

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO**

Civil Action No. 25-cv-04066-RBJ

RUBEN UGARTE HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, Aurora, Colorado, in his official capacity;

ROBERT HAGAN, Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity;

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity;

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity; and

PAM BONDI, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, in her official capacity,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Respondents submit this response to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Petition"), ECF No. 1, and the Court's order to show cause why the Petition should not be granted, ECF No. 10 at 4. The Court should deny the Petition.

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is detaining Petitioner under a statutory provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), that applies to noncitizens who, like Petitioner, entered the United States without inspection and have never been admitted, and thus are treated as "applicant[s] for admission." Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires detention of an "applicant for admission" if an "examining immigration officer

determines that [the] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”

Petitioner claims he is not an applicant for admission subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) but is instead subject to a different provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes detention of certain noncitizens while removal proceedings are pending. The practical difference between the two sections is that Congress has provided that noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) are ordinarily *not* eligible for bond, while those detained under § 1226(a) are. Based on the premise that his detention is governed by § 1226(a) (and thus entitles him to a bond hearing), Petitioner requests a bond hearing in seven days, or immediate release. ECF No. 1 at 17. In addition, he claims that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process.

The Court should find that Petitioner is an applicant for admission within the scope of § 1225(b)(2). The plain text of § 1225(b)(2), as well as a Supreme Court case, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), support that conclusion. And Petitioner has not demonstrated that his detention violates due process.

BACKGROUND

I. Legal Background

In the INA, Congress established rules governing when certain noncitizens may be detained or removed. As relevant here, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the processes for the detention and removal of “applicants for admission.” The scope of this section was analyzed by the Supreme Court in *Jennings*. At issue in that case was whether noncitizens are entitled to periodic bond hearings during detention under §§ 1225 and 1226 that becomes prolonged. Because in that case (as in this one) “[t]he primary issue [wa]s the proper interpretation of

§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c),” 583 U.S. at 289, the Supreme Court’s explanation in *Jennings* of § 1225’s scope should guide the Court’s analysis here.

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” which includes noncitizens who are unlawfully present but were never admitted. The Court explained that § 1225 applies to an “applicant for admission,” and that this term applies to both (a) an “arriving alien,” as well as (b) an individual who is *present* in this country but has not been admitted. 583 U.S. at 287. The INA defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” *Id.* § 1101(a)(13)(A).

The Court made clear that “applicant for admission” is a defined term of art. “Under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is *treated as* ‘an applicant for admission.’” 583 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added); *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (“An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission[.]”).

The Court’s treatment of the phrase “applicant for admission” as a term of art made two points clear. First, “applicant for admission” does *not* exclude individuals who are in the country but unlawfully present. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287-88. Rather, that term of art covers all noncitizens who are present in the country and were never lawfully admitted. Second, the term “applicants for admission” is not limited to noncitizens who have also submitted some type of immigration application. Rather, any “alien who ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted’ is *treated as* ‘an applicant for admission.’” *Id.* at 287 (emphasis added). The Court observed that “[i]n sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” *Id.* at 289. But that

statement did not introduce some separate and new “seeking admission” criterion that must exist for a noncitizen to fall within § 1225. This summation reinforces the Court’s explanation of the scope of § 1225—that noncitizens who fall within §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) are, as a matter of law, “treated as” “applicants for admission.” *Id.* at 287.

Section 1225(b) applies to *all* applicants for admission, not just arriving aliens or those who unlawfully entered the United States recently. The Court explained that § 1225(b)(1) applies to a few subcategories of individuals: those who are “arriving aliens,” and those who have been unlawfully present in the United States for less than two years. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(iii)(II) (explaining that this subsection generally applies to a noncitizen who cannot show that they have “been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior”). Noncitizens in those subcategories are subject to a process known as “expedited removal.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (“Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed ‘without further hearing or review’ pursuant to an expedited removal process.”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)).

The Court then explained that “all” remaining applicants for admission who fall outside that subcategory in § 1225(b)(1) are covered by § 1225(b)(2). It explained that § 1225(b)(2) is a “*catchall* provision that applies to *all* ‘applicants for admission’ not covered by” § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* at 287 (emphases added). For example, a noncitizen who was never admitted to the United States and has been unlawfully present in the country for *more* than two years is an “applicant for admission” who falls under the catchall provision of § 1225(b)(2).

8 U.S.C. § 1226 provides for detention for *other* categories of aliens subject to removal, such as previously admitted aliens. The two categories of noncitizens described in

§ 1225(b)(1) and the catchall category of noncitizen “applicants for admission” described in § 1225(b)(2) do not encompass all noncitizens who may be subject to removal. A person may be admitted but then face removal after admission. As the Court explained in *Jennings*,

Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute right to remain here. For example, an alien present in the country may still be removed if he or she falls ‘within one or more . . . classes of deportable aliens.’ § 1227(a). That includes aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses *since admission*. See §§ 1227(a)(1), (2).

583 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).

In discussing § 1226, the Court did not suggest that this provision applied to the detention of noncitizens who are covered by § 1225. Rather, read in context, it made clear that the detention of noncitizens covered by § 1225 is authorized by § 1225, and that *other* individuals in the country may be detained under § 1226. See *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289 (“U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”).

Detention under § 1225 does not grant applicants for admission a right to a bond hearing. The Court in *Jennings* explained that Congress has provided that aliens covered by § 1225(b)(2) generally “shall be detained” during their removal proceedings, with narrow exceptions. 583 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), all other applicants for admission who an immigration officer determines are “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” shall be detained for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. In short, § 1225 does not provide a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under that provision.

II. Factual Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. *See* Ex. 1 (Johnson Decl.) ¶ 4. He entered the United States on an unknown date and at an unknown location. *Id.* ¶ 5. He has never been admitted or paroled into the United States. *Id.* ¶ 6. In 2011, Petitioner was charged with being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and Petitioner admitted the charges, but removal proceedings were administratively closed in 2014 on Petitioner's unopposed motion for administrative closure. *Id.* ¶¶ 9-12. Petitioner filed, then later withdrew, an application for protection before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. *Id.* ¶¶ 7, 11.

On November 13, 2025, immigration officers detained Petitioner under § 1225(b). *Id.* ¶¶ 17-18. Petitioner's reinstated removal proceedings remain pending. *Id.* ¶¶ 21-22.

ARGUMENT

I. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who entered without inspection and are unlawfully present.

Petitioner argues that his detention should be governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and thus he should be released immediately or consistent with the terms identified by the immigration judge. ECF No. 1 at 20. For the reasons described below, Petitioner's detention is appropriate under § 1225(b)(2).

The plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) covers Petitioner. Section 1225 provides that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Thus, by statute, a noncitizen who enters the country without permission is an “applicant for admission,” regardless of the duration of their presence in the United States, their distance from the border, or if they have otherwise

applied for admission. *See Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, 25-cv-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025). In turn, § 1225(b)(2) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained” pending removal proceedings if the “alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(2)(A).

Petitioner falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). He entered the country without inspection. Ex. 1 ¶ 5. He has not been admitted to the United States. *Id.* ¶ 6. He remains an applicant for admission.

All “**applicants for admission**” are deemed to be “**seeking admission.**” Petitioner argues that this plain reading of the text does not justify his detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he believes that the provision only those “seeking admission.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 38-39. But the statutory text of § 1225(a)(1), quoted above, shows that being an “applicant for admission,” without more, is *deemed as a matter of law* to be “seeking admission.”

Section 1225(a) states that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for admission *or otherwise seeking admission* . . . shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). Section 1225(a)(3) confirms that a noncitizen seeks admission by meeting the definition of being deemed an applicant for admission, *or* by “otherwise” directly applying for admission. In other words, the statute deems any “applicant for admission” to be necessarily “seeking admission.” *See also Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025) (stating that the “seeking admission” language “is best read as simply another way of referring to aliens who are applicants for admission”).

Even when a noncitizen has been physically present in the country for many years, they can “still be an applicant for *lawful* entry, seeking legal ‘admission.’” *Mejia Olalde*, 2025 WL

3131942, at *3. Congress knows how to limit the scope of immigration provisions. For example, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) is limited to noncitizens “who [are] arriving in the United States.” Section 1225(b)(2) has no similar language limiting applicability only to noncitizens who are in the process of “arriving.” And § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) is limited to noncitizens who cannot show they have been physically in the United States “continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior[.]” But § 1225(b)(2) contains no time limit. As the geographic and temporal limits in the neighboring provision demonstrate, “[i]f Congress meant to say that an alien no longer is ‘seeking admission’ after some amount of time in the United States, Congress knew how to do so.” *Mejia Olalde*, 2025 WL 3131942, at *4.

8 U.S.C. § 1226 does not change the scope of § 1225. Petitioner argues that noncitizens who enter without inspection and are not apprehended at the border are not covered by § 1225(b)(2)(A) but by § 1226. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36-39. But Petitioner’s arguments about § 1226 do not change § 1225’s clear meaning.

Petitioner argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him because § 1226(a) should. *See* ECF No. 1 ¶ 37. He specifically refers to § 1226(c), which expressly requires mandatory detention for certain categories of noncitizens, including at least one group of noncitizens who entered without inspection. *See id.* ¶ 36 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)). He argues that *all* noncitizens who entered without inspection, not subject to subparagraph (E)(ii), are entitled to a bond hearing. *See id.*

Petitioner’s arguments contradict normal rules of statutory interpretation. Section 1226(a)’s general detention authority, which permits the issuance of warrants to detain noncitizens for their removal proceedings, must be read alongside § 1225, which *specifically*

addresses the detention of applicants for admission. Where “there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.” *Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund*, 493 U.S. 365, 375 (1990) (citation omitted).

To be sure, some applicants for admission might also be covered by § 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for a narrow category of noncitizens who both (1) entered the country without inspection and (2) were later arrested for, committed, or have admitted to committing one of a list of enumerated crimes. That subsection requires DHS to take such noncitizens into custody after their release from criminal custody and detain them. *See Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U.S. 392, 414-15 (2019). But the fact that § 1226(c)(1)(E) provides rules for detention of a subset of applicants for admission—those noncitizens who entered without inspection and then had criminal-related conduct—does not show that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not still apply to other noncitizens who entered without inspection. Redundancies “are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020). “Redundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text.” *Id.* The Court should not read a partial overlap in a subset of individuals subject to both § 1226(c) and § 1225(b)(2)(A) to require courts to ignore the express scope of § 1225.

Petitioner’s interpretation would subvert Congress’s intent. Petitioner’s reading would require detention for those who present themselves for inspection at the border in compliance with law but grant bond hearings to noncitizens who enter the United States unlawfully, evade immigration authorities, and remain in the country unlawfully for years until

an encounter with immigration authorities.

This result—rewarding those who enter unlawfully and evade authorities—would undermine one of the express objectives of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Before the passage of IIRIRA, the INA “provided for two types of removal proceedings: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.” *Hose v. I.N.S.*, 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A noncitizen who arrived at a port of entry would be placed in “exclusion proceedings and subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a grant of parole.” *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216, 223 (BIA 2015). In contrast, a noncitizen who physically entered the United States unlawfully would be placed in deportation proceedings. *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). Those in deportation proceedings, unlike those in exclusion proceedings, “were entitled to request release on bond.” *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994)). This meant that noncitizens who entered the United States unlawfully were given “equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that [were] not available to aliens who present[ed] themselves for inspection” at the border, including the right to secure release on bond. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996).

Through IIRIRA, Congress meant to dispense with this regime. *See id.*; *see also Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (explaining that “IIRIRA addressed th[e] anomaly” of noncitizens who had entered without inspection being able to “take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings”). But Petitioner’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(a) would bring it back.

Past practice does not show that Petitioner is subject to § 1226, rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner argues that granting him bond would accord with past practice. He points to an entry in the Federal Register that states that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 48 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997)).

The Federal Register does not support Petitioner’s argument for at least two reasons. First, the entry acknowledges that noncitizens who are present without having been admitted are “applicants for admission.” Thus, the cited language implicitly acknowledges that applicants for admission are not eligible for bond hearings under the statute. Instead, the entry apparently regards noncitizens as eligible for bond hearings as a matter of discretion, not statutory interpretation.

Second, the Federal Register does not change the plain language of the statute. The weight given to agency interpretations must “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.” *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 388 (2024) (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Here, the agency provided no analysis for granting bond hearings to applicants for admission. *See* 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. Its prior practice carries little weight in interpreting the text of § 1225.

II. Petitioner has not shown that he has a due-process right to a bond hearing.

Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to a bond redetermination hearing as a matter of due process. *See* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55-60. This argument should be rejected.

First, Petitioner has not shown prejudice—that he has been denied due process by being denied procedures in his immigration proceedings, where he can challenge the determination that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to him. As he will have that opportunity in his immigration proceedings, he has not shown a violation of his rights to procedural due process. *See Duran-Hernandez v. Ashcroft*, 348 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that where a noncitizen failed to show “that additional procedural safeguards would have changed” the immigration court’s decision, that “failure to prove prejudice leads us to reject [his] due process claim”). “[S]o long as the government reasonably affords noncitizen detainees in ongoing immigration proceedings administrative process to challenge the merits determinations that are keeping them in custody, continued custody is permissible.” *Utoliti v. Ceja*, No. 25-cv-00418-GPG-CYC, 2025 WL 2418598, at *4 (D. Colo. May 29, 2025) (quotation omitted).

Second, Petitioner’s detention has been sufficiently short that it is presumptively constitutional. His period of detention is less than two months as of the date of this submission. In a different immigration context—noncitizens already ordered removed and awaiting their removal—the Supreme Court has explained that detention of less than six months is presumptively constitutional. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). And in other contexts, even this presumptive constitutional limit has been distinguished as unnecessarily restrictive. In *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 527-30 (2003), the Supreme Court explained that noncitizens who were convicted of certain crimes may be detained during the entire course of their removal proceedings. In that case, like this one, Congress mandated detention pending removal proceedings. *See id.* The Court reasoned that the “definite termination point” of the detention at the end of removal proceedings assuaged any constitutional concern. *See id.* at 529.

The same is true here. Petitioner's removal proceedings are moving toward a definite endpoint. *See* Ex. 1 ¶¶ 21-23. Congress's decision to detain him pending removal is a "constitutionally permissible part of [this] process." *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 531. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Fifth Amendment requires any additional process.

III. Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the *Bautista* decision.

Petitioner argues that his rights have been decided in *Bautista v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-1873 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), ECF No. 94. *See* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 61-66; ECF No. 12-3. This Court should not give effect to that decision (which is now on appeal).

First, the *Bautista* court lacked jurisdiction to determine the legality of Petitioner's detention. That court addressed whether class members were unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and such a challenge to the legality of detention can only be brought in habeas. *See Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). Under habeas principles, "jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement." *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). And a habeas petitioner must name his immediate custodian. *Id.* at 435. The *Bautista* court thus lacked jurisdiction to determine the legality of the detention of class members like Petitioner confined outside the Central District of California. That court also lacked jurisdiction to determine a preliminary issue that class members then rely on to seek relief in individual habeas actions. *See Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747-49 (1998) (identifying "the need . . . to prevent federal-court litigants from seeking by declaratory judgment to litigate a single issue in a dispute that must await another lawsuit for complete resolution," concluding that the action for declaratory judgment was "not a justiciable case" because it "would simply carve out one issue in the dispute for separate adjudication"). Other federal courts have determined they

are not bound by the *Bautista* decision. See *Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys*, No. 25-cv-714, 2025 WL 3754411, at *8 (D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2025) (citing *Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-226-H, 2025 WL 3683918, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)).

Second, the pendency of an appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the *Bautista* decision supports not giving that decision force at this time. While the mere “pendency of an appeal does not prevent application of the collateral estoppel doctrine,” *Ruyle v. Cont’l Oil Co.*, 44 F.3d 837, 846 (10th Cir. 1994), applying preclusive force to a judgment that has been appealed can cause difficulty because a judgment that is reversed is “deprived of all conclusive effect,” *United States v. Lacey*, 982 F.2d 410, 412 (10th Cir. 1992). Courts should strive to avoid this result. See 9 A.L.R.2d 984. When a prior judgment has been appealed, the second court may hold the “disposition in abeyance until the pending appeal [is] resolved,” *Ruyle*, 44 F.3d at 846, and “strong reasons must be found to justify proceeding with the second action pending appeal from the first judgment.” C. Wright, 18A Fed. Prac. & Prod. § 4433. Here, if this Court is inclined to grant effect to the *Bautista* decision, it should hold its decision in abeyance pending appeal.

Third, the existence of prior inconsistent judgments weighs against applying issue preclusion. See *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). District courts have interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) differently from the *Bautista* court. See, e.g., *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3199872, at *4-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (citing cases). These varying rulings support not giving the *Bautista* judgment preclusive effect, rather than those favoring the government. See Order, *Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-00226 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 12, at 11 & 28.

Fourth, offensive collateral estoppel is disfavored when applied against the federal

government. See *United States v. Mendoza*, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984) (the federal government’s unique position weighs against “a broad application of collateral estoppel”).

This Court should decline to accord the *Bautista* decision effect as to Petitioner and should instead address the scope of § 1225(b)(2) based on the analysis set forth above.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court should deny the Petition.

Dated: January 5, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on January 5, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following recipients by e-mail:

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