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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ISMAEL MENDOZA JACOBO,

Petitioner,

v.

GARRETT RIPA, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Miami Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
PAMELA JO BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW;
KEVIN RAMBOSK, Sheriff of COLLIER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

Respondents.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner ISMAEL MENDOZA JACOBO has been residing in the United States since 2008 and was apprehended by immigration authorities on December 5, 2025 in Immokalee, Florida following an arrest for No Valid Driver License in violation of Fla. Stat. §322.03.
2. Petitioner is currently in the physical custody of Respondents at the Collier County Jail in Naples, Florida. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in direct collaboration with the adjudicative body with jurisdiction over immigrants (the Executive Office of Immigration Review) (EOIR) during contested removal proceedings, have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.
3. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), (7)(A)(i)(I).
4. On July 8, 2025, DHS rolled out a new policy, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.
5. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states that an applicant for admission seeking admission shall be detained for a removal proceeding. It is the position of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which houses both the BIA and immigration judges, that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to all individuals who arrived in the United States without documents, regardless of how long they have lived in the United States and regardless of how far they were apprehended from the border.
6. This position was recently affirmed, on September 5, 2025, by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board). The BIA issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration

judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

7. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

8. Despite the existence of an order certifying a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing based on the government's allegation that they entered the United States without admission or inspection, *see Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, Central District of California, (Nov. 2025), DHS and Immigration Judges have still maintained that non-citizens, like Petitioner, are subject to mandatory detention and are ineligible for bond.

9. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

10. Indeed, the Government itself has made an abrupt about-face on this issue. Respondents should be judicially estopped from asserting their current interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), because they previously prevailed in litigation after asserting the opposite interpretation. As explained in *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), judicial estoppel applies when a party assumes a position in a legal proceeding, succeeds in

maintaining that position, and then adopts a contrary position in a subsequent proceeding to gain an unfair advantage. Here, Respondents previously, and successfully, argued that individuals who entered the United States without inspection were subject to detention under § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and courts accepted that position. Respondents now reverse course and assert that such individuals are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), thereby denying them bond hearings. This shift in legal position undermines the integrity of the judicial process and imposes an unfair detriment on Petitioners who relied on the prior interpretation. Accordingly, Respondents should be estopped from asserting this inconsistent position.

11. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION

12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Collier County Jail in Immokalee, Florida in Naples, Florida.

13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and (5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

14. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Administrative Procedure Act at 5 U.S.C.A. § 704.

VENUE

15. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

17. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause "forthwith" why the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

18. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application." *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

19. Petitioner, ISMAEL MENDOZA JACOBO, is a resident of Naples, Florida.

20. Respondent GARRETT RIPA is the Director of the Miami Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division; however, on information and belief, the DHS is rotating their Field Office Director without publishing a schedule of rotation. As such, GARRETT RIPA or his unknown, unannounced provisional replacement is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He or his acting counterpart is named in his or her official capacity.
21. Respondent KRISTI NOEM is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. NOEM has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.
22. Respondent (through its agent Secretary Noem) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.
23. Respondent PAMELA JO BONDI is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.
24. Respondent (through its director Attorney General Bondi) EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.
25. Respondent, Sheriff KEVIN RAMBOSK, is the Sheriff of Collier County, Florida and is responsible for the Collier County Jail, in Naples, Florida. He has ultimate authority over

the facility where Petitioner is detained and is the immediate custodian responsible for Petitioner's physical custody. Petitioner's present address, at the Collier County Jail, is 3347 Tamiami Trail E, Naples, FL 34112. Sheriff RAMBOSK is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

26. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

27. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

28. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

29. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

30. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

31. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

32. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

33. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

34. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from assuming inconsistent positions in litigation to gain unfair advantage. It is "especially" applicable "if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him." *Davis v. Wakelee*, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895).

35. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in *New Hampshire v. Maine*, holding that judicial estoppel applies when: (1) a party's later position is "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier position; (2) the party succeeded in persuading a court to accept the earlier position, such that acceptance of the later position would create the perception that the court was misled; and (especially) when (3) the party would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. 532 U.S. 742, 749–51 (2001). The

Court emphasized that these factors are not "inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula," and that "additional considerations may inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts." Id. at 751.

36. In *New Hampshire*, the Court barred the state from asserting a boundary interpretation that contradicted its prior position, which had been accepted by the Court and had yielded a favorable outcome. The Court found that the reversal would "undermine the integrity of the judicial process" and create a "risk of inconsistent court determinations." Id. at 751, 755.

37. In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, a case in which the government prevailed, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explicitly acknowledged that individuals who have already entered the United States and are not apprehended within 100 miles of the border or within 14 days of entry are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b).

38. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

39. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,"[1] claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

40. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States

[1] *Available at* https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission.

without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

41. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, several federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

42. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

43. A growing number of federal courts have rejected ICE and EOIR's expanded interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act's detention provisions. These courts have consistently held that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governs the detention authority applicable in these cases. For example, courts in Florida, Massachusetts, Arizona, New York, Minnesota, California, and Nebraska have reached this conclusion. *See Vasquez Carcamo v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-00922-SPC-NPM (M.D.F.L. November 7, 2025); *Hinojosa Garcia v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-00879-SPC-NPM (M.D.F.L. October 31, 2025); *Grigorian v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR (S.D.F.L. Sept. 9, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB) (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE (D. Minn.

Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025).

44. These decisions reflect a clear judicial consensus that the government's reliance on § 1225(b)(2) is misplaced in cases involving those whose immigration status lawfully falls under § 1226(a).

45. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

46. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

47. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

48. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

49. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States and were not free to mingle with the general population after being free from official restraint. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

50. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who is an uninspected entrant. This reversal undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process and triggers the principles of issue preclusion recognized in *B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 138 (2015), which require courts to respect agency determinations when the ordinary elements of preclusion are met.

FACTS

51. Petitioner is currently detained by at the Collier County Jail in Naples, Florida, at the direction of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pursuant to a 287(g) agreement between the Collier County Sheriff's Office and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

52. On November 8, 2025, Petitioner was driving a vehicle registered to his long term partner and mother of his children, Rosa Ramos. Petitioner was driving the vehicle because Ms. Ramos was not feeling well.

53. Following Petitioner's purported failure to stop before the white stop bar adjacent to a clearly visible stop sign, he was stopped by the Collier County Sherrif's Deputy, Garrett Nottle.

54. Deputy Nottle requested Petitioner's driver license and upon his failure to produce a driver license, he was arrested for Driving Without a Valid License, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 322.03.[2]

55. On December 5, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to ICE custody following a hearing in his traffic case.

56. Following his release from custody in Collier County, Petitioner was detained by ICE officials and was detained at the Collier County Jail in Naples, FL.

57. To date, Petitioner has not been placed in removal proceedings and has not been servied with a Notice to Appear. Presumably, he will be charged with having entered the United States without inspection and being present without valid immigration documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i).

58. Petitioner has not sought custody redetermination with the Immigration Judge as any such attempt at release would be futile.

[2] The facts presented here are based the Narrative Report prepared by Deputy Garrett J. Nottle in connection with Petitioner's November 8, 2025 arrest in Collier County Florida. This report is attached and incorporated herein as **Exhibit 1**.

JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ ORAL ARGUMENTS

59. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, the government clarified that individuals who have already effected an entry into the United States are to be placed in INA § 236 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than INA § 235 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), unless they are apprehended within 100 miles of the border and within 14 days of entry. Justice Sotomayor specifically asked whether unadmitted aliens who are found in the U.S. illegally fall under mandatory detention under 1225(b) or discretionary detention under 1226(a). Solicitor General Gershengorn stated: "So they are held under -- if they are not -- if they are not detained within 100 miles of the border or within 14 days, so they've been there longer than those two things, then they are under 1226(a) and not 1226(c)." (Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. argued Nov. 30, 2016)).

60. On page 8, lines 21–25, Solicitor General Gershengorn further clarified that an alien who entered illegally and resides 50 miles from the border for 20 years "is held under 1226(a) and that they get a bond hearing under -- and this is at page 156a of the appendix." (*Id.* at 8).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Unlawful Denial of Bond Hearing

61. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

62. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of "Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of

[Noncitizens]," the agencies explained that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination." 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

63. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

64. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT II
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Unlawful Denial of Bond

65. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

66. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility because they originally entered the United States without inspection or parole. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c) or § 1231).

67. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to bar Petitioner from receiving a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

COUNT III

Violation of Procedural Due Process

68. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

69. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

70. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

71. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

COUNT IV

Judicial Estoppel

72. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

73. The Government is judicially estopped from asserting that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In prior litigation, including *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Government prevailed, and in doing so argued that individuals who entered without inspection and were not apprehended near the border or within 14 days were subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, No. 15-1204, Tr. of Oral Arg. at 7–8 (Nov. 30, 2016).

74. The Courts historically accepted this asserted position. Now, the Government reverses course and asserts the opposite interpretation to deny bond hearings. Under *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), judicial estoppel applies where a party assumes a position, prevails, and then adopts a contrary position to gain an unfair advantage. The Government's reversal undermines the integrity of the judicial process and prejudices Petitioners who relied on the prior interpretation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

(1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

(2) Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA while this habeas petition is pending;

(3) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;

(4) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;

(5) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and

(6) Any further relief the Court deems proper.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2025.

Respectfully Submitted,

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