

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION**

ANNER ANTONIO LOAISIGA TAPIA,

Petitioner,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, in her official capacity as Acting Director of the El Paso Field Office of ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations, and
ANGEL GARITE, in his official capacity as Warden of ERO El Paso Camp East Montana Detention Center,
DAREN K. MARGOLIN, in his official capacity as Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. EP-25-CV-665

Immigration No. A 

**PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL
VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 2241 AND REQUEST FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner ANNER ANTONIO LOAISIGA TAPIA (A# ) is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who has resided in the United States for many years, most recently in Saugus, MA. He was recently transferred to ICE custody in Texas and is currently detained at the El Paso Service Processing Center – East Montana in El Paso, Texas. *See* Ex. A, Proof of Detention in ICE Custody.

2. Mr. Loaisiga was placed into removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, following a September 11, 2022, stop by ICE officers while he was driving near

his home in Saugus, Massachusetts. During the encounter, ICE officers told him he would be released if he provided information regarding the whereabouts of his employer. Mr. Loaisiga complied, yet ICE nevertheless detained him. *See* Ex. B, Notice to Appear.

3. In recent months, immigration judges have routinely denied requests for a bond hearing to individuals in situations substantially similar to that of Mr. Loaisiga, due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction. These denials have relied on recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) precedent in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). *See* Ex. C, Recent BIA Decisions on Bond. However, numerous federal district court, including some from within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have made clear that noncitizens detained under INA § 236(a) are entitled to individualized bond hearings.

4. Despite this posture, immigration judges continue to refuse to provide noncitizens such as Mr. Loaisiga with an individualized custody redetermination hearing, asserting a lack of jurisdiction based on erroneous Board of Immigration Appeals precedent. The refusal to provide such a hearing violates the INA, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the APA, because detention in § 240 proceedings is governed by INA § 236(a), which clearly provides that noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings.

5. Mr. Loaisiga therefore petitions this Court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and he also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) which will be filed in a separate motion, ordering his release under reasonable conditions without delay, or in the alternative, directing Respondents to provide him an individualized custody hearing.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants federal district courts authority to hear habeas petitions filed by persons held in custody in violation of federal law or the Constitution. This action also invokes the Court’s authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

7. The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do not bar this suit. Petitioner does not challenge a final order of removal, nor seek classwide relief. Detention-based habeas claims are not channeled by Section 1252(b)(9). *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839–42 (2018). Section 1252(g) is narrowly construed and does not foreclose review of unlawful custody or *ultra vires* attempts to switch a non-final INA § 240 case into expedited removal. *See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999) (hereinafter also referred to as “*Reno v. AADC*”). Individual injunctive relief is not barred by Section 1252(f)(1). *See Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065–66 (2022).

8. Venue is proper in this District, and in the El Paso Division, because Petitioner is detained at the El Paso Service Processing Center – East Montana in El Paso, Texas, within this Court’s jurisdiction, whereas Petitioner’s detention is controlled by the El Paso Field Office of ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations. *See Ex. A.*

III. PARTIES

9. Petitioner, ANNER ANTONIO LOAISIGA TAPIA (“Mr. Loaisiga”), is a citizen and national of Nicaragua who has lived in the United States for more than three years.

He was transferred to the El Paso Service Processing Center – East Montana, where he remains detained, following his traffic stop by ICE officers near his home in Saugus, MA. Petitioner is currently in active removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240), for which he is currently scheduled to appear in person before the Judge Le Huy of the Boston Immigration Court. Petitioner’s next scheduled hearing in his § 240 removal proceedings is a Master Calendar Hearing, currently set for October 19, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. *See* Ex. D, EOIR Automated Case Information System.

10. Respondent KRISTI NOEM is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She is sued in her official capacity.

11. Respondent TODD LYONS is the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an executive branch agency within the Department of Homeland Security. He is sued in his official capacity.

12. Respondent MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA is the Director of the El Paso Field Office of ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”), and therefore, he oversees the El Paso Sub-Office of ERO, which has jurisdiction over Petitioner. She is sued in her official capacity as Petitioner’s local custodian and DHS’s local decisionmaker.

13. Respondent, ANGEL GARITE, is the Assistant Field Office Director of ERO El Paso and Warden of the ERO Camp East Montana Detention Center. As such, he is responsible for housing noncitizens from various regions of Texas in ICE custody pending the completion of their removal proceedings. The El Paso Camp East Montana Detention Center is located at 6920 Digital Road, El Paso, Texas 79936. Respondent is

sued in his or her official capacity as Petitioner's immediate physical custodian as of the filing of this petition.

14. Respondent, DAREN K. MARGOLIN, is Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. As such, he is responsible for directing and coordinating policy for the United States Immigration Court system, including policies relating to immigration bond applications and requests for custody redeterminations in immigration court. He is sued in his official capacity only.

15. Respondents Noem and Lyons, who represent DHS and ICE, are properly included herein as the executives of federal agencies within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Petitioner ANNER ANTONIO LOAISIGA TAPIA is a thirty-five-year-old citizen of Nicaragua who has made the United States his home for many years. He entered the United States without inspection on or about three years ago, and he has lived here continuously since that date.

2. Mr. Loaisiga finds himself in immigration custody after ICE officials conducted a suspicionless stop of his vehicle on September 11, 2025, while he was driving in Essex County, Massachusetts. Until his recent transfer into a remote immigration facility in El Paso, Texas, Mr. Loaisiga had lived and worked in Saugus, MA for many years, where he developed close ties to his community. He has no history of violence and no disqualifying convictions that would justify treating him as a danger to society.

3. Mr. Loaisiga's effected his last entry to the United States near the Arizona border on June 10, 2022, and DHS officials released him after initial processing. Shortly before

his release, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served him with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), initiating removal proceedings and charging him as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for entry without inspection. Mr. Loaisiga has a pending, lawful application for asylum filed on Form I-589. *See* Ex. B, Documentation of Immigration History. Mr. Loaisiga also has family members with status in this country, including his father, who has been a Lawful Permanent Resident since August 18, 2015.

4. Critically, when Mr. Loaisiga’s case was filed with the immigration court and served upon him, it placed him into § 240 removal proceedings. As a result of this, Mr. Loaisiga is entitled to the full panoply of due process guaranteed by the INA, including a hearing on relief from removal and a bond hearing under § 236(a), and not merely a summary expulsion—a natural result, in view of his lengthy history in this country.

5. Despite this posture, Mr. Loaisiga has been treated for bond immigration purposes as though he were subject to the harshest form of “arriving alien” detention, even though he has been properly placed in § 240 proceedings. Instead of being allowed to seek release on bond before an immigration judge, ICE has categorically denied him any chance to demonstrate that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. This blanket denial is not based on any individualized finding, but on the government’s insistence on applying the Board of Immigration Appeals’ recent decisions in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Those decisions—issued without notice-and-comment rulemaking, and in direct tension with binding circuit law—purport to strip immigration judges of authority to hold bond hearings for individuals like Mr. Loaisiga

6. As a result, Mr. Loaisiga now finds himself locked away at the El Paso Camp East Montana Detention Center in El Paso, Texas, a remote facility thousands of miles from his community Eastern Massachusetts. *See* Ex. A. He is held under conditions indistinguishable from those reserved for dangerous criminals, despite the absence of any criminal conviction that would bar his release under Section 236(c) of the INA. Each day of confinement exacerbates the harm—separating him from family and community support, impeding his ability to consult with counsel, and inflicting the psychological strain that prolonged and unnecessary detention inevitably produces.

7. In sum, Mr. Loaisiga is a man with deep roots in the United States, strong claims for humanitarian protection, and no disqualifying criminal record. He has been thrust into prolonged civil detention solely because of the government’s reliance on recent, non-binding BIA decisions that contravene the plain language of the INA and the decisions of numerous federal courts from within this Circuit. His detention, absent the possibility of an individualized bond hearing, is unlawful, arbitrary, and profoundly unjust.

V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Statutory Framework for Immigration Custody Determinations.

8. Immigration detention is governed primarily by two provisions of the INA: Section 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]. Whereas Section 236(a) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to release noncitizens on bond pending removal proceedings, in contrast, Section 235(b) applies to certain categories of “arriving aliens” and mandates detention pending completion of expedited or threshold screening.

9. Congress designed § 236(a) to govern the detention of individuals who, like Petitioner, are in regular removal proceedings under § 240. The statutory text expressly provides for release on bond, subject only to conditions ensuring appearance and protecting the community.

10. The Supreme Court has confirmed the distinction between these statutory schemes. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018) (explaining differences between § 235(b) mandatory detention and § 236(a) discretionary custody). The Board of Immigration Appeals itself recognized for decades that individuals in § 240 proceedings after entry without inspection were eligible for custody redeterminations. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).

11. Despite this clear statutory scheme, DHS has invoked recent BIA decisions (*i.e.*, *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025); *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)) to strip immigration judges of bond authority in cases such as those of Petitioner. Those decisions, however, cannot override the plain language of the statute.

12. In recent months, multiple district courts in 2025 have directly addressed the Government's efforts to expand § 1225(b)(2)(A) beyond its intended scope by assessing habeas petitions for noncitizens in similar circumstances and have repeatedly concluded that the clear and unambiguous language of Section 236 of the INA permits noncitizens who arrived without inspection—persons in precisely the same legal circumstances as Mr. Loaisiga—are eligible to request bond hearings before the immigration court.

13. For example, in *Santos v. Noem*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183412 (W.D. La. Sept. 15, 2025), the court emphasized that habeas relief is proper to correct statutory misclassification and to preserve the petitioner's due process rights. In *Kostak v. Trump*,

2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167280 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025), the court ordered bond eligibility under § 1226(a), rejecting the Government's assertion that § 1225(b) applied. Likewise, in *Salazar v. Dedos*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183335 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025), the district court ordered an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days, holding that prolonged detention without such a hearing violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

14. Similarly, recent decisions from district courts within the Fifth Circuit, such as *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188232 (S.D. Tex. 2025), further confirm that courts around the country are rejecting agency efforts to apply § 1225(b)(2)(A) to individuals who are properly subject to § 1226(a). *See, e.g., Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-3726, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara*, No. 5:25-cv-00112, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) (reviewing new detention policy); *Alonso Sanchez v. Hermosillo*, No. 2:25-CV-02152-TMC, 2025 WL 3171362 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2025); *Anselmo v. Moniz*, No. 1:25-CV-13309-IT, 2025 WL 3171137 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2025); *Cabrera v. Noem*, No. 25 C 12160, 2025 WL 3171288 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2025); *Contreras Alvarez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-1313, 2025 WL 3151948 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2025); *Diallo v. Maldonado, Jr.*, No. 25-CV-05740 (DG), 2025 WL 3158295 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025); *Diego v. Raycraft*, No. 25-13288, 2025 WL 3159106 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2025); *Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons*, No. 5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206751 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); *Parada-Hernandez v. Johnson*, No. 3:25-cv-2729-K-BN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234517 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025). This Court should follow suit.

15. These holdings reflect a growing consensus that district courts retain jurisdiction to intervene where detention rests on a statutory misapplication and results in ongoing constitutional harm. The cumulative weight of these decisions underscores that Mr. Loaisiga is entitled to bond consideration under § 1226(a).

VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count I – Violation of INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)]

16. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-asserts them as though stated fully herein.

17. Respondents' refusal to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody redetermination hearing violates the INA and controlling precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

18. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” and that the Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested alien” or “may release the alien on—(A) bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole.”

19. By its plain text, Section 236(a) applies to all noncitizens arrested and detained pending removal proceedings unless mandatory detention under § 236(c) applies.

20. In interpreting the plain language of Section 236(a), various federal district courts confirmed that noncitizens detained under Section 236(a) are statutorily eligible for individualized bond determinations before an immigration judge. Thus, the Attorney General must consider bond application by detained aliens pending the outcome of their

removal proceedings, since immigration judges retain jurisdiction to conduct custody redetermination hearings under that provision.

21. Petitioner is now in removal proceedings under Section 240 of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1229a], and his case has been placed on the detained docket of the Boston, MA Immigration Court. Because Petitioner is detained in the context of ongoing removal proceedings, his custody is governed by § 236(a), not § 235(b).

22. By adopting a policy refusing to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing that comports with INA § 236(a), Respondents have acted contrary to statutory authority requiring consideration of such bond application. This policy supports the conclusion that the filing of a bond application with the immigration courts is currently a futile endeavor. Petitioner's continued detention without access to an individualized custody redetermination violates the INA and must be corrected through habeas relief.

23. Accordingly, this Court should grant the writ and order that Petitioner receive an individualized bond hearing under INA § 236(a), as mandated by controlling law in this Circuit.

Count II – Fifth Amendment Due Process Violation

24. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-asserts them as though stated fully herein.

25. Petitioner's continued detention without access to an individualized custody redetermination hearing also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Prolonged detention without bond review is arbitrary, punitive, and unconstitutional.

26. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the

heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Immigration detention is civil in nature, but it nonetheless implicates this fundamental liberty interest.

27. Because Petitioner is detained by ICE at the El Paso Service Processing Center – East Montana, he is categorically barred from presenting evidence that he is not a danger to the community and that he poses no flight risk. The blanket denial of access to a bond hearing strips Petitioner of the individualized determination required by due process and by the plain language of Section 236(a).

28. Unlike noncitizens subject to mandatory detention for serious criminal offenses under Section 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)], Petitioner has no qualifying convictions that justify a categorical denial of release. His only arrest was conducted by ICE as a result of perceived alienage. The government has no legitimate basis to insist that Petitioner’s detention be mandatory, yet he remains confined with no opportunity for release.

29. Denying Petitioner any access to a bond hearing deprives him of procedural protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, prolonged detention without meaningful review violates the substantive limits of due process, as articulated in *Zadvydas* and *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

30. Petitioner is a long-time resident of the United States, with over three years of continuous presence. He has strong family and community ties in Eastern Massachusetts. There has been no finding that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Yet, solely because of recent, erroneous BIA decisions—decisions not binding in this Circuit—he has been categorically denied the process to which he is entitled. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

31. Accordingly, the Court should grant habeas relief on constitutional grounds and order that Petitioner be afforded an immediate bond hearing, or that he be released from custody pending the final outcome of his Section 240 removal proceedings.

Count III – Unlawful Agency Action (APA)

32. Petitioner incorporates by reference the above factual allegations and re-asserts them as though stated fully herein.

33. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioner without affording him a bond hearing also constitutes unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. The abrupt departure from longstanding precedent without reasoned explanation violates the Administrative Procedure Act.

34. For decades, immigration judges exercised bond jurisdiction over individuals detained under INA § 236(a), including those who entered without inspection. *See Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006); *see also* Ex. E, Pre-2025 Unpublished BIA Bond Decisions. That framework allowed for individualized custody determinations consistent with both statutory text and constitutional principles. These cases include, without limitation, the following:

- *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) (establishing criteria of danger to community and flight risk as factors for immigration bond requests);
- *In re L-E-V-H-*, AXXX-XXX-504 (BIA, Dec. 21, 2018) (despite noncitizen's testimony he had "turned himself in to officials at the border," held noncitizen had entered without inspection and was therefore not "arriving alien");

- *In re A-R-S*, AXXX-XXX-161 (BIA, June 25, 2020) (remanding to develop record where noncitizen who had DACA alleged he had entered without inspection but had been misclassified as “arriving alien”);
- *In re M-D-M*, AXXX-XXX-797 (BIA, Aug. 24, 2020) (despite recent arrest, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 20 years); and
- *In re F-P-J*, AXXX-XXX-699 (BIA, Oct. 22, 2020) (where noncitizen had a pending circuit court appeal and IJ failed to consider alternatives to detention, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 17 years).

35. In 2025, the BIA issued *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which held that certain noncitizens who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). These decisions abruptly stripped immigration judges of bond authority for a large class of detainees, including Petitioner, without notice-and-comment rulemaking and without reasoned explanation for abandoning prior precedent.

36. The APA requires agencies to engage in reasoned decision-making, and prohibits arbitrary or capricious action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The BIA’s reversal of decades of established law without acknowledging or adequately explaining its departure is the very definition of arbitrary and capricious action. *See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 579 U.S. 211, 221–22 (2016).

37. Although Petitioner has not filed a bond application since first entering ICE custody on or about September 10, 2022, doing so would be futile, as immigration judges refuse to exercise jurisdiction, expressly relying on this recent BIA policy shift. *See Ex. F, Sample IJ Bond Decision*. By treating individuals such as Petitioner as subject to

mandatory detention under Section 235(b), Respondents have applied an unlawful, arbitrary interpretation of the statute that is inconsistent with the plain language of Section 236(a) and unsupported by reasoned analysis.

38. Accordingly, Respondents' refusal to provide Petitioner an individualized custody redetermination hearing constitutes unlawful agency action under the APA, and this Court should grant habeas relief to remedy the violation.

Count V – Fourth Amendment Violation

39. Petitioner incorporates by reference the foregoing factual allegations and asserts an additional, independent claim arising under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

40. On or about the morning of September 11, 2025, Mr. Perez was arrested by ICE officers after being encountered by local law enforcement during a suspicionless traffic stop in Essex, Massachusetts. The officers did not present a warrant or have any individualized basis to believe that Mr. Perez had committed any immigration violation. Instead, the agents addressed him in Spanish and began questioning him about his immigration status.

41. This pattern of conduct demonstrates that ICE agents acted not pursuant to individualized suspicion, but rather engaged in a form of dragnet racial profiling directed at individuals of Hispanic appearance. Such conduct violates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has made clear that seizures without probable cause, or predicated solely on race or ethnicity, are unconstitutional. *See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S.

873, 885-87 (1975) (holding that apparent Mexican ancestry alone cannot justify a stop by immigration officers).

42. Here, there is no evidence that ICE possessed either (1) a valid arrest warrant specifically naming Petitioner, or (2) reasonable suspicion particularized to Petitioner that would justify a seizure. Instead, the agents' conduct fits precisely within the type of generalized, race-based enforcement action that *Brignoni-Ponce* and its progeny forbid. By seizing Petitioner without lawful authority, Respondents violated the Fourth Amendment.

43. This violation is not a mere procedural irregularity; it taints the very basis of Petitioner's detention. As courts have recognized, unlawful seizures may warrant suppression of evidence in immigration proceedings, and they independently justify habeas relief where continued detention is the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation. *See, e.g., Oliva-Ramos v. Att'y Gen.*, 694 F.3d 259, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2012) (suppression warranted where ICE engaged in warrantless, suspicionless home raids); *Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch*, 789 F.3d 434, 449-50 (4th Cir. 2015) (held that exclusionary rule stemming from Fourth Amendment violations applies even in removal proceedings, because “[t]o hold otherwise would give no effect to the language used by the Supreme Court in *Lopez-Mendoza* expressing concern over fundamentally unfair methods of obtaining evidence and would ignore the fact that eight justices in *Lopez-Mendoza* seem to have agreed that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings in some form”); *Orhorhaghe v. INS*, 38 F.3d 488, 501 (9th Cir. 1994) (suppressing evidence obtained through race-based immigration stop).

44. Moreover, Petitioner's arrest, effected in a public place without a judicial warrant, violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), which requires that immigration officers may arrest an alien

without a warrant only where they have “reason to believe” the person is in violation of the law and is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” No such exigent circumstances existed here. Petitioner was simply on his way to work.

45. Therefore, it is clear that Petitioner's ongoing detention is the direct product of an unconstitutional seizure and should be declared unlawful. This Court should grant habeas relief and order his release, or at minimum, declare that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment and enjoin Respondents from continuing to detain him on the basis of this unconstitutional arrest.

VII. REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

46. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue an injunction directing Respondents to release him under reasonable conditions of supervision or, alternatively, to provide him an immediate individualized custody redetermination hearing under INA § 236(a) within seven (7) days. Petitioner further intends to request a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunctive relief in a separate filing.

47. The Supreme Court has made clear that such extraordinary relief depends on a four-factor test: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434–35 (2009). As explained below, Petitioner satisfies each of these factors.

A. Mr. Loaisiga Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of His Petition.

48. Mr. Loaisiga has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. As explained more fully hereinabove, numerous district courts including some from within the Fifth Circuit, have already determined that noncitizens in circumstances substantially

similar to that of Mr. Loaisiga, who are detained under Section 236(a), are entitled to individualized bond hearings before an immigration judge.

49. Current BIA policy prohibiting immigration judges from exercising jurisdiction over any immigration bond request that Mr. Loaisiga might file—due to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ recent decisions in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)—cannot override the clear and unambiguous language of Section 236(a).

50. Additionally, Mr. Loaisiga raises a constitutional claim under the Fifth Amendment, as prolonged detention without any opportunity for individualized custody review violates due process.

51. Taken together, these statutory and constitutional grounds present not merely a plausible claim, but a compelling one. Under *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), likelihood of success is the most critical factor in evaluating interim relief. Here, Petitioner’s claim is exceptionally strong.

B. Mr. Loaisiga Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If an Injunction Does Not Issue.

52. If this Court does not grant immediate relief, Mr. Loaisiga will continue to suffer irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Constitution. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Everyday Mr. Loaisiga remains confined without access to the procedures guaranteed by law constitutes a grave and irreversible injury.

53. Even if Mr. Loaisiga were eventually granted a bond hearing after protracted litigation, the harm inflicted by the period of unlawful detention—loss of liberty,

disruption of family life, psychological strain, and reputational damage—could never be undone. As *Nken* instructs, irreparable harm cannot be speculative; it must be actual and concrete. 556 U.S. at 435. Mr. Loaisiga’s ongoing imprisonment without a lawful hearing meets that standard.

C. Balance of Equities Weighs in Mr. Loaisiga’s Favor.

54. The balance of equities tips decisively in Petitioner’s favor. On his side lies the interest in safeguarding one of the most fundamental rights recognized in our legal system—the right not to be arbitrarily detained without process. On the government’s side, the only asserted interest is administrative convenience in applying the BIA’s recent precedents, which the federal courts have resoundingly eschewed in recent weeks.

55. There is no evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight, and the dismissal of his recent criminal indictment further diminishes any legitimate basis for continued detention. In contrast, every additional day of unlawful confinement inflicts significant harm on Petitioner. When weighed against each other, the equities clearly support granting immediate relief.

D. There Is Strong Public Interest In Maintaining the Pre-2025 Status Quo.

56. Finally, the public interest strongly supports the issuance of an injunction. The Supreme Court in *Nken* explained that when the government is the opposing party, the balance of equities and the public interest merge. 556 U.S. at 435. The public has no interest in perpetuating unlawful detention; rather, the public’s interest is served by ensuring that government agencies act within the bounds of statutory and constitutional authority.

57. Granting Petitioner an individualized bond hearing promotes confidence in the integrity of the immigration system, reinforces respect for the rule of law, and prevents the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Protecting fundamental due process rights is not just in Petitioner's interest, but in the interest of the public at large.

58. Each factor of the equitable test weighs heavily in Mr. Loaisiga's favor. He has shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits based on the interpretation of Section 236(a) by various federal district courts and the Due Process Clause; he faces irreparable harm each day he remains detained without lawful process; the equities tilt overwhelmingly toward protecting his liberty; and the public interest is best served by ensuring that immigration detention is consistent with statutory and constitutional limits.

59. For these reasons, this Court should issue an injunction at the earliest possible opportunity, requiring Respondents to provide Mr. Loaisiga an immediate bond hearing or release.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

60. For the above and foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court take the following actions:

- a. Issue an Order to Show Cause to Respondents named herein;
- b. Schedule a hearing on an injunction, for the cross-examination of the immigration officers who arrested Petitioner, and at the conclusion of such hearing, issue findings of fact and conclusions of law;
- c. Based on upon the Court's findings and conclusions, issue an order granting the writ of habeas corpus, and injunctive relief ordering Petitioner's immediate release, or in the alternative, an immigration bond hearing within seven (7) days;

- d. Issue a declaration that the plain language of INA § 236(a) permits immigration judges to consider bond requests of noncitizens who are present without admission and are not classified as arriving aliens;
- e. Issue a declaration that DHS may not initiate or pursue expedited removal against Mr. Larrea while his § 240 proceedings remains non-final and while he seeks relief from removal before an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals;
- f. Grant permanent injunctive relief as appropriate;
- g. Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), and any other applicable provision of law; and
- h. Grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATE: December 12, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

THE LAW OFFICE OF JOHN M. BRAY, PLLC
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By: /s/ John M. Bray

John M. Bray
Texas Bar No. 24081360
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

VERIFICATION

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

§
§
§

ESSEX COUNTY

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared DANIELA SALAZAR ("AFFIANT"), known to me to be the person whose name is included in the foregoing document as Petitioner's wife, and who after being by me duly sworn, stated that she is above the age of twenty-one (21) years of age, is of sound mind, and is in all ways competent to make this verification. Affiant acknowledged that she had the substance of the foregoing document read to her, that she has personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, and that the factual statements contained herein above are true and correct to the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief.

Daniela Salazar

DANIELA SALAZAR,
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME on this 10 day of December, 2025.

[SEAL]

[Signature]

NOTARY PUBLIC
In and for the State of Massachusetts

