

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
FORT MYERS DIVISION**

ARKADY RUDENKO,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 2:25-cv-1157-JES-NPM

WARDEN, SOUTH FLORIDA SOFT-  
SIDED FACILITY SOUTH, et al. (all  
official capacity),<sup>1</sup>

Respondents.

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**Response to Habeas Petition**

Petitioner Arkady Rudenko challenges the revocation of his Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) along with the resulting detention by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The Court lacks jurisdiction. Apart from that, ICE properly exercised its discretion to revoke Rudenko’s OSUP—a decision on which the Court is statutorily prohibited from reviewing. So the Court should deny the Petition.

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<sup>1</sup> The Warden is the only appropriate Respondent. 8 U.S.C. § 2243; *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434-36 (2004); *Vandersnick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.*, No. 5:18-cv-603-SPC-PRL, 2021 WL 1020914, at \*1 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2021). Any relief the Court awards should be fashioned to that within the power of the immediate custodian (i.e., the Warden) or ICE/DHS. *See, e.g., Mirando Bravo v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-1046-SPC-DNF, Doc. 8 at \*3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2025) (ordering ICE either to bring petitioner for a bond hearing or release by a specific date).

### **Background**

This is an immigration habeas case. Rudenko was born in the Soviet Union; he is a Russian citizen by birth who was born in present-day Ukraine. (Ex. 1 at 1-2). At birth, it appears Rudenko's last name was "Beliy" (i.e., his father's last name). (Ex. 1 at 1). He entered the United States and adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") in the early 80s. (Doc. 1-2 at 3; Ex. 1 at 2).

In 2009, Rudenko was convicted and sentenced for felony attempted cocaine trafficking. *State v. Rudenko*, No. 13-2008-CF-040849 (11th Jud. Cir., Miami-Dade Cnty.). In 2010, Rudenko was convicted and sentenced for felony harassment of a witness, victim, or informant. *State v. Rudenko*, No. 09-019246-CF-10A (17th Jud. Cir., Miami-Dade Cnty.).

Shortly after his felony convictions, Rudenko was placed in removal proceedings. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). An immigration judge ("IJ") ordered him removed to Ukraine or Russia by in October 2011. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). He waived his appeal and never made one. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). So his order of removal became final. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.

In 2012, ICE released Rudenko on an OSUP. (Doc. 1 at 8). Since then, he has been living in the United States subject to OSUP revocation and removal.

On November 3, Rudenko was encountered and detained by ICE at his residence. (Ex. 1 at 2). The next day, ICE served him with a Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest. (Ex. 2 at 7). It also revoked his OSUP for changed circumstances after it determined there is now a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future ("SLRRFF"). (Doc. 1 at 9; Ex. 2 at 9). ICE served the revocation

notice on Rudenko. (Ex. 2 at 10). The OSUP was revoked revocation by an assistant field office director (“AFOD”). (Ex. 2 at 9). The Miami Field Office Director (“FOD”) delegated OSUP revocation powers to AFODs (among others). (Ex. 3 at 3).

What’s more, ICE provided him an informal interview to contest the revocation and detention. (Ex. 4 at 1). This interview occurred on December 20, which was after he filed for habeas. (Ex. 4 at 1). Rudenko made what appears to be thoughtful argument in support of his position to remain in the United States. (Ex. 4 at 1). Yet ICE exercised its discretion to continue with removal and detention pending that process.

In the past, ICE had issues securing Rudenko’s removal given his unique citizenship status and different birth name. But with those issues now clarified, ICE believes it can secure travel documents to Ukraine.

Rudenko has been in ICE detention since November 3. (Doc. 1 at 9). He is currently at “Alligator Alcatraz.” (Doc. 1 at 2). This challenge followed.

### **Certified Habeas Return**

The Court has power to grants writs of habeas corpus where (among other instances) petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner bears the burden to prove custody violates federal law. *Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y of State*, 853 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021).

After Rudenko’s felony conviction, an IJ ordered him removed to Ukraine or Russia. Rudenko waived his right to appeal. So his order of removal was final in 2011.

At that point, Rudenko was removable from the United States. The Attorney General (through her delegates) has a statutory obligation to execute that removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(3).

ICE is detaining Rudenko under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) pending his removal. After clarifying several issues, ICE continues to work towards executing removal.

The period of Rudenko's detention is still well within the presumptively reasonable limits established in *Zadvydas*. Even if he were able to challenge detention before then, Rudenko cannot show there is no SLRRFF.

### **Discussion**

Rudenko challenges his detention as a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process clause and *Accardi* doctrine. These claims fail. As described below, the Court has no jurisdiction. Even if it did, detention has not extended to a length creating constitutional questions; nor did ICE violate any law in proceeding with removal.

#### **A. Lack of Jurisdiction**

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

In the context of immigration habeas cases related to removal—like here—the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) divests this Court's jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), (g). As discussed, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Rudenko's claims. Regardless of how the filings get dressed up, he challenges the revocation of his OSUP

and detention to execute a final order of removal.

1. *Jurisdiction Stripping Under § 1252(g)*

There is no jurisdiction to review “any” claim “arising from the decision or action” to “execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This provision bars habeas review in federal courts when the claim arises from a decision or action to “execute” a final order of removal. *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC)*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

Courts consistently hold that § 1252(g) eliminates subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges—including constitutional claims—to an arrest or detention for the purpose of executing a final removal order. *E.g., Camarena v. ICE*, 988 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to consider ‘any’ cause or claim brought by an alien arising from the government’s decision to execute a removal order.”); *Johnson v. U.S. Attorney General*, 847 F. App’x 801, 802 (11th Cir. 2021); *Gupta v. McGahey*, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013).<sup>2</sup> Likewise, § 1252(g) precludes review of the method by which ICE chooses to commence removal proceedings. *Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, the provision

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<sup>2</sup> See also *Hamama v. Adducci*, 912 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Under a plain reading of the text of the statute, the Attorney General’s enforcement of long-standing removal orders falls squarely under the Attorney General’s decision to execute removal orders and is not subject to judicial review.”); *Tazu v. U.S. Attorney General*, 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The plain text of § 1252(g) covers decisions about whether and when to execute a removal order.”); *Rauda v. Jennings*, 55 F.4th 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2022); *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2021).

bars us from questioning ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal—and thus necessarily prevents us from considering whether the agency should have used a different statutory procedure to initiate the removal process.”).

Rudenko’s OSUP was revoked, and he was detained to execute the final removal order against him. He is well within the presumptively reasonable period of detention (as detailed below). And ICE is in the process of executing removal. This action is an effort to interfere with or halt that legal process. The INA plainly strips the Court’s jurisdiction in these instances. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

The Court lacks jurisdiction for a separate reason.

2. *Jurisdiction Stripping Under § 1252(b)(9)*

There is no jurisdiction to review “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” outside a case reviewing the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). This is known as the “zipper clause.” *Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS*, 964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020). The zipper clause is “a jurisdictional bar where” petitioner seeks “review of an order of removal [or] the decision to seek removal.” *DHS v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (cleaned up).

There is a single path for judicial review of removal orders—“a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Reading § 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) together, courts conclude petitioners must funnel all aspects of challenges to removal proceedings through that avenue. *Nasrallah v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 573, 580 (2020) (“The REAL ID Act clarified that final orders of removal may not be

reviewed in district courts, even via habeas corpus, and may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals.”); *see also Bonhometre v. Gonzales*, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) (There is “clear intent to have all challenges to removal orders heard in a single forum (the courts of appeals).”).

The zipper clause encompasses more than § 1252(g). *AADC*, 525 U.S. at 483. Under these provisions, “most claims that even relate to removal” are improper in a district court. *E.O.H.C. v. DHS*, 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020). There are limitations on how broadly courts interpret the zipper clause. *E.g. Canal A*, 964 F.3d at 1257. But a claim obviously “arises from a removal proceeding when the parties are challenging removal proceedings.” *Id.* (cleaned up); *see also Regents of Cal.*, 591 U.S. at 19.

Here, the crux of this case challenges ICE’s execution of Rudenko’s final removal order to stop the removal process. These are the exact claims barred by the zipper clause. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

### 3. *Conclusion of Jurisdiction Stripping*

As discussed above, Rudenko’s claims fall squarely within the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9). The Court, therefore, lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss.

## **B. Constitutionally Lawful Detention**

Even if the Court disagrees with the above, it must still deny the writ. Rudenko cannot make a claim for unlawfully prolonged detention at this time. Nor can he litigate SLRRFF prematurely.

After a final removal order, an alien must be removed within ninety days—i.e.,

the removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001). During the removal period, the alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683. An alien, however, can be detained beyond that removal period. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), (a)(6); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683. This is called a “post-removal” period. *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021).

There is no statutory limit on how long ICE can detain an alien during the post-removal period. *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 579 (2022). Yet indefinite detention would present obvious constitutional concerns. *Id.* So the Supremes interpret this post-removal period to allow extended detention for “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. In all, a reasonable length of detention “is presumptively six months.” *Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. at 529; *see also Akinwale v. Ashcroft*, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating six-month period is inclusive of any ninety-day removal period).

If the presumptively reasonable period expires without removal, then a burden-shifting framework comes into play regarding SLRRFF. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. But before that six-month period expires, any habeas challenge to the detention itself is premature. *E.g.*, *Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1051-52; *Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Attorney General*, 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013); *Gozo v. Napolitano*, 309 F. App’x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009).<sup>3</sup> At bottom, “This presumptively reasonable six month period

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<sup>3</sup> Some districts disagree. *Cesar v. Achim*, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2008). Of course, *Akinwale* binds the Court. Even if it didn’t, *Cesar* and any progeny are wrong. *Zadvydas* recognized the presumptive six-month period for the specific “sake of uniform administration

must have expired at the time of the filing of a petition.” *E.g.*, *Jiang v. Mukasey*, No. 2:08-cv-773-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at \*2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009) (Steele, J.); *Noel v. Glades Cnty. Sheriff*, No. 2:11-cv-698-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 6412425, at \*2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011) (Steele, J.).

Rudenko has only been in detention for sixty days. He was first detained on November 3 and sued on December 12. At that point, Rudenko had only been detained for thirty-nine days. Either timeline is well under the 180-day period that is presumptively reasonable. That is fatal to jurisdiction. *Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1051-52.

To contend ICE cannot detain him for the purpose of removal, as Rudenko does, would effectively eliminate ICE’s ability to ever remove an alien unless it does so within the presumptively reasonable timeframe. *Chun Yat Ma v. Asher*, No. C11-1797 MJP, 2012 WL 1432229, at \*3 (Apr. 25, 2012). *Zadvydass* doesn’t sweep that broad. It goes without saying an alien must be detained (or otherwise in custody) to effect removal unless the alien leaves voluntarily. Rudenko has not left voluntarily, and ICE is attempting to remove him. If the Court accepts his position, it is unclear how ICE would be able to remove Rudenko—which ICE is actively working toward. *But see Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“We think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody . . . while

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in the federal courts.” *Zadvydass*, 533 U.S. at 701. That was not an invitation to make up exceptions to this ripeness doctrine—like *Cesar* did.

arrangements were being made for their deportation.”).

Because Rudenko was first detained on November 3, any *Zadvydas* challenge fails. *E.g.*, *Jiang*, 2009 WL 260378, at \*2 (“This presumptively reasonable six month period must have expired at the time of the filing of a petition.”).

ICE recognizes the Court has held the *Zadvydas* period is coterminous with the statutory removal and post-removal periods—meaning it can run while an alien is outside detention. *Godinez Perez v. Noem*, No. 2:25-cv-00429-JES-NPM, 2025 WL 2806557, at \*2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2025) (Steele, J.). Respectfully, ICE disagrees based on the INA and *Zadvydas* itself. As three Southern District cases recently made clear, this period begins at the start of an alien’s actual detention and begins again when ICE makes a renewed effort to remove after failing long ago. *Barrios v. Ripa*, No. 1:25-cv-22644-GAYLES, 2025 WL 2280485 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (holding claim premature and rejecting argument that aggregate prior detentions considered for *Zadvydas* purposes); *Guerra-Castro v. Parra*, No. 1:25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (holding claim premature when removal period ended in 2014); *Grigorian v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at \*7-8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025) (same for 2011). Other courts agree. *Ghamelian v. Baker*, No. SAG-25-02106, 2025 WL 2049981, at \*4 (D. Md. July 22, 2025) (“The government is entitled to its six-month presumptive period before Petitioner’s continued § 1231(a)(6) [re-]detention poses a constitutional issue.”).

With *Zadvydas*, the “basic question” is “whether the detention in question

exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Court “used the words ‘detain’ and ‘custody’ to refer exclusively to physical confinement and restraint.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 311 (2018). *Zadvydas* protects against unconstitutionally indefinite detention; it did not interpret starting an imaginary detention clock based on statutory periods divorced from physical restraint. Again, to conclude the detention period started with the statutory removal time requires a corresponding finding that ICE has been unconstitutionally detaining Rudenko since his OSUP release. That is a factual impossibility. Yet it also imposes an impossible burden on ICE—requiring it to justify over a decade detention if the burden shifts. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701 (“And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.”).

*Akinwale* and other courts recognize that calculating time will often begin when detention is required (i.e., start of the removal period). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). But this would only be the case where petitioner challenges detention beginning at that time. If—as here—petitioner gets detained years later, no reasonable interpretation of *Zadvydas*, *Akinwale*, or any other binding law suggests the six-month period can expire before detention occurs. Many cases on this exact issue hold the period begins with actual detention. *E.g.*, *Cheng Ke Chen v. Holder*, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (rejecting claim as premature for petitioner who was not detained during removal period because “it defies common sense to suggest that *Zadvydas* time can run

while a petitioner is not in custody”).<sup>4</sup> Again, *Zadvydias* “exclusively” addressed “physical confinement and restraint.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 311.

Here, Rudenko is in the “post-removal period” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). *Zadvydias*, 533 U.S. at 683. It is “presumptively reasonable” for ICE to detain an individual with that status for a total of six months. *Id.* at 701. To this day, Rudenko is still within that reasonable detention period.

A dicta footnote in *Akinwale* does not alter this outcome. 287 F.3d at 1053 n.3. In part, *Akinwale* decided whether the action was premature. *Id.* at 1051-52. There was no doubt it was since petitioner filed four months after he was “taken into custody.” *Id.* 1051. In dicta and its related footnote, *Akinwale* stated the six-month term was inclusive of the removal period (i.e., six months in total, not six months on top of the ninety-day removal period). ICE does not dispute that. Instead, *Akinwale*’s express holding is relevant: petitioner “must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months.” *Id.* at 1052.

There is no way Rudenko can make that showing. It is undisputed he has not been in physical detention for six months. As explained, the constitutional detention

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<sup>4</sup> See also *Callender v. Shanahan*, 281 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); *Rodriguez-Guardado v. Smith*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 331, 335 n.8 (D. Mass. 2017); *Rivera v. Hassell*, No. 4:15-01497-WMA-SGC, 2016 WL 4257692, at \*3 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2016), *R&R adopted*, 2016 WL 4257052 (Aug. 10, 2016); *Chun Yat Ma v. Asher*, No. C11-1797 MJP, 2012 WL 1432229, at \*3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2012); *Raia v. Aviles*, No. 11-3374 (WJM), 2011 WL 2710275, at \*5 & n.9 (D.N.J. July 6, 2011); *Thelemaque v. Barr*, No. 20-20467-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid, 2020 WL 13551808, at \*2 & n.1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2020); *Aionesei-Lupu v. Barr*, No. 1:20-cv-22998-BLOOM, 2020 WL 8679783, at \*2 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2020); *Cruz v. Lumpkin*, No. H-23-2224, 2023 WL 4566252, at \*1 n.7 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2023).

period cannot start running without some form of constraint. This case is unripe because *Zadvydas* does not protect against detention that never existed.

Importantly, that six-month period is a bright-line, irrebuttable presumption of constitutionally acceptable detention. See *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701; *Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1052.<sup>5</sup> It is only “after” this time that SLRRFF and *Zadvydas* burden-shifting comes into play. *Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. at 529 (cleaned up); see also *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 298-99; *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005); *Jama v. ICE*, 543 U.S. 335, 347-48 (2005). In American English, after means “following in time or place or subsequently to the time when or later in time.” *Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Ubiquiti, Inc.*, No. 1:23-cv-00865-JCG, 2025 WL 1640270, at \*3 (D. Del. June 10, 2025) (cleaned up). The word gets used to “describe a temporal sequence.” *Id.*; see also *Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.*, No. 02-22555-CIV, 2004 WL 5504978, at \*42 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2004) (giving “after” its “ordinary meanings” like “following in time”). Until the Supreme Court recognizes a *Zadvydas* challenge *during* that six-month period, the Court cannot create that cause of action where none exists in derogation of *Akinwale*. See 287 F.3d at 1052 (“This six-month period thus must have expired . . . in order to state a claim under *Zadvydas*.”).

To require detailed justification from ICE before the *Zadvydas* period expires is

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<sup>5</sup> See also *Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Attorney General*, 516 F. App'x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013); *Gozo v. Napolitano*, 309 F. App'x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009); *Vaz v. Skinner*, 634 Fed. App'x 778, 782 (11th Cir. 2015); *Ivantchouk v. U.S. Attorney General*, 417 Fed. App'x 918, 921 (11th Cir. 2011); *Chance v. Napolitano*, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011); *Agyei-Kodie v. Holder*, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011); *Okpoju v. Ridge*, 115 F. App'x 302, 302 (5th Cir. 2004).

a significant infringement on separation of powers principles. Essentially every question related to immigration is “exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). This is not a recent development. *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018) (“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments.” (cleaned up)). That power, however, is always “subject to important constitutional limitations.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 695. “In these cases, we focus upon those limitations.” *Id.*

Other principles of judicial review come into play too. *Id.* at 700. Courts “recognize primary Executive Branch responsibility” in this field. *Id.* They must also “give expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise.” *Id.* Important here, that includes “Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters.” *Id.* These basic separation-of-powers principles “require courts to listen with care when the Government’s foreign policy judgments, including, for example, the status of repatriation negotiations, are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise.” *Id.*

The Executive branch is attempting to remove Rudenko—who is a convicted felon originally from the Soviet Union apparently born to Russian parents in present-day Ukraine. Following its loss in the Cold War, the Soviet Union is no more. Currently, Ukraine and Russia are locked in a bitter war that is not cold in the least. The Executive’s efforts to remove Rudenko in these circumstances goes to the very

core of its power to enforce immigration laws and conduct delicate, ever-shifting foreign policy negotiations. *See United States v. Texas*, 599 U.S. 670, 679 (2023) (“That principle of enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context, where the Court has stressed that the Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only normal domestic law enforcement priorities but also foreign-policy objectives.” (cleaned up)); *Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 805-06 (2022) (“That is no less true in the context of immigration law, where the dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy.” (cleaned up)). Until Rudenko’s detention raises a constitutional problem—i.e., after six months—the political branches (namely, the Executive) must be permitted to pursue law enforcement and foreign policy objectives without interference.

To find otherwise would demand the Executive explain its constitutionally acceptable actions for the Judiciary to decide if it concurs based on an individual judge’s interpretation of current world events. Yet in the American system of delegated, separated powers, coequal branches need not justify to one another the determinations made within their legal discretion. That is especially true where—as here—the law largely entrusts the subject to the Executive alone.

What’s more, an interpretation allowing a challenge now grants rights based on the statutory definitions of removal and post-removal periods under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. But that statute literally specifies it “shall [not] be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United

States.” *Id.* § 1231(h). The only way to conclude SLRRFF burden-shifting applies now is by first concluding ICE’s failure to remove within the statutory period somehow entitles Rudenko to review. Again, that’s atextual.

Even if the Court were to get past the bright-line cutoff, there is no way for Rudenko to show no SLRRFF exists. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. At this point, ICE is working toward removal “the reasonably foreseeable future.” *See id.* Prior impediments to Rudenko’s removal related to differences between his birth (i.e., Arkady Bely) and current, legal names. Having resolved those distinctions, ICE now believes it can obtain travel documents in the reasonably foreseeable future. There are no allegations—much less evidentiary support—to rebut ICE’s SLRRFF determination.

As explained, these claims fail. Apart from that, Rudenko fails to show any regulatory violation.

### **C. Complying with OSUP Regulations**

The bulk of Rudenko’s challenge relates to alleged violations of OSUP and immigration regulations. But he misunderstands the facts and asks the Court to review decisions it plainly lacks jurisdiction over. In short, ICE exercised its discretion to revoke Rudenko’s OSUP and complied with its obligations in doing so.

Rudenko relies heavily on regulatory compliance—particularly 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13—contending ICE failed to comply with procedure. He alleges ICE did not give him notice and of the reasons for his revocation and a prompt informal interview to respond. But that just isn’t true under either regulation.

ICE provided Rudenko notice and interview. In exercising its discretion, ICE revoked the OSUP due to changed circumstances because it determined there is now SLRRFF. ICE provided an informal interview for Rudenko to respond, which he did. After this interview, ICE chose not to release. Now, therefore, Rudenko will receive a new review if he believes removal unlikely.

The procedure described above is exactly what relevant regulations require. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i); 241.4(l). Since ICE did not violate any regulations, habeas fails.

Section 241.13 “establishes special review procedures for those aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and are detained . . . where the alien has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal . . . in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* § 241.13(a). If ICE determines there is no SLRRFF, it can release under an OSUP—which happened for Rudenko. *Id.* § 241.13(h). But that is not somehow legal status to remain in the United States forever. These OSUPs must specifically “promote the ability of [ICE] to effect the alien's removal as ordered, or removal to a third country, should circumstances change in the future.” *Id.*

Nor is an OSUP the final word on SLRRFF. ICE can revoke them. *Id.* § 241.13(i). Notably, it may revoke “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* § 241.13(i)(2). ICE must then provide an informal interview—allowing the alien to respond and submit any evidence regarding SLRRFF. *Id.* § 241.13(i)(3). If ICE determines revocation and detention still remain appropriate, an alien may seek another request for review based on any additional evidence. *Id.*

§ 241.13(j).

Likewise, the procedure required by § 241.4 does not change the outcome. That provision sets out procedures and “authority to continue an alien in custody or grant release or parole.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a). Certain officials “may continue an alien in custody beyond the removal period . . . pursuant to the procedures described in this section.” *Id.*

For aliens released on supervision, authorities have broad powers to revoke their status. *Id.* § 241.4(l). Again, notice and interview procedures apply when ICE revokes release due to violations of OSUP conditions. *Id.* § 241.4(l)(1), (3). Yet one subsection—§ 241.4(l)(2)—likely does not include those notice, explanation, or interview requirements. *Id.* § 241.4(l)(2); *Tanha v. Warden, Balt. Detention Facility*, No. 1:25-cv-02121-JRR, 2025 WL 2062181, at \*6 n.10 (D. Md. July 22, 2025). Regardless, of the notice procedure required, § 241.4(l) vests broad “discretion” if “in the opinion of the revoking official” ICE should “enforce a removal order” (among other options). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).

This “regulation permits the Government extraordinarily broad discretion to revoke an OSUP.” *Tran v. Baker*, No. 1:25-cv-01598-JRR, 2025 WL 2085020, at \*4 (D. Md. July 24, 2025). In fact,

the regulation does not compel the Government to demonstrate what facts or factors, if any, it considered in deciding to revoke; nor does the regulation (or any other authority of which the court has been made aware) require the Government to demonstrate what, if any, steps it took to effect or secure removal prior to OSUP revocation.

*Id.*; see also *Grigorian*, 2025 WL 1895479, at \*6 (noting differences between both

subsections). The Court recently recognized the deference afforded to ICE when it decides the time is appropriate to revoke an OSUP and enforce a removal order. *Valdes-Santovenia v. Ripa*, No. 2:25-cv-01063-JES-DNF, 2025 WL 3771264, at \*3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2025) (Steele, J.).

As described above, ICE revoked the OSUP. This was based on its discretionary determination that circumstances changed and there is now SLRRFF. Because ICE provided Rudenko notice and an informal interview required by either § 241.4(l) or § 241.13(i), he cannot establish a violation.

Crucially, the actual decision to revoke is entirely discretionary and beyond the Court's review—it can only maybe review the process by which revocation occurred.<sup>6</sup> *Navarro v. Bondi*, No. 8:25-cv-3213-KKM-NHA, 2025 WL 3275944, at \*2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (“In the present context, courts differentiate between the decision to revoke an OSUP and a failure to follow procedures in doing so.” (cleaned up)); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“In other words, while courts cannot question the discretion that is exercised, they can address the process used to exercise that discretion.”). Put bluntly: courts “will not further scrutinize ICE’s discretionary decision” in that regard. *Roe v. Oddo*, No. 3:25-CV-128, 2025 WL 1892445, at \*8 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2025); *Yi Mei Zhen v. ICE*, No. 3:25-cv-01507-PAB, 2025 WL 2258586, at \*10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025).

What’s more, even if the Court could get to the issue of SLRRFF, Rudenko

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<sup>6</sup> Again, the revocation of an OSUP is clearly a “decision or action” to “execute removal orders” stripped from the Court’s jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

cannot show its absence. It appears his argument on that matter is the Ukrainian and Russian governments did not grant him travel documents over a decade ago. But a lot happened since then. That single fact falls short on lack of SLRRFF showing. *Godinez Perez*, 2025 WL 2806557, at \*3 (holding SLRRFF not established on conclusory allegations even for alien who had withholding of removal to home country).

Even if some further notice and an interview were required, the proper relief would be ordering that to occur. *See Yi Mei*, 2025 WL 2258586, at \*10 n.19 (noting “even if these procedures have not yet been completed, courts have found that such procedures may take place after the detention has occurred”). The remedies sought of release from custody are “an overreach and not the appropriate cure.” *Tanha*, 2025 WL 2062181, at \*6; *see also Tran*, 2025 WL 2085020, at \*6-7 (holding errors in notice procedure “do not entitle [petitioner] to release from detention”). The proper remedy for these allegations would be—at most—ordering ICE to provide Rudenko notice and an informal interview before removal. *See, e.g., I.V.I. v. Baker*, No. JKB-25-1572, 2025 WL 1811273, at \*3 (D. Md. July 1, 2025) (“And while habeas is a proper vehicle to challenge detention that is without statutory authority or violative of the Constitution, it is not a proper vehicle for vindicating every procedural error the Government may have committed along the way.”).

True, some courts have ordered release when they believed ICE should be providing more robust notice and hearing. *E.g., Grigorian v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at \*8-10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). Respectfully, many of these decisions appear driven by policy disagreement with the current immigration

enforcement environment rather than grounding in any cognizable law. To be clear, there is nothing in the INA or relevant regulatory scheme providing for full-blown evidentiary hearings with defined preparation deadlines when ICE revokes an OSUP. The regulations simply say aliens get an “informal interview” after revocation to contest revocation and detention. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1); 241.13(i)(3). And if that doesn’t result in release, the alien can request a more thorough review. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(3); 241.13(j).

At this stage, ICE already provided the minimum notice and hearing required by regulation. To conclude otherwise would simply be reading more requirements into ICE’s own regulations to say it should be providing more initial opportunity for aliens to contest revocation and detention. But that isn’t adjudicating a due process or *Accardi* claim; that’s policymaking. Due process is simply the process due under the law and circumstances—not an individuals most desired procedure. *See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (cleaned up)).

ICE can revoke OSUPs in its discretion based on its determinations—which are substantively unreviewable. ICE can continue to detain if an alien does not change its mind after informal interview. All this happened here. Now, Rudenko is free to contest SLRRFF with ICE again using the regulatory procedure and providing evidence in support of his position. Or if he is not removed within the 180-day *Zadvydus* time, he can refile a habeas petition to challenge SLRRFF before the Court. Until then, this

action is premature and there is nothing for the Court to review.

As for his challenge to proper delegation of powers on OSUP revocations, Rudenko misunderstands the facts. His OSUP was signed by an AFOD. Two years ago, the FOD delegated OSUP revocation powers to AFODs. (Ex. 3 at 3). So the delegated power argument is factually flawed. Nor is an AFOD required to set out any specific findings in her OSUP revocation determination about the public's interest. *Barrios*, 2025 WL 2280485, at \*7; *see also Valdes-Santovenia*, 2025 WL 3771264, at \*3.

In short, ICE did not violate the OSUP or regulations raised in the Petition. Nor has any due process violation occurred.


### **Conclusion**

For those reasons, the Court should deny the Petition. To the extent that the Court grants any relief, the only proper relief would be whatever notice and hearing requirement it believes proper—not outright release.

Date: January 3, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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