

JUDGE LEON SCHYDLOWER

Martin W. Chow, Esq. (NY Bar: 1960079)
Martin C. Liu & Assoc., PLLC
135 Bowery, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10002
Tel: (212) 255-8833
Fax: (212) 226-0036
e-mail: martin.chow@martinliu.com
Attorneys for Petitioner

EP 25 CV 0621

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION**

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ MENDOZA,)
)
Petitioner,)
)
v.)
)
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR Enforcement and)
Removal Operations, Camp East Montana)
Detention Facility, El Paso, Texas Field Office;)
TODD M. LYONS, Acting/Director,)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S.)
Department of Homeland Security; and)
PAM BONDI, Attorney General of the)
United States, in their official capacities)
Respondents.)
_____)

Case No. _____

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Rogelio Rodriguez Mendoza brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek enforcement of their rights as members of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.). Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Camp East Montana detention facility, in El Paso, Texas, after an

arrest by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in Chicago, Illinois on November 8, 2025. Petitioner now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

2. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

3. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

4. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

5. Petitioner Rogelio Rodriguez Mendoza is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

- a. does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Camp East Montana detention facility. He was apprehended by immigration authorities on November 8, 2025;

- b. entered the United States without inspection nearly 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival, *cf. id.*; and
- c. is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

6. After apprehending Petitioner on November 8, 2025, the DHS placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS has charged Petitioner as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

7. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

8. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

9. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

10. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day, Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

11. Alternatively, the Court should order Petitioner’s release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

12. The Petitioner, Rogelio Rodriguez Mendoza is a 43-year-old native, and citizen of Mexico, who last entered the United States without inspection in 2006 at the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona and has continuously resided in the United States for nearly 20 years.

13. On or about November 8, 2025, the Petitioner was detained while working at a construction site with his U.S. native-born son by ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), in Oak Park, IL a border suburb and adjacent to Chicago.

14. Petitioner is currently being detained at the Camp East Montana detention facility in El Paso, TX, since his arrest by ICE in Chicago, IL on November 8, 2025.

15. On February 4, 2022, Petitioner filed an affirmative application for asylum on Form I-589, Application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and Relief Under the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT), as an applicant for asylum, pursuant to INA §208 *et. seq.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 *et seq.*, INA § 241(b)(3) *et seq.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (CAT), and refugee status, as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A).

16. Since February 4, 2022, the Petitioner has been waiting for an asylum interview to be scheduled on his application for relief on Form I-589.

17. Petitioner is currently languishing in detention since his arrest on November 8, 2025, without the opportunity for a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, pursuant to a recently issued BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals) decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)(Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to hear Respondent's bond request for individuals who entered the U.S. without inspection and are therefore present without lawful admission and are considered "applicants for admission" and are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b)(2)), 8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(2)).

18. Petitioner is also being held in detention without the opportunity for bond based on a recent abrupt change in ICE policy.

19. On July 8, 2025, acting Director, Todd M. Lyons, (ICE) issued a policy memo which abruptly changed the detention and release policies that had been applied previously over several decades.

20. Prior to the July 8, 2025 Lyons memo, individuals present and apprehended within the United States were afforded bond hearings pursuant to INA § 236.

21. The policy memo directed ICE employees to apply INA § 235(b) instead of INA § 236(a) to *all* applicants seeking admission to the United States, including individuals present in the United States without admission, thus making persons, such as the Petitioner - who has resided in the United States continuously for nearly 20 years - ineligible for release and mandatorily detained without the benefit of a bond hearing.

22. Many U.S. district courts nationwide have rejected the application of detention and release policies found in INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to persons such as the Petitioner, who entered the United States many years earlier without inspection and then arrested or detained by ICE many years later, and have granted habeas corpus petitions, including in United States district courts in this district and other district courts nationwide.

23. For a comprehensive list of district court favorable decisions finding that INA §236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (non detention and release) applies not INA §235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention and no release), *see* table attached, entitled, Memorandum and Appendix of collected cases in *Demirel v. Federal Detention Center*

Philadelphia, 2:25-cv-05488 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025).

24. Petitioner has no criminal history, except for a DUI arrest with no conviction, on April 21, 2002 -- 23 years ago.

25. Petitioner is not a danger to the community or a national security risk

26. Petitioner is gainfully employed in the construction industry, has paid his taxes and has strong community ties.

27. Petitioner is married to Alma Yuli Perez Lara and has two U.S. native-born minor children ages, 8-years-old and 17-years-old.

28. Petitioner's wife, Alma also filed for asylum and cancellation of removal on Form EOIR 42B Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents pursuant to INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), as additional relief from removal.¹

29. Petitioner's detention is unconstitutional, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution's right to Due Process and is unlawful pursuant to a long-standing statutory and regulatory practice of DHS releasing from detention noncitizens under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for a bond hearing.

30. Petitioner's release from custody is not reasonably foreseeable and is

¹ 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act) is a discretionary form of relief from removal. To be eligible for this form of relief, an applicant must show (1) at least 10 years of continuous physical presence in the U.S.; (2) good moral character during those 10 years; (3) no disqualifying criminal convictions and (4) that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.

futile because the DHS has recently changed its policy from entertaining bond hearing requests for the release of noncitizens from detention pursuant to INA § 236(a) 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to a policy of asserting mandatory detention, nationwide, pursuant to INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without a right to a bond hearing. *See, Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. (BIA 2025).

31. Therefore, exhaustion of Petitioner’s administrative remedies would be futile and is not required.

32. Habeas corpus review is necessary and a temporary and permanent injunction is requested enjoining Respondents from detaining Petitioner unless provided a bond hearing by an Immigration Judge; or in the alternative, releasing Petitioner from custody on his own recognizance; and enjoining the Respondents from transferring, moving, relocating the Petitioner to another location or detention facility, pending a hearing on this matter

33. In addition, Respondents are in violation of another major federal court decision issued that directly establish the illegality of Petitioner’s arrest, detention, and ongoing incarceration.

34. On November 13, 2025, in *Castañon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 13, 2025), [hereinafter “Nava Order”], Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings, issued an enforcement order finding that DHS/CBP’s warrantless interior arrests without probable cause for immigration violation and without probable cause that the arrestee is “likely to escape” violated the Nava settlement consent decree and applicable federal law. Judge Cummings ordered release of 600+ class members, explicitly including those transferred out of

state. However, Judge Cummings' Nava Order has been stayed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. To date, the Nava Order remains stayed.

35. *See also Nava Settlement Consent Decree, Castanon Nava et. al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al.*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025).

36. The Nava Settlement Consent Decree mandates release of any person detained without a warrant or probable cause and authorizes affected individuals to seek enforcement of the Nava Settlement Consent Decree through a habeas corpus petition or injunction. *See Castanon Nava v. DHS*, 435 F. Supp. 3d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2022), extended in 2025, *Castanon Nava et. al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al.*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025)(order extending consent decree to February 2, 2026).

37. Accordingly, to vindicate the Petitioner's rights to Due Process and unlawful custody pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of federal statutes and regulations, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

38. Absent an order from this Court, the Petitioner will be unlawfully and mandatorily detained, for the foreseeable future, in violation of his due process rights, and in violation of federal statute and regulation.

39. Petitioner has not previously sought or requested a bond hearing from an Immigration Judge, because the same would be futile. *See, Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. (BIA 2025).

JURISDICTION

40. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

41. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

42. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

43. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at Camp East Montana detention facility in El Paso, Texas, which is within the jurisdiction of this District.

44. Venue is proper in this District because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims occurred in this District, Petitioner resides in this District and no real property is involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

45. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and issue an injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) to the Respondents “forthwith,” unless the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

46. If an injunction and temporary restraining order is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return “within *three days* unless for good cause additional

time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

47. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

PARTIES

48. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico, who last entered the U.S. without inspection at the U.S.-Mexico border, in 2006. Petitioner has continuously resided in the U.S. for nearly 20 years. Petitioner is currently detained at the Camp East Montana detention facility, in El Paso, Texas, and has been in ICE custody since his arrest in Oak Park, IL, on November 8, 2025. Camp East Montana is located in El Paso County, Texas. The Petitioner is a resident of Camp East Montana detention facility, in El Paso County, Texas. Petitioner is in custody and under the direct control of Respondents and their agents.

49. Respondent is in the custody of the Field Director of the Camp East Montana detention facility, and he has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to the facility’s contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain noncitizens and is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Field Director of the Camp East Montana detention facility has

authority to release Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

50. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director, United States Immigration and Enforcement.

51. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention/custody. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

52. Respondent Pam Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

53. Petitioner is a 43-year-old native and citizen of Mexico. Petitioner last arrived in the United States in 2006 and has continuously resided in the United States for nearly 20 years.

54. Petitioner is married to a non-US citizen. He has two children who are both U.S.-native born citizens and are 17 and 8 years old.

55. On February 4, 2022, Petitioner filed an affirmative application for asylum on

Form I-589, Application for Asylum Withholding of Removal and Relief Under the U. N. Convention Against Torture, and for refugee status as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A), pursuant to INA § 208 et. seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 et. seq. (asylum),

56. On November 9, 2025, the Petitioner was served with an NTA (Form I-862, Notice to Appear), charging him with removability under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled or who arrived in the U.S. at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card or other suitable travel document.

57. Petitioner is eligible for relief from removal from the United States under INA § 208 et. seq. as a refugee for asylum 8 U.S.C. § 1158, Form I-589 and under INA §240A(b)(1) Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Non-Permanent Residents.

58. Immigration Judges across the country have been denying custody redetermination requests for noncitizens similarly situated as the Petitioner, based on lack of jurisdiction, and relying on, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)(finding that any noncitizen who is present in the United States without having been inspected and admitted is subject to detention pursuant to INA § 235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) not INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226).

59. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) has been rejected by

numerous courts, including: *Buenrostro-Menez v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3726, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025); *Covarrubias v. Nergara*, No. 25-cv-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); *Angel Fuentes v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-00153, Doc. No. 15 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025). For a comprehensive survey of district court decisions finding that INA §236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (non detention and release) applies not INA §235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention and no release), as Respondents' assert, *see* table entitled: Memorandum of the Hon. Paul S. Diamond, compiled as an Appendix in *Demirel v. Federal Detention Center Philadelphia*, No. 2:25-cv-054388 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025).

60. Therefore, Petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief that is necessary for adjudication of his request for a bond hearing and release from unlawful custody.

61. Petitioner seeks a TRO preliminarily enjoining and restraining Respondents from transferring or removing Petitioner to another jurisdiction or location outside the United States.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

62. This Court possesses jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, to issue an order to preliminarily enjoin Respondents from removing the Petitioner, and to order the release of Petitioner on bond pursuant to § 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), when there is a violation of the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause and violations of federal statute and regulation.

63. Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection or

parole in 2006 at the U.S.-Mexico border in Phoenix, AZ— nearly 20 years ago.

64. Petitioner filed an affirmative application for relief from removal on February 4, 2022, on Form I-589 Application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and Relief Under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), INA § 208 *et. seq.*, 8 U.S.C. §1158 *et. seq.* (asylum), INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(withholding of removal), and 8 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18 (CAT).

65. Petitioner is eligible for relief from removal on Form EOIR 42b Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents.

66. Petitioner was not detained by DHS/ICE or CBP (U.S. Customs & Border Patrol) at a U.S. border or port of entry, until on or about November 8, 2025, in Oak Park, IL – in the interior of the United States, in the outskirts of Chicago while working with his son, at a construction site.

67. For decades, DHS took the position that noncitizens like Petitioner were eligible for release on bond pursuant to INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), unless they fell under the mandatory detention provisions of INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

68. However, on July 8, 2025, DHS issued an internal memo that abruptly changed its longstanding position. DHS now takes the position that *all* noncitizens who entered the U.S. without inspection or parole are actually “applicants for admission” pursuant to INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and therefore are ineligible for release on bond regardless of how long they have resided in the United States.

69. DHS' new position is without legal support, and this Court should find that DHS's new interpretation of INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the Petitioner's right for a bond hearing under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and that a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a TRO and preliminary injunction should issue, enjoining Respondents from removing, transferring, relocating the Petitioner, and immediately releasing Petitioner from custody or in the alternative be afforded a bond hearing.

70. INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is the default rule for discretionary detention. It applies to anyone who is detained "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." *See, Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. ___ (2018)(slip op. at 4)

71. Noncitizens detained under INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 are eligible for custody redetermination hearings unless they fall under the mandatory detention provisions of INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

72. First, the carve out under INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), including the most recent passage of the Laken Riley Act ("LRA"), Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), illustrates that Congress intended INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to serve as the default detention authority for individuals like Petitioner who have lived in the U.S for many years. When Congress creates specific exceptions to a statute's applicability, it proves that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies. LRA supports the Petitioner's position of detention authority under INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applies rather than

application of INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 because INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 applies mostly to noncitizens who are recently arriving noncitizens at the border (governing inspection and mandatory detention) and not to persons like Petitioner who have been arrested and detained by ICE long after the arrival in the interior of the United States, under INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (governing detention and bond hearings).

73. Second, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice clearly demonstrate that Congress *did not* intend noncitizens like Petitioner to be subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

74. DHS' position runs contrary to the plain meaning of the text and how INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) has been consistently applied in the past and finds no basis in the context of the statutory schemes governing immigration detention.

75. To find otherwise would render significant parts of INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) obsolete, redundant or superfluous, which clearly Congress did not intend to do.

76. Third, DHS' position is not supported by its past practice and interpretation of statutes that consistently applied detention and release authority found in INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) to those who are "arriving aliens" at the border and INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to those noncitizens who have resided in the U.S. for many years to be afforded bond. *See* for example, Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director Immigration, Customs and Enforcement (ICE) internal memo dated July 8, 2025, abruptly changing DHS policy directing employees to treat *all* noncitizens as "applicants for admission" and are subject to detention under INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and not under INA § 236(a), 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a).

77. DHS's position is not supported by any precedential Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") case law. *Matter of Q. Li* is distinguishable and concerned a noncitizen who was detained shortly after crossing the border and who was subsequently released on parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), but later re-detained.

78. Unlike the Petitioner in the instant case, who entered the U.S. in 2006 – nearly 20 years ago and has continuously resided in the U.S. and was not arrested or detained at or near the border but was arrested and detained in Oak Park, IL a suburb adjacent to Chicago, IL in the interior of the U.S., the noncitizen in *Matter of Q. Li* was arrested at or near the border shortly after entry.

79. Under those circumstances, the Board found in *Matter of Q. Li* that the noncitizen was an applicant for admission and subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

80. Crucially, the Board's holding in *Matter of Q. Li* reiterated the well-established understanding that INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens already present in the United States, while INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), applies primarily to noncitizens seeking entry into the United States and authorizes DHS to detain them without a warrant at the border. However, the Board's decision in *Matter of Q. Li* is distinguishable on the facts in Petitioner's case because the noncitizen in *Matter of Q. Li* was arrested at or near and soon after entry at the border, unlike the Petitioner who was

arrested and detained at ORD airport, in Chicago, IL in the interior of the United States and long after residing in the U.S. for 24 years.

81. More recently, the BIA decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) should not be given deference to statutory interpretation when the BIA's decision is contrary to agency consistency and lack of thorough reasoning. *See Chogollo Chafila v. Scott*, No. 2:25cv-00439-SDN, 2025 WL (D.Me. Sept. 18, 2025).

82. This interpretation is also supported by the Supreme Court's decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez* and *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)(overruling the Chevron deference doctrine and that under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts must exercise independent judgment in determining whether an agency acted within its statutory authority, rather than deferring to an agency's interpretation simply because a statute is ambiguous) and numerous recent district court decisions, including decisions of U.S. district courts from the Fifth Circuit, that have granted preliminary injunctive relief and enjoined the application of INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) to individuals similarly situated to Petitioner. *See Memorandum of the Hon. Paul S. Diamond attached as an Appendix in Demirel v. Federal Detention Center Philadelphia*, No. 2:25-cv-05488 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025).

83. The Respondents' position is further undercut by *Matter of Akhdemov*, 29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025) in circumstances much like the Petitioner, applying INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to noncitizens already in the U.S. and affording them a bond hearing.

84. Respondents are in further violation of the Nava Settlement Consent Decree

which mandates release of any person detained without a warrant or probable cause applicable to six states in the Midwest, and authorizes affected individuals to seek enforcement of the Nava Settlement decree through a habeas corpus petition or injunction. *See Castanon Nava v. DHS*, 435 F. Supp. 3d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2022), extended in 2025, *Castanon Nava et. al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al.*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025)(order extending consent decree to February 2, 2026).

85. Because the Respondents detained and arrested the Petitioner in Oak Park, IL on about November 8, 2025, in a warrantless arrest, without probable cause, the Respondents are in violation of the Nava Settlement Consent Decree and Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

86. The allegations in the above paragraphs 1- 85 are realleged and incorporated herein.

87. The Petitioner is currently being detained at Camp East Montana detention facility in El Paso, Texas, after his arrest in Oak Park, IL on November 8, 2025, in violation of the Petitioner's rights to seek a bond hearing pursuant to INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. §1226(a).

88. If Petitioner were to make a motion for a bond hearing, it would be denied

based on the Immigration Court's lack of jurisdiction. *See Matter Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)(Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to hear Respondent's bond request for individuals who entered the U.S. without inspection and are therefore present without lawful admission and are considered "applicants for admission" and are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b)(2)), 8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(2).

89. It would be futile to pursue continued administrative remedies in this case. Petitioner would be prejudiced if bond hearing relief were not immediately granted, and Petitioner would be irreparably be harmed.

90. Consequently, for these reasons, Petitioner's unlawful detention without the right to a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO

Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), INA § 236(a) and Implementing Regulations

91. The allegations in the above paragraphs 1-90 are realleged and incorporated herein.

92. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens already present in the United States, while INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), applies primarily to noncitizens seeking entry into the United States and authorizes DHS to detain them without a warrant at the border.

93. Because Petitioner entered the U.S. in 2006, and has been present in the U.S. for nearly 20 years, and was detained in the interior, the Petitioner should be afforded a bond hearing.

94. Petitioner's detention is unlawful in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), INA § 236(a) and the writ of habeas corpus and an order to preliminarily enjoin Respondents from removing, transferring or relocating Petitioner should be granted, immediately releasing Petitioner or in the alternative afford a bond hearing.

COUNT THREE

Petitioner is a Class Member in *Castanon Nava et. al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al.*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025) and *Castañon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 13, 2025)

95. The allegations in the above paragraphs 1-94 are realleged and incorporated herein.

96. The Nava Settlement Consent Decree mandates release of any person detained without a warrant or probable cause and authorizes affected individuals to seek enforcement of the Nava Settlement Consent Decree through a habeas corpus petition or injunction. *See Castanon Nava v. DHS*, 435 F. Supp. 3d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2022), extended in 2025, *Castanon Nava et. al. v. Department of Homeland Security et al.*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025)(order extending consent decree to February 2, 2026) and *Castañon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security*, No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 13, 2025)(enforcement mandate). However, enforcement has been stayed pursuant to an order of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

97. Petitioner is a class member in the Nava Settlement Consent Decree. However, although enforcement of the Consent Decree has been stayed by the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioner is entitled to be released upon dismissal of the appeal.

98. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. *INS v. Delgado*, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).

99. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits detention without an individualized determination. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

100. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 830 (2018) provides for habeas corpus review for unreasonably prolonged or unlawful detention.

101. *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 359 (2024) requires independent judicial review of statutory authority, eliminating the Chevron deference standard. *See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

102. Petitioner is being held in violation of the Nava Settlement Consent Decree and is required to be immediately released or afforded a bond hearing, upon dismissal of the case by Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

COUNT FOUR

Petitioner is a Class Member in *Maldonado Bautista* and Is Entitled to Be Immediately Released From ICE Custody or Afforded a Bond Hearing

103. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

104. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

105. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

106. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

107. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*

108. Pursuant to the final declaratory judgment and grant of class certification in *Maldonado Bautista*, Petitioner is a class member in that case and by virtue of the final declaratory judgment issued in that case, Petitioner is entitled to be immediately released from ICE custody or in the alternative, afforded a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Declare that Petitioner is a class member in *Maldonado Bautista v. Moniz*, and by virtue of the final declaratory judgment issued, Petitioner is entitled to be immediately released from ICE custody without bond or in the alternative, afforded a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
- (3) Declare that Petitioner is a class member in the Nava Settlement Consent Decree and

- immediately release Petitioner from ICE custody without bond pursuant to the Nava Settlement Consent Decree enforcement mandates or afford Petitioner a bond hearing;
- (4) Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), enjoining and restraining the Respondents from further transferring, removing or relocating Petitioner;
 - (5) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, against unreasonable searches and seizures;
 - (6) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), INA §236(a);
 - (7) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents immediately release Petitioner;
 - (8) Schedule a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge and, at such hearing, affording Petitioner to be released from custody;
 - (9) That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter;
 - (10) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and
 - (11) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Martin W. Chow, Esq.
Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: December 3, 2025
New York, NY

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Rogelio Rodriguez Mendoza and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 3rd day of December 2025.

/s/ Martin W. Chow, Esq.
Martin W. Chow, Esq.