

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ARKADY RUDENKO

Petitioner-Plaintiff,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, in their official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security;

PAMELA BONDI, in their official capacity as Attorney General of the United States;

MATTHEW MORDANT, in their official capacity as Florida Soft Side South Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

TODD LYONS, in their official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

GARRET RIPA, in their Official capacity as, Director of Miami Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

JUAN AGUDELO, in their Official capacity as Interim field office director for ICE in Miami,

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE);

Respondents-Defendants.

Case No. _____

Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Oral Argument Requested

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The Petitioner, Arkady Rudenko, submits this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for Related Relief, by and through undersigned counsel and alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued and unlawful detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The Petitioner seeks immediate release, or in the alternative, a constitutionally adequate bond hearing.

2. Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, but on or about November 4, 2025 ICE detained him without notice or opportunity to be heard, on the decision of an individual without authority to do so, without findings required by law, and in violation of agency rules

3. Petitioner was detained on November 4, 2025, in Broward County, and has remained in civil detention in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Florida Soft Side South, also known colloquially as Alligator Alcatraz.

4. Respondents-Defendants' actions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations, and the Accardi doctrine, which obligates administrative agencies to follow their own rules, procedures, and instructions.

5. Petitioner brings this action for habeas relief and respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner's release from custody, with appropriate conditions of supervision if necessary.

6. Continued detention under these circumstances serves no legitimate governmental purpose and violates the humanitarian and constitutional principles that govern civil immigration custody.

7. This petition challenges the government's ongoing violation of Petitioner's statutory and constitutional rights. ICE's re-detention of Petitioner has become arbitrary, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

8. ICE's re-detention is in violation of ICE's own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed

circumstances, (4) removal has been significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R §241.13(i)(2).


9. Additionally, and alternatively, ICE has failed to provide the Petitioner with an Informal Interview in violation of its own regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Petitioner is in federal custody and seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his continued civil detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

11. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) because Petitioner is detained within the geographic boundaries of the Middle District of Florida, at Florida Soft Side South in Collier County, Florida, which lies within the Fort Myers Division of this District.

PARTIES

12. Petitioner, ARKADY RUDENKO is a stateless individual, born on . (Please see Exhibit A) He entered the United States on or about October 22, 1979, and has continuously resided in this country for more than forty-five years. Petitioner is currently detained at Florida Soft Side South since November 4, 2025. He is in custody of ICE, and under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents.

13. Respondent KRISTI NOEM is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent NOEM is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody. Respondent NOEM is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

14. Respondent PAM BONDI is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for

Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent BONDI is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

15. Respondent, MATTHEW MORDANT is sued in their official capacity as the Warden of the Florida Soft Side South Facility. Respondent Mordant has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to the facility's contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain noncitizens and is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent MORDANT therefore is a legal custodian of Petitioner.


16. Respondent TODD LYONS is sued in their official capacity as the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

17. Respondent GARRET RIPA is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of the Miami Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Ripa exercises authority over Petitioner's detention, transfer, and potential release.

18. Respondent, JUAN AGUDELO, is sued in his official capacity as the Interim Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for in Miami, FL. Respondent Agudelo exercises authority over Petitioner's detention, transfer, and potential release.

19. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) is the agency directly responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

20. Petitioner was born in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter "USSR") on , in the city of Odessa- which is located in present-day Ukraine. The Petitioner, his mother and stepfather were paroled into the United States as Refugees on October 22, 1979, and forfeited their USSR citizenship. His status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident on July 7, 1983. On the Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful Permanent Residence, the Petitioner's country of nationality is filled in as "stateless." (Please see Exhibit A)

21. On June 20, 2011, the Petitioner was convicted and subsequently placed in removal proceedings before the Immigration Court.

22. On October 3, 2011, while detained at Krome Service Processing Center (hereinafter "Krome") the Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States to Ukraine/Russia. (Please see Exhibit B)

23. On or about October 6, 2011, a Post Order Custody Review worksheet was prepared and placed in the Petitioner's immigration record. Also in his

immigration file are print outs of what appear to be the Russian Federation and Ukrainian travel document request parameters current through 2009. (Please see Exhibit C).

24. On or about February 1, 2012, through prior counsel, the Petitioner formally requested release from custody after having been detained about 120 (one hundred twenty) days since the entry of a final order of removal. (Please see Exhibit D) In the request, the Petitioner noted that Ukraine had denied the issuance of a travel document and that Russia would deny but required an in-person interview with the Petitioner to issue a formal denial of a travel document. Additionally, the Petitioner does not speak or read Ukrainian. The Petitioner fled from the USSR at such a young age, he has very little memory of the former Soviet town where he was born.

25. Upon information and belief, the Petitioner was released from custody on an unknown date in 2012 and placed on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Petitioner has since lived his life as a stateless person with a work permit, routinely checking in with ICE. The Petitioner has never violated the terms of his supervision order.

26. On or about November 3, 2025, ICE appeared at the Petitioner's home in Hollywood, FL, telling him to get down on the ground, and detained him. The Petitioner was handcuffed and placed in a van.

27. On November 4, 2025, ICE gave the Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release. The document stated that "based on a review of his official alien file and/or a personal interview on account of changed circumstances ICE determined a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." The Notice cites both "8 C.F.R. § 241.4/241.13."

28. The Notice then states "You will promptly be afforded an informal interview." To date, the Petitioner has not had any interview, formally or informally, with any ICE officers.

29. Upon information and belief, the Notice was signed by a special agent, with the name of the Assistant Field Officer Director in Miramar, FL under the signature and served on the Petitioner by a special agent.

30. The Petitioner did not receive any information that the governments of Ukraine or Russia had found Mr. Rudenko eligible for a travel document at any point during this process.

31. The Petitioner's mother is a U.S. Citizen and suffers from Parkinson's disease. The Petitioner is her only child as well as her financial provider due to her condition.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Due Process Governs Decisions to Revoke an Order of Supervision

32. "The Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citation modified). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Id.* at 690.

33. Under substantive due process doctrine, a restraint on liberty like revocation of a non-citizen's order of supervision is only permissible if it serves a "legitimate nonpunitive objective." *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). The Supreme Court has only recognized two legitimate objectives of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or preventing flight prior to removal. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690-92 (discussing constitutional limitations on civil detention).

34. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty,” like the decision to revoke a non-citizen’s order of supervision. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (citation modified). “The fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” *Id.* at 333 (citation modified).

Statute and Regulations Governing Procedures for Revoking an Order of Supervision

35. A non-citizen with a final order of removal “who is not removed within the [90-day] removal period . . . shall be subject to [an order of] supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (titled “Supervision after 90-day period”).

36. A non-citizen may only be detained past the 90-day removal period following a removal order if found to be “a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal” or if the order of removal was on specified grounds. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6).

37. But even where initial detention past the 90-day removal period is authorized, if “removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold

continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by [§ 1231(a)(6)]. In that case, of course, the alien's release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700.

38. The Regulations for issuance and revocation of an Order of Supervision, and re-detention of a non-citizen past the removal period relevant here are 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and §241.13.

39. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 generally governs the detention and release of non-citizens under a final order of removal, unless the Service releases a non-citizen after making a determination under §241.13 that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13

40. Generally, the Service may release an alien on an Order of Supervision (OSUP) under § 241.4 if it determines that the alien would not pose a danger to the public or a risk of flight, without regard to the likelihood of the alien's removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

41. When a non-citizen is initially released on an OSUP pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g), after the service made a determination there was no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the subsequent decision to revoke the OSUP is regulated by 8 C.F.R. §241.13(i), which states that any non-citizen released under an order of supervision under this section who violates any of the conditions of release may be returned to custody. 8 C.F.R. §241.13(i)(1).

42. The Service may also revoke an alien's release under section 241.13(i)(2) and return the non-citizen to custody if, on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).

43. Upon revocation pursuant to section 241.13(i), the non-citizen will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his release. 8 C.F.R. §241.13(i)(3). The Service will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the non-citizen an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. *Id.* The non-citizen may submit any evidence or information that he believes shows there is no significant likelihood he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he has not violated the order of supervision. *Id.* The revocation

custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release. *Id.*

44. Thereafter, if the alien is not released from custody following the informal interview, the provisions of § 241.4 shall govern the alien's continued detention pending removal. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).

45. If, however, the initial decision to release the non-citizen and place them on an Order of Supervision was made pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, ICE can revoke an OSUP pursuant to §241.4(l) if the individual violates conditions of release or:

in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official: (1) the purposes of release have been served; (2) the alien violates any condition of release; (3) it is appropriate to enforce a removal order; or (4) the conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.

8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).

46. Upon revocation of an order of supervision, ICE must give a non-citizen notice of the reasons for revocation and a prompt informal interview to respond. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).

47. If the non-citizen is not released from custody following the informal interview, ICE must then commence “[t]he normal review process ...with notification to the alien of a records review and scheduling of an interview, which will ordinarily be expected to occur within approximately three months after release is revoked.” *Id.* at § 241.4(l)(3).

48. ICE’s regulations permit only certain officials to revoke an order of supervision: the ICE Executive Associate Director, a field office director, or an official “delegated the function or authority . . . for a particular geographic district, region, or area.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 241.4(l)(2). If the field office director or a delegated official intend to revoke an order of supervision, they must first make findings that “revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate [Director].” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).

The *Accardi* Doctrine Requires Agencies to Follow Internal Rules

49. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, a foundational principle of administrative law, agencies must follow their own procedures, rules, and instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (setting aside an order of deportation where the Board of Immigration Appeals failed

to follow procedures governing deportation proceedings); *see also Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).

50. *Accardi* is not “limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations.” *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts must also reverse agency action for violation of unpublished rules and instructions to agency officials. *See Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 235 (affirming reversal of agency denial of public assistance made in violation of internal agency manual); *U.S. v. Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969) (under *Accardi*, reversing decision to admit evidence obtained by IRS agents for violating instructions on investigating tax fraud).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One

Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Substantive Due Process

51. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

52. When ICE issued Petitioner an order of supervision, the Service found that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk, or that there was no significant likelihood he would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

53. When Respondents revoked the order of supervision, Petitioner had complied with every condition of the order and ICE had not secured necessary travel documents for removal. No change in circumstances warranted the order's revocation.

54. Petitioner's detention therefore does not bear a reasonable relationship to the two regulatory purposes of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or flight prior to removal.

55. Because Respondents had no legitimate, non-punitive objective in revoking Petitioner's order of supervision, Petitioner's detention violates substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Count Two

Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Procedural Due Process

56. Plaintiffs reallege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

57. Courts balance three factors to determine whether procedural due process is satisfied: (1) the private interest at issue; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements entail. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

58. The first factor, the private interest at issue, favors Petitioner. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690.

59. The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and the probable value of procedural safeguards, favors Petitioner. To safeguard against erroneous deprivations of liberty, the statute specifies the limited number of reasons that an order of supervision can be revoked. Regulations specify who may lawfully revoke the order and the procedures that must be

followed when doing so, including giving notice and an opportunity to be heard. Respondents violated those laws here, leaving the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty not just high, but certain. Requiring Respondents to give notice and an opportunity to respond prior to revoking an order of supervision is of great value because it reduces the probability of needless detention of a person, like Petitioner, who is neither dangerous nor a flight risk.

60. The third factor, the government's interest, also favors Petitioner. When the government ignores law that ensures notice and an opportunity to respond to a person at risk of revocation of an order of supervision, it is more likely to waste limited financial and administrative resources on unnecessary detention of people who are neither flight risks nor dangerous. This waste drags down the efficiency of the entire immigration system. And because the government must also spend resources defending against a habeas corpus petition in federal court to compel Respondents to comply with law, requiring Respondents to instead provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond prior to revoking an order of supervision reduces fiscal and administrative burdens on the government.

61. For these reasons, revoking Petitioner's order of supervision without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Count Three

Violation of Statute and Regulations Governing Procedures for Revoking an Order of Supervision

62. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

63. Respondents violated agency regulations at 8 C.F.R. §241.4 and §241.13, governing who and upon what findings the Service may properly revoke an order of supervision when it revoked Petitioner's order.

64. The Respondent's gave Petitioner a Notice signed by an Assistant Field Officer Director or a Special Agent, and the signature is unclear as to which of the two signed it. Either way, neither is the executive associate director or field office director and no finding was made that "revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate [Director]." 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).

65. "As a result, this Court cannot conclude that [the revoking officer] had the authority to revoke release" and Petitioner "is entitled to release on that

basis alone.” *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 162 (citing *Rombot v. Moniz*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 386, 386-89); see also, e.g., *Zhu v. Genalo*, 2025 WL 2452352 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, 2025 WL 2430267 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (releasing habeas petitioner where revocation of an ICE order of supervision was ordered by someone without regulatory authority to do so).

66. Respondents also violated agency regulations in providing the notice after revocation and failing to provide any interview upon revocation.

67. Respondent’s issued Petitioner a Notice of Revocation that does not specify which regulation the revocation is being pursued by; however, the revocation is problematic via both 8 C.F.R. §241.13 and 241.4.

68. The Petitioner was released initially on an Order of Supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §241.13(g), as evidenced by the fact that his release was procured after his request and indication that his removal was not reasonably likely in the future, and the revocation of his OSUP is accomplished by adherence to 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i)(1) or (2). However, the Petitioner did not violate any of the conditions of release and there was no determination that there is a significant likelihood that the Petitioner may be

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He remains a stateless individual with no travel documents.

69. Alternatively, even if the Petitioner was released initially on an OSP pursuant to 8.C.F.R. § 241.4, the revocation is flawed and violates the agency's regulations.

Count Four
Violation of the *Accardi* Doctrine

70. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

71. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Petitioner has a right to set aside agency action that violates agency procedures, rules, or instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (“If petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing”).

72. Under *Accardi*, Respondents' revocation of the order of supervision, a decision to ignore the requirements of the regulations, should be set aside for violating agency procedures, rules, or instructions.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that this Court:

- a. Exercise jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin Petitioner's removal or transfer outside the jurisdiction of this Court and the United States pending its adjudication of this petition;
- c. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the INA and implementing regulations and the *Accardi* doctrine;
- d. Order Petitioner's immediate release;
- e. Award Petitioner costs and reasonable attorneys' fees; and
- f. Order such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

 /s/Carolina A. Collado

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8 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with the Petitioner the events described in this Petition and Complaint. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in this Petition and Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.