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7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
8 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

9
10 Luis Sahid Guanin-Manzaba,
11
Petitioner,

12 v.

13 John E. Cantu, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
14 Phoenix Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
15

16 Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security;
17

18 Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General;

19 Alexis Garcia, Assistant Field Office
Director of Immigration and Customs
20 Enforcement, Florence Service
Processing Center;
21

22 Todd Lyons, Acting Director,
23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and Removal Operations.
24

25 Respondents.

Case No.

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 2241**

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28 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Quiju-Ramos v. Cantu, et al.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Since at least the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, noncitizens who entered the country illegally could generally be released on bond while their removal proceedings were pending. Yet earlier this year, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “revisited” its position and determined that all noncitizens who are present without admission are subject to mandatory detention while in removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently reached the same conclusion in a precedential decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), holding for the first time that all noncitizens who entered the country without admission are categorically ineligible for bond regardless of how long they have lived in the United States.

2. Federal judges have issued over 280 decisions finding the government’s novel interpretation incompatible with the INA. *See infra* nn. i, ii. The provision on which the government relies states that noncitizens who are “seeking admission” are subject to mandatory detention while in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Congress defined “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus, by its plain terms, the provision only applies to noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry. And in addition to disregarding the plain text of § 1225(b)(2)(A), the government’s contrary interpretation renders superfluous other provisions of the INA that require the mandatory detention of noncitizens who have engaged in criminal activity—including a provision, § 1226(c)(1)(E), enacted this year in the Laken Riley Act.

1 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5)
2 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of
3 the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

4 7. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory
5 Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

6 8. The “zipper clause” at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which channels “[j]udicial
7 review of all questions of law . . . including interpretation and application of constitutional
8 and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the
9 United States” to the appropriate federal court of appeals, does not apply because that
10 section applies only to review of removal orders, and Petitioner does not seek review of
11 orders of removal but of custody. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-
12 SSS-BFM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171364, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025).

13 9. The bar to review at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips all courts of jurisdiction to
14 hear “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
15 the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
16 orders against any alien under this chapter.” The Supreme Court previously characterized
17 § 1252(g) as a narrow provision, applying “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney
18 General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, *adjudicate* cases, or
19 *execute* removal orders.” *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471,
20 482 (1999) (emphasis in original). In doing so, the Supreme Court found it “implausible
21 that the mention of *three discrete events* along the road to deportation was a shorthand way
22 to referring to *all claims arising from* deportation proceedings.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

1 Petitioner's challenge to his detention does not fall within these discrete actions.
2 *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171364 at *11.

3 10. Subsection 2 of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), titled "Judicial Review of Orders of
4 Removal," contains four subsections, which outline categories of claims that are not subject
5 to judicial review. § 1252(a)(2)(A)–(D). None of these subsections precluding judicial
6 review apply to this matter, as the specified statutory provisions do not cite § 1225(b)(2)(A)
7 or § 1226(a), which are the two provisions Petitioner challenges. Thus, no part of § 1252
8 deprives this Court of jurisdiction. *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171364 at
9 *12. As such, the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner's challenge to his detention.

12 VENUE

13 11. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484,
14 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for Arizona, the judicial
15 district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

16 12. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because
17 Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a
18 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the District
19 of Arizona.
20

21 REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

22 13. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order
23 Respondents to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28
24 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a return
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1 “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is
2 allowed.” *Id.*

3 14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the
4 constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of
5 illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).
6 “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or
7 justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of
8 the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
9

10 **PARTIES**

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12 15. Petitioner Luis Sahid Guanin-Manzaba is a 21-year-old resident of Phoenix,
13 Arizona. He first entered the United States in 2024 at the age of 19 and has resided here
14 continuously since that time. Exhibit TK. ICE has charged Petitioner with removability
15 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien in the United States without being admitted
16 or paroled, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien who, at the time of his
17 application for admission, was not in possession of the requisite immigration document.
18 Exhibit B. He is presently detained at the Florence Detention Center in Florence, Arizona.
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21 16. Respondent John Cantu is the Director of the Phoenix Field Office of ICE’s
22 Enforcement and Removal Operations division, which oversees operations at the San Luis
23 Regional Detention Center. As such, Mr. Cantú is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is
24 responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.
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27 17. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
28 Security. He is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and

1 oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate
2 custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

3 18. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the United States Attorney General. He is
4 responsible for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is the
5 component of the U.S. Department of Justice that is responsible for implementing and
6 enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redetermination in bond
7 hearings.
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9 19. Respondent Alexis Garcia is ICE Assistant Field Office Director (AFOD) for
10 the Florence Service Processing Center, where Petitioner is detained. She has immediate
11 physical custody of Petitioner. She is sued in her official capacity.
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13 20. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE and is named in his
14 official capacity. Among other things, ICE is responsible for the administration and
15 enforcement of the immigration laws, including the removal of noncitizens. In his official
16 capacity as head of ICE, he is the legal custodian of Petitioner.
17

18 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

19 Immigration and Nationality Act and Federal Regulations

20 21. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
21 noncitizens who are alleged or found to be removable from the United States.
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23 22. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard
24 removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention
25 are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§
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1 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have engaged in specified criminal and
2 terrorist activity are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

3 23. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
4 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other noncitizens seeking
5 admission under § 1225(b)(2).
6

7 24. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been
8 ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1231(a)–(b).
10

11 25. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

12 26. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part
13 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
14 Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583,
15 3009–585. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states that if an “examining immigration
16 officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
17 entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for [removal proceedings].” The IIRIRA
18 also defined “admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) as the “lawful entry of the alien into
19 the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” § 301, 110
20 Stat. 3009–575.
21

22 27. Consistent with these statutory provisions, federal regulations preclude
23 immigration judges from granting bond to “arriving aliens,” 8 C.F.R. §
24 1003.19(h)(1)(B)(ii), a phrase defined in relevant part as “applicant[s] for admission
25 coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. §
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1 1001.1(q). The decision to preclude immigration judges from granting bond to arriving
2 aliens—as distinct from all noncitizens who entered without admission—was the product
3 of notice and comment rulemaking in early 1997 following the enactment of the IIRIRA.

4 28. As the regulations were initially proposed, all “[i]nadmissible aliens in
5 removal proceedings” would have been ineligible for bond. *Inspection and Expedited*
6 *Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal*, 62 Fed. Reg.
7 444, 483 (Jan. 3, 1997). After receiving comments, however, the Attorney General deleted
8 the proposed provision and replaced it with one that would apply only to “[a]rriving
9 aliens.”¹ *Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;*
10 *Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures*, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10361 (March
11 6, 1997). As the Attorney General explained, “[t]he effect of this change [was] that
12 inadmissible aliens, except for arriving aliens, have available to them bond redetermination
13 hearings before an immigration judge, while arriving aliens do not.” *Id.* at 10323. In other
14 words, “aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred
15 to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
16 redetermination.” *Id.*

17 29. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without
18 inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless
19 their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many
20 more decades of prior practice in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were
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¹ This provision was originally promulgated as 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(5)(i) and was later transferred to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B).

1 32. The BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, renders
2 prudential exhaustion futile in bond cases involving individuals who entered the United
3 States without inspection. *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D.
4 Cal. Sept. 8, 2025). Although Petitioner has just received a denial of his bond request by
5 an immigration judge, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* "predetermine[s]" the outcome of that
6 appeal. *McCarthy*, 503 U.S. at 148. Prudential exhaustion is therefore unnecessary, and the
7 Court should take jurisdiction over Petitioner's case.
8

9 33. A motion to reconsider has been filed in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. The
10 motion challenges the Board's statutory analysis and asks it to withdraw its decision
11 because (a) the underlying removal proceedings had concluded by the time the Board
12 issued its decision, making the case moot, and (b) the decision conflicts with longstanding
13 regulations issued by the Attorney General.²
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16 **Federal Court Decisions Regarding Detention of
17 Individuals Who Are Present Without Admission**

18 34. To date, federal district judges have issued over 280 decisions either outright
19 rejecting the government's novel interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A),ⁱ or finding that
20 noncitizens challenging the government's interpretation were substantially likely to prevail
21 on the merits.ⁱⁱ These judges have not been unsparing in their criticism of the government's
22 newfound position. One called it a "nonstarter." *Doe v. Moniz*, No. 25-12094, 2025 WL
23 2576819 at *10 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2025). Another called it "willfully blind." *Leal-*
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26 ² The Board's Decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is also not entitled to deference
27 because it contravenes the statutory language and legislative history, and it deviates from
28 longstanding agency practice and regulations.

1 *Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 25-2428, 2025 WL 2430025 at *25 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025).
2 Another called it “a policy argument, projected onto Congress.” *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-
3 11631, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 2403827 at *28 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025). And another
4 noted that the government “could not identify any federal court that has adopted their novel
5 reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A).” *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-12546, 2025 WL 2609425
6 at *20 (E.D. Mich Sept. 9, 2025).

8 35. The district court in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, 5:25-cv-01873 (C.D.
9 Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (Sykes, J.), has granted nationwide class certification and summary
10 judgment on this issue. Specifically, the court has declared illegal ICE’s policy, and the
11 BIA’s decision in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), requiring
12 detention without bond of all persons who entered without inspection or admission. Thus,
13 class members nationwide now have a binding judgment declaring they are detained under
14 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and are entitled to consideration for release on
15 bond. *Maldonado Bautista*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231977,
16 at *26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (extending the same declaratory relief granted to
17 individual petitioners to the class as a whole).

20 36. The court there expressly extended the declaratory relief to the Bond Eligible
21 Class, which is nationwide and encompasses:

23 All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have
24 entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or
25 will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject
26 to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.

27 *Id.* at *4.

1 37. Petitioner in this case is thus a class member and covered by the declaratory
2 relief granted in *Maldonado Bautista*. Still, Petitioner’s habeas action is necessary because
3 the class-wide declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* does not provide coercive
4 remedies like a writ of habeas corpus ordering release or a bond hearing. 28 U.S.C. §
5 2201(a); *Steffel v. Thompson*, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (explaining that declaratory
6 judgment “is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is
7 not contempt.”)

9 38. It is not difficult to understand why federal district courts have rejected the
10 government’s novel interpretation, as the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates
11 that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

13 39. By its terms, § 1225(b)(2)(A) only applies to noncitizens who are “seeking
14 admission,” and Congress defined “admission” as the “lawful entry of the alien into the
15 United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” §
16 1101(a)(13)(A). Accordingly, “[c]onstruing section 1225(b)(2) to apply to noncitizens
17 already residing in the country would read the word ‘entry’ out of the definitions of
18 ‘admitted’ and ‘admission.’” *Chafila v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist.
19 LEXIS 184909, at *19 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025).

22 40. Accordingly, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry. The
23 statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are
24 “seeking admission” to the United States, and individuals who entered without inspection
25 and have never affirmatively applied for admission or parole do not fit within that category.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see *Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

1 175767, at *19 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (specifically rejecting the Board’s analysis of the
2 statute in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and concluding that it is “difficult to square a
3 noncitizen’s continued presence with “seeking admission” when that noncitizen never
4 attempted to obtain lawful status”); *Vasquez-Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-
5 MMP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171714, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2025) (rejecting DHS’
6 contention that an individual who entered the United States without inspection “is
7 automatically understood to be ‘seeking admission’ within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A),
8 without need[ing] to affirmatively apply for admission or parole”); *see also Arrazola*
9 *Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158808, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal.
10 Aug. 15, 2025) (concluding that habeas petitioner showed likelihood of success on the
11 merits of argument that “[t]o ignore the ‘seeking admission’ language [in 8 U.S.C. §
12 1225(b)(2)(A) . . . would render the language purposeless and violate a key rule of
13 statutory construction”).
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17 41. Throughout its text, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 defines its scope by reference to
18 “inspections”—a term not defined in the INA but which typically connotes an examination
19 upon or soon after physical entry. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (titled “Inspection by immigration
20 officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving [noncitizens]; referral for hearing”);
21 §§ 1225(b)(1)–(2) (referring to “inspections” in their titles); § 1225(d)(1) (authorizing
22 immigration officials to search certain conveyances to conduct “inspections” where
23 noncitizens “are being brought into the United States”). Many statutory provisions, various
24 regulations and agency precedent discuss “inspection” in the context of admission
25 processes at ports of entry, further supporting the conclusion that § 1225(b) has a limited
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1 temporal and geographic scope. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1187(h)(2)(B)(i), 1225A; 8 U.S.C.
2 § 1752a; 8 C.F.R. § 235.1; *Matter of Quilantan*, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010)).

3 42. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention
4 scheme applies to noncitizens who are “arriving in the United States,” *Clark v. Martinez*,
5 543 U.S. 371, 373 (2005), “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the
6 Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is
7 admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

8 43. As importantly, § 1226(c) subjects numerous categories of inadmissible
9 noncitizens to mandatory detention. If “the [BIA was] correct that § 1225(b)’s mandatory
10 detention provisions apply to all persons who have not been admitted into the United States,
11 that would render superfluous those provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories
12 of inadmissible aliens, such as § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), and (E).” *Hasan v. Crawford*, __ F.
13 Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 268225 at *22 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025) (Brinkema, J.). Indeed, the
14 BIA’s interpretation would “render the Laken Riley Act a meaningless amendment, since
15 it would have prescribed mandatory detention for noncitizens already subject to it.” *Aceros*
16 *v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2637503 at *28 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025).

17 44. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not
18 apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the United
19 States at the time they were apprehended.

24 FACTS

25 45. Petitioner is a 21-year-old resident of Phoenix, Arizona. *Exhibit A*. He first
26 arrived on January 18, 2024, encountered immigration officials, and was released from
27

1 DHS custody by “Order of Recognizance” on January 18, 2024. *Id.* He came to the United
2 States seeking protection after [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] *Tab C – Motion to Reopen.* He applied for asylum and paid
4 the required fee. *Id.*

5
6 46. While his removal proceedings were pending, Petitioner was arrested for
7 transporting illegal aliens for profit on July 13, 2025. *Id.* He was detained and accepted a
8 plea agreement on August 5, 2025, for a five month sentence, which concluded on
9 December 10, 2025. *Id.* He was put into ICE custody at that time.

10
11 47. While still in criminal custody, Petitioner was ordered removed in absentia
12 in the Phoenix Immigration Court on August 6, 2025. *Id.* He subsequently moved to reopen
13 the proceedings, which the Immigration Judge granted on December 5, 2025. *Tab D.* His
14 case is currently pending in the Phoenix Immigration Court, with a master calendar hearing
15 on February 4, 2026. *Tab E.* However, ICE Assistant Field Office Director Alexis Garcia
16 notified undersigned counsel via email that the Respondent would remain in ICE custody
17 for his proceedings, housed at the Florence Detention Center. *Tab F.* On December 18,
18 Respondent moved to change venue to the Florence Immigration Court, which remains
19 pending. *Id.*

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22 48. Petitioner is still detained at a federal detention center in Arizona. Absent
23 this Court’s intervention, he will remain detained for the duration of his removal
24 proceedings.

25
26 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

27 **COUNT I**

28 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Guanin-Manzaba v. Cantu, et al.

Violation of the INA

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2 49. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the
3 preceding paragraphs.

4 50. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
5 apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who entered the country without being
6 admitted. By its terms, § 1225(b)(2)(A) only applies to noncitizens who are “seeking
7 admission.” The term “admission” is defined to require a “lawful entry” following
8 “inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” § 1101(a)(13)(A). Accordingly,
9 § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioner who were not inspected or
10 admitted and are later apprehended outside a port of entry. Such noncitizens are instead
11 detained under § 1226 while in removal proceedings, and are thus eligible for release on
12 bond under § 1226(a) unless they are subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c).
13
14

15 51. The application of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his
16 continued detention without a bond hearing and violates the INA.
17

18 **COUNT II**
19 **Violation of Federal Regulations**

20 52. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the
21 preceding paragraphs.

22 53. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1), immigration judges may grant bond to any
23 noncitizen in removal proceedings who is not subject to a final order or to any of the
24 exceptions in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19. None of the exceptions in § 1003.19 preclude
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1 immigration judges from granting bond to noncitizens simply for being present without
2 admission.

3 54. As relevant here, the regulations only preclude immigration judges from
4 granting bond to noncitizens who qualify as “arriving aliens,” § 1003.19(h)(1)(B)(ii), *i.e.*,
5 those who presented themselves for inspection at a port of entry. When these regulations
6 were initially promulgated, the Justice Department explained that “inadmissible aliens,
7 except for arriving aliens, have available to them bond redetermination hearings before an
8 immigration judge.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (March 6, 1997). The Justice Department
9 thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for
10 consideration for bond and bond hearings before Immigration Judges (IJs) under 8 U.S.C.
11 1226 and its implementing regulations.

14 55. Notwithstanding these regulations, the BIA held in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*
15 that all noncitizens who are present without admission are ineligible to receive a bond from
16 IJs. Application of this decision to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention
17 without a bond hearing in violation of §§ 1236.1 and 1003.19

19
20 **COUNT III**
21 **Violation of Due Process**

22 56. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference every allegation
23 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

24 57. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without
25 due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from
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1 government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
2 liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

3 58. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official
4 restraint.

5
6 59. The government’s detention of Petitioner and its issuance of a precedential
7 decision precluding his release violates her right to due process.

8 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

9 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 10 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 11 b. Set this matter for expedited consideration;
- 12 c. Declare that no statute or regulation prohibits an immigration judge from
13 holding a custody redetermination hearing for Petitioner, and that Petitioner
14 is properly detained, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a);
- 15
16 d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus and conduct a bond hearing within 15 days,
17 or order Petitioner’s release within 15 days unless Respondents provide him
18 with a bond hearing before an immigration judge;
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20 e. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice
21 Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis
22 justified under law; and
- 23
24 f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.
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1 DATED this 19th day of December, 2025.

2 s/Gregory P. Fay

3 Gregory P. Fay

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Guanin-Manzaba v. Cantu, et al.

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2242

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I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am one of Petitioner’s attorneys. I have discussed with the Petitioner the events described in the Petition. Based on those discussions, I verify that the factual statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on this 19th day of December, 2025 in Phoenix, Arizona.

s/Gregory P. Fay

Gregory P. Fay
Attorney for Petitioner

ⁱ See, e.g., *Perez Camacho v. Holinshead*, 25-593 (D. Id. Nov. 19, 2025) (Winmill, J.); *Macilla Ruiz v. Larose*, No. 25-379 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025) (Bashant, J.); *Maravilla Amaya v. Noem*, 25-2892 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) (Moskowitz, J.); *Hernandez-Luna v. Noem*, 25-1818 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2025) (Navarro, J.); *Castellanos Lopez v. Warden*, No. 25-2527 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (Huie, J.); *Esquivel-Ipina v. Larose*, No. 25-2672 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sammartino, J.); *Benitez-Cornejo v. Cantu*, No. 25-3672 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2025) (Tuchi, J.); *Torres v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2855379 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025) (Menendez, J.); *BDVS v. Forestal*, No. 25-1968 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2025) (Evans Barker, J.); *Eliseo v. Olson*, No. 25-3381 (Oct. 8, 2025) (Blackwell, J.); *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 25-3726, (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (Rosenthal, J.); *Echevarria v. Bondi*, No. 25-3252, 2025 LX 492534 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025) (Joun, J.); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3682 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (Menendez, J.); *Santiago Santiago v. Noem*, No. 25-361 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2025) (Cardone, J.); *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 25-1382, 2025 WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025) (Nachmanoff, J.); *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 25-5240, 2025 WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (Cartwright, J.); *Da Silva v. ICE*, No. 25-284, 2025 WL 2778083 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2025) (McCafferty, J.); *Quispe v. Crawford*, No. 25-1471, 2025 WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2025) (Trenga, J.); *Inlago Tocagon v. Moniz*, No. 25-12453, 2025 WL 2778023 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2025) (Joun, J.); *Barrios v. Shepley*, No. 25-406, 2025 WL 2772579 (D. Maine Sept. 29, 2025) (Woodcock, Jr.); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-4836, 2025 WL 2772765 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (Merchant, J.); *Savane v. Francis*, No. 25-6666, 2025 WL 2774452 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025) (Woods, J.); *Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-14626, 2025 WL

1 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025) (Hayden, J.); *Villanueva Herrera v. Tate*, No. 25-3364 (S.D. Tex.
2 Sept 26, 2025) (Hittner, J.); *Gamez Lira v. Noem*, No. 25-855 (D.N.M. 25-855) (Johnson, J.); *Singh*
3 *v. Lewis*, No. 25-96, 2025 LX 400065 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025) (Jennings, J.); *Chafila v. Scott*,
4 No. 25-437, 2025 LX 422663 (D. Maine Sept. 21, 2025) (Neumann, J.); *Hasan v. Crawford*, No.
5 25-1408, 2025 LX 499354 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025) (Brinkema, J.); *Barrera v. Tindall*, No. 25-
6 451, 2025 LX 435572 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (Jenning, J.); *Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-835,
7 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025) (Urias, J.); *Garcia Cortes v. Noem*, No. 25-2677, 2025
8 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-12546,
9 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (White, J.); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 25-11981, 2025
10 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (Kobick, J.); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin*, No. 25-326, 2025 LX
11 360066 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025) (McCafferty, J.); *Doe v. Moniz*, No. 25-12094, 2025 WL 2576819
12 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2025) (Talwani, J.); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25-5937, 2025 WL 2267803
13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (Ho, J.); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 25-12486, 2025 WL 2496379
14 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (McMillion, J.); *Diaz v. Mattivelo*, No. 25-12226, 2025 WL 2457610
15 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2025) (Kobick, J.); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3051, 2025 WL 2466670 (D.
16 Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (Tostrud, J.); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 25-2428, 2025 WL 2430025 (D.
17 Md. Aug. 24, 2025) (Rubin, J.); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2025 WL
18 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025) (Murphy, J.); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25-6373, 2025 WL 2398831
19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025) (Ho, J.); *dos Santos v. Noem*, No. 25-12052, 2025 WL 2370988 (D.
20 Mass. Aug. 14, 2025) (Kobick, J.); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. 25-11613, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2025
21 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (Murphy, J.); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 25-11571, 2025 WL
22 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (Kobick, J.).

23 ⁱⁱ See, e.g., *Rueda Padilla v. Bowen*, 25-cv-10780 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (Snyder, J.); *Sandigo*
24 *Manzanarez v. Bondi*, 25-1536 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (Coggins, J.); *Orozco Acosta v. Bondi*,
25 25-9601 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (Gillam, J.); *Diaz v. Albarran*, 25-cv-9601 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
26 2025) (Corley, J.); *Estuardo Marin v. Andrews*, 25-cv-1422 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) (Boone, J.);
27 *Lopez v. Lyons*, 25-3174 (E.D. Cal. Nov 7, 2025) (Calabretta J.) *Castillo v. Wamsley*, 25-2054
28 (W.D. Wash. Nov 5, 2025) (Cartwright, J.); *Arce-Cervera v. Noem*, 25-1895 (D. Nev. Oct. 28,
29 2025); *Martinez Lopez v. Noem*, No. 3:25-2734 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025) (Park, J.); *Sabi Polo v.*
30 *Chestnut*, No. 25-1342 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (Thurston, J.); *Menjivar Sanchez v. Wofford*, No.
31 25-1187 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (Oberto, J.); *E.C. v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2916264 (D. Nev. Oct. 14,
32 2025) (Boulware, J.); *Rico-Tapia v. Smith* No. 25-379 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (Park, J.); *Alvarez*
33 *Chavez v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2909526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (Beeler, J.) *Flores v. Noem*, No. 25-
34 2490, 2025 LX 444718 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025) (Birotte, J.); *Roa v. Albarran*, No. 25-7802,
35 2025 WL 2732923 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025) (Seeborg, J.); *Lopez v. Hardin*, No. 25-830, 2025
36 WL 2732717 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025) (Dudek, J.); *Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-
37 01163 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (Sherriff, J.); *Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-06924, 2025 LX 330524
38 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (Chen, J.); *Guzman v. Andrews*, No. 25-01015, 2025 LX 354551 (E.D.
39 Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (Sherriff, J.); *Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 25-2304, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal.
40 Sept. 8, 2025) (Snyder, J.); *Nieves v. Kaiser*, No. 25-6921, 2025 LX 320701 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
41 2025) (Beeler, J.); *Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-2180, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025)
42 (Sabraw, J.); *Garcia v. Kaiser*, No. 25-06916, 2025 LX 322337 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025)
43 (Gonzalez Rogers, J.); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 25-1093, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025)
44 (Edwards, J.); *Benitez v. Noem*, No. 25-02190, 2025 LX 322897 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025)
45 (Klausner, J.); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-06248, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
46 2025) (Freeman, J.); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 25-01789, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal.

1 Aug. 15, 2025) (Wright, J.); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-3142, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn.
2 Aug. 15, 2025) (Nelson, J.); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 25-01873, 2025 LX 341363
3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025); *Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 25-05240, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash.
4 April 24, 2025) (Cartwright, J.). *But see Sixtos Chavez v. Noem*, No. 25-2325 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 24,
2025) (Bencivengo, J.) (denying temporary restraining order); *Villanueva v. Chestnut*, No. 25-2
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sheriff, J.) (same).

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