

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO**

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04051

**ALBERT JOSHUA RAMIREZ ANDRADE,**  
Petitioner-Plaintiff

v.

**JUAN BALTAZAR,** Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, Aurora, Colorado, in his official capacity,

**ROBERT HAGAN,** Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity,

**KRISTI NOEM,** Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity,

**TODD LYONS,** Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity,

**PAM BONDI,** Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, in her official capacity,  
Respondents

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**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

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Petitioner-Plaintiff Albert Joshua Ramirez Andrade (“Plaintiff”) moves for a temporary restraining order against Respondents-Defendants (“Defendants”) pursuant to Rule 65 and the All Writs Act. Plaintiff is a civil immigration detainee at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado (“Aurora Facility”). Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights when they rejailed him without notice or an opportunity to be heard and now deny him release on bond under their erroneous, new interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Court should order Plaintiff’s release (or that Defendants provide a bond hearing within seven (7) days). The Court should further enjoin Defendants from transferring Plaintiff outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.

**I. Introduction**

For nearly thirty years noncitizens that entered the country without inspection and who Defendants later detained for removal proceedings were bond eligible. Defendants’ radical change in course violates the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 provides noncitizens “arrested and detained” during removal proceedings “may [be] release[d] on a bond ...” absent certain criminal charges. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c). The Supreme Court explained § 1226 is the “default” detention provision, authorizing the incarceration of people “already in the country,” distinguishing them from “[noncitizens] seeking admission into the country” who “shall” be detained under § 1225. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Defendants now erroneously insist that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs Plaintiff’s detention.

Under Defendants’ new theory, despite ICE jailing Plaintiff in the interior of the United States and ICE’s decision to place him in § 1229a proceedings, Plaintiff is now “seeking admission” to the U.S. and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). This is a sharp contrast to Defendants’ decades-long practice where § 1225 applied only “at the Nation’s borders

and ports of entry.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. It is also wrong. Federal courts overwhelmingly agree.<sup>1</sup> The “tsunami” of federal courts ruling in Plaintiff’s favor, *Roa*, 2025 WL 2732923, at \*1

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<sup>1</sup> *Lepe v. Andrews*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, No. 1:25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Hernandez Lopez v. Hardin*, 1:25-cv-830, (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025); *Roa v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-7802, 2025 WL 2732923, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025); *Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496 (D. N.J. Sept. 26, 2025); *Savane v. Francis*, 1:25-cv-6666-GHW, 2025 WL 2774452 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025); *Luna Quispe v. Crawford*, 1:25-cv-1471, 2025 WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2025); *da Silva v. ICE*, 1:25-cv-00284, 2025 WL 2778083 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2025); *Santiago Helbrum v. Williams*, 4:25-cv-00349, WL (S.D Iowa, Sept. 30, 2025); *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, 0:25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 (D.Min.. Oct. 1, 2025); *Rocha v. Hyde*, 25-cv-12584, 2025 WL 2807692 (D.Mass. Oct. 2, 2025); *Guzman Alfaro v. Wamsley*, 2:25-cv-01706, 2025 WL 2822113 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2025); *Ayala Casun v. Hyde*, 25-cv-427, 2025 WL 2806769 (D.R.I. Oct. 2, 2025); *Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz*, 25-cv-12664-PBS, 2025 WL 2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Elias Escobar v. Hyde*, 25-cv-12620-IT, 2025 WL 28233324 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Echevarria v. Bondi*, 25-cv-03252, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025); *Cordero Pelico v. Kaiser*, 25-cv-07286-EMC, 2025 WL 2822876 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); *Artiga v. Genalo*, 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 5, 2025); *S.D.B.B. v. Johnson*, 1:25-cv-882, 2025 WL 2845170 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, 2:25-cv-01401, 2025 WL 2841574 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Mena Torres v. Wamsley*, C25-5772-TSZ, 2025 WL 2855739 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025); *B.D.V.S. v. Forestal*, 25-cv-01968, 2025 WL 2855743 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2025); *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson et al.*, 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D.Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut*, 1:25-cv-01228, 2025 WL 2879514 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); *Mugliza Castillo v. Lyons*, 25-cv-16219, 2025 WL 2940990 (D. N.J. October 10, 2025); *Alejandro v. Olson*, 1:25-cv-02027, 2025 WL 2896348 (S.D. Ind.); *Singh v. Lyons*, 1:25-cv-01606, 2025 WL 2932635 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2025); *Teyim v. Perry*, 1:25-cv-01615, 2025 WL 2950183 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2025); *Hernandez Hernandez v. Crawford*, 1:25-cv-01565-AJT-WBP, 2025 WL 2940702 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2025); *Menjivar Sanchez v. Wofford*, 2025 WL 2959274 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); *Gonzalez v. Joyce*, 25-cv-8250 (AT), 2025 WL 2961626 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025); *Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem et al.*, 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Polo v. Chestnut et al.*, 1:25-cv-01342 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2959346 (E.D. Ca. Oct.17, 2025); *Chavez v. Director of Detroit Field Office et al.*, 4:25-cv-02061-SL, 2025 WL 2959617 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2025); *HGVU v. Smith et al.*, 25-cv-10931, 2025 WL2962610 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2025) *Da Silva v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-12672-DJC, 2025 WL269163 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025); *Buestan v. Chu*, No. 25-16034 (MEF), 2025 WL2972252 (D. N.J. Oct. 21, 2025); *Maldonado v. Baker*, No. 25-3084-TDC (D. Md. Oct. 21,2025); *Gonzalez Martinez v. Noem*, EP-25-cv- 430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); *Miguel v. Noem*, 25 C 11137, 2025 WL 2976480 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025); *Loa Caballero v. Baltazar et al.*, 25-cv-03120 2025, WL 2977650 (D. Colo Oct. 22, 2025); *Lopez*

(citation omitted), includes the Western District of Washington’s grant of summary judgement to a class of incarcerated noncitizens presenting the same arguments Plaintiff does here. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 3:25-cv-05240, ---F.Supp.3d---, 2025 WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025). It also includes declaratory judgment to a certified class—of which Plaintiff is a member—finding that Defendant’s authority to jail Plaintiff and those similarly situated is pursuant to § 1226(a). *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, -- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at \*9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

Every court in this District to consider the issue agrees that Defendants’ position is illegal. *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar et al.*, 1:25-cv-2720, 2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025); *Moya Pineda v. Baltasar et al.*, 1:25-cv-2966, No. 1:25-cv-2966 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025); *Loa Caballero v. Baltazar et al.*, 25-cv-03120, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025); *Hernandez Vazquez v. Baltasar et al.*, 1:25-cv-3049 (D. Colo. Oct. 23, 2025); *Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar et al.*, 1:25-cv-03094, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025); *Artola Aruaz v. Baltazar, et al.*, 1:25-cv-03260-CNS, 2025 WL 3041840 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025), ECF 16; *Cervantes Arredondo v. Baltazar, et al.*, 1:25-cv-03040-RBJ (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025), ECF 21; *De Domingo Campos v. Baltazar*, 25-cv-3062 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 2025), ECF 33; *Ortiz Rosales v. Baltazar, et al.*, 25-cv-

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*Lopez v. Soto*, 2:25-cv-16303, 2025 WL 2987485 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025); *Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar et al.*, 1:25-cv-03094, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025).

03275-GPG (D. Colo. Nov. 16, 2025), ECF 25; *Espinoza Ruiz v. Baltazar*, 25-cv-03642, 2025 WL 3294762-CNS (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2025), ECF 25.

Adding insult to injury, Defendants released Plaintiff on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 when they first encountered him in 2024. Defendants denied Plaintiff procedural due process when they reincarcerated him almost two years later and now erroneously claim their authority to do so is pursuant to § 1225. Defendants violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights merits release. *Rosado v. Figueroa*, CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025).

## **I. Factual Background**

### **a. Immigration Detention's Legal Framework**

This case concerns two provisions of the INA: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and § 1225(b). The distinction determines whether a noncitizen can be released on bond or is subject to mandatory detention. Noncitizens subject to § 1226(a) face discretionary detention. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). These noncitizens can seek a “custody redetermination,” i.e., a bond hearing, before an immigration judge (“IJ”) to present evidence that they are neither a flight risk nor a danger. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006). By contrast, people detained under § 1225(b) are subject to mandatory detention. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).

These two provisions reflect immigration law's distinction between noncitizens arrested after entering the country (§ 1226) and those arrested while arriving in the country (§ 1225). Prior to 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the statutory authority for custody was 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994), authorizing detention during “deportation” proceedings and release on bond. Those “deportation” proceedings governed the detention of anyone in the United States, regardless of manner of entry. IIRIRA maintained that authority for

detention and release on bond at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *See* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (explaining the new § 1226(a) “restate[d] the current provisions in [then 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)] regarding the authority ... to ... detain, and release on bond...”). The IIRIRA also enacted new mandatory detention (without bond) provisions for people apprehended on arrival at 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303.

In implementing the IIRIRA’s detention authority, the then-INS clarified that people entering the U.S. without inspection and who were not apprehended while “arriving” would continue to be detained under § 1226(a) (formerly § 1252(a)) with access to bond. 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Inadmissible [noncitizens], except for arriving [noncitizens], have available to them bond ... This procedure maintains the status quo”).

**b. Defendant’s New Illegal Mandatory Detention Policy**

Since IIRIRA’s passage, Defendants applied § 1226(a) to people arrested in the interior after entry without inspection. Defendants switched course and now insist that § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires detention of all persons who entered the U.S. without inspection, regardless of where they were arrested or how long they have resided in the country. The change began at the Tacoma Immigration Court where IJs began denying bond to those who entered without inspection. *See Rodriguez-Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. at 1244. Then, on May 22, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued an unpublished decision affirming one Tacoma IJ’s decision denying bond pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A).

After the unpublished BIA decision, in July 2025, DHS “in coordination with the [DOJ]” issued a memo stating, “effective immediately, it is the position of DHS” that anyone who entered without inspection is “subject to detention under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and may not be released from ICE custody ... .” According to DHS, noncitizens are now “ineligible for a [bond] hearing

... and may not be released” during removal proceedings.<sup>2</sup> The BIA published a precedential decision finding the same on September 5, 2025. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). IJs at the Aurora Facility continue to adopt this illegal interpretation of the INA’s detention scheme.

**c. Plaintiff is Ideally Qualified for Bond**

Plaintiff is detained solely because of Defendants’ new policy. ICE first encountered and jailed Plaintiff on March 2, 2024 and placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, charging him as removable under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present without inspection.<sup>3</sup> The next day, ICE released Plaintiff on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, finding that he is neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community.<sup>4</sup> ICE required Plaintiff to physically report to the agency periodically and placed an application on his phone through which it monitored him. For nearly two years, Plaintiff without fail complied with ICE’s requirements and lived in Denver, working to support his U.S. citizen family. He had no criminal legal contact then or at any time in his life. Nevertheless, ICE abruptly changed course jailing Plaintiff without notice, cause, or an opportunity to be heard on November 14, 2025. Indeed, Defendants prohibit Plaintiff from being heard on whether he should be jailed due to its new interpretation of the law.

**II. Legal Standard for Granting Preliminary Relief**

Plaintiff shows he is entitled to preliminary relief as (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff Ex. 1, “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission.”

<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff Ex. 2, Plaintiff’s Notice to Appear.

<sup>4</sup> Plaintiff Ex. 3, Plaintiff’s 2024 Notice of Custody Determination.

favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers*, 321 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2003).

### **III. Legal Argument- The Court Should Order Preliminary Relief**

#### **A. Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on the Merits**

Defendants' policy violates the INA. As the Supreme Court explained, § 1225 is concerned "primarily [with those] seeking entry," i.e., cases "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 & 287. In contrast, § 1226 applies to people who, like Plaintiff, are "already in the country" and are detained "pending the outcome of removal proceedings." *Id.* at 289. The INA's plain text, canons of statutory construction, the statutes' legislative history, the implementing regulations, and decades of agency practice all support this conclusion. The Federal Courts agree. *Supra* n. 1

#### **1. The text of § 1226(a) and canons of statutory construction demonstrate Plaintiff is entitled to a bond hearing.**

Application of § 1226(a) does not turn on whether a person was previously admitted to the country. The plain text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) includes people who entered the United States without inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). Section 1226(a), the INA's "default" detention authority, *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 281, applies to people detained "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed," 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). As the statute provides, this language includes both (1) people like Plaintiff who entered without inspection, were never formally admitted to the country, and thus are charged as "inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and (2) people who were admitted and are charged as "deportable." *See id.* § 1229a(a)(3) (removal proceedings "determine[e] whether a [noncitizen] may be admitted to the [U.S.] or, if the [noncitizen] has been so admitted, removed from the [U.S.]" (emphasis added)).

The statute's structure makes this clear. Subsection 1226(a) provides the right to bond. Subsection 1226(c) then carves out discrete categories of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention due to criminal contacts. *See, e.g., id.* § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). These carve-outs include noncitizens inadmissible for entering without inspection and who meet certain crime-related criteria. *See id.* § 1226(c)(1)(E). Because § 1226(c)'s exception expressly applies to people who entered without inspection, it reinforces the default rule: § 1226(a)'s general detention authority otherwise applies to Plaintiff. *See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010). Recent statutory amendments do the same.

Congress made significant changes to § 1226 in January 2025. *See* Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (LRA). These amendments make people charged under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for entering without inspection or (a)(7) for lacking valid documentation and who have had certain criminal encounters subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). By including such individuals under § 1226(c), Congress reaffirmed that § 1226(a) covers persons charged under § 1182(a)(6)(A) or (a)(7). “[W]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1256-57 (quoting *Shady Grove*, 559 U.S. at 400).

Several canons of interpretation reinforce this understanding. First, is the canon against rendering statutory language superfluous. *See, e.g., Clark v. Rameker*, 573 U.S. 122, 131 (2014) (“a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,” internal citations omitted). Defendants’ position does just that. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, this is so because if “Section 1225 ... and its mandatory detention provisions apply to all noncitizens who have not been admitted, then it would render

superfluous provisions of Section 1226 that apply to certain categories of inadmissible noncitizens.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1258 (citation modified).

Second, “when Congress amends legislation, courts must presume it intends the change to have real and substantial effect.” *Estrada v. Smart*, 107 F.4th 1254, 1268 (10th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). That presumption applies here, given LRA’s amendments to § 1226. *See Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1259 (quoting *Stone v. I.N.S.*, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)). LRA’s amendments explicitly provide that § 1226(a) covers people like Plaintiff. This is because the “specific exceptions [in the LRA] for inadmissible noncitizens who are arrested, charged with, or convicted of the enumerated crimes logically leaves those inadmissible noncitizens not criminally implicated under Section 1226(a)’s default rule for discretionary detention.” *Id.* 1259 (emphasis in original, citation modified). *See also, e.g., Diaz Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238, at \*7 (“if, as the Government argue[s], ... a non-citizen’s inadmissibility were alone already sufficient to mandate detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A), then the 2025 [LRA] amendment would have no effect”).

Finally, “[w]hen Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a longstanding administrative construction,” courts “generally presume[] the new provision should have been understood to work in harmony with what has come before.” *Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi*, 145 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (2025) (citation modified). This canon also supports Plaintiff’s position because “Congress adopted the new amendments to Section 1226(c) against the backdrop of decades of post-IIRIRA agency practice applying discretionary detention under Section 1226(a) to inadmissible noncitizens such as [Plaintiffs].” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d, at 1259.

**2. The statutory structure of § 1225(b)(2), the textual limitations of § 1225(b)(2), and canon against superfluity further demonstrate that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), applies to Plaintiff.**

Section § 1225's structure also supports § 1226(a) applying to Plaintiff. "In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (citations omitted); *see also Biden v. Tex.*, 597 U.S. 785, 799-800 (2022) (interpreting INA).

The Supreme Court has described the structure of § 1226 and § 1225 as distinguishing between the two basic groups of noncitizens. Section 1226(a) applies to those who are "already in the country" and are detained "pending the outcome of removal proceedings." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. By contrast, § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Id.* at 287. The whole purpose of § 1225 is to define how DHS inspects, processes, and detains people at the border. *See id.* at 297 ("[Section] 1225(b) applies primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the [U.S.] ..."). *See also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 157-58, 228-29 (explaining the purpose of § 1225).

Section 1225's text reinforces its limited temporal scope. To begin, § 1225 concerns the "inspection" and "expedited removal of inadmissible arriving [noncitizens]." 8 U.S.C. § 1225. For example, § 1225(b)(1) encompasses only "inspection" of certain "arriving" noncitizens, and only those who are "inadmissible" for having misrepresented information or lacking entry documents.

Section 1225(b)(2) is similarly limited to people applying for admission on arrival, but for whom (b)(1) does not cover. The title explains that it addresses "[i]nspection of other [noncitizens]." The subsection further specifies it applies only to "applicants for admission"

(defined at § 1225(a)(1)) who “seek[] admission.” By stating § 1225(b)(2) applies only to those “seeking admission,” Congress confirmed it did not intend to sweep up those who previously entered and began residing in the United States. A commonsense example clarifies the point:

[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be described as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that person would be described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not describe them as ‘seeking admission’ (or ‘seeking’ ‘lawful entry’) at that point – one would say they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there.

*Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2267803, \*7; *See also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 157-58, 228-29; H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 209. *Diaz Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238, at \*\*6-7 (emphasis in original). “This active construction of the phrase ‘seeking admission’” accords with the plain language in § 1225(b)(2)(A) by requiring that a person be an “applicant for admission” and “also [be] *doing* something” to obtain authorized entry. *Diaz Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238, at \*\*6-7 (emphasis in original); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2267803, at \*7 (this is the “plain, ordinary meaning” of “seeking admission”). The statute’s temporal focus on people “arriving” is evident in other respects too. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) addresses “[t]reatment of [noncitizens] *arriving* from contiguous territory” (emphases added). Section § 1225’s focus is on people entering the U.S.

Defendants reading of § 1225 would also render significant portions of § 1225 meaningless. Several requirements must be met for § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention regime to apply; namely, (1) an “examining immigration officer” (2) must conclude during an “inspection” (3) of an “applicant for admission” (4) who is also “seeking admission” (5) that the person “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Defendants’ interpretation of § 1225 reads out three of those five requirements.

First, it makes superfluous the requirements that the “examining immigration officer” conduct an “inspection.” *Jimenez*, 2025 WL 2639390 at \*7. “[E]xamination is not an unbound concept. Rather, it is the specific legal process one undergoes while trying to enter the country.” *Id.* (citations omitted). The regulations make that plain. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (noting that “scope of examination” occurs while one seeks to “enter the United States” “at a U.S. port-of-entry . . .”). Nor is the inspection requirement untethered to entry to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (“All [noncitizens] who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by immigration officers”) (emphasis added). Defendants’ interpretation renders both the examination officer and inspection requirements superfluous.

Second, it renders superfluous §1225(b)(2)(A)’s requirement that the noncitizen be “seeking admission.” *Jimenez*, 2025 WL 2639390, at \*8. The statute defines admission to mean “the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). “While an applicant for admission has not been ‘admitted’ to the United States, it does not follow that an applicant for admission continues to be actively seeking . . . lawful entry.” *Jimenez*, 2025 WL 2639390, at \*8 (citation omitted). “If as the Government argues, all applicants for admission are deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ for as long as they remain applicants, then the phrase ‘seeking admission’ would add nothing to the provision” in § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Salcedo Aceros*, 2025 WL 2637503, at \*10. Defendants’ position would similarly “read the word ‘entry’ out of the definitions of ‘admitted’ and ‘admission.’” *Chafla*, 2025 WL 2688541, at \*6.

The implementing regulation for § 1225(b) supports Plaintiff’s reading, noting that §1225(b) applies to “any arriving [noncitizen] who appears to the inspection officer to be

inadmissible.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (emphasis added). “The regulation thus contemplates that ‘applicants seeking admission’ are a subset of applicants ‘roughly interchangeable’ with ‘arriving [noncitizens].” *Salcedo Aceros*, 2025 WL 2637503, at \*10 (quoting *Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238, at \*6); *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (defining an arriving noncitizen as an applicant for admission “coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry”).

While Petitioner is not lawfully admitted, he is not actively “seeking admission i.e., seeking lawful entry . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” *Jimenez*, 2025 WL 2639390, \*8. Defendants’ reading of the statute is incorrect.

**3. The legislative history further supports that Plaintiff’s Incarceration is Pursuant to § 1226.**

IIRIRA’s legislative history also supports the conclusion that § 1226(a) applies to Plaintiff. In the IIRIRA, Congress focused on recent arrivals who lacked documents to remain. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 157-58, 228-29. Notably, Congress said nothing about subjecting all people present in the U.S. to mandatory detention.

Before the IIRIRA, people like Plaintiff were not subject to mandatory detention under any theory. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994). Had Congress intended a monumental shift in immigration law, it would have clearly said so. *See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (finding “implausible that Congress would give to the [agency] through these modest words [such] power”). In fact, Congress said the opposite: the new § 1226(a) just “restates the current provisions . . . regarding the authority . . . to arrest, detain, and release on bond a[] [noncitizen].” H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229. “Because noncitizens like [Plaintiff] were entitled to discretionary detention under [§] 1226(a)’s predecessor statute and Congress declared its scope unchanged . . . this background supports [Plaintiff’s] position that he too is subject to discretionary detention.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1260.

**4. Defendants' position to jail Plaintiff pursuant to § 1225 violates its regulations.**

Defendants' view violates EOIR's regulations. Following the IIRIRA, EOIR explained that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted ... will be eligible for bond." 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. In the following decades, the relevant regulations remain unchanged. Compare 63 Fed. Reg. 27441, 27448 (May 19, 1998), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2). The regulation governing IJs' bond jurisdiction still only limits an IJ's bond jurisdiction to noncitizens subject to § certain conditions irrelevant here 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2). Regulatory "guidance and the agency's subsequent years of unchanged practice is persuasive." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1261. "When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power ... [courts] greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism." *Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA*, 574 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).

**5. Defendants' decision to reincarcerate Plaintiff violated Due Process.**

Plaintiff is entitled procedural due process. "It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings." *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). "Even those who face significant constraints on their liberty or those over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty." *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*11; *Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, 791 F.Supp.3d 1021, 1030 (N.D. Ca. Jul. 17, 2025) (citations omitted) (same).

"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty . . . ." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (citation modified). "The fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." *Id.* at 333 (citation modified). The "touchstone" of due process is protecting people against arbitrary government action, whether from "denial of a

fundamental procedural fairness, or the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objection.” *Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 532 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).

Whether government action violates procedural due process is determined by the three-factor balancing test in *Mathews*. 424 U.S. at 335. The test requires the Court to balance (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Id.* A proper application of the test demonstrates ICE’s unlawfulness and the need for this Court to order Plaintiff’s release.

First, the private liberty interest at stake is the most significant liberty interest there is, the interest in being free from imprisonment. *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action.” *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). Incarceration “constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection” no matter the purpose. *Jones v. United States*, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983). “Although ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody they have a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*12 (collecting cases). “When assessing this factor, courts consider the conditions under which detainees are currently held, including whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*13. Courts in this district have repeatedly found that the Aurora Facility “strongly resemble[s] penal confinement”

and that the conditions there “are abhorrent.” *Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, 794 F.Supp.3d 926, 940 (D. Colo. 2025). This factor strongly weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, especially when—as here—Defendants’ decision to jail Plaintiff is pursuant to the wrong statute. *Mendoza Gutierrez*, 2025 WL 2962908, at \*9.

Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is significant because ICE’s decision to re-jail Plaintiff lacked any procedures at all and ICE has not provided him with any process since. *Lopez v. Sessions*, 18 Civ. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 12, 2018) (finding that “re-detention, in the absence of any procedure or evidentiary findings, establishes the risk of erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest”); *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335. That is particularly true where—as here—ICE reincarcerates a noncitizen that it originally released because while “ICE has the authority to re-arrest a noncitizen and revoke their release pending the outcome of removal proceedings[,]” it may “only” do so “when there has been a change in circumstances since the individual’s initial release.” *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at \*12. Here, ICE provided him with no process prior to jailing him again, there has been no change in circumstance meriting his reincarceration, and Defendants now refuse to provide him with process. This factor also weighs in Plaintiff’s.

Third, the Government’s interest is not served by the process it gave Plaintiff because, once again, it gave him no process. The Supreme Court recognized that the government’s interest in civil immigration detention is limited to “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (quotation omitted). Those limited interests are mitigation of flight and danger to the community. *Id.*; *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 515, 527–28 (2018). The non-existent process to jail Plaintiff without notice, without cause, and without a hearing after having released him almost two years ago does not address the government’s purported interests and reeks of

arbitrariness. *Lopez*, 2018 WL 2932726 at \*12. This is especially true where—as here—the noncitizen “was released pursuant to a process that involved a determination that he was neither a danger to himself or others and” then re-detained “without prior notice, a showing of changed circumstances, or any meaningful opportunity to respond . . . .” *Id.*; *See Saravia v. Sessions*, 280 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk). This factor therefore also weighs in his favor.

Under the circumstances, courts repeatedly find that ICE’s failure to provide noncitizens with notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to reincarceration violates procedural due process. *E.g.*, *Cruz Valera v. Baltazar*, 1:25-cv-03744-CNS, 2025 WL 3496174, at \*3–4 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 2025); *Cifuentes Rivera v. Arnott*, et al., 4:25-cv-00570-RK (W.D.Mo Oct. 7, 2025);<sup>5</sup> *Grigorian v. Bondi*, 25-cv-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at \*6–10 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 9, 2025); *K.E.O. v. Woosley*, No. 4:25-cv-74-RGJ, 2025 WL 2553394, at \*3 (W.D.Ky. Sept. 4, 2025); *Zhu v. Genalo*, 1:25-cv-06523 (JLR), 2025 WL 2452352, at \*5–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); *Roble v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3196 (LMP/LIB), 2025 WL 2443453, at \*5 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F.Supp.3d 137, 163–64 (W.D.N.Y. 2025). This Court should do the same.

#### **B. Petitioner Faces Imminent, Irreparable Harm**

Defendants unlawfully incarcerate Plaintiff in jail-like conditions, causing harm that is immediate, ongoing, and cannot be remedied later. *Mendoza Gutierrez*, 2025 WL 2962908, at \*9 (finding that the Plaintiff there “and other noncitizens like him” suffer irreparable harm because they are “being unlawfully detained without bond”). “The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it

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<sup>5</sup> Plaintiff Ex. 4.

enforces idleness.” *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972). Each day Plaintiff remains detained, he suffers not only the deprivation of his liberty but also disruption to his family, employment, and well-being—harms that cannot be undone. “It is hard to adequately state the significance of the potential injury” to a person who is illegally incarcerated, as one cannot “be given back” any day “he has spent in prison.” *Case v. Hatch*, No. 08-CV-00542 MV/WDS, 2011 WL 13285731, \*5 (D. N.M. May 2, 2011). Courts recognize that detention causes “potentially irreparable harm every day [one] remains in custody.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1262. This injury is “certain, great, actual, and not theoretical.” *Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, Utah*, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Courts routinely grant preliminary relief based on far less weighty interests, including the payment of taxes, control over real property, or termination of business agreements. *Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway*, 279 U.S. 813 (1929); *RoDa Drilling v. Siegal*, 552 F.3d 1203, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2009); *Bray v. QFA Royalties, LLC*, 486 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D. Colo. 2007).

### **C. Balancing the Equities and Public Interest Weigh Heavily in Favor of Relief**

In cases against the government, the balance of equities and the public interest typically merge. *See Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009). The government cannot claim injury from enjoining their unlawful conduct. *See Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013); *Wages & White Lion, Inv., L.L.C. v. FDA*, 16 F.4th 1130, 1143 (5th Cir. 2021); *L.G. v. Choate*, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1182 (D. Colo. 2024) (“There is generally no public interest in ... unlawful agency action”). Here, requiring the government to comply with the law and return to its prior bond-and-detention practices causes no cognizable harm. Courts have consistently recognized that “[t]he harm to the government is minimal” when an injunction prevents unlawful detention. *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1262. By contrast, continued enforcement of the automatic

stay regulation causes significant, irreparable harm to Plaintiff. Thus, both the equities and the public interest strongly favor preliminary relief.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Accordingly, the Court should grant a temporary restraining order (or preliminary injunction) requiring either Plaintiff's release from custody, or that Defendants provide a bond hearing within 7 days. The Court should further enjoin the Defendants from transferring Plaintiff outside the District of Colorado.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Conor T. Gleason

Conor T. Gleason

Hans Meyer

Mary Jo Highland

The Meyer Law Office

1547 Gaylord St.

Denver, CO 80206

(303) 831 0817

conor@themeyerlawoffice.com

hans@themeyerlawoffice.com

maryjo@themeyerlawoffice.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER

**CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL**

I hereby certify, consistent with D. Colo. Local Rule 7.1, that I conferred via email with counsel for Defendants-Respondents, Kevin Traskos of the US Attorney's Office for the District of Colorado regarding the relief requested herein. Defendants-Respondents have yet to provide their position.

/s/ Mary Jo Highland  
Meyer Law Office, P.C.  
1547 Gaylord St.  
Denver, CO 80206  
T: (303) 831 0817  
maryjo@themeyerlawoffice.com  
*Attorney for Plaintiff-Petitioner*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Conor T. Gleason, hereby certify that on December 17, 2025 I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. I, Lourdes Cervantes, hereby certify that I will mail a hard copy of the document and accompanying exhibits to the individuals identified below pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 via certified mail within 72 hours of filing or pursuant to any forthcoming Court order requiring something else. Attorney for Respondent, Kevin Traskos, confirmed that he will accept service on behalf of all Defendants-Respondents.

Kevin Traskos  
Chief, Civil Division  
U.S. Attorney's Office  
District of Colorado  
1801 California Street, Ste. 1600  
Denver, CO 80202

Pam Bondi

Attorney General of the United States  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

And to: Kristi Noem and Todd Lyons, DHS/ICE, c/o:

Office of the General Counsel  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave., SE  
Washington, D.C. 20528

And to:

Juan Baltazar  
GEO Group, Inc.  
3130 N. Oakland Street  
Aurora, CO 80010

And to:

Robert Hagan  
Denver ICE Field Office  
12445 E. Caley Ave.  
Centennial, CO 80111

/s/ Conor T. Gleason  
Conor T. Gleason  
Meyer Law Office, P.C.  
1547 Gaylord St.  
Denver, CO 80206  
T: (303) 831 0817  
conor@themeyerlawoffice.com

/s/ Lourdes Cervantes  
Paralegal  
Meyer Law Office  
1547 Gaylord St.  
Denver, CO 80206  
Phone: 303.831.0817  
lourdes@themeyerlawoffice.com