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10 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 11 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

12 Gustavo Sandoval Cirne,  
 13 Petitioner,  
 14 v.  
 15 Kristi Noem, *et al.*,  
 16 Respondents.

No. CV-25-04659-PHX-MTL (MTM)  
**RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW  
 CAUSE**

17  
 18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 Respondents, by and through counsel, respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause  
 20 (Doc. 4), and hence to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner Gustavo  
 21 Sandoval Cirne is a national of Mexico who allegedly entered the United States without  
 22 inspection. *See* Petition at ¶¶ 10, 19. The Court should dismiss the Petition or stay this  
 23 action for three reasons. First, Petitioner is a member of a certified non-opt-out class in  
 24 *Bautista* pursuing the same relief he requests here, so his Petition should be dismissed.  
 25 Second, the Court in *Bautista* has not yet ordered any class-wide relief. Finally,  
 26 Respondents preserve and maintain their legal position that Petitioner is subject to  
 27 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

28 ///

1           **II.     STATUTORY FRAMEWORK**

2           **A.     Petitioner’s claim is already being litigated in the *Bautista* class action.**

3           Petitioner is currently held in immigration custody without bond pursuant to  
4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). In this action, Petitioner asks this court to declare that Section  
5 1225(b)(2) does not apply to him and to grant him either release from custody or a bond  
6 hearing. *See* Petition at 36. However, because that claim is already being adjudicated in the  
7 nationwide *Bautista* class action, this Court should decline to consider it. *See Bautista v.*  
8 *Santacruz*, 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.); *see also Clinton v. Jones*, 520 U.S. 681,  
9 706 (1997) (noting that a district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an  
10 incident to its power to control its own docket). As part of district courts’ discretion to  
11 administer their dockets, courts have dismissed, without prejudice, suits brought by  
12 individuals whose claims are duplicative of class claims in other litigation. *See, e.g., Griffin*  
13 *v. Gomez*, 139 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 1998) (in habeas case, discussing prior stay of Fifth  
14 Amendment challenge pending completion of pending class action); *Herrera v. Birkholz*,  
15 No. 22-cv-07784-RSWL-JDE, 2022 WL 18396018, at \*4-6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2022),  
16 *report and recommendation adopted*, 2023 WL 319917 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2023)  
17 (dismissing habeas case brought by federal prisoner related to COVID-19 measures  
18 reasoning that petitioner’s claims were based, in part, on a duplicative class action and were  
19 “not properly before the court.”).

20           Multiple courts of appeals have upheld dismissals of cases where parallel class  
21 actions raise the same or substantially similar issues. *See, e.g., Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d  
22 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a district court may dismiss “those portions of  
23 [the] complaint which duplicate the [class action’s] allegations and prayer for relief”);  
24 *McNeil v. Guthrie*, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that individual suits  
25 for injunctive and declaratory relief cannot be brought where a class action with the same  
26 claims exists); *Gillespie v. Crawford*, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (once a class  
27 action has been certified, “[s]eparate individual suits may not be maintained for equitable  
28 relief”); *Goff v. Menke*, 672 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1982) (“If a class member cannot

1 relitigate issues raised in a class action after it has been resolved, a class member should  
2 not be able to prosecute a separate equitable action once his or her class has been  
3 certified”).

4 Petitioner’s claim seeking to invalidate the Board of Immigration Appeals’  
5 interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) substantially overlaps with the *Bautista* nationwide  
6 class action. Indeed, on November 25, 2025, the court in *Bautista* certified, pursuant to  
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), a class of individuals defined as follows:

8  
9 All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have  
10 entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or  
11 will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject  
12 to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the  
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.

13 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (Doc. 82) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)  
14 (“Class Certification Ruling”). Petitioner is a member of the class because he entered the  
15 United States without inspection, *see* Petition, Exhibit 5, he was not apprehended on  
16 arrival, *see* Petition at ¶ 20, and he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).  
17 *See id.* at ¶ 46.

18 Because the *Bautista* class was certified pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(2), *see Bautista*,  
19 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (Doc. 82), at 14, membership in the class is mandatory with no  
20 opportunity to opt out. *See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 361-62 (2011)  
21 (stating that Rule 23 “provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out,  
22 and does not even oblige the [d]istrict [c]ourt to afford them notice of the action”);  
23 *Sanderson v. Whoop, Inc.*, No. 3:23-CV-05477-CRB, 2025 WL 744036, at \*15 (N.D. Cal.  
24 Mar. 7, 2025) (noting that “23(b)(2) class members have no opportunity to opt out”).  
25 Members of FRCP 23(b)(2) classes may not bring individual suits over the same issues  
26 covered by the class action. *See Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 1979); *see also*  
27 *Gillespie v. Crawford*, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988); *McNeil v. Guthrie*, 945 F.2d  
28 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); *Stewart v. Asuncion*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162036 at \*5–6

1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (collecting cases). “Individual members of the class . . . may  
2 assert any equitable or declaratory claims they have, but they must do so by urging further  
3 action through the class representative and attorney, including contempt proceedings, or  
4 by intervention in the class action.” *Gillespie*, 858 F.2d at 1165.

5 The *Bautista* court granted partial summary judgment to the named plaintiffs,  
6 *Bautista*, 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (Doc. 81) (“Partial MSJ Ruling”), but the court did not  
7 order any relief at that time. The case remains pending. As a member of the certified class,  
8 Petitioner is entitled to and bound by any relief that the *Bautista* court ultimately grants,  
9 including any applicable injunctive relief. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss his  
10 claims seeking release or a bond hearing because they are subsumed within the issues being  
11 litigated in *Bautista*. To do otherwise would undermine what Rule 23 was intended to  
12 ensure: consistency of treatment for similarly situated individuals. *See Howard v. Aetna*  
13 *Life Ins. Co.*, No. CV2201505CJCMRWX, 2024 WL 1098789, at \*11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27,  
14 2024). It would also open the floodgates of parallel litigation in district courts all over the  
15 country, which could ultimately threaten the certification of the underlying class by  
16 creating differences among the class members. The proper way for Petitioner to request  
17 relief for his claim is “by urging further action through the class representative and  
18 attorney, including contempt proceedings, or by intervention in the class action,” which he  
19 is perfectly free to do. *Gillespie*, 858 F.2d at 1165.

20 **B. The Petition should be dismissed or stayed pending an order granting**  
21 **class-wide relief in *Bautista*.**

22 Alternatively, the Petition should be dismissed or stayed pending a resolution of the  
23 *Bautista* action because Petitioner is currently litigating this exact claim in another court,  
24 and the other action was first-in-time. A court may “decline jurisdiction over an action  
25 when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another  
26 district.” *Pacesetter Sys. v. Medtronic*, 678 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing *Church of*  
27 *Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of the Army*, 611 F.2d 738, 749 (9th Cir. 1979)).  
28 “Normally sound judicial administration would indicate that when two identical actions are

1 filed in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquired jurisdiction should  
2 try the lawsuit and no purpose would be served by proceeding with a second action.” *Id.*  
3 Although the first-in-time rule is permissive, not mandatory, it “should not be disregarded  
4 lightly.” *Id.* (quoting *Church of Scientology*, 678 F.2d at 750).

5 Here, principles of comity and efficiency strongly suggest that this Court should  
6 dismiss the Petition or stay this action pending further proceedings in *Bautista*. Petitioner  
7 is a member of the class certified in the *Bautista* action. The petition in *Bautista* was filed  
8 on July 23, 2025, and the parties were given substantial and ample time to brief their  
9 positions. The *Bautista* court then certified a class, granted summary judgment, and is  
10 presumably in the process of working with the parties to craft appropriate relief. It is  
11 unclear how the “goal of judicial efficiency,” *Pacesetter Sys.*, 678 F.2d at 96, would be  
12 served through granting relief in the present action rather than in *Bautista*. Moreover,  
13 Petitioner is still a member of the *Bautista* class. If this Court chooses to exercise  
14 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim now, it may muddle the *Bautista* action by casting doubt  
15 on the membership of the class. Finally, Petitioner cannot “identify any legal bar, or even  
16 a practical impediment,” to his ability to receive full and fair relief from the *Bautista* suit.  
17 *See Minor v. Sotheby’s*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 590 at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Jan 7, 2009). This  
18 Court should thus decline to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.

19 Because Petitioner is bound as a member of the non-opt out class of individuals  
20 governed by the *Bautista* suit, this Court should dismiss the Petition since another court is  
21 already considering Petitioner’s alleged statutory right to a bond hearing. This Court should  
22 also dismiss the Petition because it would harm the goals of judicial efficiency and comity  
23 between courts if this court chooses to hear this claim.

24 **C. The *Bautista* orders have no preclusive effect on this case.**

25 Even if this Court determined that it may exercise jurisdiction over Petitioner’s  
26 duplicative action, *Bautista* has ordered no relief, so this Court is not obligated to do  
27 anything based thereon. Neither the Partial MSJ Ruling nor the Class Certification Ruling  
28 entered declaratory judgment as to the nationwide class or otherwise provided for class-

1 wide relief. *See* Partial MSJ Ruling at \*17 (granting motion for partial summary judgment  
2 but expressly not ordering any relief); Class Certification Ruling at \*15 (granting motion  
3 for class certification but ordering only that class be certified, Petitioners be appointed class  
4 representatives, Petitioners' counsel be appointed class counsel, ordering a joint status  
5 report and setting status conference).<sup>1</sup> In the Partial MSJ Ruling, the court also expressly  
6 declined to enter final judgment as to the claims at issue in the motion under Federal Rule  
7 of Civil Procedure 54(b). Partial MSJ Ruling at \*17. Rather, in the Class Certification  
8 Ruling, the court set a January 9, 2026, joint status report deadline and January 16, 2026,  
9 status conference indicating that the court intends to address the question of final relief  
10 later. Class Certification Ruling at \*15.

11 To be proper, a declaratory judgment must have preclusive effect. “Without  
12 preclusive effect, a declaratory judgment is little more than an advisory opinion.” *Haaland*  
13 *v. Brackeen*, 599 U.S. 255, 293 (2023); *see also Wells v. Johnson*, 150 F.4th 289, 301 (4th  
14 Cir. 2025) (stating that the only reason a proper declaratory judgment does not violate  
15 Article III’s requirements is because it has preclusive effect between the parties);  
16 *Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005). And preclusive  
17 effect cannot be obtained without sufficient finality. *B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis*  
18 *Indus., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27,

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19  
20 <sup>1</sup> In other cases, this Court has contended that “declaratory relief was expressly extended  
21 [by the *Bautista* court] to the entire nationwide class, not merely the named petitioners.”  
22 *See, e.g., Guillen v. Unknown Party*, No. CV-25-04501-PHX-SHD (JZB) (Doc. 5) at 3  
23 (citing Class Certification Ruling at 14–15). The *Bautista* court did say that “[w]hen  
24 considering [the decision to certify a class under FRCP 23(b)(2)] with the MSJ Order, the  
25 Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class  
26 as a whole.” *See* Class Certification Ruling at 14. However, the *Bautista* court never issued  
27 an order accordingly, either in the Class Certification Ruling, *see* Class Certification Ruling  
28 at 15, or anywhere else. The Partial MSJ Ruling granted declaratory relief only to the  
named Plaintiffs, so it cannot fairly be read to grant relief to the class. Indeed, the *Bautista*  
petitioners recently filed a motion requesting clarification of the Class Certification Ruling  
requesting that the court issue an order extending its relief to all class members. *Bautista*,  
5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (Doc. 87). Respondents do not know *why* the *Bautista* court  
declined to order declaratory relief for the class members, but it is clear that no such order  
was issued.

1 p. 250 (1980), for the general rule that an issue must be determined by a “valid and final  
2 judgment” for preclusion to apply); *Luben Indus., Inc. v. United States*, 707 F.2d 1037,  
3 1040 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court decision not to apply preclusive effect to an  
4 interlocutory decision that “could not have been the subject of an appeal at the time”);  
5 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, p. 273 (1980) (issue preclusion does not apply  
6 when the “party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have  
7 obtained review of the judgment in the initial action”; *id.* at cmt. a (“[T]he availability of  
8 review for the correction of errors has become critical to the application of preclusion  
9 doctrine.”)).

10 Absent an entry of final judgment on the entire case, or a certification of partial final  
11 judgment under Rule 54(b), there is no declaratory judgment. The Partial MSJ Ruling does  
12 not operate as a “judgment” because it is not an appealable order and “does not end the  
13 action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of  
14 a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”  
15 FRCP 54(a), (b). Thus, there is no class-wide judgment, let alone any final judgment that  
16 could have preclusive effect as to class members.

17 **D. Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).**

18 Petitioner argues that his detention is unlawful because Respondents denied him a  
19 bond hearing, which Respondents did because of an immigration judge’s finding that  
20 Respondent was categorically ineligible for release. Petitioner argues that denying him a  
21 bond hearing constitutes a violation of his due process rights. Respondents maintain that  
22 Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” to the United States.  
23 Respondents argue that all such people must be detained for removal proceedings under 8  
24 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A) in most circumstances. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (“All aliens . . .  
25 who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or  
26 transit through the United States *shall be inspected* by immigration officers.”) (emphasis  
27 added); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (“An alien present in the United States who has not been  
28 admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter

1 an applicant for admission.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (“[I]n the case of an alien who is  
2 an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien  
3 seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall  
4 be detained”).

5 For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this Court deny the  
6 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

7 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED December 18, 2025.

8  
9 TIMOTHY COURCHAIINE  
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11 District of Arizona

12 *s/ Brooks Chupp*  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on December 18, 2025, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing.

*s/ M. Beickert*  
United States Attorney’s Office