

1 ADAM GORDON
2 United States Attorney
3 SHELDON A. SMITH
4 Special Assistant United States Attorney
5 New Jersey Bar No. 041482009
6 U.S. Attorney's Office
7 880 Front Street, Room 6293
8 San Diego, CA 92101
9 (619) 546-7304
10 Sheldon.smith@usdoj.gov
11 Attorneys for the United States

12 Attorneys for Respondents

13
14 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
15 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

16 JOSE CASTRO MARTINEZ,
17
18 Petitioner,

19 v.

20 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
21
22 Respondents.

Case No.: 25-cv-3449-DMS-MMP

**RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S
HABEAS PETITION AND MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER**

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I. Introduction and Summary of Argument

Petitioner¹ has filed a habeas petition and a motion for temporary restraining order. For the reasons set forth below, the Court should deny Petitioner's request for interim relief and dismiss the petition.

Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and is charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. *See* Exhibit 1 (Notice to Appear). Accordingly, Petitioner is mandatorily detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled on this issue in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After detailed analysis, the BIA determined that based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to noncitizens who are present in the United States without admission. Other district courts have followed the BIA's approach. *See, e.g., Valencia v. Chestnut*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); *Alonzo v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-04830 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025); *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-00168-JMD (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); *Silva Oliveira v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025); *Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Cirrus Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct.

¹ Petitioner appears to be a class member of *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.). The court in *Bautista* granted class certification and partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs in that case, but did not issue a class-wide declaratory judgment. The court also did not issue a class-wide injunction, which would not be permitted by law. Rather, the court set a January 9, 2026 joint status report deadline and January 16, 2026 status conference. Until and unless the *Bautista* court issues a class-wide declaratory judgment or injunction, the *Bautista* court's opinion and partial grant of summary judgment does not constitute a judgment. *See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)*.

1 30, 2025); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb.
2 Sept. 30, 2025); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal.
3 Sept. 24, 2025); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983-NMG, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July
4 28, 2025).

5 Based on the arguments below, the Court should deny any requests for relief and
6 dismiss the petition.

7 II. Statutory Background

8 A. Individuals Seeking Admission to the United States

9 For over a century, this country’s immigration laws have authorized immigration
10 officials to charge noncitizens as removable from the country, arrest those subject to
11 removal, and detain them during removal proceedings. *See Abel v. United States*, 362
12 U.S. 217, 232–37 (1960). “The rule has been clear for decades: ‘[d]etention during
13 deportation proceedings [i]s ... constitutionally valid.’” *Banyee v. Garland*, 115 F.4th
14 928 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)), *rehearing by*
15 *panel and en banc denied*, *Banyee v. Bondi*, No. 22-2252, 2025 WL 837914 (8th Cir.
16 Mar. 18, 2025); *see Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is
17 necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523 n.7 (“In fact,
18 prior to 1907 there was no provision permitting bail for *any* aliens during the pendency
19 of their deportation proceedings.”) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court even
20 recognized that removal proceedings ““would be [in] vain if those accused could not be
21 held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.”” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at
22 523 (quoting *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)). Over the century,
23 Congress has enacted a multi-layered statutory scheme for the civil detention of aliens
24 pending a decision on removal, during the administrative and judicial review of removal
25 orders, and in preparation for removal. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. It
26 is the interplay between these statutes that is at issue here.

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1 **B. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225**

2 “To implement its immigration policy, the Government must be able to decide
3 (1) who may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.” *Jennings v.*
4 *Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018). Section 1225 governs inspection, the initial step
5 in this process, *id.*, stating that all “applicants for admission . . . shall be inspected by
6 immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The statute—in a provision entitled
7 “ALIENS TREATED AS APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION”—dictates who “shall be
8 deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission,” defining that term to
9 encompass *both* an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted *or*
10 [one] who arrives in the United States . . .” *Id.* § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section
11 1225(b) governs the inspection procedures applicable to all applicants for admission.
12 They “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered
13 by § 1225(b)(2).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287.

14 Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and “certain other” aliens “initially
15 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid
16 documentation.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). These
17 aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. §
18 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if the alien “indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a
19 fear of persecution,” immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear
20 interview. *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). An alien “with a credible fear of persecution” is
21 “detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” *Id.*
22 § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express
23 a fear of persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” they are detained until
24 removed from the United States. *Id.* §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

25 Section 1225(b)(2) is “broader” and “serves as a catchall provision.” *Jennings*,
26 583 U.S. at 287. It “applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”
27 *Id.* Under § 1225(b)(2), an alien “who is an applicant for admission” shall be detained
28 for a removal proceeding “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the]

1 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
2 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); *see Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA
3 2025) (“[A]liens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants
4 for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.”);
6 *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 68 (BIA 2025) (“for aliens arriving in and seeking
7 admission into the United States who are placed directly in full removal proceedings,
8 section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention ‘until
9 removal proceedings have concluded.’”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 299). However,
10 DHS has the sole discretionary authority to temporarily release on parole “any alien
11 applying for admission to the United States” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent
12 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see Biden v.*
13 *Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022).

14 **C. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

15 Section 1226 provides for arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether
16 the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a),
17 the government may detain an alien during his removal proceedings, release him on
18 bond, or release him on conditional parole. By regulation, immigration officers can
19 release an alien who demonstrates that he “would not pose a danger to property or
20 persons” and “is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). An
21 alien can also request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an IJ at any
22 time before a final order of removal is issued. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§
23 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19.

24 At a custody redetermination, the IJ may continue detention or release the alien
25 on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). IJs have
26 broad discretion in deciding whether to release an alien on bond. *In re Guerra*, 24 I&N
27 Dec. 37, 39-40 (BIA 2006) (listing nine factors for IJs to consider). But regardless of
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1 the factors IJs consider, an alien “who presents a danger to persons or property should
2 not be released during the pendency of removal proceedings.” *Id.* at 38.

3 Section 1226(a) does not grant “any *right* to release on bond.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23
4 I&N Dec. at 575 (citing *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) (emphasis in
5 original). Nor does it address the applicable burden of proof or particular factors that
6 must be considered. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Rather, it grants DHS and the
7 Attorney General broad discretionary authority to determine, after arrest, whether to
8 detain or release an alien during his or her removal proceedings. *See id.* If, after the bond
9 hearing, either party disagrees with the decision of the IJ, that party may appeal the
10 decision to the BIA. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1003.19(f), 1003.38, 1236.1(d)(3).

11 Included within the Attorney General and DHS’s discretionary authority are
12 limits on the delegation to the immigration court. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B),
13 the IJ does not have authority to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by DHS
14 for any arriving alien. The regulations also include a provision that allows DHS to
15 invoke an automatic stay of any decision by an IJ to release an individual on bond when
16 DHS files an appeal of the custody redetermination. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (“The
17 decision whether or not to file [an automatic stay] is subject to the discretion of the
18 Secretary.”).

19 **D. Review Before the Board of Immigration Appeals**

20 The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration
21 Review (EOIR) and possesses delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R.
22 §§ 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(1). The BIA is “charged with the review of those administrative
23 adjudications under the [INA] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to
24 it,” including IJ custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1, 1236.1. The
25 BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but is also directed to, “through
26 precedent decisions, [] provide clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration
27 judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the
28 [INA] and its implementing regulations.” *Id.* § 1003.1(d)(1). Decisions rendered by the

1 BIA are final, except for those reviewed by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. §
2 1003.1(d)(7).

3 If an automatic stay of a custody decision is invoked by DHS, regulations require
4 the BIA to track the progress of the custody appeal “to avoid unnecessary delays in
5 completing the record for decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(3). The stay lapses in 90 days,
6 unless the detainee seeks an extension of time to brief the custody appeal, 8 C.F.R.
7 § 1003.6(c)(4), or unless DHS seeks, and the BIA grants, a discretionary stay. 8 C.F.R.
8 § 1003.6(c)(5).

9 If the BIA denies DHS’s custody appeal, the automatic stay remains in effect for
10 five business days. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d). DHS may, during that five-day period, refer
11 the case to the Attorney General under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) for consideration. *Id.*
12 Upon referral to the Attorney General, the release is stayed for 15 business days while
13 the case is considered. The Attorney General may extend the stay of release upon
14 motion by DHS. *Id.*

15 III. Argument

16 A. Claims and Requested Relief Jurisdictionally Barred

17 Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that this Court has subject matter
18 jurisdiction over asserted claims. *See Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States*, 217 F.3d
19 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000); *Finley v. United States*, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989).

20 In general, courts lack jurisdiction to review a decision to commence or
21 adjudicate removal proceedings or execute removal orders. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
22 (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
23 alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
24 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-*
25 *Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“There was good reason for
26 Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial
27 review of the Attorney General’s discrete acts of ‘commenc[ing] proceedings,
28 adjudicat[ing] cases, [and] execut[ing] removal orders’—which represent the initiation

1 or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process.”); *Limpin v. United States*,
2 828 Fed. App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding district court properly dismissed under 8
3 U.S.C. § 1252(g) “because claims stemming from the decision to arrest and detain an
4 alien at the commencement of removal proceedings are not within any court’s
5 jurisdiction”). In other words, § 1252(g) removes district court jurisdiction over “three
6 discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to
7 ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” *Reno*, 525 U.S.
8 at 482 (emphasis removed). Congress has explicitly foreclosed district court jurisdiction
9 over claims that necessarily arise “from the decision or action by the Attorney General
10 to commence proceedings [and] adjudicate cases” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

11 Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the method
12 by which the government chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the
13 decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203
14 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE’s
15 discretionary decisions to commence removal” and bars review of “ICE’s decision to
16 take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during his removal proceedings”).

17 Other courts have held, “[f]or the purposes of § 1252, the Attorney General
18 commences proceedings against an alien when the alien is issued a Notice to Appear
19 before an immigration court.” *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. 08-2941 DSF
20 (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). “The Attorney General
21 may arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that
22 individual until the conclusion of those proceedings.” *Id.* at *3. “Thus, an alien’s
23 detention throughout this process arises from the Attorney General’s decision to
24 commence proceedings” and review of claims arising from such detention is barred
25 under § 1252(g). *Id.* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)); *ang*
26 *v. United States*, No. CV-10-0389 SVW (RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
27 Aug. 8, 2018); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

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1 Moreover, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “[j]udicial review of all questions of law
2 and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien
3 from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review
4 of a final order under this section.” (emphasis added). Further, judicial review of a final
5 order is available only through “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
6 appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The Supreme Court has made clear that § 1252(b)(9)
7 is “the unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause,” channeling “judicial review of all” “decisions and
8 actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation,” including “non-
9 final order[s],” into proceedings before a court of appeals. *Reno*, 525 U.S. at 483, 485;
10 see *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1252(b)(9) is
11 “breathhtaking in scope and vise-like in grip and therefore swallows up virtually all
12 claims that are tied to removal proceedings”). “Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and
13 § 1252(b)(9) mean that any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any removal-
14 related activity can be reviewed only through the [petition for review] PFR process.”
15 *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis in original) (“[W]hile these sections limit how
16 immigrants can challenge their removal proceedings, they are not jurisdiction-stripping
17 statutes that, by their terms, foreclose all judicial review of agency actions. Instead, the
18 provisions channel judicial review over final orders of removal to the courts of appeal.”)
19 (emphasis in original); see *id.* at 1035 (“§§ 1252(a)(5) and [(b)(9)] channel review of
20 all claims, including policies-and-practices challenges . . . whenever they ‘arise from’
21 removal proceedings”).

22 Critically, “1252(b)(9) is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring
23 one.” *Aguilar v. ICE*, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). Indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)
24 provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter . . . shall be construed
25 as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition
26 for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”
27 See also *Ajlani v. Chertoff*, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[J]urisdiction to review
28 such claims is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals[.]”). The petition-for-review

1 process before the court of appeals ensures that noncitizens have a proper forum for
2 claims arising from their immigration proceedings and “receive their day in court.”
3 *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031–32 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Rosario v. Holder*,
4 627 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the [INA] to
5 obviate . . . Suspension Clause concerns” by permitting judicial review of
6 “nondiscretionary” BIA determinations and “all constitutional claims or questions of
7 law.”). These provisions divest district courts of jurisdiction to review both direct and
8 indirect challenges to removal orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of
9 removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9)
10 includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien] in the first place or to seek
11 removal”).

12 In evaluating the reach of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), the Second Circuit has
13 explained that jurisdiction turns on the substance of the relief sought. *Delgado v.*
14 *Quarantillo*, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Those provisions divest district courts of
15 jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including
16 decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S.
17 at 294–95 (section 1252(b)(9) includes challenges to the “decision to detain [an alien]
18 in the first place or to seek removal[.]”). Here, Petitioner challenges the government’s
19 decision and action to detain, which arises from DHS’s decision to commence removal
20 proceedings, and is thus an “action taken . . . to remove [him/her] from the United
21 States.” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); *see also, e.g., Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294–95; *Velasco*
22 *Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did
23 not bar review in that case because the petitioner did not challenge “his initial
24 detention”); *Saadulloev v. Garland*, No. 3:23-CV-00106, 2024 WL 1076106, at *3
25 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024) (recognizing that there is no judicial review of the threshold
26 detention decision, which flows from the government’s decision to “commence
27 proceedings”).

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1 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this petition under 8 U.S.C.
2 § 1252.² See *Axcel S.Q.D.C. v. Bondi*, No. 25-3348 (PAM/DLM), 2025 U.S. Dist.
3 LEXIS 175957 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2025).

4 **B. Petitioner is Lawfully Detained**

5 Petitioner’s claims for alleged statutory and constitutional violations fail because
6 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

7 Based on the plain language of the statute, Petitioner’s detention is governed by
8 § 1225. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention of “an alien who is *an*
9 *applicant for admission*, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien
10 seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” *Chavez*
11 *v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025)
12 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)) (emphasis in original). Section 1225(a)(1)
13 “expressly defines that ‘[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
14 admitted ... shall be deemed for purposes of this Act *an applicant for admission*.’” *Id.*
15 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). Here, Petitioner is an “alien
16 present in the United States who has not been admitted.” Thus, as found by the district
17 court in *Chavez v. Noem* and as mandated by the plain language of the statute, Petitioner
18 is an “applicant for admission” and subject to the mandatory detention provisions of
19 § 1225(b)(2).

20 When the plain text of a statute is clear, “that meaning is controlling” and courts
21 “need not examine legislative history.” *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d

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23 ² On an alternative basis, the Court should ensure Petitioner properly exhausts
24 administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit requires that “habeas petitioners exhaust
25 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.”
26 *Castro-Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001). “When a petitioner does
27 not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the
28 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted
remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” *Leonardo v. Crawford*, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160
(9th Cir. 2011); see also *Alvarado v. Holder*, 759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014)
(issue exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement); *Tijani v. Holder*, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080
(9th Cir. 2010) (no jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in the petitioner’s
administrative proceedings before the BIA).

1 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing
2 “refutes the plain language” of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d
3 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
4 Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) to correct “an anomaly whereby
5 immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse
6 position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d
7 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *declined to extend by, United States v. Gambino-*
8 *Ruiz*, 91 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2024); *see Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 223-
9 34 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996)). It “intended to replace certain
10 aspects of the [then] current ‘entry doctrine,’ under which illegal aliens who have
11 entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration
12 proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a
13 port of entry.” *Id.* (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225).

14 “The entry fiction doctrine flows from the principle that the ‘power to admit or
15 exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative,’ and ‘the Constitution gives the political
16 department of the government plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit.’”
17 *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
18 Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 139
19 (2020) (quotations omitted)). Such plenary power includes the “power to set procedures
20 to be followed in determining whether an alien should be admitted.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591
21 U.S. at 139. “The entry fiction doctrine protects that sovereign prerogative, which
22 ‘would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on
23 U.S. soil.’” *Altamirano Ramos*, 2025 WL 3199872, at *7 (quoting *Thuraissigiam*, 591
24 U.S. at 139). Within this context, the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen an alien
25 arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil,
26 but the alien is not considered to have entered the country.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at
27 139. Such is true even in situations where an alien is “paroled elsewhere in the country
28 *for years pending removal.*” *Id.* (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has recognized

1 that those individuals are treated “as if stopped at the border.” *Id.* “The same must be
2 true” of an “applicant for admission” who enters into the United States unlawfully. *Id.*
3 at 140.

4 A contrary interpretation would put aliens who “crossed the border unlawfully”
5 in a better position than those “who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.”
6 *Id.* Aliens who presented at a port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention
7 under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under §
8 1226(a). *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 225 (“The House Judiciary
9 Committee Report makes clear that Congress intended to eliminate the prior statutory
10 scheme that provided aliens who entered the United States without inspection more
11 procedural and substantive rights than those who presented themselves to authorities
12 for inspection.”). The Court should “‘refuse to interpret the INA in a way that would in
13 effect repeal that statutory fix’ intended by Congress in enacting the IIRIRA.” *Chavez*,
14 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (quoting *Gambino-Ruiz*, 91 F.4th at 990).

15 The plain language of § 1225(b)(2) does not contradict nor render § 1226(a)
16 superfluous. Section 1226(a) provides the detention authority for the significant group
17 of aliens who are *not* “applicants for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)—
18 specifically, aliens who have been admitted to the United States but are now removable.
19 *RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“the
20 specific governs the general”). For example, the detention of any of the millions of
21 aliens who have overstayed their visas are governed by § 1226(a), because those aliens
22 (unlike Petitioner) *were* lawfully admitted to the United States.

23 Moreover, in *Chavez v. Noem*, the district court noted that § 1226(a) “‘generally
24 governs the process of arresting and detaining’ certain aliens, namely ‘aliens who were
25 inadmissible at the time of entry *or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses*
26 *since admission.*’” *Chavez*, 2025 WL 2730228, at *5 (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at
27 288) (emphasis in original). In turn, individuals who have not been charged with
28 specific crimes listed in § 1226(c) are still subject to the discretionary detention

1 provisions of § 1226(a) *as determined by the Attorney General*. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
2 (“*On a warrant issued by the Attorney General*, an alien may be arrested and detained
3 pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”)
4 (emphasis added). Therefore, heeding the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) has no effect
5 on § 1226(a). Similarly, the application of § 1225’s explicit definition of “applicants for
6 admission” does not render the addition of § 1226(c) by the Riley Laken Act
7 superfluous. Once again correctly determined by the district court in *Chavez v. Noem*,
8 the addition of § 1226(c) simply removed the Attorney General’s detention discretion
9 for aliens charged with specific crimes. 2025 WL 2730228, at *5.

10 One of the most basic interpretative canons instructs that a “statute should be
11 construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” See *Corley v. United States*, 556
12 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). If Congress did not want § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply
13 to “applicants for admission,” then it would not have included the phrase “applicants
14 for admission” in the subsection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also *Corley*, 556
15 U.S. at 314.

16 Finally, the phrase “alien seeking admission” does not limit the scope of
17 § 1225(b)(2)(A). The BIA has long recognized that “many people who are not *actually*
18 requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless
19 deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws.” *Matter of Lemus-Losa*,
20 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (emphasis in original). Statutory language “is known
21 by the company it keeps.” *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.
22 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase
23 “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of
24 “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those
25 individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United States. See 8
26 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be “seeking admission” under § 1225(a)(1).
27 See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 221; *Lemus-Losa*, 25 I&N Dec. at 743.
28 Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens “who are applicants

1 for admission or otherwise seeking admission” to be inspected by immigration officers.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word “or” here “introduce[s] an appositive—a word or
3 phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or Wien,’ ‘Batman or the
4 Caped Crusader’).” *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013). Further,
5 § 1225(a)(5) provides that “[a]n applicant for admission may be required to state under
6 oath any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and
7 intentions of the applicant in seeking admission to the United States.” The reasonable
8 import of this particular phrasing is that one who is an applicant for admission is
9 considered to be “seeking admission” under the statute.

10 Because Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225, Petitioner cannot show
11 entitlement to relief.

12 Respondents acknowledge that courts in this district have recently rejected
13 similar arguments in other similar habeas matters. Respondents maintain that Petitioner
14 is properly subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 and dismissal is proper. To the
15 extent the Court finds this Petitioner subject to detention authority under 8 U.S.C.
16 § 1226(a), Respondents’ position is that the proper remedy would be directing a bond
17 hearing under § 1226(a), to be held within fourteen (14) days. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)
18 (“No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this
19 section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial
20 of bond or parole.”); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (“As we have
21 previously explained, § 1226(e) precludes an alien from ‘challeng[ing] a “discretionary
22 judgment” by the Attorney General or a “decision” that the Attorney General has made
23 regarding his detention or release.’ But § 1226(e) does not preclude ‘challenges [to] the
24 statutory framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.’”); 8 U.S.C.
25 § 1226(b) (“The Attorney General at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized
26 under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”).

27 C. Fourth Amendment Claims Fail

28 To the extent Petitioner asserts claims under the Fourth Amendment, he fails to

1 explain why release is the remedy for such alleged violations. *United States v. Crews*,
2 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (noting, in the criminal context, that Fourth Amendment’s
3 “exclusionary principle” “delimits what proof the Government may offer against the
4 accused at trial, closing the courtroom door to evidence secured by official
5 lawlessness,” but an individual “is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit’”); *Cruz v. Barr*,
6 926 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (releasing petitioner on Fourth Amendment
7 grounds because fruits of the regulatory violation were the only evidence of petitioner’s
8 alienage).

9 Moreover, Fourth Amendment claims related to alienage “belong in front of an
10 Immigration Judge, not a federal district court.” See *Marvan v. Slaughter*, No. CV 25-
11 49-H-DLC, 2025 WL 1940043, at *3 (D. Mont. July 15, 2025) (denying habeas petition
12 challenging detention based on Fourth Amendment violations for lack of subject matter
13 jurisdiction). Petitioner cannot simply “bypass the immigration courts and proceed
14 directly to district court. Instead, [he] must exhaust the administrative process before
15 [he] can access the federal courts.” *Id.* at *4 (quoting *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1029). To
16 the extent Petitioner desires to bring such claims, this district court does not have
17 jurisdiction. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and
18 fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from
19 the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a
20 final order under this section.” Further, judicial review of a final order is available only
21 through “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1252(a)(5).

23 **D. Conditions of Confinement**

24 To the extent Petitioner asserts claims regarding conditions of his confinement
25 and medical care, the Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims because they do not
26 challenge the lawfulness of his custody. An individual may seek habeas relief under 28
27 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is “in custody” under federal authority “in violation of the
28 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). But habeas

1 relief is available to challenge only the legality or duration of confinement. *Pinson v.*
2 *Carvajal*, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023); *Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th
3 Cir. 1979); *Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (The
4 writ of habeas corpus historically “provide[s] a means of contesting the lawfulness of
5 restraint and securing release.”). The Ninth Circuit squarely explained how to decide
6 whether a claim sounds in habeas jurisdiction: “[O]ur review of the history and purpose
7 of habeas leads us to conclude the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations
8 in the petition, release is *legally required* irrespective of the relief requested.” *Pinson*,
9 69 F.4th at 1072 (emphasis in original); *see also Nettles v. Grounds*, 830 F.3d 922, 934
10 (9th Cir. 2016) (The key inquiry is whether success on the petitioner’s claim would
11 “necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release.”). Here, Petitioner’s claims
12 regarding the conditions of his confinement do not arise under § 2241. *See Nettles*, 830
13 F.3d at 933 (“We have long held that prisoners may not challenge mere conditions of
14 confinement in habeas corpus.”); *Giron Rodas v. Lyons*, No. 25cv1912-LL-AHG, 2025
15 WL 2300781, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (“Like in *Pinson*, the Court lacks
16 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s § 2241 habeas petition since it cannot be fairly read as
17 attacking ‘the legality or duration of confinement.’”) (quoting *Pinson*, 69 F.4th at 1065);
18 *Guselnikov v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1971-BTM-KSC, 2025 WL 2300873, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
19 Aug. 8, 2025) (finding petitioners’ claims did not arise under § 2241 because they were
20 not arguing they were unlawfully in custody and receiving the requested relief would
21 not entitle them to release). Thus, such claims do not arise under § 2241 and the petition
22 should be dismissed.

23 Moreover, Petitioner claims his medical care has been inadequate under the Fifth
24 Amendment due process clause. To demonstrate that officials violate the rights of an
25 immigration detainee based on their deliberate indifference to medical needs, Petitioner
26 must establish the following:

- 27 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
28 conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put

1 the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant
2 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though
3 a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high
4 degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's
5 conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant
6 caused the plaintiff's injuries.

7 *Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't*, 16 F.4th 613, 636 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting
8 *Gordon v. County of Orange*, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). The third factor
9 requires a showing that officials' conduct was "objectively unreasonable," a standard
10 which requires "more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin
11 to reckless disregard." *Id.* (quoting *Castro v. County of Los Angeles*, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071
12 (9th Cir. 2016)).

13 Petitioner has fallen far short of demonstrating a due process violation
14 surrounding his medical care. While he asserts a serious high blood pressure problem,
15 he refused medical care at an appointment on December 3, 2025. *See* Exhibit 2 (Excerpt
16 from Petitioner's Medical Records)(filed under seal).

17 IV. CONCLUSION

18 For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court
19 dismiss this action.

20 DATED: December 11, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

21 ADAM GORDON
22 United States Attorney

23 *s/ Sheldon A. Smith*
24 SHELDON A. SMITH
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Respondents

ADAM GORDON
United States Attorney
SHELDON A. SMITH
New Jersey Bar No. 041482009
Special Assistant United States Attorney
880 Front Street, Room 6293
San Diego, CA 92101-8893
Telephone: (619) 546-7304
Facsimile: (619) 546-7751
Email: sheldon.smith@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Respondents

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JOSE CASTRO MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LaROSE, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 25-cv-3449-DMS-MMP

TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibits:

1. Notice to Appear, dated November 11, 2025
2. Excerpt from Petitioner's Medical Records in Custody (Under Seal)

EXHIBIT 1

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NOTICE TO APPEAR

DOB: [REDACTED]
Event No: [REDACTED]

In removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

Subject ID: [REDACTED] FINS: [REDACTED] File No: [REDACTED]

In the Matter of:

Respondent: JOSE CASTRO-MARTINEZ currently residing at:
[REDACTED] (Number, street, city, state and ZIP code) [REDACTED] (Area code and phone number)

- You are an arriving alien.
- You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.
- You have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.

The Department of Homeland Security alleges that you:

1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States;
2. You are a native of MEXICO and a citizen of MEXICO;
3. You entered the United States at or near an unknown location, on or about an unknown date;
4. You were not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.


- This notice is being issued after an asylum officer has found that the respondent has demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture.
- Section 235(b)(1) order was vacated pursuant to: 8CFR 208.30 8CFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv)

YOU ARE ORDERED to appear before an immigration judge of the United States Department of Justice at:

[REDACTED] SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92154. OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER
(Complete Address of Immigration Court, including Room Number, if any)

on November 24, 2025 at 8:00 am to show why you should not be removed from the United States based on the
(Date) (Time)

charge(s) set forth above.


MV 6643 VELA JR - SDDO
(Signature and Title of Issuing Officer)

Date: November 11, 2025 Los Angeles, CA
(City and State)

Notice to Respondent

Warning: Any statement you make may be used against you in removal proceedings.

Alien Registration: This copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are in removal proceedings. You are required to carry it with you at all times.

Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other individual authorized and qualified to represent persons before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.16. Unless you so request, no hearing will be scheduled earlier than ten days from the date of this notice, to allow you sufficient time to secure counsel. A list of qualified attorneys and organizations who may be available to represent you at no cost will be provided with this notice.

Conduct of the hearing: At the time of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents that you desire to have considered in connection with your case. If you wish to have the testimony of any witnesses considered, you should arrange to have such witnesses present at the hearing. At your hearing you will be given the opportunity to admit or deny any or all of the allegations in the Notice to Appear, including that you are inadmissible or removable. You will have an opportunity to present evidence on your own behalf, to examine any evidence presented by the Government, to object, on proper legal grounds, to the receipt of evidence and to cross examine any witnesses presented by the Government. At the conclusion of your hearing, you have a right to appeal an adverse decision by the immigration judge. You will be advised by the immigration judge before whom you appear of any relief from removal for which you may appear eligible including the privilege of voluntary departure. You will be given a reasonable opportunity to make any such application to the immigration judge.

One-Year Asylum Application Deadline: If you believe you may be eligible for asylum, you must file a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. The Form I-589, Instructions, and information on where to file the Form can be found at www.uscis.gov/i-589. Failure to file the Form I-589 within one year of arrival may bar you from eligibility to apply for asylum pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Failure to appear: You are required to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in writing, with your full mailing address and telephone number. You must notify the Immigration Court and the DHS immediately by using Form EOIR-33 whenever you change your address or telephone number during the course of this proceeding. You will be provided with a copy of this form. Notices of hearing will be mailed to this address. If you do not submit Form EOIR-33 and do not otherwise provide an address at which you may be reached during proceedings, then the Government shall not be required to provide you with written notice of your hearing. If you fail to attend the hearing at the time and place designated on this notice, or any date and time later directed by the Immigration Court, a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detained by the DHS.

Mandatory Duty to Surrender for Removal: If you become subject to a final order of removal, you must surrender for removal to your local DHS office, listed on the internet at http://www.ice.gov/contact/ero, as directed by the DHS and required by statute and regulation. Immigration regulations at 8 CFR 1241.1 define when the removal order becomes administratively final. If you are granted voluntary departure and fail to depart the United States as required, fail to post a bond in connection with voluntary departure, or fail to comply with any other condition or term in connection with voluntary departure, you must surrender for removal on the next business day thereafter. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you will be ineligible for all forms of discretionary relief for as long as you remain in the United States and for ten years after your departure or removal. This means you will be ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of nonimmigrant status, registry, and related waivers for this period. If you do not surrender for removal as required, you may also be criminally prosecuted under section 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

U.S. Citizenship Claims: If you believe you are a United States citizen, please advise the DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.

Sensitive locations: To the extent that an enforcement action leading to a removal proceeding was taken against Respondent at a location described in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(e)(1), such action complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1367.

Request for Prompt Hearing

To expedite a determination in my case, I request this Notice to Appear be filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review as soon as possible. I waive my right to a 10-day period prior to appearing before an immigration judge and request my hearing be scheduled.

Before:

(Signature of Respondent)

Date:

(Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)

Certificate of Service

This Notice To Appear was served on the respondent by me on November 11, 2025, in the following manner and in compliance with section 239(a)(1) of the Act.

- [X] In person [] by certified mail, returned receipt # _____ requested [] by regular mail
[] Attached is a credible fear worksheet.
[X] Attached is a list of organization and attorneys which provide free legal services.

The alien was provided oral notice in the SPANISH language of the time and place of his or her hearing and of the consequences of failure to appear as provided in section 240(b)(7) of the Act.

[Signature]
Refused to sign
(Signature of Respondent if Personally Served)

A. 11863 COVARRUBIAS - Deportation Officer
(Signature and Title of officer)

Privacy Act Statement

Authority:

The Department of Homeland Security through U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are authorized to collect the information requested on this form pursuant to Sections 103, 237, 239, 240, and 290 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended (8 U.S.C. 1103, 1229, 1229a, and 1360), and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

Purpose:

You are being asked to sign and date this Notice to Appear (NTA) as an acknowledgement of personal receipt of this notice. This notice, when filed with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), initiates removal proceedings. The NTA contains information regarding the nature of the proceedings against you, the legal authority under which proceedings are conducted, the acts or conduct alleged against you to be in violation of law, the charges against you, and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated. The NTA also includes information about the conduct of the removal hearing, your right to representation at no expense to the government, the requirement to inform EOIR of any change in address, the consequences for failing to appear, and that generally, if you wish to apply for asylum, you must do so within one year of your arrival in the United States. If you choose to sign and date the NTA, that information will be used to confirm that you received it, and for recordkeeping.

Routine Uses:

For United States Citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, or Individuals whose records are covered by the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (5 U.S.C. § 552a note), your information may be disclosed in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), including pursuant to the routine uses published in the following DHS systems of records notices (SORN): DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, DHS/USCIS-007 Benefit Information System, DHS/ICE-011 Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records (CARIER), and DHS/ICE-003 General Counsel Electronic Management System (GEMS), and DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records (BPER). These SORNs can be viewed at <https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorn>. When disclosed to the DOJ's EOIR for immigration proceedings, this information that is maintained and used by DOJ is covered by the following DOJ SORN: EOIR-001, Records and Management Information System, or any updated or successor SORN, which can be viewed at <https://www.justice.gov/opcl/doj-systems-records>. Further, your information may be disclosed pursuant to routine uses described in the abovementioned DHS SORNs or DOJ EOIR SORN to federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement agencies for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

For all others, as appropriate under United States law and DHS policy, the information you provide may be shared internally within DHS, as well as with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign law enforcement; other government agencies; and other parties for enforcement, investigatory, litigation, or other similar purposes.

Disclosure:

Providing your signature and the date of your signature is voluntary. There are no effects on you for not providing your signature and date; however, removal proceedings may continue notwithstanding the failure or refusal to provide this information.