

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION

Mohamed RASHED,

Petitioner-Plaintiff,

v.

George STERLING, in his official capacity as Director of the Atlanta Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jason STREEVAL, in his official capacity as Warden, Stewart Detention Center; TODD LYONS, acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General.

Respondents-Defendants.

Case No. 4:25-cv-00454

Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Order to Show Cause Within Three Days, and Complaint for Injunctive Relief

Oral Argument Requested

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §2241

INTRODUCTION

1. This case challenges the unlawful detention of Mr. Mohamed Rashed (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Rashed”), who is currently in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Stewart Detention Center. Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. But on or about April 25, 2025, ICE detained him without notice or opportunity to be heard, on the decision of an individual without authority to do so, without findings required by law, and in violation of agency rules that provide for an opportunity for an orderly departure when the time came for Petitioner’s removal from this country.

2. ICE found that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community when it previously released Petitioner from ICE detention on August 23, 2011, under an order of supervision. Since then, Petitioner has fully abided by the order's terms, including attending regularly scheduled check-ins with ICE.

3. During a regular scheduled check-in with ICE on approximately April 25, 2025, Respondents-Defendants suddenly revoked Petitioner's order of supervision and arrested him. Petitioner has been detained at Stewart Detention Center since then.

4. Respondents-Defendants' actions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the *Accardi* doctrine, which obligates administrative agencies to follow their own rules, procedures, and instructions.

5. Petitioner brings this action for injunctive, habeas, and declaratory relief ordering Respondents to release him.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.S. § 2243

6. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the respondents "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days is allowed." *Id.*

7. Court have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint and confinement. *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963)

(overruled on other grounds by *Wainwright v. Sykes*, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)) (emphasis added).

PARTIES

8. Petitioner, Mr. Rashed is currently detained at Stewart Detention Center after being detained following an ICE report, pending the government's attempt to obtain travel documents.

9. Respondent George Sterling is sued in his official capacity as the ICE Atlanta Field Office Director for Atlanta, Georgia, which includes Stewart Detention Center. Upon information and belief, he decided to revoke Petitioner's order of supervision.

10. Respondent Jason Streeval is sued in his official capacity as Warden of Stewart Detention Center, where Petitioner is currently detained.

11. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Director of ICE. He is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws, including immigrant detention. As such, Mr. Lyons is a legal custodian of Mr. Rashed. He is sued in his official capacity.

12. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for the administration of ICE, a subunit of DHS, and the implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws. As such, Ms. Noem is the ultimate legal custodian of Mr. Rashed. She is sued in her official capacity.

13. Respondent Pam Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and head of the Department of Justice, which encompasses the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Courts. Ms. Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws

with Respondent Noem. Ms. Bondi is a legal custodian of Mr. Rashed. She is sued in her official capacity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution because this action is a habeas corpus petition, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under federal law, including the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, *et seq.*, and Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, *et seq.*

15. Venue is proper in this district because Respondent Warden Streeval is Petitioner's immediate custodian and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because Respondents are officers of United States agencies, Petitioner currently resides within this District, and there is no real property involved in this action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

16. Petitioner is fifty-four (54) years old and came to the United States after the Egyptian government issued him travel documents over thirty (30) years ago. Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously since then. Prior to being detained, Petitioner, Mr. Rashed resided with his United States citizen wife, Leena Moahmoud, and their two United States citizen children. Petitioner also owned a restaurant that he operated with his wife, which has now stopped operating due to his absence for over six (6) months.

17. Petitioner's situation is unique in the fact that he is Stateless. Specifically, Petitioner's parents were born in the Gaza Strip. After the creation of the State of Israel, Petitioner's parents moved to the United Arab Emirates. In 1971, Petitioner was born in the United Arab

Emirates, but was not recognized as a citizen of the country due to the constitutional laws not granting birthright citizenship. Petitioner is also not recognized as a citizen of the Gaza Strip because he was not born there.

18. On January 19, 2011 Petitioner pled guilty to tax fraud.. He was subsequently placed in removal proceedings. On January 31, 2011, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed from the United States. He was detained at the time he was ordered removed from the United States. On August 30, 2011, ICE placed Petitioner on an Order of Supervision, after the appropriate travel document could not be obtained by ICE due to the Petitioner being stateless.

19. Since August 30, 2011, when ICE released Petitioner on an order of supervision, he has complied with all conditions of the order, including periodic check-ins with ICE. No circumstances have changed that make Petitioner a flight risk or danger to the community. In fact, Petitioner attended all of his ICE reports from November 1, 2011, until his detention on April 25, 2025.

20. Petitioner made attempts on his own to obtain a travel document. Specifically, on November 7, 2016, Petitioner sent a letter to the United Arab Emirates Consulate General requesting travel documents to allow him to be deported there.

21. On November 17, 2016, at an ICE report, an ICE Officer rescheduled Petitioner to await a response from the United Arab Emirates following his letter. Neither the Petitioner nor ICE received a response, and a travel document was never issued.

22. Throughout this time, Petitioner understood from a release notification accompanying the order of supervision that ICE would give “the opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure” after securing Petitioner’s travel documents.

23. Petitioner has now been detained for over six (6) months, and ICE has been unable to obtain a travel document from the United Arab Emirates or any other country.

24. Upon information and belief, the ICE Officer responsible for revoking Petitioner's Order of Supervision did not first refer the case to the ICE Executive Associate Director, did not make findings that revocation was in the public interest and that circumstances did not reasonably permit referral to the Executive Associate Director, and had not been delegated authority to revoke an order of supervision.

25. Upon arrest, ICE transferred Petitioner to the Stewart Detention Center, where he is currently detained.

26. Upon information and belief, at the time ICE revoked Petitioner's order of supervision, the agency had not secured travel documents necessary for removal from the United States.

27. Upon information and belief, to date ICE has not secured travel documents to facilitate Petitioner's removal from the United States despite Petitioner Rashed providing all information requested to help facilitate his removal.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Due Process Governs Decisions to Revoke an Order of Supervision

28. "The Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citation modified). "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Id.* at 690 (2001).

29. Under substantive due process doctrine, a restraint on liberty like revocation of a non-citizen’s order of supervision is only permissible if it serves a “legitimate nonpunitive objective.” *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). The Supreme Court has only recognized two legitimate objectives of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or preventing flight prior to removal. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690-92 (discussing constitutional limitations on civil detention).

30. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty,” like the decision to revoke a non-citizen’s order of supervision. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (citation modified). “The fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” *Id.* at 333 (citation modified).

Statute and Regulation Govern Procedures for Revoking an Order of Supervision

31. A non-citizen with a final order of removal “who is not removed within the [90-day] removal period . . . shall be subject to [an order of] supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (titled “Supervision after 90-day period”).

32. A non-citizen may only be detained past the 90-day removal period following a removal order if found to be “a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal” or if the order of removal was on specified grounds. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6).

33. But even where initial detention past the 90-day removal period is authorized, if “removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by [§ 1231(a)(6)]. In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances ” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700.

34. Regulations purport to give additional reasons, beyond those listed at § 1231(a)(6), that an order of supervision may be revoked and a non-citizen may be re-detained past the removal period: “(1) the purposes of release have been served; (2) the alien violates any condition of release; (3) it is appropriate to enforce a removal order; or (4) the conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2); *see also id.* § 241.13(i) (permitting revocation of an order of supervision only if a non-citizen “violates any of the conditions of release”). Because “[r]egulations cannot circumvent the plain text of the statute[,]” courts question whether these regulations are ultra vires of statutory authority. *See, e.g., You v. Nielsen*, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (comparing regulations to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which authorizes detention past the removal period only if person is a risk to the community, unlikely to comply with the order of removal, or was ordered removed on specified grounds).

35. It is clear, however, that regulations permit only certain officials to revoke an order of supervision: the ICE Executive Associate Director, a field office director, or an official “delegated the function or authority . . . for a particular geographic district, region, or area.” *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 241.4(l)(2) and explaining that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 renamed the position titles listed in § 241.4). If the field office director or a delegated official intend to revoke an order of supervision, they must first make findings that “revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate [Director].” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). And for a delegated official to have authority to revoke an order of supervision, the delegation order must explicitly say so. *See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 161 (finding a delegation order that “refers only to a limited set of powers under

part 241 that do not include the power to revoke release” insufficient to grant authority to revoke an order of supervision).

36. Upon revocation of an order of supervision, ICE must give a non-citizen notice of the reasons for revocation and a prompt interview to respond. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).

The APA Sets Minimum Standards for Final Agency Action

37. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial review of final agency action. **5 U.S.C. § 704.**

38. Final agency actions are those (1) that “mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process” and (2) “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citation modified).

39. ICE’s revocation of an order of supervision is a final agency action subject to this Court’s review.

40. The revocation here marked the consummation of ICE’s decision-making process regarding Petitioner’s custody.

41. The revocation was also an action by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences flowed because it led ICE to detain Petitioner in violation of his rights under the Constitution, statute, and regulation.

The *Accardi* Doctrine Requires Agencies to Follow Internal Rules

42. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, a foundational principle of administrative law, agencies must follow their own procedures, rules, and instructions. See *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (setting aside an order of deportation where the

Board of Immigration Appeals failed to follow procedures governing deportation proceedings); *see also Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).

43. *Accardi* is not “limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations.” *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts must also reverse agency action for violation of unpublished rules and instructions to agency officials. *See Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 235 (affirming reversal of agency denial of public assistance made in violation of internal agency manual); *U.S. v. Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969) (under *Accardi*, reversing decision to admit evidence obtained by IRS agents for violating instructions on investigating tax fraud).

44. Where a release notification issued alongside an order of supervision instructs that a non-citizen with a final order of removal will be given an opportunity to prepare for an “orderly departure,” ICE’s failure to follow that instruction is an *Accardi* violation. *See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 169; *Ragbir v. Sessions*, 2018 WL 623557 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018), *vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Ragbir v. Barr*, 2019 WL 6826008 (2d Cir. July 30, 2019); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383 (D. Mass. 2017) (ordering release of petitioners to give an opportunity to prepare for orderly departure).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One

Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Substantive Due Process

45. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

46. When ICE issued Petitioner an order of supervision, it found that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.

47. When Respondents revoked the order of supervision, Petitioner had complied with every condition of the order, and ICE had not secured necessary travel documents for removal. No change in circumstances warranted the order's revocation.

48. Petitioner's detention therefore does not bear a reasonable relationship to the two regulatory purposes of immigration detention: preventing danger to the community or flight prior to removal.

49. Because the Respondents had no legitimate, non-punitive objective in revoking Petitioner's order of supervision, Petitioner's detention violate substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Count Two
Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Procedural Due Process

50. Plaintiffs reallege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

51. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333, instructs courts to balance three factors to determine whether procedural due process is satisfied: (1) the private interest at issue; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements entail.

52. The first factor, the private interest at issue, favors Petitioner. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690.

53. The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty, and the probable

value of procedural safeguards, favors Petitioner. To safeguard against erroneous deprivations of liberty, the statute specifies the limited number of reasons that an order of supervision can be revoked. Regulations specify who may lawfully revoke the order and the procedures that must be followed when doing so, including giving notice and an opportunity to be heard. Respondents violated those laws here, leaving the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty not just high, but certain. Requiring Respondents to give notice and an opportunity to respond prior to revoking an order of supervision is of great value because it reduces the probability of needless detention of a person, like Petitioner, who is neither dangerous nor a flight risk.

54. The third factor, the government's interest, also favors Petitioner. When the government ignores the law that ensures notice and an opportunity to respond to a person at risk of revocation of an order of supervision, it is more likely to waste limited financial and administrative resources on unnecessary detention of people who are neither flight risks nor dangerous. This waste drags down the efficiency of the entire immigration system. And because the government must also spend resources defending against a habeas corpus petition in federal court to compel Respondents to comply with the law, requiring Respondents to instead provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond prior to revoking an order of supervision reduces fiscal and administrative burdens on the government.

55. For these reasons, revoking Petitioner's order of supervision without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Count Three

**Violation of Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B)
Contrary to Law and Constitutional Right**

56. Plaintiffs reallege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

57. Under the APA, a court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . not in accordance with law” or “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B).

58. The APA’s reference to “law” in the phrase “not in accordance with law,” “means, of course, *any* law, and not merely those laws that the agency itself is charged with administering.” *FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc.*, 537 U.S. 293, 300 (2003) (emphasis in original)

59. Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s order of supervision was contrary to the agency’s constitutional power under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as explained above.

60. The revocation was also not in accordance with the INA and implementing regulations governing who may lawfully revoke an order of supervision and under what circumstances, as cited and discussed in the Statutory Framework section above.

61. Petitioner’s order of supervision was not revoked by the ICE Executive Associate Director. The officer who revoked the order did not first make findings that revocation was in the public interest and that circumstances did not reasonably permit referral to the Executive Associate Director. Nor had the officer been delegated authority to revoke an order of supervision.

62. Before revoking the order, Respondents did not make findings that Petitioner is dangerous or unlikely to comply with a removal order, as required by statute.

63. Even assuming that regulations purporting to offer additional justifications for revocation of an order of supervision are not ultra vires, respondents did not comply with them.

Respondents could not make findings that Petitioner's conduct indicated release would no longer be appropriate or that Petitioner violated any condition of release, because he had not. Nor could Respondents make findings that the purposes of release had been served or that it was appropriate to enforce a removal order, because it had yet to make final arrangements for Petitioner's removal.

64. Nor did the Respondents give Petitioner notice of the reasons for revocation and opportunity to be heard.

65. The revocation should be held unlawful and set aside because it was contrary to the agency's constitutional power and not in accordance with the INA and implementing regulations.

Count Four
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
Arbitrary and Capricious

66. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

67. Under the APA, a court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary [or] capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

68. Respondents' revocation of Petitioner's order of supervision was arbitrary and capricious because it violated statute, regulation, and the Constitution, as described above.

69. An agency decision that "runs counter to the evidence before the agency" is also arbitrary and capricious. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

70. Respondents' decision to revoke Petitioner's order of supervision ran counter to the evidence before the agency that Petitioner would comply with a demand to appear for removal without detention. Petitioner has never violated a condition of his order of supervision, and no new facts or changed circumstances suggest he would.

71. The revocation also “failed to consider important aspects of the problem” before Respondents, making it arbitrary and capricious for multiple other reasons. *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910 (2020).

72. First, Respondents failed to consider the serious constitutional concerns raised by revoking Petitioner’s order of supervision without notice and opportunity to respond.

73. Second, Respondents failed to consider the increased administrative burden to the agency caused by revoking the order of supervision of Petitioner, who is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and for whom the agency does not have travel documents needed to effectuate removal, including financial and administrative costs incurred by the agency due to unnecessary detention.

74. Third, Respondents failed to consider reasonable alternatives to revoking Petitioner’s order of supervision that were before the agency, like simply continuing release under the order of supervision and scheduling a future time and date to appear for removal. This alternative would vindicate the government’s interests in effectuating a removal order and save it the expense of detention not needed to guarantee Petitioner’s appearance.

75. Fourth, Respondents failed to consider Petitioner’s substantial reliance interest, created by its instruction on Petitioner’s release notification, the agency would give an opportunity to arrange for an orderly departure once it obtained travel documents.

76. For these and other reasons, Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s order of supervision was arbitrary and capricious and should be held unlawful and set aside.

Count Five
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)
In Excess of Statutory Authority

77. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

78. Under the APA, a court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

79. “An agency . . . literally has no power to act—including under its regulations—unless and until Congress authorizes it to do so by statute.” *FEC v. Cruz*, 596 U.S. 289, 301 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

80. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) only authorizes detention past the 90-day removal period for a person who is found to be a danger to the community, unlikely to comply with a removal order, or whose removal order is on certain grounds specified in the statute. Even then, if removal “is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by [§ 1231(a)(6)]. In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700.

81. Regulations that purport to give Respondents authority to revoke an order of supervision on grounds other than those listed § 1231(a)(6) are ultra vires and in excess of statutory authority because “[r]egulations cannot circumvent the plain text of the statute.” *You v. Nielsen*, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

82. Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s order of supervision was based on ultra vires regulations. So it was in excess of statutory authority and should be held unlawful and set

aside.

**Count Six
Ultra Vires Action**

83. Plaintiffs reallege all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

84. There is no statute, constitutional provision, or other source of law that authorizes Respondents to detain Petitioner.

85. Petitioner has a non-statutory right of action to declare unlawful, set aside, and enjoin Respondents' ultra vires actions.

**Count Seven
Violation of the *Accardi* Doctrine**

86. Petitioner realleges all paragraphs above as if fully set forth here.

87. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Petitioner has a right to set aside agency action that violated agency procedures, rules, or instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (“If petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing”).

88. Respondents violated agency regulations governing who and upon what findings it may properly revoke an order of supervision when it revoked Petitioner's order. “As a result, this Court cannot conclude that [the revoking officer] had the authority to revoke release” and Petitioner “is entitled to release on that basis alone.” *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 162 (citing *Rombot v. Moniz*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 386, 386-89); *see also, e.g., Zhu v. Genalo*, 2025 WL 2452352 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, 2025 WL 2430267 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (releasing habeas petitioner where where revocation of an ICE order of supervision was ordered by someone without regulatory authority to do so).

89. Respondents also violated agency instructions in Petitioner's release notification

to give an opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure when they revoked Petitioner's order without advance notice.

90. Under *Accardi*, Respondents' revocation of the order of supervision and decision to ignore instructions in the release notification should be set aside for violating agency procedures, rules, or instructions.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that this Court:

- a. Exercise jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin Petitioner Mr. Rashed's removal or transfer outside the jurisdiction of this Court and the United States pending its adjudication of this petition;
- c. Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the INA and implementing regulations, the APA, and the *Accardi* doctrine;
- d. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner, Mr. Rashed from custody;
- e. Issue an Order to Show Cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days and set a hearing on this Petition within five days of the return pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- f. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Respondents from further unlawful detention of Petitioner, Mr. Rashed;
- g. Order Petitioner Mr. Rashed's immediate release;
- h. Award Petitioner costs and reasonable attorneys' fees; and
- i. Order such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted on the 9th day of December,

/s/Kamala W. Sessoms
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28 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with the Petitioner the events described in this Petition and Complaint. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in this Petition and Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Respectfully submitted on 9th day of December,

/s/Kamala W. Sessoms
Kamala W. Sessoms
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