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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
11 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

12 FRANCISCO JAVIER QUIROZ
13 FIGUEROA,

14 Petitioner,

15 v.

16 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, *et al.*,

17 Respondents.
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Case No.: 3:25-cv-3623-AGS-DEB

RESPONSE TO PETITION

I.

EFFECT OF FINAL JUDGMENT IN BAUTISTA

On July 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) instituted a notice titled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission” (the “Notice”) requiring, in general, that anyone arrested in the United States and charged with being inadmissible to be considered an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

In *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025), the district court declared the Notice unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act but did not issue a final judgment. On December 18, 2025, however, the *Bautista* court entered final judgement. *Bautista*, ECF No. 94. Accordingly, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Respondents reserve the right to supplement this response in the event of a stay of enforcement of the *Bautista* final judgment, appellate relief, or a change in DHS policy.

II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS FAIL

To the extent Petitioner asserts claims under the Fourth Amendment, he fails to explain why release is the remedy for such alleged violations. *United States v. Crews*, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (noting, in the criminal context, that Fourth Amendment’s “exclusionary principle” “delimits what proof the Government may offer against the accused at trial, closing the courtroom door to evidence secured by official lawlessness,” but an individual “is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit’”); *Cruz v. Barr*, 926 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (releasing petitioner on Fourth Amendment grounds because fruits of the regulatory violation were the only evidence of petitioner’s alienage).

1 Moreover, Fourth Amendment claims related to alienage “belong in front of an
2 Immigration Judge, not a federal district court.” *See Marvan v. Slaughter*, No. CV 25-49-
3 H-DLC, 2025 WL 1940043, at *3 (D. Mont. July 15, 2025) (denying habeas petition
4 challenging detention based on Fourth Amendment violations for lack of subject matter
5 jurisdiction). Petitioner cannot simply “bypass the immigration courts and proceed
6 directly to district court. Instead, [he] must exhaust the administrative process before [he]
7 can access the federal courts.” *Id.* at *4 (quoting *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1029). To the extent
8 Petitioner desires to bring such claims, this district court does not have jurisdiction. Under
9 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from
10 any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under
11 this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”
12 Further, judicial review of a final order is available only through “a petition for review filed
13 with an appropriate court of appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).

14 DATED: December 19, 2025

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16 s/ Glen F. Dorgan
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