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4
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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
7 BAKERSFIELD, CA

8 **JIWAN SINGH**

9 Petitioner,

10 v.

11 **SERGIO ALBARRAN**, Field Office Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations, **ERO**
12 San Francisco Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; **Kristi NOEM**,
13 Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
14 HOMELAND SECURITY; **Todd M. Lyons**,
Acting Director of the United States
15 Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
16 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW; **Warden**, California City Corrections
17 Center

18 Respondents

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
AND COMPLAINT FOR
INJUNCTIVE
AND DECLARATORY RELIEF**

INTRODUCTION

1
2 1. Petitioner Jiwan Singh brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek
3 enforcement of their rights as members of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado*
4 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) Petitioner is in the physical
5 custody of Respondents at the California City Corrections Center. He now faces unlawful
6 detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for
7 Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf
8 of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

9 2. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on
10 behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and
11 extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-
12 CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025)
13 (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista*
14 *v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D.
15 Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible
16 Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners'
17 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

18 3. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained
19 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
20 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

21 4. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the
22 Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to
23 abide by the declaratory relief and have maintained an erroneous position stating that the
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1 declaratory judgment is not final and is not considered to be a binding judgment in view of
2 which the Respondent withdrew his bond thereby obviating his opportunity to be released.

3 5. Petitioner, Jiwan Singh is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

4 a. does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the
5 California City Corrections Center. He was apprehended by immigration
6 authorities on December 02, 2025;

7 b. entered the United States without inspection over 2 years ago and was detained
8 at the border where he signed on the paperwork and was fingerprinted and then
9 released, *cf. id.*; and

10 c. is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

11 6. Thereafter, the DHS placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
12 1229a. DHS has charged Petitioner as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as
13 someone who entered the United States without inspection.

14 7. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

15 8. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, which carries the
16 full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Despite this binding mandate,
17 Respondents have disregarded their obligations under *Maldonado Bautista* by continuing to
18 detain Petitioner without affording him the bond eligibility and custody review required for
19 members of the Bond Eligible Class. Petitioner’s current detention—absent any statutory basis
20 and without consideration for release on bond—constitutes a direct violation of the judgment and
21 its implementing requirements.

22 9. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have
23 been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not
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1 controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the
2 agency's prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

3 10. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory
4 judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day,
5 Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

6 11. Alternatively, if the Court declines to order immediate release, it should require
7 Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
8 before an Immigration Judge within seven days, at which the government must bear the burden of
9 proving by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified. Absent such a
10 hearing, Petitioner should be released.

11 12. Petitioner's detention violates the plain language of the Immigration and
12 Nationality Act. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals, like Petitioner, who
13 previously entered and are now residing in the United States for years. Parole under 8 U.S.C. §
14 1182(d)(5)(A) terminates any prior custody under § 1225(b). Instead, such individuals are subject
15 to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. Section
16 1226(a) expressly governs individuals who, like Petitioner, may be charged as inadmissible for
17 having entered without inspection but are no longer subject to mandatory detention as "arriving
18 aliens."

19 13. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework
20 and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

21 14. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released
22 on the same conditions as he was previously released without any additional condition.

23 **JURISDICTION**
24

15. Petitioner is in physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the California City Corrections Center in California City, CA.

16. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

17. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

18. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the, Eastern District of California, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

19. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of California.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

20. The Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus “forthwith,”

21. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. *Id.* In any event, the legal issues have already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*, and the Court must grant the petition for writ on that basis.

22. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or

1 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the
2 writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and
3 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208
4 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

5
6 **PARTIES**

7 23. Petitioner Jiwan Singh is a citizen of India who has been in immigration
8 detention approximately since December 02, 2025. After ICE arrested Petitioner, the agency did
9 not set a bond amount, and Petitioner has been unable to seek custody review before an
10 Immigration Judge because IJs have incorrectly maintained that he—like other similarly situated
11 persons—is an “applicant for admission” and therefore not bond eligible. Petitioner was lawfully
12 released into the United States on May 18, 2023, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and has
13 continuously resided in the United States since that time.

14 24. Respondent Sergio Albarran, Field Office Director for ERO San Francisco, is
15 responsible for ICE’s regional custody decisions and is therefore also a proper respondent in his
16 official capacity. As such, Sergio Albarran is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is responsible
17 for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

18 25. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
19 Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and
20 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner’s detention. Ms.
21 Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

26. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

27. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

28. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

29. Respondent, Warden, is employed by The GEO Group, Inc., as Warden of the California City Correction Center, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

30. Custody determinations under § 1226(a) are individualized and based on the facts presented in those cases. Unlike § 1226(c), which can provide for categorical determinations for detention regardless of flight risk or safety risks, § 1226(a) requires a case-by-case review of the facts and circumstances.

31. Once a determination to release an individual from custody is made, the release order may be revisited when the facts or circumstances warrant revocation or reconsideration. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). For an individual who was once in custody, the Attorney General may take that individual back into custody by revoking the individual's release when the facts and circumstances warrant it.

1 32. Revocation and return to custody are authorized only based on the individualized
2 facts and circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9). By regulation, revocation decisions are limited
3 in nature and may only be made by certain authorized officials. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9).

4 33. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
5 noncitizens in removal proceedings.

6 34. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
7 proceedings before an IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally
8 entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d),
9 while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are
10 subject to mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

11 35. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
12 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
13 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

14 36. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered
15 removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)-(b).

16 37. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

17 38. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
18 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
19 –208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a)
20 was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat.
21 3 (2025).

22 39. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining
23 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained
24

1 under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited
2 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum
3 Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

4 40. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection
5 and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal
6 history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with
7 many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were
8 entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994);
9 see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the
10 detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

11 41. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that
12 rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of
13 practice.

14 42. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
15 Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the United States without
16 inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Ex.
17 2. The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have
18 resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

19 43. Even before ICE or the Board introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the
20 Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who
21 entered the United States without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the U.S.
22 District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is

23 ¹ Available at [https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-](https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission)
24 [applications-for-admission](https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission).

likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the *United States*. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

44. Further, the declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861

45. Court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation in these cases too. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-

1 MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-
2 02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No.
3 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-
4 11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No.
5 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to
6 agree” that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-
7 03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*,
8 No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

9 46. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it
10 defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the
11 statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

12 47. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether
13 the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under
14 § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

15 48. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible,
16 including those who entered without inspection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s
17 reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing
18 under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates
19 ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute
20 generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic*
21 *Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also* Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299,
22 at *7.

49. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

50. By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies only to individuals who are encountered at U.S. ports of entry or who have recently entered and are undergoing inspection at the border. The statute’s mandatory detention framework is expressly tied to the inspection and admission process for noncitizens who are “seeking admission” to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As the Supreme Court has explained, this detention regime operates “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a noncitizen seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of the INA

51. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

52. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

53. Additionally, the order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

54. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

55. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

56. By not considering Petitioner for a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner's statutory rights under the INA and the Court's judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

Violation of Due Process

57. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

58. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

59. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;
- c. Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide him with an individualized custody hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an Immigration Judge within seven days, at which the

1 government must bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
2 evidence that continued detention is justified;

- 3 d. Declare that Petitioner's detention without an individualized determination
4 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
- 5 e. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act
6 (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under
7 law; and
- 8 f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

9 DATED this December 11 of 2025.

10 /s/ Manpreet Singh Gahra
11 MANPREET SINGH GAHRA, ESQ.
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13 P.O. BOX 11717
14 PLEASANTON, CA 94588
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare that my office is Pleasanton, California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the action within. On December 11, 2025, I served the following documents: **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF § 2241** by placing a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope, each addressed as follows:

SERGIO ALBARRAN

Field Office Director

ERO San Francisco Field Office,

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

630 Sansome St,

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1 Civil Process Clerk

2 U.S. Attorney's Office

3 501 I St, Suite 10-107

4 Sacramento, CA 95814

5 Warden,

6 California City Corrections Center

7 22844 Virginia Boulevard

8 California City, Ca 93505

9 **By mail.** I am readily familiar with the business for collection and processing of
10 correspondence for mailing in the United States Postal Service and that this document, with
11 postage fully prepaid, will be deposited with the United States Postal Service this date in the
12 ordinary course of business.

13 I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
14 December 11, 2025, at Pleasanton, California.

15 s/ Manpreet Singh Gahra
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