

Gurpreet Kaur, Esq.
Law Office of Gurpreet Kaur
674 County Square Dr, Suite 305
P.O. Box 2022
Ventura, CA 93003
Ph. 805-300-9003; Cell 909-997-4570
Fax: 805-716-6100
E-mail: gurpreetkauresq@gmail.com
Attorney for Petitioner

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

GURWINDER SINGH

Petitioner,

v.

MARK BOWEN, Acting-Warden of the Adelanto
Detention Center; TODD LYONS, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; PAMELA
BONDI, Attorney General of the United States

Respondents.

Civil Action No.

**MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER**

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INTRODUCTION

1
2 Petitioner, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court hear this matter on an expedited basis
3 and grant his release to prevent further irreparable harm. Mr. Singh is a citizen of India who fled his
4 country and sought refuge in the United States in 2024 to escape persecution. Upon arrival, he entered the
5 United States without inspection and was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

6 Following his initial detention, DHS released Mr. Singh under an Order of Release on Parole which
7 required his enrollment in the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program and mandated that he check in
8 with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). On October 24, 2024, DHS issued a Notice to
9 Appear (“NTA”), charging him as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or
10 paroled,” and alleging removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
11 (“INA”)—as an individual who entered the United States at a time or place other than as designated by
12 the Attorney General.

13 Following his release from detention, Petitioner timely filed a Form I-589, Application for
14 Asylum, with the immigration court. He subsequently obtained stable employment and fully complied
15 with all conditions of his release on recognizance (ROR). Petitioner has no criminal history. Nevertheless,
16 on November 29, 2025, ICE agents unexpectedly detained Petitioner while he was leaving his home to go
17 to work. ICE had been searching for another individual at the location but stopped Petitioner, questioned
18 him about his immigration status, and took him into custody without prior notice.

19 Despite his full compliance and lack of any risk to public safety or flight, ICE detained Mr. Singh.
20 This abrupt detention—absent any change in circumstances or violation of release conditions—has caused
21 Mr. Singh severe hardship and constitutes the irreparable harm this petition seeks to remedy.

22 Petitioner is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is therefore statutorily
23 eligible for a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). However, on July 8, 2025, the Department
24 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Interim Guidance (the “Policy”) asserting that all noncitizens—
25 such as Petitioner—who entered the United States without inspection, permission, or parole are
26 categorically ineligible for release on bond.

27 This Policy radically departs from decades of well-established interpretation of DHS’s detention
28 authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b). It effectively transforms discretionary detention into
mandatory detention, unlawfully depriving noncitizens like Petitioner of the individualized custody
determinations long recognized under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).

1 Subsequently, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued its
2 decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), adopting DHS’s interpretation and
3 holding that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to grant bond to noncitizens who entered the United
4 States without admission or parole. This decision, in conjunction with DHS’s Policy, has effectively
5 stripped Petitioners such as Mr. Singh of the statutory right to seek release on bond, subjecting them to
6 indefinite and unnecessary detention contrary to law, due process, and longstanding agency practice.

7 Petitioner has satisfied all the criteria necessary for the issuance of injunctive relief.

8 First, Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The Department of
9 Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Policy, which categorically denies Petitioner the opportunity for a bond
10 hearing, violates both the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment
11 procedural and substantive due process rights. The INA expressly contemplates individualized custody
12 determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and long-standing judicial precedent has affirmed that
13 noncitizens are entitled to such hearings to assess flight risk and danger to the community.

14 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of federal district courts—including courts within this
15 District—have rejected policies identical or substantially similar to DHS’s current approach, consistently
16 holding that such blanket denials of bond eligibility are contrary to statute and constitutionally infirm.
17 Accordingly, Petitioner is highly likely to prevail on the merits of his claim.

18 Second, Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent prompt judicial intervention. But for DHS’s
19 unconstitutional actions depriving him of a bond hearing, Petitioner would already have had the
20 opportunity to seek release from custody. Instead, he remains detained under conditions akin to criminal
21 incarceration, despite having committed no crime and fully complying with all prior conditions of release.

22 Continued detention not only inflicts severe emotional, physical, and psychological hardship, but
23 also impedes Petitioner’s ability to meaningfully prepare and present his asylum case, particularly given
24 the constraints of detention facilities. Moreover, because Respondents retain unfettered discretion to
25 transfer Petitioner at any time to facilities outside this District, he faces an ongoing risk of being moved
26 far from counsel and the Court’s jurisdiction, further exacerbating the harm.

27 Third, the balance of equities and the public interest strongly favor Petitioner. The harm to
28 Petitioner if injunctive relief is denied is grave and irreparable. He would remain in confinement
indefinitely, despite having never been found to pose any danger to the community or risk of flight. In
contrast, the harm to Respondents from the requested relief is minimal to nonexistent. Respondents’
position regarding the scope of their detention authority lacks merit, and they cannot, in good faith, claim

1 that providing Petitioner with release or a constitutionally adequate bond hearing would cause any
2 cognizable harm to the government or the public.

3 Both equity and public interest are best served by ensuring adherence to the rule of law and the
4 constitutional protections guaranteed to all persons within the United States.

5 For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- 6 • Grant Petitioner’s immediate release from detention, or, in the alternative, order that Petitioner be
7 provided a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge; and
- 8 • Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside of this District pending the Court’s final
9 adjudication of this matter.

10 STANDARD OF REVIEW

11 The standards governing the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary
12 injunction are substantially identical. *See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832,
13 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is
14 likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
15 relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *See Winter*
16 *v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

17 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry
18 and the most important factor.” *Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir.
19 2025). Nonetheless, even where a plaintiff cannot make a strong showing on the merits, a preliminary
20 injunction may still issue when “serious questions going to the merits” are raised—so long as the balance
21 of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor and the remaining Winter factors are met. *Friends of the*
22 *Wild Swan v. Weber*, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

23 ARGUMENTS

24 **I. THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) AND 8 U.S.C. 25 § 1226(a) IS BASELESS**

26 The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
27 or § 1225(b)(2). For nearly three decades, both the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the
28 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) consistently interpreted the governing statutes to hold that
noncitizens like Petitioner—who entered the United States without inspection but were later placed in
removal proceedings—are detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and therefore eligible for bond.

1 However, on July 8, 2025, DHS abruptly reversed this long-standing interpretation and announced
2 that all noncitizens who have not been formally admitted to the United States are categorically ineligible
3 for bond. The BIA adopted this new position in its decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec.
4 216 (BIA 2025), effectively extending mandatory detention to millions of individuals who were
5 previously entitled to individualized custody determinations under § 1226(a).

6 This sweeping policy shift not only contradicts decades of agency and judicial precedent, but also
7 violates the statutory and constitutional guarantees that safeguard liberty pending removal proceedings.
8 For the reasons set forth below, this Court should again grant habeas relief and reaffirm that Petitioner is
9 detained under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing.

10 ***A. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) Does Not Govern Petitioner's Detention***

11 In examining the relevant provisions of sections 1225 and 1226, the Court should consider
12 "whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute
13 in the case." *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). But crucially, a statute "cannot be
14 construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must
15 be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." *Roberts v. Sea-*
16 *Land Services, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (quoting *Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury*, 489 U.S. 803,
17 809 (1989)). Here, the context is clear that "detention authority in § 1225 is exercised at or near the port
18 of entry; and detention authority arises from § 1226 when a noncitizen is arrested in the interior of the
19 United States." *Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-14626 (KSH), 2025 LX 482036, at *19 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2025).
20 Indeed, "[t]he line historically drawn between these two sections, making sense of their text and the overall
21 statutory scheme, is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens 'seeking admission into the
22 country,' whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens 'already in the country.'" *Martinez v.*
23 *Hyde*, Civil Action No. 25-11613-BEM, 2025 LX 284582, at *18 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). In other words,
24 the text and context of section 1225(b)(2) indicates that it applies to noncitizens entering, or attempting to
25 enter, or who have recently entered the U.S. It does not include noncitizens "who entered long ago, are
26 not taking affirmative steps that could be characterized as 'seeking admission,' and have been residing in
27 the U.S. for years." *Vazquez v. Feeley*, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 LX 460110, at *39 (D. Nev.
28 Sep. 17, 2025).

29 This is true for several reasons. First, "for section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must
30 be met—in particular, an 'examining immigration officer' must determine that the individual is: (1) an
31 'applicant for admission'; (2) 'seeking admission'; and (3) 'not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

1 admitted.” *Martinez*, 2025 LX 284582, at *6. There was no examination by an immigration officer in this
2 case. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was arrested based on an I-200 warrant,
3 which specifically references section 1226. Petitioner was also released on ROR, which explicitly
4 references section 1226. The issuance of the NTA is not an examination by an immigration officer, and
5 the Government cannot present any legal authority demonstrating otherwise.

6 Furthermore, the phrase “seeking admission” is undefined but “necessarily implies some sort of
7 present-tense action.” *Martinez*, 2025 LX 284582, at *11. Here, there is no present action, and the NTA
8 cannot conceivably be interpreted such. As another district court succinctly stated, “[t]o reiterate, §
9 1225(b)(2)(A) narrows the above broader definition of ‘applicants for admission’ and applies in the
10 context of (1) ‘inspection’ by an ‘examining immigration officer’ only to (2) ‘applicants for admission’
11 as defined above, who are (3) ‘seeking admission,’ and (4) whom § 1225(b)(1) does not address.” *Vazquez*,
12 2025 LX 460110, at *36. “It is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘seeking
13 admission’ to apply this section to all noncitizens already present and residing in the U.S., regardless of
14 whether they are taking any affirmative acts that constitute ‘seeking admission.’” *Id.*

15 As a court in this district recently held: “[t]he government’s argument that section 1225(b) applies
16 to all noncitizens present in the United States without admission is implausible. The government’s
17 proposed interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2)
18 disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to
19 section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and
20 practice.” *Sanchez v. Minga Wofford, Warden, Mesa Verde Immigrant Processing Ctr.*, No. 1:25-cv-
21 01187-SKO (HC), 2025 LX 481997, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025). Other courts in this district have
22 ruled similarly. *See Sanchez v. Minga Wofford, Warden, Mesa Verde Immigrant Processing Ctr.*, No.
23 1:25-cv-01187-SKO (HC), 2025 LX 481997, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); *Polo v. Chestnut*, No. 1:25-
24 CV-01342 JLT HBK, 2025 LX 451732, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); *J.S.H.M v. Wofford*, No. 1:25-
25 CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 LX 426816, at *29 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); *Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-
26 06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 LX 330524, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025).

27 Second, “the titles and headings of § 1225 repeatedly cabin its application to ‘Inspections,’ which,
28 as petitioner convincingly argues, occur at ports of entry, their functional equivalent, or near the border.”
29 *Zumba*, 2025 LX 482036, at *23. While not binding, [titles and headings of a statute] are instructive and
30 provide the Court with the necessary assurance that it is at least applying the right part of the statute in a
31 given circumstance.” *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 LX 315102, at *15 (E.D. Mich.

1 Aug. 29, 2025). Therefore, “1225(b)(2)(A) applies when people are being inspected, which usually occurs
2 at the border, when they are seeking lawful entry into this country.” *Id.* at *18.

3 ***B. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) Clearly Applies to Petitioner***

4 As a matter of plain-text reading, it is § 1226(a) that applies to people situated like Petitioner, not
5 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226(a) concerns all noncitizens who are not subject to section 1225 and 1231
6 (which concerns those with final orders of removal). *See Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 LX 337407, *3
7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (holding that § 1225 did not apply because the “plain text, overall structure, and
8 uniform case law interpreting” the statutory provision compels the conclusion). “Indeed, for nearly 30
9 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either seeking entry to the United States or have a close
10 nexus to the border, and § 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United States.”
11 *Zumba*, 2025 LX 482036, at *26. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings* compels a different
12 outcome. *Id.* (“Although the *Jennings* Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the ‘catchall’ detention
13 provision for noncitizens who are ‘seeking admission,’ it identifies § 1226(a) as the ‘default rule’ for the
14 arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States.”).

15 The recent enactment of Laken Riley Act further supports this finding. The Act added language to
16 section 1226(c) that directly references people who have entered without inspection or who are present
17 without authorization. *See Laken Riley Act*, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Pursuant to these
18 amendments, noncitizens charged as inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A) (the inadmissibility ground
19 for entry without inspection) or INA 212 § (a)(7)(A) (the inadmissibility ground for lacking valid
20 documentation to enter the United States) and who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of new
21 certain crimes (not previously covered by section 1226(c)) are now subject to § 1226(c)’s mandatory
22 detention provisions. *See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)*. By including such individuals under section 1226(c),
23 Congress reaffirmed that section 1226(a) covers noncitizens who are not subject to section (c) but are
24 charged as removable under § 212(a)(6)(A) or 212(a)(7). Otherwise, the Respondents’ position would
25 effectively render 1226(a) and the LRA superfluous.

26 ***C. Respondents’ Actions Violate Petitioner’s Due Process Rights and the INA***

27 Petitioner’s continued detention violates due process. The Court must evaluate the three-part test
28 set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to determine whether the procedures (or
lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue.

1 In *Mathews*, the Court determined the following: “[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the
2 specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
3 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
4 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
5 safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
6 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”

7 During his time on recognizance, “Petitioner built a life outside detention, has been gainfully
8 employed, and has supported family members” *Polo*, 2025 LX 451732, at *32. Petitioner therefore
9 “has a substantial private interest in being out of custody, which would allow him to continue in these life
10 activities.” *Id.* Moreover, “Respondents' interest in continuing to detain Petitioner is slight” and there has
11 “been no change in any of Petitioner's circumstances that would warrant a finding that [he] is a flight risk
12 or a danger to the community. There is no dispute that Petitioner does not have a criminal record.” *Id.*
13 Indeed, “in releasing him on parole, DHS necessarily concluded that Petitioner was not a flight risk or
14 danger to the community.” *J.S.H.M v. Wofford*, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 LX 426816, at *40
15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); *see also Noori v. LaRose, et al.*, 2025 WL 2800149, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1,
16 2025) (noting that “[r]elease reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger
17 to the community or a flight risk.”); *Vieira v. Anda-Ybarra*, No. EP-25-CV-00432-DB, 2025 LX 410786,
18 at *17 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (“But that interest, in this case, seems particularly diluted given
19 Respondents' own decision to release Petitioner on his own recognizance once before.”); *J.C.L.A. v.*
20 *Wofford*, No. 1:25-cv-01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 LX 404689, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (“Even
21 if the government were correct that § 1225(b), by its terms, could apply to petitioner, the government
22 previously represented to petitioner, in the order of release on recognizance, that he had been ‘released on
23 [his] own recognizance [under § 1226(a)] provided that he comply with’ certain conditions. This was an
24 ‘implicit promise’ that his release would ‘be revoked only if he fail[ed] to live up to the [release]
25 conditions,’ as in *Morrissey*.”).

26 **II. PETITIONER SUFFERS IRREPARABLE HARM**

27 “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights *unquestionably constitutes*
28 *irreparable injury*.” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*,
427 U.S. 247, 272 (1976)). The Ninth Circuit has likewise recognized the “*irreparable harms imposed on*

1 *anyone subject to immigration detention, including the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their*
2 *families as a result of detention.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017); see also*
3 *Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the inability to pursue a petition*
4 *for review may constitute irreparable harm).*

5 Here, Petitioner plainly satisfies this standard. He is being unlawfully deprived of a bond hearing
6 to which he is statutorily and constitutionally entitled. Each additional day of confinement exacerbates the
7 irreparable injury to his liberty interests and imposes significant emotional and economic hardship on both
8 Petitioner and his family. Absent this Court’s intervention, Petitioner will remain confined in prison-like
9 conditions and be forced to litigate the merits of his asylum claim from detention, severely impairing his
10 ability to prepare his case and to meaningfully exercise his legal rights.

11 **III. BALANCE OF HARMS AND PUBLIC INTEREST FAVOR PETITIONER**

12 The merged "balancing-the-equities" and "public interest" factors favor Petitioner. The potential
13 harm to Petitioner if injunctive relief is not granted is serious. If Petitioner is not released or promptly
14 provided a constitutionally adequate bond hearing, he will be forced to continue litigating his asylum
15 claim in detention even though he is statutorily eligible for release on bond. “In comparison, the harm to
16 Respondents is minimal.” *Lira v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-00855-WJ-KK, 2025 LX 383996, at *11-12 (D.N.M.
17 Sep. 5, 2025). Indeed, “there is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the
18 federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” *League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby*, 838
19 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Practically speaking, injunctive relief would inflict little more on Respondents
20 than ensure they adhere to the requirement of the Constitution.

21 **IV. THE PROPER REMEDY IS RELEASE OF PETITIONER FROM DETENTION**

22
23 A habeas court has "the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully
24 detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case
25 in which the writ is granted." *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). Several courts, including at
26 least one in this district, have held that the appropriate remedy for the government’s constitutional
27 violations is release from detention. *See Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-cv-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 LX
28 452767, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2025) (“[g]iven that the government does not assert any other basis for


1 petitioner's detention and does not argue that petitioner presents a flight risk or danger, the appropriate
2 remedy is petitioner's immediate release."); *see also Zumba*, 2025 LX 482036 at *32 (holding that "habeas
3 does not provide meaningful relief with respect to some of the indignities petitioner has endured But
4 due to its flexible nature, the Court may fashion a remedy that returns petitioner to her position prior to
her unlawful detention. The Court finds that release from detention is the appropriate relief").

5 Alternatively, if the Court is not inclined to release Petitioner, it should instead direct a bond
6 hearing at which time the burden of proof lies with DHS given the gravity of the unconstitutional action
7 and the fact that Petitioner was already once found not to be a danger to the community or a risk of flight
8 when it released him pursuant to ROR. *See Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 LX 227518,
9 at *21 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (directing that petitioner "may not be detained unless the government
10 demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger
11 to the community and that no conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such
12 harms."); *J.S.H.M.*, 2025 LX 426816, at *49 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (holding that "[d]oing so is logical
13 even for a post-detention custody hearing for the reasons articulated in *Pinchi*-namely that the immigrant's
14 initial release reflected a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the
15 community or a flight risk."). In addition, the Court should also enjoin Respondents from transferring
16 Petitioner out of the district. *See Santiago v. Noem*, No. EP-25-CV-361-KC, 2025 LX 349750, at *5 (W.D.
17 Tex. Sep. 9, 2025) ("[t]he Court finds persuasive the decisions enjoining removal and transfer of
18 petitioners under the Court's inherent power to preserve its ability to hear the case" and that enjoining
transfers was necessary "[t]o ensure the ability to meaningfully assess [Petitioner's] Petition.").

19 **CONCLUSION**

20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant habeas relief and order Petitioner released from
21 detention.

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23 Respectfully submitted on 10th day of December, 2025

24 
Gurpreet Kaur, Esq.
25 Law Office of Gurpreet Kaur
674 County Square Dr, Suite 305
26 P.O. Box 2022
Ventura, CA 93003
27 Ph. 805-300-9003; Cell 909-997-4570
28 Fax: 805-716-6100