts. *D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 942948, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2025), *appeal dismissed*, No. 25-

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700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

1311, 2025 WL 2720812 (1st Cir. June 30, 2025). On March 28, 2025, the district court entered a TRO enjoining DHS and others from "[r]emoving any individual subject to a final order of removal from the United States to a third country, *i.e.*, a country other than the country designated for removal in immigration proceedings" unless certain conditions were met. *Id.*

On April 18, 2025, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and motion for preliminary injunction. *D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 778 F. Supp. 3d 355, 394 (D. Mass. 2025). A class was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without a provision for an opt out. *See id.* at 386. The Preliminary Injunction was national in effect and established certain procedures that DHS was required to follow before removing an alien with a final order of removal to a third country. Specifically, the certified class is defined as:

> All individuals who have a final removal order issued in proceedings under Section 240, 241(a)(5), or 238(b) of the INA (including withholding-only proceedings) who DHS has deported or will deport on or after February 18, 2025, to a country (a) not previously designated as the country or alternative country of removal, and (b) not identified in writing in the prior proceedings as a country to which the individual would be removed.

Id. at 378.

On May 21, 2025, the district court issued a Memorandum on Preliminary Injunction offering the following summary and clarification of its Preliminary Injunction:

> All removals to third countries, *i.e.*, removal to a country other than the country or countries designated during immigration proceedings as the country of removal on the non-citizen's order of removal, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(C), must be preceded by written notice to both the non-citizen and the non-citizen's counsel in a language the non-citizen can understand. Dkt. 64 at 46– 47. Following notice, the individual must be given a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal. *See id.* If the non-citizen demonstrates "reasonable fear" of removal to the third country, Defendants must move to reopen the non-citizen's immigration proceedings. *Id.* If the non-citizen is not found to have demonstrated a "reasonable fear" of removal to the third country, Defendants must provide a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum

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700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

> of fifteen days, for the non-citizen to seek reopening of their immigration proceedings. *Id.*

D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 25-cv-10676, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025), *reconsideration denied sub nom. D.V.D v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 223 (D. Mass. 2025). The *D.V.D.* court indicated that the Order applied "to the Defendants, including the Department of Homeland Security, as well as their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, any person acting in concert, and any person with notice of the Preliminary Injunction." *Id.*

On June 23, 2025, the United States Supreme Court stayed the District of Massachusetts' preliminary injunction pending appeal in the First Circuit Court of Appeals. *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2153 (2025). That same day, the District Court ordered that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's order, its remedial order granting relief to eight individual class members who DHS sought to remove to South Sudan remained in effect. Order, *D.V.D.* (Dkt. 176). Defendants moved to clarify the Supreme Court's Order and, on July 3, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the motion, allowing the eight individual aliens to be removed to South Sudan. *D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2627, 2629 (2025). The class certification in *D.V.D.* remains in effect notwithstanding the Supreme Court's stay.

4. DHS Policy on Third-Country Removals

On March 30, 2025, and then later, on July 9, 2025, DHS issued a guidance regarding third country removals. *See* U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Guidance Regarding Third Country Removals," Kristi Noem, March 30, 2025, *available at* https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.282404/gov.uscourts.mad.282404.43.1.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2025) ("DHS Memo"); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Third Country Removals Following the Supreme Court's Order in *Department of Homeland*

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700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

Security v. D.V.D., No. 24A1153 (U.S. June 23, 2025)," Todd M. Lyons, July 9, 2025, *available* at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.282404/gov.uscourts.mad.282404.190.1.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2025) (hereinafter "July 9 Memo"); *see also Kumar*, 2025 WL 3204724, at *2-3 (describing contents of these memos and the distinction between the two).

The July 9 Memo discusses DHS's policies and procedures regarding the removal of individuals with final orders of removals to countries other than those designated for removal in those orders (referred to as "third country removals"). According to the guidance outlined in the July 9 Memo, if DHS has not received diplomatic reassurances from the designated country, DHS will first inform the individual that DHS seeks removal to that country. *Id.* at 2. If the individual expresses that they are afraid of being removed to that country, DHS will refer them to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") for a reasonable fear interview, to screen that person for protection against removal to that country. *Id.*

After the interview is conducted, USCIS will determine whether the individual would more likely than not be persecuted or tortured in the country of removal. *Id.* If USCIS finds that the individual has met this standard, if the person was previously in removal proceedings, USCIS will inform ICE, and ICE can then file a motion to reopen with the Immigration Court. *Id.* Alternatively, ICE can also choose to designate another country of removal. If USCIS finds that the person has not met the standard, according to DHS policy, they will be removed. *Id.* There is nothing in the memo or in ICE policy that prevents an individual from filing a motion to reopen their prior removal proceedings at any time they so choose, based on a request for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture. *See id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i).

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(206) 553-7970

B. Petitioner Deladdo Fernando Lecky

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 3. On August 16, 2009, Petitioner was admitted to the United States on a K-1 fiancé visa at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York for the purpose of marrying his U.S. citizen fiancé. *Id.* ¶ 4.

On April 9, 2012, Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the distribution of a controlled substance, and was subsequently sentenced to five years of probation. *Id.* ¶ 5.

On October 20, 2014, the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO") encountered Petitioner at the Baltimore City Jail after he was criminally detained for driving while his license was suspended. *Id.* ¶ 6. On the same day, ERO took Petitioner into custody after he was released from jail. *Id.*

On October 21, 2014, ERO placed Petitioner in removal proceedings by issuing a Notice to Appear ("NTA"), charging him as removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i). Benjamin Decl. ¶ 7; Wong Decl. at Exs. 1 & 2 (Notice to Appear; I-213).

On December 8, 2014, Petitioner filed an application for relief with the immigration court. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 8. On December 14, 2014, Petitioner appeared for a bond hearing, with counsel, and subsequently withdrew his bond request as he was mandatorily detained pursuant to his controlled substance conviction. *Id.* ¶ 9. On April 21, 2015, the immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States but granted withholding of removal to Jamaica. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 10; Wong Decl. at Ex. 3 (Order of Removal). Petitioner did not appeal. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 10.

On or about June 12, 2015, Petitioner was released on an OSUP, imposing reporting requirements and various conditions on Petitioner's release. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 11; Wong Decl. at Ex. 4 (OSUP).

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700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
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(206) 553-7970

On or about February 22, 2016, ERO became aware that Petitioner has been arrested for assault. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 12. On or about July 27, 2018, when Petitioner reported for a check in, ERO became aware Petitioner had recent traffic citations and probation violations. *Id.* ¶ 13.

On or about April 20, 2022, Petitioner was enrolled in Compliance Assistance Reporting Terminal ("CART"), an automated kiosk used by ICE to streamline check-ins and reporting for non-detained individuals. *Id.* ¶ 14. Petitioner then failed to report to the kiosk for his CART check-in on three separate occasions: May 24, 2023; August 2, 2024; and September 6, 2024. *Id.* ¶¶ 15-17.

On September 17, 2025, ERO Baltimore officers located and arrested Petitioner to execute his final order of removal, and Petitioner was issued a notice of the revocation of his OSUP which cited ICE's intention to remove him from the United States pursuant to the removal order. *Id.* ¶¶ 18-19.

On September 23, 2025, Petitioner was transported to the NWIPC in Tacoma, Washington. *Id.* ¶ 20. He was identified for possible third country removal on September 25, 2025. *Id.* ¶ 21. On November 17, 2025, ERO Tacoma prepared a third country removal notice for Mexico. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 22; Wong Decl. at Ex. 5 (Notice of Removal).

On November 20, 2025, ERO Tacoma received guidance that this Petitioner would not be removed to Mexico. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 23. ERO Tacoma intends to pursue available third country removal options. *Id.* When potential third country removal options are identified and directed, notice will be given to Petitioner, and he will be provided an opportunity to claim fear related to the third country notice provided. *Id.* ¶ 24. Petitioner remains detained under INA § 241 as an alien with a final order of removal. *See id.* ¶ 25.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

III. ARGUMENT

A. Lecky is lawfully detained pending his removal.

To succeed on a habeas petition, Petitioner must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, his claim that his detention is unlawful lacks merit. Petitioner has not demonstrated that his detention has become "indefinite" or unconstitutional. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the potentially open-ended duration of detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is constitutional. The Court read an implicit limitation of post-removal detention "to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. It was further specified that Section 1231(a)(6) does not permit indefinite detention. *Id.* Thus, "once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute." *Id.* at 699.

The *Zadvydas* Court recognized that as the length of detention grows, a sliding scale of burdens is applied to assess the continuing lawfulness of a noncitizen's post-order detention. *Id.* (stating that "for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonably foreseeable future' conversely would have to shrink"). However, the Supreme Court determined that it is "presumptively reasonable" for the Government to detain a noncitizen for six months following entry of a final removal order, while it worked to remove the noncitizen from the United States. *Id.* at 701. Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that six months is the *earliest* point at which a noncitizen's detention could raise constitutional issues. *Id.* Moreover, the Supreme Court noted the six-month presumption "does not mean that every [noncitizen] not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, [a noncitizen] may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.*

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(206) 553-7970

Federal Respondents acknowledge that Courts in this district disagree as to whether the presumptively reasonable period expires six months after a final order, regardless of detention. *See Tran v. Bondi*, No. CV-25-01897-JLR, 2025 WL 3140462 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025); *but see Thach Wana v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-02321-RSL, 2025 WL 3628634, at *3, n.2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2025). For the reasons set forth in their briefing in the *Tran* case, Federal Respondents do not agree with this decision. In any event, Petitioner's detention is still lawful even if the presumptively reasonable period in this case has passed for the reasons stated herein.

Here, Petitioner was re-detained in September 2025, and he received notice of removal to Mexico on November 18, 2025. However, since that time, ERO Tacoma received guidance that this Petitioner would not be removed to Mexico. Benjamin Decl. ¶¶ 22-23. While Petitioner was granted withholding of removal under CAT for Jamaica, he is subject to a final order of removal and can be removed—pursuant to receiving proper notice of removal to a third country and the opportunity to express fear of removal. As stated above, ERO Tacoma intends to pursue available third country removal options, and potential third country removal options are identified and directed, notice will be given to Petitioner, and he will be provided an opportunity to claim fear related to the third country notice provided. Benjamin Decl. ¶ 24.

Petitioner's detention is neither indefinite nor potentially permanent. Since his detention in September 2025, Petitioner was given notice of removal to Mexico and ERO Tacoma now continues to pursue other available third country removal options. That Petitioner does not yet have a specific date of anticipated removal does not render his detention indefinite. *See Diouf v. Mukasey*, 542 F. 3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008). Detention becomes indefinite in situations where the country of removal refuses to accept the noncitizen or if removal is legally barred. *Id.* There is no reason to believe that is the situation here. Based on the declaration of Deportation Officer Sheldon Benjamin, ICE is pursuing third country removal options for Petitioner, and it is

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(206) 553-7970

reasonable that such third country would be one that would accept Petitioner, consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. *See* Benjamin Decl. ¶ 24.

Furthermore, ICE did not violate regulations concerning OSUP revocations when arresting Petitioner. Neither the statute nor the regulations require a pre-deprivation hearing before revoking an OSUP for the purposes of executing a removal order. *Id.* This would be impracticable and unworkable as a noncitizen released on an OSUP is not in removal proceedings. That means that the noncitizens are subject to final orders of removal and no longer before the immigration court or the BIA. Thus, a pre-deprivation hearing would provide a significant delay in executing a removal order in conflict with the Government's interest in executing removal orders. *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) ("There is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders). Since the issuance of Petitioner's OSUP, and prior to Petitioner's arrest, ERO became aware of Petitioner's arrest for assault on or about February 22, 2016, as well as his traffic citations and probation violations on or about July 27, 2018. Benjamin Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. Petitioner also failed to report to his CART check in on three different occasions from 2023 to 2024. *Id.* ¶¶ 15-18.

Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. ICE anticipates that they will be able to find a suitable third country allowing for Petitioner's removal, and provide him of such notice and the opportunity to express fear regarding removal to that third country. *See id.* ¶ 24. Thus, his detention is lawful pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) pending his removal. At this stage, the burden remains on Petitioner to present good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and he has not done so. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

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B. Petitioner's claim of fear of removal to a third country is already protected under existing DHS policy.

Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin his removal to a third country "without notice and meaning opportunity to respond." Pet. at 27. DHS policy already provides this relief, and ICE has complied with those procedures in this case. Here, Petitioner identifies no country, no policy, and no factual circumstance demonstrating that third-country removal would operate as punishment rather than lawful execution of a removal order. *Id.* at 19-20. Petitioner mentions that he cannot be removed to Jamaica due to the granting of withholding of removal to Jamaica, *id.* at 7, and ICE does not intend to remove him to Jamaica.

Because no third country has yet been designated, Petitioner's claim is premature and unripe. Petitioner's claim further fails because it seeks prospective injunctive relief for procedures that DHS already provides as a matter of policy. Because DHS policy already provides the process that Petitioner requests, and because Petitioner is already being afforded the benefits under that policy, his claim is not ripe for habeas relief. ICE has yet to provide notice of removal to a third country, other than Mexico, which is no longer deemed an option for Petitioner. ICE will provide Petitioner with notice of his removal, and he will be able to assert a claim of fear to that country once ICE determines the alternative third country for removal. Thus, the main protection he seeks is already addressed by existing DHS policy.

The relief Petitioner seeks—namely, notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond—are already DHS policy. And ICE has already demonstrated that they followed these procedures in Petitioner's case by providing him this notice and opportunity. This notice would allow Petitioner to claim fear of removal to that country, and if Petitioner were to claim a fear of removal to that third country, ICE would refer him to USCIS, and USCIS would schedule Petitioner for

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(206) 553-7970

an interview to determine whether it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted or tortured in that third country. *See* DHS Memo.

C. Petitioner is a member of the Plaintiff Class in *D.V.D. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.* and is bound by the proceedings in that case.

Further, the relief Petitioner seeks here—notice and an opportunity to raise fear-based claims prior to third-country removal—is the same relief at issue in *D.V.D.* Because Petitioner is a member of the certified *D.V.D.* class and seeks the same injunctive relief at issue there, principles of comity and docket control counsel against parallel litigation of identical claims. As a member of the plaintiff class in *D.V.D.*, he is bound by the proceedings in that case the same as all other class members. The plaintiff class in *D.V.D.* sought an injunction precluding their removal to a third country unless they were first afforded essentially the same process that Petitioner asks the Court to order here. The Supreme Court's stay of the preliminary injunction entered in that case is both precedent and the result is binding on Petitioner here by virtue of his status as a member of the *D.V.D.* plaintiff class.

Additionally, courts recognize that members of class action lawsuits should not be permitted to bring separate actions where they seek to re-litigate individually issues that were raised in the class action. *See Wynn v. Vilsack*, No. 3:21-cv-514, 2021 WL 7501821, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2021) (collecting cases) ("Multiple courts of appeal have approved the practice of staying a case, or dismissing it without prejudice, on the ground that the plaintiff is a member of a parallel class action.") (internal quotations omitted). This prevents class members from avoiding the binding results of the class action. *Goff v. Menke*, 672 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1982).

This is also the rule in this Circuit. A district court may properly dismiss an individual complaint where the plaintiff is a member in a class action, to the extent the individual action duplicates the claims and seeks the same relief as the class action. *Pride v. Correa*, 719 F.3d 1130,

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1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing *Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1979)). Such a dismissal is within the court's discretion based on its inherent power to control its own docket. *Crawford*, 599 F.2d at 893. But it is "imperative to avoid concurrent litigation in more than one forum whenever consistent with the rights of the parties." *Id.*; *see Frost v. Symington*, 197 F.3d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1999) ("To the extent that a class action involving the same issues raised by [plaintiff] is currently pending . . . [he] may have to bring all of his related claims for equitable relief . . . through . . . class counsel.").

This Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Petitioner's third country removal claim as a matter of comity because the District of Massachusetts has certified a class action that includes the same claim Petitioner is pursuing here. *Pacesetter Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.*, 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982) ("There is a generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another district.").

D. Petitioner is not entitled to a pre-detention hearing in the post-order context, and his detention was lawful and comported with Due Process.

The authorities Petitioner relies upon to argue that due process requires a pre-detention hearing are inapposite. Pet. at 10–13 (Section VIII). Petitioner cites cases such as *E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-cv-01192-KKE, 2025 WL 2402130, and *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, No. 2:25-cv-01404-JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, among other recent out-of-district decisions. None applies to detention governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. *See* Pet. at 10-13. Petitioner does not dispute that he is subject to an order of removal. Each of the cases cited arose in the context of pre-order detention or under regulatory schemes materially distinct from the post-order detention

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framework at issue here.[2] As such, they provide no meaningful guidance on whether due process requires a hearing before detention under § 1231.

To the extent Petitioner also asserts that ICE violated its own regulations or failed to provide sufficient notice of revocation, these assertions are boilerplate and unsupported by facts specific to this case. *See* Pet. at 14-15 (Section IX). The Petition recites generalized legal arguments without alleging conduct particular to Petitioner. *Id.* Indeed, Petitioner identifies no regulation that was violated and no notice requirement applicable to his circumstances that was not satisfied.

In any event, those arguments are irrelevant under the circumstances presented by this particular case. Here, Petitioner was detained in order for ERO to effectuate his removal and following ERO's knowledge of his arrest for assault on or about February 22, 2016, and traffic citations and probation violations on or about July 27, 2018, as well as Petitioner's failure to report for required check-ins on multiple occasions. Benjamin Decl. ¶¶ 12-17. Under these circumstances, ICE acted well within its statutory authority in detaining Petitioner.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Federal Respondents respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition and dismiss this matter. This Court should not order that he be released.

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[2] Federal Respondents acknowledge that some opinions in this District have recently found that the Due Process Clause requires a pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of an OSUP. *See, e.g.*, *Thach Wana v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-02321-RSL, 2025 WL 3628634, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2025); *Sieng Kim Khim v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 2:25-CV-02383-RSL, 2025 WL 3653724, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2025). Federal Respondents respectfully submit, however, that in the context of a noncitizen with a final order of removal already in place, pre-deprivation hearings are not mandated by the Due Process Clause where the rationale for the detention is to effectuate the order of removal.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970

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Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES NEIL FLOYD
United States Attorney

s/ Jennifer Wong
JENNIFER WONG, CA No. 341634
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
Western District of Washington
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
Phone: 206-553-7970
Fax: 206-553-4067
Email: jennifer.wong@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Federal Respondents

I certify that this memorandum contains 4,959 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.