

United States District Court
Western District of Texas
San Antonio Division

Liljana Rudaj
Petitioner,

v.

Jose Rodriguez, Jr., Warden Karnes County
Immigration Processing Center
et al.,
Respondents.

No. 5:25-CV-01805-FB

**Federal¹ Respondents' Corrected Response in Opposition to
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus**

Respondents timely submit this response per this Court's Order dated December 19, 2025, directing service and ordering a response within five days of service. *See* ECF Nos. 3; 4 (confirming CMRRR delivery). In his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Ms. Rudaj ("Petitioner"), seeks release from civil immigration detention, claiming that her approximately one month detention has become unreasonably prolonged, contrary to statute and the Due Process Clause. *See* ECF No. 1. Petitioner's claims lack merit, and this petition should be denied.

Despite her allegation that there is "no basis" for his continued detention, Petitioner has a final order of removal from September 14, 2007, which not only mandated her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) during the 90-day removal period but allows for continued detention beyond the removal period in the exercise of ICE's discretion, so long as removal is reasonably foreseeable. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); *see Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Petitioner claims if she

¹ The named warden in this action is not a federal employee. The Department of Justice does not represent him in this action. The Federal Respondents are lawfully detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).

is returned to Albania, she will be questioned and tortured. ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. She also argues she should not be removed from the United States due to long term presence and overall uncertainty about returning to Albania. *Id.* ¶18.

Petitioner is lawfully detained with a final order of removal, her constitutional challenge to continued detention is not ripe until she has been detained in post-order custody for at least six months, and there is insufficient reason to believe that removal is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The burden of proof has not shifted to Respondents, but even if it had, Respondents can show that removal to Albania is, in fact, likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. For these reasons, the Court should deny this habeas petition.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Albania. ECF No. 1 a¶ 18. On or about December 10, 2000, Rudaj entered the United States at or near the Orlanda International Airport, Florida, as a stowaway. Ex. A (ERO Declaration) ¶ 4. On January 8, 2001, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States after determining she was not eligible for asylum, statutory withholding under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)². *Id.* at ¶ 7. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) who dismissed the Petitioner's appeal, on September 14, 2007. *Id.* ¶ 7. Petitioner has filed motions with the Board to reopen or reconsider the removal order. Ex. A, Decl. ¶¶ 8, 27. Those motions were denied.

On or about November 23, 2025, RUDAJ was taken into custody by ICE pending removal. Ex. A at ¶ 32. On November 30, 2025, she was transported to the Dilley Immigration

² Petitioner alleges she was granted deferral of removal under CAT. ECF Doc. No. 1. This is not accurate, all of her applications were denied. Ex. A, ¶ 7.

Processing Center in Dilley, Texas. *Id.* ¶ 3.

You need to list from the declaration the sections where ICE released her on OSUP, and told her she needed to file for documents over the years. Those facts are key to showing ICE has been trying to remove her. The information about obtaining passports, etc. The information from December about obtaining the tentative itinerary, etc. efforts to obtain a travel document

II. Detention Is Lawful Under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6).

The authority to detain aliens after the entry of a final order of removal is set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). That statute affords ICE a 90-day mandatory detention period within which to remove the alien from the United States following the entry of the final order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The 90-day removal period begins on the latest of three dates: the date (1) the order becomes “administratively final,” (2) a court issues a final order in a stay of removal, or (3) the alien is released from non-immigration custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

Not all removals can be accomplished in 90 days, and certain aliens may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. Under § 1231, the removal period can be extended in at least three circumstances. *See Glushchenko v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 566 F.Supp.3d 693, 703 (W.D. Tex. 2021). Extension is warranted, for example, if the alien presents a flight risk or other risk to the community. *Id.*; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C); (a)(6). An alien may be held in confinement until there is “no significant likelihood of removal in a reasonably foreseeable future.” *Zadvydas*, at 533 U.S. at 680.

III. Petitioner’s Substantive Due Process Claim under *Zadvydas* is Premature.

Petitioner’s reliance on *Zadvydas* is premature because she has been detained less than six months. To state a claim for relief under *Zadvydas*, Petitioner must show that: (1) she is in DHS custody; (2) she has a final order of removal; (3) she has been detained in *post-removal-order*

detention for six months or longer; and (4) there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 700. Petitioner does not and cannot make this showing, as he has been detained less than six months in post-order custody. *Chance v. Napolitano*, 453 F. App'x 535, 2011 WL 6260210 at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011); *Agvei-Kodie v. Holder*, 418 F. App'x 317, 2011 WL 891071 at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2011); *Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions*, 317 F.Supp.3d 917, 929 n.33 (W.D. Tex. 2018); *Kasangaki v. Barr*, 2019 WL 13221026 at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2019); *Linares v. Collins*, 1:25-CV-00584-RP-DH, ECF No. 14 at 7–16 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2025).

IV. There Is No Good Reason to Believe That Removal Is Unlikely in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future.

Petitioner cannot show “good reason” to believe that removal to Albania is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future. In *Zadvydas*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) “read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” but “does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” *Id.* at 699. The Court designated six months as a presumptively reasonable period of post-order detention but made clear that the presumption “does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months.” *Id.* at 701; *see also Linares*, ECF No. 14 at 8, 10–11.

Once the alien establishes that she has been in post-order custody for more than six months at the time the habeas petition is filed, the alien must provide a “good reason” to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *Id.* at 14–16; *see Andrade v. Gonzales*, 459 F.3d 538, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2006); *Gonzalez v. Gills*, No. 20–60547,

2022 WL 1056099 at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022). Unless the alien establishes the requisite “good reason,” the burden will not shift to the government to prove otherwise. *Id.*

The “reasonably foreseeable future” is not a static concept; it is fluid and country-specific, depending in large part on country conditions and diplomatic relations. *Ali v. Johnson*, No. 3:21-CV-00050-M, 2021 WL 4897659 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2021). Additionally, a lack of visible progress in the removal process does not satisfy the petitioner’s burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal. *Id.* at *2 (collecting cases); *see also Idowu v. Ridge*, No. 3:03-CV-1293-R, 2003 WL 21805198, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2003). Conclusory allegations are also insufficient to meet the alien’s burden of proof. *Nagib v. Gonzales*, No. 3:06-CV-0294-G, 2006 WL 1499682, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2006) (citing *Gonzalez v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement*, No. 1:03-CV-178-C, 2004 WL 839654 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2004)). One court explained:

To carry his burden, [the] petitioner must present something beyond speculation and conjecture. To shift the burden to the government, [the] petitioner must demonstrate that “the circumstances of his status” or the existence of “particular individual barriers to his repatriation” to his country of origin are such that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Idowu, 2003 WL 21805198, at *4 (citation omitted).

Petitioner’s claims are insufficient under *Zadvydas* because she has not shown that she has been in post-order custody for six months, and she has not shown any good reason to believe that removal is unlikely. *See Linares*, ECF No. 14 at 8, 10–11, 14–16; *Nogales v. Dept. of Homeland Sec.*, No. 21-10236, 2022 WL 851738 at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (citing *Rice v. Gonzalez*, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021)); *Akbar v. Barr*, SA-20-CV-01132-FB, 2021 WL 1345530 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2021); *see also Andrade*, 459 F.3d at 543–44; *Boroky v. Holder*, No. 3:14-CV-2040-L-BK, 2014 WL 6809180, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2014); *Thanh v. Johnson*, No. EP-15-CV-403-

PRM, 2016 WL 5171779, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016) (denying habeas relief where government was taking affirmative steps to obtain Vietnamese travel documents). Petitioner has not shown that her continued detention is unreasonable, nor has she shown she is owed any additional due process than what he is currently receiving. *See Hernandezs-Esquivel v. Castro*, No. 5-17-cv-0564-RBF, 2018 WL 3097029, at *8 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2018). Therefore, the burden of proof does not shift to Respondents to prove significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Prior to FY2025, 40 Albania nationals were successfully removed in FY2024, showing an overall increase in successful removals to Albania since FY 2019. *See* <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf> (last accessed July 9, 2025). On December 23, 2025, ERO mailed the completed travel documents request to the Albanian Embassy along with the tentative flight itinerary for Rudaj. *Id.* ¶ 36. As of December 29, 2025, ERO is pending a response from the Albanian Embassy on the travel document request and RUDAJ has a tentative flight itinerary for early 2026, pending the issuance of a travel document. *Id.* ¶ 37.

V. ICE Has Afforded Petitioner Procedural Due Process During His Post-Order Custody Pending Removal.

To establish a procedural due process violation, Petitioner must show that she was deprived of liberty without adequate safeguards. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). The Fifth Circuit has not provided guidance to lower courts, post-*Arteaga-Martinez*, on the appropriate standard for reviewing a procedural due process claim alleged by an alien detained under § 1231, but the Fourth Circuit, post-*Arteaga-Martinez*, used the *Zadvydas* framework to analyze a post-order-custody alien's due process claims. *See Linares*, at 10–14 (discussing *Castaneda v. Perry*, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024)). This Court should also follow *Zadvydas* to review the procedural claim at issue here. *Id.* Under the

Zadvydas framework, six months post-order detention is reasonable, and unless that time frame has passed, any procedural due process claim is also premature.

In any event, the Fifth Circuit finds no procedural due process violation where the constitutional minima of due process is otherwise met. *Murphy v. Collins*, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994). Even if the Court were to find a procedural due process violation here, the remedy is substitute process. *Mohammad v. Lynch*, No. EP-16-CV-28-PRM, 2016 WL 8674354, at *6 n.6 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2016) (finding no merit to petitioner's procedural due process claim where the evidence demonstrated that the review had already occurred, thereby redressing any delay in the provision of the 90-day and 180-day custody reviews). Even in the criminal context, failure to comply with statutory or regulatory time limits does not mandate release of a person who should otherwise be detained. *U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo*, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990).

Petitioner argues she has communal ties, and has ongoing harm³ from detention. ECF. Doc. 1 ¶ 18. These allegations are insufficient to establish ICE has failed to provide procedural protections, and even if it did, it would not result in her release from custody or a stay of her removal order.

VI. Conclusion

Petitioner's detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and any due process claim is premature under *Zadvydas*. Moreover, Petitioner fails to show good reason to believe that there is

³ Allegations regarding conditions of administrative detention do not provide a basis for release in habeas. See *Rice v. Gonzalez*, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021) (rejecting a habeas petitioner's argument that alleged deficiencies in the conditions of confinement would entitle him to release, with the explanation that "[s]imply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention," and its "sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))

no significant likelihood of removal to Albania in the reasonably foreseeable future. As such, the burden has not shifted to ICE to show the opposite. Even if the burden had shifted, ICE could establish that removal is foreseeable. Additionally, ICE has afforded Petitioner procedural due process over the course of his one-month post-order detention. Petitioner's continued detention, therefore, is not unreasonably prolonged, nor is it in violation of the INA or the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court should deny this petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Justin R. Simmons
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Anne Marie Cordova
Anne Marie Cordova
Assistant United States Attorney
Texas Bar No. 24073789
601 N.W. Loop 410, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
(210) 384-7100 (phone)
(210) 384-7118 (fax)
Anne.Marie.Cordova@usdoj.gov

/s/ Adrian Acosta
Assistant United States Attorney
Texas Bar No. 24097275
700 E. San Antonio Dr., Ste. 200
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 534-6884

Attorneys for Respondents