

LAW OFFICE OF SHARA SVENDSEN PLLC
SHARA SVENDSEN, WSB: 38151
shara@svenlaw.com
16300 Mill Creek Blvd. Ste. 206
Mill Creek, WA 98012
425-361-1511

Attorney for Petitioner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN WASHINGTON

Fidel Vazquez Dominguez,

Petitioner,

v.

Laura HERMOSILLO, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Case No. 2:25-cv-2553-TMC

Agency No. A



PETITIONER TRAVERSE

**Noted for Consideration:
January 6, 2026**

Petitioner hereby submits this reply to Federal Respondents' Return Memorandum. The core of Petitioner's habeas claim is that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Since the filing of the petition, Mr. Vazquez has attended a bond hearing where the Immigration Judge denied bond, finding no jurisdiction, and issued an alternate order granting bond "if the court had jurisdiction". Petitioner reiterates his requires that the Court order the Respondents to release him from detention, or at a minimum to uphold the Immigration Judge's alternate order granting bond.

I. COURT JURISDICTION

Respondents first assert that Mr. Vazquez is subject to mandatory detention and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over review of the statutory basis for detention under the INA.

Respondents point to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) for this assertion. This provision states:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), **including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision**, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)(emphasis added). However, this jurisdictional bar is narrow. "The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her 'decision or action' to '*commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.*'" *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original); see also *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) ("We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to 'arise from' the three listed actions of the Attorney

General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”); *see also, Ibarra-Perez v. USA*, 154 F.4th 989 (9th Cir. 2025)(“we have been clear that § 1252(g) does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders”). Respondents point to no caselaw of any kind to support their theory that INA § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to hear Mr. Vazquez’s habeas claim.

Respondents also invoke the INA’s “zipper clause,” to deny the Court jurisdiction over the question of which INA section governs Mr. Vazquez’s detention. The INA states:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Specifically, Respondents assert that Petitioner is challenging “the decision and action to detain him”, which they assert “arises from the government’s decision to commence removal proceedings” and is thus “an action taken ... to remove an alien from the United States.” This interpretation runs counter to Supreme Court precedent. The zipper clause applies only to claims requesting review of a removal order; here, Mr. Vazquez is not “asking for review of an order of removal”; is not “challenging the decision to detain [him] in the first place or to seek removal”; and is “not even challenging any part of the process by which [his] removability will be determined.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294. Claims independent of or collateral to the removal process are outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9). *See, J.E.G.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)(citing *Torres-Tristan v. Holder*, 656 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2011)); *Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020)(“§

1252(b)(9) is a ‘targeted’ and ‘narrow’ provision that ‘is certainly not a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal proceedings.’” (quoting *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020))).

Finally, Respondents assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), asserting that the “plain language” of the statute precludes judicial review for noncitizens determined to be detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2). The Supreme Court has cautioned against an “expansive” interpretation of the bars that would lead “absurd” results make certain claims “effectively unreviewable.” *See Jennings* at 293-94. It is well established that courts retain jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Ye v. INS*, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Mr. Vazquez contends that he is detained under § 1226 and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing. If so, then Section 1252(e)(3) does not apply, as that statute only addresses determinations under section 1225(b). Furthermore, Section 1252(e)(3) specifically relates to INA section 1225(b)(1), not (b)(2), to limit review of orders of expedited removal. Respondents do not argue that Mr. Vazquez has been ordered removed pursuant to Section 1225(b)(1), and Mr. Vazquez is not seeking review of an order of expedited removal here. As with the above jurisdictional assertions, Respondents cite to no case law supporting their assertions that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this habeas petition, regarding the imposition of mandatory detention, pursuant to § 1252(e)(3).

II. PETITIONER’S DETENTION IS GOVERNED BY §1226(a)

Respondents do not argue that Mr. Vazquez was apprehended at his arrival in the United States, or that he is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Nor do they dispute that he is currently being detained and subjected to mandatory detention under §

1225(b)(2). This Court has declared application of § 1225(b)(2) unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act as applied to persons similarly situation to Mr. Vazquez. *See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, --- F.Supp.3d ----, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *27 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025).

On November 25, 2025, the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California certified a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in immigration detention and have been denied access to a bond hearing based on the government’s allegation that they entered without admission or inspection, like Mr. Vazquez. *See, Maldonado Bautista et al v. Santacruz Jr. et al*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM. Dkt. No. 41 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order granting plaintiff petitioners’ motion for class certification).

Like the members of the *Rodriguez Vazquez* Bond Denial Class and the *Maldonado Bautista* Bond Eligible Class, Mr. Vazquez is not “seeking admission” and thus cannot be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock* at *16-*27; *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz Jr.* at page 1447. Instead, he is subject to detention under § 1226(a), which permits release on bond. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock* at *16-*27.

Respondents acknowledge the Courts’ holdings in *Rodriguez Vazquez* and *Maldonado Bautista*. Respondents also concede that Mr. Vazquez could be a *Rodriguez Vazquez* classmember. However, they continue to insist that Mr. Vazquez is subject to mandatory detention, relying on two cases and ignoring the plethora of cases holding to the contrary. Respondents rely on *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 8:25-cv-00526, WL 2780351 (D. Neb. September 30, 2025) and *Chavez v. Noem, et. al.*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228 (S. D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) for district court authority supporting their proposition that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) properly governs Petitioner’s detention. In

spite of Respondents' continued citation to these two cases, these cases do not support Respondents' position.

The *Vargas* petition was dismissed by the Nebraska District Court due to that petitioner's failure to provide evidence and develop the record. *Vargas Lopez*, 2025 WL 2780351

The *Chavez* court has not reached a decision on the merits of the legal argument as to whether § 1225 or § 1226 properly applies to individuals such as Petitioner, who physically entered the United States more than two years ago. Respondents rely on language from the *Chavez* court's order denying an Ex Parte Application for a temporary restraining order. *Chavez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2730228, Doc. No. 2. The *Chavez* court found only that the petitioner did not meet their burden for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, but has not issued a decision denying the underlying habeas petition. The *Chavez* court did find jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018), and that exhaustion would be futile based on *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

Numerous districts courts throughout the country have held that people like Mr. Vazquez – who entered the United States over twenty years ago without inspection – are properly detained under § 1226 and not subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b). *See, e.g., Pichard Medina v. Hermosilla* [sic], No. 3:25-cv-02233-MC (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2025); *B.D.A.A. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-cv-02062-AA (D.Or. Dec. 4, 2025); *Cruz Vega v. Larose, et al*, 3:25-cv-2725-CAB-MSB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order issuing preliminary injunction); *Delgado Avila v. Crowley*, No. 2:25-cv-00533-MPB-MJD, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2025); *Hyppolite v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); *Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); *Lepe v. Andrews*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); *Barrera v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19,

2025); *Hasan v. Crawford*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); *Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025). By contrast, it appears that to date only the two district courts cited by Respondents have followed *Hurtado*'s reasoning to find that noncitizens already in the county are covered by section 1225(b)(2). See *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025). This Court should similarly reject Respondents' interpretation.

III. PETITIONER COULD NOT PREVAIL IN A BOND DETERMINATION HEARING UNDER BIA CASE LAW

Respondents concede that Mr. Vazquez could be considered a member of the Bond Denial Class for purposes of this litigation.

Petitioner attended a bond determination hearing on December 17, 2025, after the filing of this habeas claim. The Immigration Judge denied bond stating that Mr. Vazquez was subject to mandatory detention under *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Immigration Judge stated that “[i]n the alternative, if the court had jurisdiction, the court would grant a bond in the amount of \$8,000.”

IV. RELEASE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY

Petitioner continues to seek release from detention. Courts apply the balancing test in *Mathews v. Edlridge* to determine whether a noncitizen's detention violates the Due Process

Clause. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see *E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1321 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025)(collecting cases applying *Mathews* to similar immigration detention contexts). Under *Mathews*, a court balances three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335. Here, the *Mathews* factors weigh in favor of Mr. Vazquez and support his release.

First, Mr. Vazquez has a private interest under the *Mathews* test. Mr. Vazquez was deprived of his liberty when he was arrested on November 29, 2025, on his way to work; he has been detained since then. “Freedom from imprisonment ... lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Liberty is the norm in the United States; detention “is the carefully limited exception.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that noncitizens retain liberty interests protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, Mr. Vazquez has a substantial interest in being free from detention, arguably the “most elemental” liberty interest. *Hamdi v. Rumseld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also *Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)(“The Supreme Court has consistently held that non-punitive detention violates the Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, accompanied by a prompt individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment serves the government’s legitimate goals.”).

Second, there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. INA § 1226(a) provides procedures, including an individualized hearing by an Immigration Judge, that work to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. *See, Rodriguez Diaz*, 55 F.4th at 1210. However, here Respondents continue to claim that Mr. Vazquez is not held pursuant to § 1226; and continue to claim he is subject to mandatory detention in defiance of court orders arising from two separate class actions. By refusing to follow the court orders of *Rodriguez Vazquez* and *Maldonado Bautista*, Respondents erroneously deprive Mr. Vazquez of his liberty. The Due Process Clause protects Mr. Vazquez from this reckless abuse of authority.

The third *Mathews* factor also weights in Mr. Vazquez's favor. While the Government has an interest in enforcing laws, including "protecting the public from dangerous criminal aliens" and "securing an alien's ultimate removal". *Rodriguez Diaz*, 53 F. 4th at 1208-09. However, these interests are best served by following the existing, well-established procedures provided in § 1226. Here, the Government failed to provide any pre-deprivation notice or hearing, and has continued to erroneously subject Mr. Vazquez to a DHS policy of mandatory detention that has been specifically overruled by the *Maldonado Bautista* court. Petitioner questions whether his detention "is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons." *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 532-33 (2003)(Kennedy, J. concurring). "Detention for its own sake, to meet an administrative quota ... is not a legitimate government interest." *See, Pinchi v. Noem*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025).

The *Mathews* factors favor Mr. Vazquez and support finding a violation of due process from his continue detention. In light of Respondents' deliberate choices to continue to subject Mr. Vazquez to mandatory detention, the appropriate remedy is his release.

Many district courts faced with the same issue in this action have determined to order the immediate release of immigration habeas petitioners. *Pichard Medina v. Hermosilla* [sic], No. 3:25-cv-02233-MC (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2025); *B.D.A.A. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-cv-02062-AA (D.Or. Dec. 4, 2025); *Santiago v. Noem*, No. EP-25-CV-361-KC, 2025 LX 473521, at *39 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2025) citing *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-cv-4836, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, 2025 WL 2772765, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); *Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, 2025 WL 2753496, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11981, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. 25-cv-2157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, No. 25-cv-1204, 2025 WL 2430267, at *15 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025). In the majority of these cases, the Court found that the government had no or an insignificant interest in detaining the petitioner. *Santiago*, 2025 LX473521 at *39 citing *J.U.*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, 2025 WL 2772765, at *10; *Zumba*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, 2025 WL 2753496, at *10; *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *14, 18; *Sepulveda Ayala v. Bondi* ("*Sepulveda Ayala II*"), 25-cv-1063, 2025 WL 2209708, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2025).

Again, the Government asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Vazquez's claim, conflating the jurisdictional bar over review of final orders of removal with review over detention itself. Respondents provide no evidence that the arresting ICE officer had "reason to believe" that Mr. Vazquez was "in the United States in violation of [the immigration laws]" and was "likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest". 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii). Respondents have not argued that Mr. Vazquez was a flight risk or that he presents a danger to society. On the contrary, Mr. Vazquez has strong community connections as the father of five U.S. citizens, who has lived in the United States for over twenty

years. He has now been detained for over a month after his warrantless arrest. Thus, Petitioner requests that he be immediately released from detention or, at a minimum, released pursuant to the Immigration Judge's alternate order granting bond.

V. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully asks that the Court grant his requests for relief.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2026.

By: /s/ Shara Svendsen
Shara Svendsen
Law Office of Shara Svendsen PLLC

Attorney for Petitioner

*I certify that this memorandum contains
2,982 words, in compliance with the Local
Civil Rules.*