

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION**

Gloria Carranza Orellana,

Petitioner,

Case No. 25-6075

v.

BRET BRADFORD, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Houston Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; RANDY TATE, Warden of Montgomery Processing Center,

Respondents.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Gloria Carranza Orellana is in physical custody of Respondents at the Montgomery Processing Center in Conroe, Texas. *See* Exhibit 1, Printout from ICE Online Detainee Locator System showing Petitioner’s current detention. She now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have concluded Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

2. In the Notice to Appear, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) alleges that Petitioner is inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for alleged entry into the United States without being admitted or paroled, and under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for alleged lack of valid entry documents at the time of application for admission. *See* Exhibit 2, Notice to Appear.

3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS denied Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the United States without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner's detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

6. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs, and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

7. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

8. Petitioner Gloria Carranza Orellana is a member of the Bond Eligible class as she:
a) does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Montgomery Processing Center in Conroe, Texas. Immigration authorities apprehended her on August 28, 2025;
b) entered the United States without inspection 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival;
and c) is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

9. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

10. Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

11. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

12. Respondents are also bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

13. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

14. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day, Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

15. Alternatively, the Court should order that, at a minimum, Petitioner be provided with a prompt custody redetermination to provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

16. Upon granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus, this Court should enjoin ICE and/or Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner based on the same underlying allegations, absent a material change of circumstances and express leave of this Court. The Court should order that the only legal permissible remedy is renewed, immediate release. *See Lopez-Tipaz v. Noem et al*, 4:25-cv-04905 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025), *Granados V Noem et al*, 5:25-cv-01464 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025), *Ramos de Lara v. Noem et al.*, 5:25-cv-01459 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025). ICE cannot nullify or evade the Court's habeas judgment through a release-and-re-detain tactic. Such conduct is barred under long-established principles of habeas corpus, due process, and the voluntary cessation doctrine.

JURISDICTION

17. Petitioner is in physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Montgomery processing Center in Conroe, Texas. *See* Exhibit 1, Printout from ICE Online Detainee Locator System showing Petitioner's current detention.

18. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

19. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

20. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

21. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States. At least one Respondent is in this District, Petitioner is Detained in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this action took place in this District. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 because the immediate custodians of Petitioner reside in this District.

22. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ISSUANCE, RETURN, HEARING, AND DECISION

23. The Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus “forthwith”, as the legal issues have already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*.

24. The Court must also grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

25. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

26. Petitioner Gloria Carranza Orellana is alleged to be a citizen of Honduras who has been in immigration detention since August 28, 2025. *See* Exhibit 2, Notice to Appear. After arresting Petitioner in Montgomery County, ICE did not set bond and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

27. Respondent Bret Bradford is the Director of the Houston Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Bret Bradford is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

28. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

29. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

30. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

31. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

32. Respondent Randy Tate is the Warden of the Montgomery Processing Center in Conroe, Texas, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner and resides in the judicial district of the United States Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. He is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

33. “In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

34. This fundamental principle of our free society is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which specifically forbids the Government to “deprive[]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” *U.S. Const. amend. V*.

35. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law”).

36. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally

entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

39. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

40. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

41. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119–1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

42. The Laken Riley Act confirms Congress preserved § 236(a)’s discretionary bond regime for most inadmissible entrants arrested in the interior by adding a narrow new mandatory detention category under § 236(c)(1)(E) (pairing inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) with specified crimes). If § 235(b) already mandated detention for all inadmissible entrants, § 236(c)(1)(E) would be redundant—an outcome courts must avoid. *See Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); *Van Buren v. United States*, 593 U.S. 374, 393 (2021). Congress legislated against decades of agency practice applying § 236(a) to interior arrests, and courts presume amendments harmonize with that practice. *Monsalvo v. Bondi*, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (2025).

43. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

44. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

45. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

46. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

47. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted the same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>

without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

48. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

49. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. The U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

50. Subsequently, Federal Courts, including this Court, addressing DHS's new theory have rejected it and ordered relief, concluding § 1226(a) or INA § 236(a) governs noncitizens "already in the country". Court after court adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-3726, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Nov.06, 2025); *Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-00112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mejia Juarez v. Bondi*, No. 4:25cv-3937 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27,2025); *Cruz Gutierrez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-cv-04965, 2025 WL 3187521 (S.D. Tex. Nov.14, 2025); *Cardenas Perez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-181, 2025 (S.D. Tex. Nov.20, 2025); *Hernandez Hervert v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01763-RP, 2025 (W.D. Tex Nov. 14, 2025); *Lopez Baltazar v. Vasquez*, No. 5:25-cv-00160 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2025.); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025);

Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

51. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

52. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

53. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* *Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

54. Statutes must be read “with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” giving effect to every clause and word. *Gundy v. United States*, 588 U.S. 128, 141 (2019) (quotation omitted); *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc.*, 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023). DHS’s view collapses §§ 235 and 236, nullifies § 236(c)(1)(E), and contradicts the INA’s structure.

55. Even under DHS’s classification, constitutional avoidance and due process require meaningful review of whether mandatory detention actually applies (a Joseph-type inquiry), and courts must preserve habeas for unlawful detention. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303; *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 380– 82 (2005); *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001).

56. The equities here underscore the *Mathews v. Eldridge* balance: (1) Petitioner's profound liberty and family interests; (2) the high risk of erroneous deprivation from DHS's categorical no-bond stance (and the value of individualized hearings); and (3) minimal governmental burden to provide the longstanding process Congress preserved. See 424 U.S. 319, 333, 335 (1976).

57. Petitioner Gloria Carranza Orellana is a member of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) She faces unlawful detention because DHS and the EOIR have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

58. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

59. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

60. Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible class because she: a) does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Montgomery Processing Center

in Conroe, Texas. Immigration authorities apprehended her on August 28, 2025; b) entered the United States without inspection about 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival; and c) is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

61. Section 1226, therefore, leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

62. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

63. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner because she was arrested in the interior. To put it another way, Petitioner had already entered and was residing in the United States at the time she was apprehended. DHS's attempt to shoehorn her into INA § 235(b)(2) is contrary to the statutory text, structure, and constitutional principles. She is entitled to release or, at minimum, a prompt bond hearing before an IJ applying the correct legal standard.

64. When a Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted, and Petitioner is released, if ICE and/or Respondent's re-detain Petitioner, then the only legal permissible remedy is renewed, immediate release. *See Lopez-Tipaz v. Noem et al*, 4:25-cv-04905 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025), *Granados V Noem et al*, 5:25-cv-01464 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025), *Ramos de Lara v. Noem et al.*, 5:25-cv-

01459 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025). ICE cannot nullify or evade the Court’s habeas judgment through a release-and-re-detain tactic. Such conduct is barred under long-established principles of habeas corpus, due process, and the voluntary cessation doctrine.

EXHAUSTION

65. “Of ‘paramount importance’ to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992); *Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith*, 676 F.2d 1023, 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (“the exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court”). Here, Congress has not specifically mandated exhaustion before judicial review of custody determinations. Because exhaustion is not required by statute, sound judicial discretion must govern this Court’s decision. There is an abundant body of law that supports this Court’s jurisdiction over this case absent exhaustion.

66. First, exhaustion does not apply whereas here, a petition challenges only the agency action collateral to removal proceedings, such as bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) applies only to challenges to a “final order of removal.” Therefore, when a noncitizen files a habeas petition challenging detention, bond, custody, or other collateral issues, the exhaustion requirement does not apply. The Fifth Circuit held that a challenge to immigration bond proceedings is not a challenge to a final order of removal, and therefore §1252(d)(1) does not require exhaustion. *See Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales*, 496 F.3d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the petition does not challenge a final order of removal and only seeks review of an IJ bond determination, the Court retains jurisdiction without any statutory exhaustion barrier.

67. Second, exhaustion is not required where the petitioner challenges the legality of the detention itself, a matter the agency lacks authority to remedy. *Roy v. Ashcroft*, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, the IJ's exercise of authority is clearly at odds - to deny Petitioner release on bond on the ground that the IJ has no jurisdiction or statutory authority pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, nor statutory authority to impose conditions other than monetary conditions directly contravenes the specific language of INA § 236(a) codified in 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which confers the IJ such authority.

68. Third, the court should find that any administrative exhaustion would be futile. BIA decisions are binding on immigration judges, and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* thus precludes an IJ from finding jurisdiction over noncitizens, like Petitioner, to hold a custody redetermination hearing. Therefore, judicial intervention enjoining Respondents from preventing Petitioner from having a bond hearing pursuant to the holding in *Yajure Hurtado* is necessary to enable Petitioner to avail himself of his administrative remedies. Even if the IJ holds a custody redetermination hearing and determines that he lacks jurisdiction pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* a remedy of an appeal taken to the BIA from the determination would also be futile pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*.

69. Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile in this case because the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues raised here. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976) (A constitutional challenge to administrative action does not require exhaustion.); *Ramirez Osorio v. INS*, 745 F.2d 937, 939 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that "exhaustion is not required when administrative remedies are inadequate").


FACTS

70. Petitioner, Gloria Carranza Orellana, is a 47-year-old native and citizen of Honduras who has continuously resided in the United States since at least 2005. She resides in Conroe, Texas, where she has established deep family, community, and economic ties. *See* Exhibit 3, Petitioner’s Declaration.

71. Petitioner is currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Montgomery Processing Center in Conroe, Texas, where she remains in the physical custody of the Respondent. *See* Exhibit 1, ICE Detainee Locator Printout.

72. Petitioner is the mother of four children, including two United States citizen daughters: Michelle Abraham, age 18, and Brittany Carranza, age 9. Petitioner has been the primary caregiver and source of emotional and financial support for her children throughout their lives. *See* Exhibit 4, Birth Certificates of Petitioner’s U.S. citizen children.

73. Petitioner has resided peacefully in the United States for about seventeen years and has no criminal history. *See* Exhibit 5, Criminal Background Search. She maintains strong family ties and has consistently supported her household without reliance on public assistance. *See* Exhibit 3, Petitioner’s Declaration.

74. Petitioner has been married to a United States citizen, Miguel Abraham Sanchez, since 2013. *See* Exhibit 6, Marriage Certificate, *see also* Exhibit 7, Spouse’s U.S. Passport. Throughout the marriage, Petitioner has been the victim of prolonged domestic violence, including verbal, emotional, and financial abuse. *See* Exhibit 3, Petitioner’s Declaration. 


. *Id.*

75. On or about August 28, 2025, Petitioner was apprehended by ICE while riding as a passenger in a vehicle. The driver of the vehicle allegedly had an outstanding removal order. Petitioner was not driving, was not the subject of any criminal investigation, and had committed no offense at the time of her apprehension. *See* Exhibit 2, Notice to Appear.

76. Following her apprehension, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Conroe Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and charged her as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), alleging entry without inspection, and under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for alleged lack of valid entry documents at the time of application for admission.

77. Petitioner has been continuously detained since on or about August 28, 2025. Her removal proceedings remain pending, and no merits hearing has been completed.

78. As a result of ICE’s continued detention and the Immigration Judge’s denial of custody jurisdiction, Petitioner faces prolonged civil immigration detention with no meaningful opportunity to obtain release or individualized custody review.

79. Petitioner’s continued detention has caused severe and ongoing harm, including prolonged separation from her minor U.S. citizen children, emotional and psychological distress, and substantial interference with her ability to assist counsel in preparing her defense in removal proceedings.

80. Petitioner presents no danger to the community and poses no risk of flight. She has a longstanding residence in the United States, strong family ties, and no criminal history. On information and belief, Petitioner is eligible for relief from removal, including cancellation of removal, Cancellation of removal for battered spouses under the Violence Against Women Act

(“VAWA”), pursuant to INA § 240A(b)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), and her continued detention serves no legitimate governmental purpose.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

81. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

82. Petitioner was detained pursuant to “authority contained in section 236” of the INA; section 236 is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Despite this, DHS finds that she is detained subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and the IJ lacks jurisdiction under *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* on the same basis.

83. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a) and are eligible for release on bond, unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

84. Respondents have wrongfully adopted a policy and practice of arguing all noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

85. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

86. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

87. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

88. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

89. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

90. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that she is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

COUNT II
VIOLATION OF THE BOND REGULATIONS

91. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

92. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were

eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

93. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individual like Petitioner.

94. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates her continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
**VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION**

95. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

96. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Here, there is no question that the government has deprived Petitioner of her liberty.

97. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

98. The government’s detention of Mrs. Gloria Carranza Orellana without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether she is a flight risk or danger to others violates her right to due process.

99. Respondents have deprived Mrs. Gloria Carranza Orellana of her liberty interest, protected by the Fifth Amendment, by detaining her since August 28, 2025.

100. Petitioner's detention is improper because she shouldn't be detained at all, and the government is depriving her of a bond hearing. A hearing is, if anything, a right to be heard, and

here the immigration judge is unable to consider whether she is even eligible for a bond, despite the law or entertaining counsel's arguments. Like the accused in criminal cases, habeas is proper. *See Moore v. Dempsey*, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); *Johnson v. Zerbst*, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); *Burns v. Wilson*, 346 U.S. 137, 154 (1953).

101. Respondents' actions in detaining Petitioner without any legal justification violate the Fifth Amendment.

102. The government's detention of Petitioner is unjustified. Respondents have not demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (finding immigration detention must further the twin goals of (1) ensuring the noncitizen's appearance during removal proceedings and (2) preventing danger to the community). There is no credible argument that Petitioner cannot be safely released back to his community and family.

103. For these reasons, Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT IV
**FIFTH AMENDMENT – DUE PROCESS DENIAL OF OPPORTUNITY TO
CONTEST MIS-INCLUSION IN MANDATORY CATEGORY OF DETENTION**

104. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

105. Petitioner has a vested liberty interest in preventing her removal because she is eligible for VAWA Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA § 240A(b)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) and is entitled to pursue that relief outside of detention by showing he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a).

106. For all of the above reasons, Respondents' attempts to detain Petitioner without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violate her Procedural Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Respondents' actions have caused Petitioner harm that warrants immediate relief

COUNT V
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

107. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

108. Respondents' continued efforts to deny her bond violate the INA, Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the U.S. Constitution.

109. As set forth in the previous Counts, federal regulations and case law provide the procedure for a Respondent in removal proceedings like her to seek a bond redetermination by an IJ.

110. In being denied the opportunity to return to her family and pursue VAWA Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA § 240A(b)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). in a non-detained court setting where she is free to gather the necessary evidence, Petitioner would be deprived of the right to freedom to lawfully pursue her rights in this civil matter. The Government's "no-review" provisions are a violation of his procedural and substantive due process and without any statutory authority. There is no time-frame or procedure for requesting DHS to itself review its custody decision, and removal proceedings in this case will proceed during that time while Petitioner remains in custody.

111. The actions by Respondents would improperly alter the substantive rules concerning mandatory custody status without the required notice-and-comment period and would be in violation of the INA and its regulations. These actions by Respondents violate the APA. Under the APA, this Court may hold unlawful and set aside an agency action which is "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). The regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(h)(1)(B) and 1003.19(h)(2)(B) providing no review of DHS custody decision for arriving aliens in removal proceedings are in violation of substantive and procedural due

process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is ultra vires because it exceeds the authority granted to ICE by Congress at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For these reasons, this Honorable Court should hold that Petitioner is detained under § 236(a), not § 235(b), and order his immediate release or, in the alternative, direct the Immigration Court to conduct a custody redetermination hearing under § 236(a) in which Petitioner has a meaningful opportunity to show that he is not a danger or flight risk. Any contrary reliance on *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* would unlawfully misapply the statute and deprive Petitioner of his rights under the INA, the APA, and the Due Process Clause.

COUNT VI
STAY OF REMOVAL CLAIM

112. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

113. A denial of a bond hearing, followed by the removal of Petitioner from the United States, would cause her irreversible harm and injury because she is mis-classified by the Government as subject to mandatory detention.

114. The Court should grant the stay of Petitioner's removal to protect her statutory rights under the INA and the APA. In attempting to assert her rights, the Government has railroaded her and deprived her of freedom and liberty to contest her removal while free on bond, or at the very least, of his ability to prove she is not subject to mandatory detention and that he merits release on bond.

COUNT VII
SUSPENSION CLAUS CLAIM

115. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

116. If 8 U.S.C. § 1252 stripped the Court's jurisdiction from this matter, it would be unconstitutional as applied because it would deny Petitioner the opportunity for meaningful review of the unlawfulness of her detention and removal.

117. To invoke the Suspension Clause, a petitioner must satisfy a three-factor test: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008). Petitioner satisfies these three requirements and may invoke the Suspension Clause.

118. First, although Petitioner is not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, she has resided continuously in the United States for more than seventeen years and is prima facie eligible for VAWA Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA § 240A(b)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). Petitioner has been physically present in the United States for well over three years prior to the service of the Notice to Appear and has maintained good moral character during the requisite statutory period. She has not been convicted of any disqualifying offense that would bar eligibility for relief. Petitioner is a victim of battery and extreme cruelty by her U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, and her removal would result in extreme hardship to herself and to her U.S. citizen children. These factors establish Petitioner’s substantial equities and significant legal ties to the United States.

119. Petitioner satisfies the second factor because she was apprehended by DHS and remains detained in the United States.

120. Finally, there are no serious, practical obstacles to resolving this present matter

121. This Court is equipped to decide whether Petitioner is entitled to the writ.

122. There is no adequate alternative to a habeas petition. The immigration court's refusal to grant Petitioner the right to show that she is misclassified and not subject to mandatory detention, without proper notice or due process, deprives her of her constitutional rights. The BIA cannot adequately and expeditiously review these issues.

COUNT VIII
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

123. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

124. This Court has the discretion to enter a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. *See Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson*, 872 F.2d 1555, 1561-1562 (11th Cir.1989). “To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the applicants must show (1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) their substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” *Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey*, 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012). All four elements must be demonstrated to obtain injunctive relief. *Id.*

125. Respondents’ actions have caused Petitioner harm that warrants immediate relief.

RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin ICE from transferring Petitioner outside the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, while this matter is pending;

- c. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that, within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;
- d. Alternatively, grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner on his own recognizance, parole, or reasonable conditions of supervision or, in the alternative, to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- e. Alternatively, issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- f. Declare that ICE's August 28, 2025, apprehension and detention of Petitioner was an unlawful exercise of authority because the ICE officer provided no reason that she presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk;
- g. Order Respondents to file with the Court a complete copy of the administrative file from the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security;
- h. Enjoin ICE and/or Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner based on the same underlying allegations, absent a material change of circumstances and express leave of this court. In this case, this court should order that the only legal permissible remedy is renewed, immediate release.
- i. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- j. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

PRAYER FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, Petitioner respectfully requests expedited consideration. Each day of unlawful detention inflicts

irreparable harm on Petitioner and her U.S. citizen children, depriving them of their mother's care, stability, and support. Prompt judicial intervention is necessary to protect Petitioner's constitutional rights and her family's well-being.

DATED 16th of December 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez
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State Bar # 24069495
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(281) 296-3741
Counsel for Petitioner

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Gloria Carranza Orellana, and submit this verification on his behalf.

I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 16th day of December 2025.

/s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez

Counsel for Petitioner

xavier@xavierlawfirm.com

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25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120

The Woodlands, TX 77380

(281) 296-3741(281) 296-3741

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 15, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and all accompanying exhibits to be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the following:

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas
USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov
Attn: Civil Process Clerk
1000 Louisiana St., Suite 2300,
Houston, TX 77002.

Warden, Montgomery Processing Center
Randy Tate
806 Hilbig Rd.
Conroe, Texas 77301

Service on the United States Attorney constitutes service on all named federal Respondents in this matter, and service has also been made directly on the Warden as Petitioner's immediate custodian.

Dated this 16th day of December 2025.

/s/ Xavier Vicente Chavez
Counsel for Petitioner
xavier@xavierlawfirm.com
Xavier Law Firm
25775 Oak Ridge Dr. Suite 120
The Woodlands, TX 77380
(281) 296-3741(281) 296-3741

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION**

Gloria Carranza Orellana,

Petitioner,

Case No. 25-6075

v.

BRET BRADFORD, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Houston Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; RANDY TATE, Warden of Montgomery Processing Center,

Respondents.

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