

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner JESUS SAMANO AGUILAR is a 52-year old citizen of Mexico who has resided in the U.S. for approximately twenty-three years. On information and belief, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection around 2002. Petitioner is currently detained at the South Texas ICE Processing Center at 566 Veterans Drive, Pearsall, TX 78061. *See Exhibit A- ICE Detainee Locator Results.*
2. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) insists that its authority to detain him stems from 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and that he is therefore ineligible for a bond hearing. This assertion is legally incorrect. Nevertheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has validated this position in contravention of the plain text of the statute and decades of statutory interpretation and practice.
3. Federal district courts across the nation have reached a clear consensus: Section 1225(b) does not apply to Petitioner's circumstances, and Respondents' reliance on this inapplicable statute renders his detention unlawful. Because Petitioner cannot be detained under Section 1225(b)(1) or Section 1225(b)(2), the only lawful basis for continued detention would be Section 1226—which provides for individualized bond determinations. However, Respondents do not assert they are detaining Petitioner under Section 1226. By detaining Petitioner under a statute that does not authorize his detention while simultaneously refusing to apply the statute that does, Respondents hold him in unlawful custody. Petitioner is therefore entitled to immediate release.
4. The present petition filed on behalf of the Petitioner is one of a number of recent lawsuits challenging the federal government's authority to detain noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). *See e.g. Roa v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-

7802, 2025 WL 2732923, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 2025) (describing the “tsunami” of recent similar cases in the Northern District of California) (quoting Hinestroza v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-7559, 2025 WL 2606983, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 9, 2025)); *see also* Savane v. Francis, No. 1:25-cv-6666, 2025 WL 2774452, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2025) (explaining that “[t]his is another case in a recent line of cases concerning the scope of the government’s authority to detain noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings”).

5. Accordingly, to preserve Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional rights, this Court should grant the instant petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the reasons stated *infra*. Absent an order from this Court, Petitioner will continue to suffer an unconstitutional deprivation of his right to liberty, as well as extreme irreparable harm given the personal facts of his situation. Petitioner asks this Court to find that his detention is unconstitutional and order immediate release from detention.

JURISDICTION

6. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*
7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).
8. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et. seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

Act, and oversees U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention / custody. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

19. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

20. Petitioner is a 52-year old -year-old native and citizen of Mexico. He was born on April 14, [REDACTED]. He entered the United States without inspection around 2002. This was his first and only entry into the United States. Petitioner has resided continuously in the United States for approximately twenty-three years.
21. Petitioner is a widower. His wife was a lawful permanent resident. His wife died of stomach cancer on May 9, 2021. Together, they had a US citizen daughter named [REDACTED] is only 15 years old. Petitioner's daughter was living with Petitioner at the time he was detained. Since, he was detained his 15-year-old daughter has had to live with an ex-wife of the brother (non-blood relative). Petitioner's daughter depends on him to take care of her and is her main emotional support.
22. Petitioner was driving a vehicle when he was detained by local police for a traffic stop on his way to work. He was picked up by ICE and later transferred to the South Texas ICE Processing Center.

23. Petitioner and his family have been suffering irreparable harm from his continued detention. Aside from the mere fact that he has been detained unlawfully, his detention is also causing severe harm to his family members, as he is the only provider for his child and his presence is critical to her well-being.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

24. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) lays out three basic forms of detention for noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard non-expedited removal proceedings before an immigration judge (IJ). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2). Last, the Act also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been previously ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).
25. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2). The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104--208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(a) was amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), which added section 1226(c)(1)(A) to the prior statutory framework. Following the enactment of IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people

who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered the U.S. without inspection—unless they were subject to some other detention authority—received bond hearings. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed to be “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

26. Respondents’ new policy of summarily detaining all noncitizens who entered the U.S. at any time without being admitted or paroled turns this well-established legal understanding and procedure on its heads and violates the statutory scheme of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Indeed, this legal theory that noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are ineligible for bond hearings has already been rejected by multiple federal District Courts, who have consistently found that such individuals are entitled to bond redetermination hearings before immigration judges, and who have rejected the application of § 1225(b)(2) to such cases. Nevertheless, in July of 2025, ICE released a memorandum instructing its attorneys to coordinate with the Department of Justice, the agency housing EOIR, to reject bond redetermination hearings for applicants who entered the United States without inspection or admission. Subsequently, on September 5, 2025 the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its precedent decision in *See Exhibit B - Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)*, in which the Board

VENUE

9. Venue is proper with this Court because Petitioner is detained at the South Texas ICE Processing Center at 566 Veterans Drive, Pearsall, TX 78061, which is within the jurisdiction of this District.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

10. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the respondents “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return “within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).
11. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

12. Administrative exhaustion is unnecessary as it would be futile. *See, e.g., Aguilar v. Lewis*, 50 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542–43 (E.D. Va. 1999). It would be futile for Petitioner to seek a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ because of the BIA recent decision holding that anyone who has entered the U.S. without inspection is now considered an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Exhibit B Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA

2025); *see also Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting that BIA's decision in *Yajure Hurtado* renders exhaustion futile).

13. Additionally, the agency does not have jurisdiction to review Petitioner's claim of unlawful custody in violation of his due process rights, and it would therefore be futile for him to pursue administrative remedies. *Reno v Amer.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (finding exhaustion to be a "futile exercise because the agency does not have jurisdiction to review" constitutional claims).

PARTIES

14. Petitioner, Jesus Samano Aguilar, is a citizen of Mexico. He is currently detained at the South Texas ICE Processing Center in Pearsall, Texas. He is in the custody, and under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents.
15. Respondent Bobby Thompson is the Warden of the South Texas ICE Processing Center and he has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to the facility's contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain noncitizens and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
16. Respondent Miguel Vergara is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director of the San Antonio Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Vergara is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.
17. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE. As the Acting Director of ICE, Respondent Lyons is a legal custodian of Petitioner.
18. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality

held that all non-citizens who have not been inspected and admitted are “applicant(s) for admission” and are thus subject to the mandatory detention provision found in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). In the decision, the Board applies highly questionable legal analysis and reasoning to arrive at its holding. This interpretation defies the INA and Petitioner’s right to Due Process pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

27. First, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.
28. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, which “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”
29. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.
30. By contrast, § 1225(b) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “Thus, for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met—in particular, an “examining immigration officer” must determine that the individual is: (1) an “applicant for admission”; (2) “seeking admission”; and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to

be admitted.” See Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). In other words, this requires (a) having a particular status, namely that of being an “applicant for admission”; (b) an affirmative, present tense act, namely that of “seeking admission”; and (c) a contemporaneous determination in response to said act by an examining immigration official, namely a determination that one is not “entitled to be admitted.”

31. The provision’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 address noncitizens who are presently “coming or attempting to come into the United States.” The statutory and regulatory text’s use of the present and present progressive tenses excludes noncitizens apprehended in the interior, because they are no longer in the process of arriving in or seeking admission to the United States. See, e.g., *Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238 at *6 (*citing the use of present and present progressive tense to support the conclusion that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals apprehended in the interior*). Although the BIA’s reasoning in *Yajure-Hurtado* draws from the Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) the Supreme Court in *Jennings* recognized the above distinction, stating that § 1225 “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” *Jennings*, at 297. The Supreme Court then notes that § 1226 “applies to aliens already present in the United States.” *Id.* at 303.

32. Second, traditional canons of statutory construction defy Respondents’ position. Under “one of the most *basic* interpretive canons ... [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant[.]” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (emphasis added). “This principle ... applies to interpreting any two provisions in the U.S. Code, even when

Congress enacted the provisions at different times.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010). Here, if the Respondents’ position were correct, and § 1225’s mandatory detention provisions apply to *all* inadmissible non-citizens then it would render superfluous provisions of 1226 that apply to certain categories of inadmissible noncitizens. See § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). See Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Put another way, section 1226(c)(1)(E)’s mandated detention for inadmissible noncitizens who are implicated in an enumerated crime, including those “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” would be meaningless since “all noncitizens who have not been admitted” would already be governed by 1225’s mandatory detention authority.”) (emphasis added). See also Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, n.5 (explaining that seemingly conflicting statutes read in isolation can be reconciled if read in their broader context, which includes observing the anti-superflousness canon).

33. Third, the recent Laken Riley Act amendments lend further support for this unassailable reading of § 1226. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). In January 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), which carved out an *additional* category of noncitizens from 1226(a)’s discretionary detention scheme. This category includes those noncitizens who are deemed inadmissible, including for being “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” and who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If § 1226(a) did not apply to noncitizens who are inadmissible for entering without having been admitted, then the added language applying § 1226(c)(1)(E) to those particular

inadmissible noncitizens would render Congress' most recent amendments to the INA as surplusage. "These 'specific exceptions' for inadmissible noncitizens who are arrested, charged with, or convicted of the enumerated crimes logically leaves those inadmissible noncitizens not criminally implicated under Section 1226(a)'s default rule for discretionary detention." Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *19 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025). Reading § 1225(b) to cover everyone present without admission would nullify the newly added § 1226(c)(1)(E) and the long-standing authority of § 1226(a). Congress's decision to target only certain inadmissible non-citizens with specific criminal conduct for mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) proves that the general rule under § 1226(a) applies to other inadmissible non-citizens. In sum, the statute can only be interpreted one way: 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to apprehensions at the border, while 1226(a) applies to apprehensions in the interior.

34. Fourth, Respondents' position is also in conflict with the legislative history of Section 1226(a). Upon passing IIRIRA, Congress declared that the new § 1226(a) "restates the current provisions in [the predecessor statute] regarding the authority of the Attorney General to arrest, detain, and release on bond a[] [noncitizen] who is not lawfully in the United States." *See* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229; *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 210 (same). Similarly, in a 1997 interim rule issued "to implement the provisions of [IIRIRA]," the underlying EOIR federal register notice explains that "[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled... will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination." 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). "Because noncitizens arrested while unlawfully residing in the United States were entitled to discretionary detention under section 1226(a)'s predecessor statute,

and Congress declared its scope unchanged by IIRIRA, this background supports the position” that Petitioner “is subject to discretionary detention.” Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *23 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025)

35. Overwhelmingly, “almost every district court to consider this issue has concluded, ‘the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades” support finding that § 1226 applies to these circumstances.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (citing Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4). *See also* Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7 (“In recent weeks, courts across the country have held that this new, expansive interpretation of mandatory detention under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect.”); Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-5240, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2025) (collecting cases and noting that “[e]very district court to address” the statutory question “has concluded that the government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice”); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (joining the “chorus” of courts concluding that § 1226 applies); Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025).

DUE PROCESS

36. Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). “To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” *Martinez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-1007-JKP, 2025 WL

2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025). Those factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.

37. As to the first element, “[t]he interest in being free from physical detention’ is ‘the most elemental of liberty interests.’ ” *Martinez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (quoting *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004)). Petitioner possesses a cognizable interest in his freedom from detention because he spent twenty-three years at liberty in the United States. See *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (“Because he spent nearly three years at liberty in the United States, Lopez-Arevelo possesses a cognizable interest in his freedom from detention.”)

38. Under the second *Mathews* factor, the Court considers “whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks.” *Martinez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2598379, at *3 (quoting *Gunaydin v. Trump*, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025)). Here, the risk of erroneous deprivation of his liberty under the current procedures is extraordinarily high. Petitioner unquestionably has a due process right to his liberty, which may not be abridged absent adequate procedural protections. The Supreme Court has explained that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Due process requires that immigration detention “bear[] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (quoting *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690). Specifically, immigration detention must be reasonably related to the government’s goals of preventing flight and protecting the community from harm, and be accompanied by adequate procedural protections to ensure that those goals are being served. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690-91. There is a high risk that Petitioner has been and will continue to be erroneously deprived of his liberty, without regard to any “reasonable relation” to any legitimate government purpose, and is therefore in violation of his right to substantive due process.

39. Here, Petitioner’s only recourse would be to request a custody redetermination hearing before the immigration judge. This would be a completely futile exercise because the immigration judge is mandated to follow the Board of Immigration Appeals decision in *Yajure Hurtado* which deprives the judge of jurisdiction over any request for release on bond. *See Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)
40. On the final factor, Respondents cannot identify any meaningful countervailing interest, other than perhaps their generalized interest in enforcing the INA as they interpret it. Overwhelmingly, federal courts have sided with immigrant detainees challenging their detention on similar grounds, on statutory and constitutional grounds, including courts in this district. *See e.g. Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *PUERTO-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. LYNCH et al.*, No. 1:25-CV-1097, 2025 WL 3012033 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); *Castellanos v. Kaiser*, No. 25-

CV-07962, 2025 WL 2689853, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025); *Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas*, No. CV 25-02943 PHX GMS (CDB), 2025 WL 2898389, at *21 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-CV-04836 (OEM), 2025 WL 2772765 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); *PÉREZ PINA, v. STAMPER*, No. 2:25-CV-00509-SDN, 2025 WL 2939298 (D. Me. Oct. 16, 2025); *Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem*, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); *Bermeo Sicha v. Bernal*, No. 1:25-CV-00418-SDN, 2025 WL 2494530 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2025).

41. “The appropriate relief for an immigration detainee held in violation of their right to due process is their immediate release from custody, and to be provided with relief returning them to *status quo ante*, i.e., the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” *Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas*, No. CV 25-02943 PHX GMS (CDB), 2025 WL 2898389, at *21 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025). “With regard to the specifics of the relief that might be ordered, in recent weeks many federal district courts” –including the Western District of Texas– “have ordered the immediate release of immigration habeas petitioners held in custody in violation of their due process rights.” *Id*; *See Santiago v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2025); *See also J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-cv-4836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); *Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11981, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, 2025 WL 2430267, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); *Bermeo Sicha v. Bernal*, No. 1:25-CV-00418-SDN, 2025 WL 2494530, at *7 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2025).

42. Alternatively, the court should order a bond hearing as a habeas remedy where the burden is on the government. Indeed “as of 2020, the ‘vast majority’—an ‘overwhelming consensus’—of courts granting immigration detainees’ habeas petitions have placed the burden on the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee poses a danger or flight risk.” *Lopez-Arevelo*, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12 (citing *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 855 n.14 (citations omitted)). “Allocating the burden in this manner reflects the concern that ‘[b]ecause the alien's potential loss of liberty is so severe ... he should not have to share the risk of error equally.’” (citing *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 214). “And the consensus appears to be holding, with many courts in recent days ordering a bond hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of justifying the immigration habeas petitioner's continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.” *Id.*; *Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos*, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); *Morgan v. Oddo*, No. 24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025); *J.M.P. v. Arteta*, No. 25-cv-4987, 2025 WL 2614688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025); *Espinoza*, 2025 WL 2581185, at *14; *Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar*, 2025 WL 2280357, at *12 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025).

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT ONE

Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Unlawful Denial of Bond Hearing

43. Petitioners repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
44. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility because

they previously entered the country without being admitted or paroled. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

45. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to bar Petitioners from receiving a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.

COUNT TWO

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

46. Petitioner repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
47. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment— from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).
48. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.
49. The government’s detention of Petitioner without the opportunity to request a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to Due Process pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter and maintain jurisdiction to the extent necessary to ensure Respondents’ compliance with any order this Court may issue;
- (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days.

- (3) Declare that the refusal to allow Petitioners a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge violates the INA and the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- (4) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents immediately release the Petitioner, or, in the alternative, provide a custody redetermination hearing before an impartial arbiter within two days in which the government bears the burden of showing that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community;
- (5) Order further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.

Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.

TX Bar No. 24143776

Jaime Ban-on, PC

4738 NW Loop 410 Suite 100

San Antonio, TX 78229

P: (210) 606-9300

E: dianisas@jaimebanon.com

Attorney for Petitioner

(Pro Hac Vice Application to be filed)

s/ Maria Nereida Jaimes

Maria Nereida Jaimes, Esq.

Texas Bar No. 24124936

O'Connor & Associates, PLLC

7703 N. Lamar Blvd. Suite 300

Austin, Texas 78752

P: (512) 617-9600

E: maria@oconnorimmigration.com

Local Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: December 10, 2025

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Jesus Samano Aguilar, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 10th day of December, 2025.

s/ Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.

Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 10, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and all accompanying exhibits to be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the following:

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas
Attn: Stephanie Rico | Civil Process Clerk
601 N.W. Loop 410, Suite 600
San Antonio, TX 78216

Warden, South Texas Detention Complex
Bobby Thompson
566 Veteran's Drive
Pearsall, TX 78061

Service on the United States Attorney constitutes service on all named federal Respondents in this matter, and service has also been made directly on the Warden as Petitioner's immediate custodian.

s/ Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.
Dianisa Erica Sosa, Esq.
TX Bar No. 24143776
Jaime Ban-on, PC
4738 NW Loop 410 Suite 100
San Antonio, TX 78229
P: (210) 606-9300
E: dianisas@jaimebanon.com
Attorney for Petitioner
(*Pro Hac Vice Application to be filed*)