

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LOURIVAL DOS SANTOS LOPES,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No.: 3:25-cv-1522-WWB-LLL

SCOTTY RHODEN, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Baker County; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; GARRETT RIPA, in his official capacity as Acting Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Miami Field Office; and PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Respondents, KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), GARRETT J. RIPA, in his official capacity as Field Office Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Miami Field Office, and PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, (“Federal Respondents”), respond to Petitioner Lourival Dos Santos Lopes’ (hereinafter “Lopes”) Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). The Court lacks jurisdiction here. Apart from that, Lopes’ detention is lawful. So, the Court should deny the writ and dismiss this action.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On December 11, 2025, Petitioner, who is a citizen of Brazil, filed the instant Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2243,

challenging his detention, at the Baker County Detention Center, as unlawful. See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-16. By Order dated December 16, 2025, this Court ordered service of the Petition and directed Respondents to respond within 30 days from the date of service. Doc. 13. Because the decision to detain Petitioner is not subject to review, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the relief sought or, alternatively, Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In the instant Petition, Lopes argues that he is being detained in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and in disregard of the nationwide class certification and entry of partial summary judgment entered in *Maldonado Bautista v. Noem*, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal). See Doc. 1, p 23-28. Because Lopes is being properly detained and because the *Maldonado Bautista* should not be applied, the instant Petition should be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a now 48-year-old Brazilian man, who entered the United States at an unknown time and place, although he alleges that he entered the country in 2004. See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-16, 26; Doc. 1-3, p 2. Petitioner is married to a Brazilian citizen, see Doc. 1-4, who also entered without inspection.

On September 30, 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Pinellas County as a result of a traffic violation for leaving the scene of an accident and failure to obtain a valid Florida drivers' license within 30 days of residing in the state. See Doc. 1, ¶ 34 at p. 14. On October 2, 2025, Lopes was encountered at the Pinellas County Jail by ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) officials and was issued a Notice to Appear, commencing removal proceedings. See Exhibit 1 (NTA dated Oct. 2, 2025).

See also Doc. 1, ¶ 37. Lopes is charged as removable under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for being present without admission or parole and not having a valid unexpired immigrant visa or passport, reentry permit, border crossing card, or suitable travel document. *Id.* Petitioner was transferred to the Baker County Detention Center where he has remained since on or about on October 3, 2025. Doc. 1, ¶ 36 at p 15.

Lopes seeks relief from removal through an EOIR-42B, Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents. See Doc. 1-11. Petitioner has a hearing on the master calendar scheduled for January 21, 2026. He has had two bond redetermination requests on November 12, 2025, and December 5, 2025, both of which were denied. See Doc. 1-14 (IJ Bond Order dated Nov 12, 2025) & Doc. 1-15 (IJ Bond Order dated December 5, 2025). A third request for bond redetermination was withdrawn on December 30, 2025. Petitioner had been in custody for approximately 62 days when he initiated the instant action on December 11, 2025, 2025; as of January 15, 2026, he has been detained for approximately 107 days.

Legal Standard

Federal courts may grant writs of habeas corpus for a petitioner “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner bears the burden to prove his custody violates federal law. *Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y of State*, 853 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021); *Martin v. Beto*, 397 F.2d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1968).

Discussion

As explained, the Court lacks jurisdiction. Even if the Court disagrees, however, Lopes' claims fail on the merits. Before getting to those matters, ICE must clarify its basis of detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

A. Habeas Return on Detention

In a habeas case, the respondent "shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention." *Id.* ICE is detaining Lopes under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Lopes is free to contend his detention under § 1225 is unlawful or argue he should instead be detained under § 1226(a). But § 1225(b)(2)—not § 1226—is the certified basis on which ICE is detaining Lopes.

B. Jurisdiction

There is no need to get into the nuances of § 1225 and § 1226 since the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Lopes' claims. There are three reasons why.

1. *Jurisdiction Stripping*

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." *Id.* (citations omitted).

In immigration habeas cases related to removal proceedings—as here—the INA divests this Court's jurisdiction to consider Lopes' claims challenging his detention pending a removal determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). "APA review does not apply when '(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.'" *Kanapuram v. USCIS*, 131 F.4th 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)).

There is no jurisdiction to review “any cause or claim . . . arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); *Gupta v. McGahey*, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013). This provision bars habeas review in federal courts when the claim arises from “discrete acts of commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders.” *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (cleaned up). These activities “represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process” that Congress had “good reason” to withhold from judicial review. *Id.*

When construing § 1252(g), one must limit the application “to just those three specific actions” listed. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). In doing so, “courts must focus on the action being challenged.” *Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS*, 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). At bottom, § 1252(g) bars review if the conduct “to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders is the basis of the claim.” *Gupta*, 709 F.3d at 1065.

The law is clear:

Securing an alien while awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to commence proceedings.

Id.; see also *Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because [the alien] challenges the methods that ICE used to detain him prior to his removal hearing, these claims are foreclosed by § 1252(g) and our decision in *Gupta*.”); *Johnson v. U.S. Attorney General*, 847 F. App'x 801, 802 (11th Cir. 2021). “By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE’s discretionary decisions to commence removal—and thus necessarily prevents us from considering whether the agency should have used a

different statutory procedure to initiate the removal process.” *Alvarez*, 818 F.3d at 1203. So, § 1252(g) strips the Court’s jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging detention pending removal proceedings.

ICE detained Lopes to initiate and to pursue removal proceedings. So now, ICE is detaining Lopes “while awaiting a removal determination.” *Gupta*, 709 F.3d at 1065. Under *Gupta*’s binding interpretation of § 1252(g), the Court plainly has no jurisdiction. *Id.* ICE decided to pursue removal proceedings against Lopes. And Congress specifically stripped the Court’s jurisdiction to review those discretionary decisions.

As the Eleventh Circuit made clear, what matters is whether the challenged conduct arose from decisions or actions to commence removal proceedings. *Gupta*, 709 F.3d at 1065 (“Each of these claims, then, challenges the actions the agents took to commence removal proceedings—exactly the claims that § 1252(g) bars from the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts.”). The Eleventh expressly reaffirmed this in several other decisions (both published and unpublished):

Because [plaintiff] challenges the methods that ICE used to detain him prior to his removal hearing, these claims are foreclosed by § 1252(g) and our decision in *Gupta*.

Alvarez, 818 F.3d at 1204; see also *Johnson*, 847 F. App’x at 802. The decisions and actions to detain Lopes (under either § 1225 or § 1226) arise from the commencement of removal proceedings. The INA strips jurisdiction over that review. *Gupta*, 709 F.3d at 1065; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

What’s more, “the sole function of habeas corpus is to provide relief from Unlawful imprisonment or custody, and it cannot be used for any other purpose.” *Cook v. Hanberry*, 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979). So, the only relief a habeas petitioner may receive is

release. *DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 119 (2020). Put differently, this case is only about whether ICE can detain Lopes pending removal proceedings. *Gupta* and its progeny hold the Court has no jurisdiction over such actions.

The Court also lacks jurisdiction on separate grounds.

2. *Zipper Clause*

The INA precludes review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” except judicial review of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). This is known as the “zipper clause” and applies where a petitioner seeks “review of an order of removal [or] the decision to seek removal.” *Canal A*, 964 F.3d at 1257; *DHS v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020). In reading this subsection alongside 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)—which limits review—courts conclude petitioners must funnel all aspects of challenges to removal proceedings through the avenue set out in § 1252(a)(5). *Nasrallah v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 573, 580 (2020) (“The REAL ID Act clarified that final orders of removal may not be reviewed in district courts, even via habeas corpus, and may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals.”); *see also Bonhometre v. Gonzales*, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) (There is “clear intent to have all challenges to removal orders heard in a single forum (the courts of appeals).”).

The zipper clause restrictions are broad but not unlimited. *Canal A*, 964 F.3d at 1257. Still, a claim arising from actions or proceedings brought to remove an alien clearly falls within the clause. *See Regents of Cal.*, 591 U.S. at 19.

Here, Lopes challenges ICE’s detention determination. This was an action arising from ICE’s choice to carry out proceedings to remove him from the United States. The

zipper clause is in full force; judicial review by this Court is inappropriate and contrary to the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

There is one final jurisdictional issue.

3. *Failure to Exhaust*

Lopes has yet to exhaust his administrative remedies. DHS makes initial decisions about custody and bond—which an IJ may review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a). But to get a bond hearing, the alien (or his lawyer) must make an application to the IJ for bond redetermination. *Id.* § 1003.19(b)-(c). The IJ's bond redetermination is “separate and apart from” the removal proceedings. *Id.* § 1003.19(d). If the alien disagrees with the IJ's decision, he may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). *Id.* § 1003.1(b)(7).

Lopes sought and received two bond hearings—which the IJ held. This mooted Lopes' assertions related to receiving a bond hearing. *See Juarez Alfredo v. Warden, Glades Cnty. Detention Ctr.*, No. 2:25-cv-00610-SPC-KCD (Doc. 5) (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2025). While the IJ ruled against him, Lopes did not appeal to the BIA.

To the extent that Lopes may argue futility in appealing to the BIA, he is mistaken. *See McGee v. Warden, FDC Miami*, 487 F. App'x 516, 518 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding no jurisdiction on habeas petition where petitioner failed to exhaust remedies despite argument doing so would be futile). Futility is not a blank check to relieve Petitioner's duty to exhaust his remedies. Under exceptional circumstances, courts may excuse an exhaustion requirement. *See Sanchez v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low*, No. 5:23-CV-79-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4489472, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2023); *Faison v. Warden, FCC Coleman*, No. 5:23-CV-67-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4489471 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2023); *Vasquez v. Warden, FCC Coleman Low*, No. 5:22-CV-517-WFJ-PRL, 2023 WL 4157364,

at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2023). Yet there are no facts alleged to support that relief in this case.

4. *Conclusion*

As explained, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this habeas action. Yet even if it disagrees, detention is still lawful.

C. Merits

At bottom, Lopes alleges ICE's decision to detain him under § 1225 rather than § 1226 was inappropriate, deprived his due process, and withheld a bond hearing. These claims fail as a matter of law because he is lawfully detained.

1. **Lopes is lawfully detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2).**

To interpret the relevant parts of the INA, courts first turn to the “plain meaning of the statute.” *Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions*, 581 U.S. 385, 391 (2017). If the statutory text is clear, the analysis ends. *Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga.*, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020).

The statutory scheme in § 1225(a) provides: “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a); *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140. Applicants for admission under this section fall into one of two categories. First, those initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation fall under § 1225(b)(1). Second, everyone else not encompassed by § 1225(b)(1) fall under the § 1225(b)(2) catchall. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(1), aliens are detained for the purpose of expedited removal. Under § 1225(b)(2), the “alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a”—*i.e.*, full removal proceedings—after “the examining immigration officer determines that

an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Read plainly, these subsections “mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297.

Given its statutory obligation, ICE detained Lopes under § 1225(b)(2). The Parties do not dispute he entered the United States illegally and without any authorization. Lopes’ detention pending his removal proceedings is not unlawful; rather, it is statutorily required. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see *Chaviano v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 1744349, at *6-8 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2025).

Essentially, Lopes argues § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to aliens who enter without inspection and are encountered after evading inspection for years. Doc. 1, p. 17-22. But nothing in the statutory language supports this conclusion. The term aliens is expressly contemplated by § 1225(a)(1)—defining applicants as a present alien “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Where the statutory text is otherwise clear, courts cannot add words or make up exceptions. *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015).

Sections 1225(a)(1) and (b)(2) are unambiguous. There are no geographic qualifiers; nor are any time limitations imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Notably, Congress included such time limitations in other parts of the same statute. For instance, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)—enacted contemporaneously with § 1225(b)(2)—applies a two-year continuous physical presence requirement. When Congress includes language in one part of a statute but omits it in another, it does so intentionally. *E.g.*, *Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.*, 344 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2003). Under these principles, the Court cannot read an additional “place of detention” or “period of residence” requirement into

§ 1225(b)(2) when it simply isn't there. Short of legislating, the Court cannot impose limitations on § 1225(b)(2) that Congress did not include. See *Germain v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 9 F.4th 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021).

As discussed, an alien's place of detention or period of residence is irrelevant under the plain language. What is relevant, however, is an alien's manner of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)-(b). Congress members said as much when amending the INA. See *Sturgeon v. Frost*, 587 U.S. 28, 54 (2019) ("The legislative history (for those who consider it) confirms, with unusual clarity, all we have said so far."). The statutory scheme that § 1225 and § 1226 replaced was structured so aliens who entered the United States undetected retained certain benefits—such as the availability of bond—where those who presented themselves at the border did not:

This subsection is intended to replace certain aspects of the current "entry doctrine," under which illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. Hence, the pivotal factor in determining an alien's status will be whether or not the alien has been lawfully admitted.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996). Recognizing that such a scheme incentivized evasion over presenting oneself at a port of entry, Congress set out to restructure the law to distinguish between deportability—applicable to admitted aliens—and inadmissibility—applicable to those present without admission. *Id.* at 226. So, aliens who enter surreptitiously "will not be considered to have been admitted." *Id.* Lopes' reading seeks to retroactively nullify this legislative fix and once again restore incentives to circumvent rather than comply with the INA.

To be fair, there are many recent decisions adverse to ICE's § 1225 position in this District. *E.g.*, *Juan Miguel Gomez-Pena v. Secretary, DHS*, No. 3:25-cv-1287-MMH-MCR

(Doc. 13) (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2026); *Melgar v. Secretary*, No. 2:25-cv-1002-JES-DNF (Doc. 12) (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2025); *Padilla Orellana v. Warden*, No. 2:25-cv-1195-SPC-NPM (Doc. 13) (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2026); *Garcia Raya v. ICE*, No. 2:25-cv-1109-KCD-DNF (Doc. 7) (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2025). There are, however, decisions in support of ICE's text-based argument. *Vargas Lopez v. Trump* thoroughly addressed this issue and agreed with ICE's reasoning. No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *7-10 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025). At least one other court came to the same conclusion. *Chavez v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025). And the BIA specifically explained this rationale in *Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216.

Lopes contends his detention under § 1225 is improper and his detention should be under § 1226(a). But Lopes did not meet his burden to establish detention under § 1226 should apply to him. Section 1226 is far broader than § 1225. Specifically, § 1226 applies to any "alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). An "alien" is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." *Id.* § 1101(a)(3). Meanwhile, the phrase "applicant for admission" in § 1225(b)(2) has distinct meaning, and not every single alien entering without inspection falls under this provision. Rather, the facts and circumstances concerning Lopes demonstrate he is an applicant for admission under § 1225(b)(2).

Lopes illegally entered the United States several years ago. He has no permission or status to remain in this country. So, it's undisputed Lopes has not been admitted to the United States.

Due to Lopes' unlawful immigration status, ICE is pursuing removal proceedings. Lopes has not stipulated that he is removable; nor has he indicated he will not contest removal. At any point, Lopes can seek release from detention to depart the United States

voluntarily. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a). But again, there is no indication he has any intention of doing so. Everything suggests Lopes will not agree to leave.

Yet, he has no status and was never admitted to the United States. Put differently, Lopes must be an applicant for admission if he wants to stay here. *Vargas Lopez*, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (Petitioner “wishes to stay in this country. This makes [him] an ‘applicant for admission,’ consistent with the conclusion of the BIA in *Hurtado* and *Jennings*.”). The alternative would be seeking an order to somehow remain unlawfully in the United States. *Id.* (That petitioner “illegally remained in this country for years does not mean that he is suddenly not an ‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(b)(2).”); *Hurtado*, 29 I&N at 221 (“If he is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not “seeking admission” (as he contends), then what is his legal status?”). At bottom, unless Lopes wants to leave, he is either an applicant for admission or seeking to remain here illegally.

To be clear, any alien intending to stay in the United States on any permanent basis must be admitted even if that’s twenty years after arriving. In the context of immigration law, “admission” is not like sneaking into a second showing at the movie theater where entry is de facto admission. Rather, this is a legal term of art. *Matter of Lopes Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 n.6 (BIA 2012) (noting “seeks admission” used by Congress “as a term of art”). The terms “admission” or “admitted” here mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Congress knows how to use a term of art. *E.g.*, *FAA v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (“[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when Congress employs a

term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” (cleaned up)). Lopes may have been living in the United States illegally for several years; but, he was never admitted—which is what makes his presence unlawful in the first instance. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (inadmissibility for presence “without being admitted”). The INA treats aliens as seeking admission even if they entered illegally and never formally applied. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); *Lopes Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743 n.6 (Unlawful entrants “deemed *constructive* applicants for admission by operation of” § 1225(a)(1).). Legislative word choices—especially terms of art—must have meaning. Congress chose to define “applicants for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

The recent enactment of the Laken Riley Act bolsters this conclusion. See Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). There, the categories of individuals subject to mandatory detention expanded to include those who entered the United States and were charged as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) or (a)(7) and have committed—or been charged or convicted of—certain specified crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Were “applicant for admission” under § 1225 interpreted as narrow as Lopes argues, then there would be no need to pass Laken Riley. Those aliens now covered by § 1226(c)(1)(E) would have already been subject to mandatory detention. Even if there are redundancies, those “are common in statutory drafting” and provide no “license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 229 (2020) (“The Court has often recognized: Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” (cleaned up)).

Likewise, ICE's position has been consistent since detaining Lopes. ICE initiated removal proceedings are under § 1229a—not § 1225 or § 1226. When ICE detained Lopes last year, it did so under the narrower provision tailored to his circumstances (*i.e.*, § 1225(b)(2)).

Finally, the fact that longstanding practice may have differed is not dispositive. The Constitution empowers the Judiciary to exercise judgment regarding the interpretation of laws independent from the political branches. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024). The question for this Court is not ICE's historical practice; instead, the inquiry is the correct statutory interpretation. As discussed, the best reading of the INA is what its words say—confirming ICE may detain Lopes under § 1225(b)(2). As explained, Lopes' detention under § 1225(b)(2) is lawful. The INA mandates his detention.

2. *Maldonado Bautista* should not be applied.

Contrary to Lopes' assertions, the *Maldonado Bautista* decision—as of December 18, 2025, the court has entered a final judgment, *Maldonado Bautista v. Noem*, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec 18, 2025)—should not apply to his case and, thus, does not entitle him to the relief he requests.

First, the court in *Maldonado Bautista*, in entering a final judgment, declined to vacate the decision of the BIA in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 2025). Further, *Hurtado* remains binding on ICE and immigration judges. See 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1) (“determination and ruling by the Attorney General to all questions of law

shall be controlling"). Thus, the final judgment entered by the *Maldonado Bautista* court does not entitle Petitioner to an individualized hearing.

Second, even if Petitioner does fit within the class in *Maldonado Bautista*, that decision is not binding on this Court. The *Maldonado Bautista* case is on appeal as of December 18, 2025 (Doc. 95); hence, this Court should not give preclusive effect to the declaratory final judgment entered in *Maldonado Bautista* on December 18, 2025. See *Maldonado Bautista*, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM (Doc. 94). Moreover, the declaratory judgment entered in *Maldonado Bautista* has no preclusive effect outside of the Central District of California and over custodians who are located outside of that District. See *Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998). See also *Burnham v. Superior Court of Cali.*, 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990). Hence, the Court should not apply the declaratory final judgment entered in *Maldonado Bautista* to this case.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons and citations of authority, the Court should deny the instant Petition and dismiss this action.

Dated: January 15, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 15, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of filing and a downloadable copy of the filed document to the following CM/ECF participant listed below:

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NOTICE TO APPEAR

DOB: [REDACTED]
Even: [REDACTED]

In removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

Subject ID: [REDACTED] PINS: [REDACTED] File No: [REDACTED]

In the Matter of:

Respondent: LOURIVAL DOS-SANTOS LOPES currently residing at:

[REDACTED] (Number, street, city, state and ZIP code) (Area code and phone number)

- You are an arriving alien.
- You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.
- You have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.

The Department of Homeland Security alleges that you:

1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States;
2. You are a native of BRAZIL and a citizen of BRAZIL;
3. You entered the United States at or near unknown, on or about unknown date;
4. You were not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.
5. You are an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Immigration and Nationality Act; and/or See Continuation Page Made a Part Hereof

On the basis of the foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

See Continuation Page Made a Part Hereof


- This notice is being issued after an asylum officer has found that the respondent has demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture.
- Section 235(b)(1) order was vacated pursuant to: 8CFR 208.30 8CFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv)

YOU ARE ORDERED to appear before an immigration judge of the United States Department of Justice at:

18201 SW 12TH ST, BLDG 1 STE C, BLDG 1 STE C MIAMI, FLORIDA 33194. KROME NORTH SERVICE PROCESSING
(Complete Address of Immigration Court, including Room Number, if any)

On October 20, 2025 at 8:00 am to show why you should not be removed from the United States based on the

charge(s) set forth above.


P 6589 PATEL - SDDO
(Signature and Title of Issuing Officer)

Date: October 2, 2025 Tampa, Florida
(City and State)

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