

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

Victor LIZANDRO CHALCO YUNGA,

Petitioner,

- against -

ALEXANDER CABEZAS, in his official capacity as Acting Assistant Field Office Director for the Newark Field Office for Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; PAMELA JO BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America,

Respondents.

No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner is an asylum seeker and resident of Queens, New York swept up in a recent campaign of race-based street stops by immigration authorities, in which Latino men going about their daily lives are stopped under false pretenses; questioned; then swiftly detained. No individualized custody determination process is then used to determine whether such individuals need to be jailed. And indeed, Petitioner poses neither a danger nor a flight risk. He is an asylum seeker with a future court date and a strong fear-based claim for relief. But because of his unlawful apprehension, he is now among the latest individuals subjected to the federal government's unlawful reinterpretation of the immigration statutes—an

interpretation that, in the government's view, mandates Petitioner's indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

2. Petitioner's confinement is unlawful—as confirmed by the rising tide of decisions, including within this District, that have rejected Respondents' interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, he brings this petition seeking his immediate and unconditional release. He also asks this Court to enjoin his transfer outside this District. *Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 1224, 1237 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Once the district court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and the parties to, the litigation, the All Writs Act [28 U.S.C. § 1651] authorizes a federal court to protect that jurisdiction” (cleaned up)); *Khalil v. Joyce*, No. 2:25-cv-1963 (MEF) (D.N.J.) Mar. 19, 2025), ECF No. 81 (enjoining transfer and removal of an immigration habeas petitioner under the All Writs Act). Alternatively, Petitioner respectfully asks the Court to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 on the expedited basis set forth in the statute, during which the Court should (1) find that Petitioner's detention violates federal law and (2) order his release.

3. Finally, Petitioner asks that the Court order Respondents to produce the Form I-213 (an agency record that typically memorializes the alleged basis for a person's arrest) in his case as part of its consideration of the legality of his arrest.

PARTIES

4. Petitioner Victor Lizandro Chalco Yunga is a resident of Queens, New York who has lived in the U.S. continuously since January 2024. ICE arrested him on or about November 29, 2025. He is currently at Elizabeth Detention Center.

5. Respondent Alexander Cabezas is named in his official capacity as the Acting Assistant Field Office Director for the Newark Field Office for ICE within the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Mr. Cabezas is a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer with DHS, ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Newark Field Office whose duties include oversight of detention operations at the Elizabeth Detention Center. In his official capacity, he is responsible for the administration of immigration laws and the execution of detention and removal determinations, and is an immediate custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Cabezas’ address is U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 970 Broad Street, 11th Floor, Newark, New Jersey 07102.

6. Respondent Kristi Noem is named in her official capacity as the Secretary of Homeland Security in the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). In her official capacity, Ms. Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); routinely transacts business in the District of New Jersey; is legally responsible for pursuing any effort to remove Petitioner, and is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent

Noem's address is U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0485.

7. Respondent Pamela Jo Bondi is named in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. In her official capacity, Ms. Bondi is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws as exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). She routinely transacts business in the District of New Jersey and is legally responsible for administering Petitioner's removal and custody proceedings and for the standards used in those proceedings. As such, she is a legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Bondi's office is located at the United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

JURISDICTION

8. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by ICE. *See, e.g., Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *Lomeu v. Soto*, No. 25-CV-16589, 2025 WL 2981296, *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (Padin, J.) (citing *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 517) ("The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"); *Contreras Maldonado v. Cabezas*, No. 25-CV-13004, 2025 WL 2985256, *2 (D.N.J.

Oct. 23, 2025) (Semper, J.) (similar); *Soto v. Soto*, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (O’Hearn, J.) (similar); *Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025) (Hayden, J.) (similar).

9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 (the Suspension Clause) of the United States Constitution. This Court has authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2202. The Court has additional remedial authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

10. In recent months Respondents have taken the position in similar matters that to the extent the courts reject their theory of statutory detention authority, administrative exhaustion is required. But Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent establishes otherwise. Due-process claims, like those brought here, are “generally exempt from the exhaustion requirement because the [Board of Immigration Appeals] does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues.” *Mudric v. Att’y Gen. of the United States*, 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006); see *Carr v. Saul*, 593 U.S. 83, 92, 93, 96 (2021) (noting that “agency adjudications are generally ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges,” that “[i]t makes little sense to require litigants to present claims to adjudicators who are powerless to

grant the relief requested,” and holding that it was legal error to impose an administrative exhaustion requirement on constitutional claims). A bond hearing cannot remedy the violation of rights here. Where “ICE’s detention of Petitioner did not comport with the implementing regulations and § 1226(a) [] a bond hearing for a post-deprivation review is wholly inadequate to remedy that unlawful detention.” *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-CV-04836 (OEM), 2025 WL 2772765, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025). Finally, because Petitioner challenges his detention under Section 1225(b)(2), any attempt to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 218 (BIA 2025) (holding that “an Immigration Judge lacks authority to hear a bond request” filed by a noncitizen held in mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)); *see also, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-2304, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (administrative challenge futile in light of *Yajure Hurtado*). That remains the case despite a recent nationwide declaratory judgment in *Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr.*, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), which Respondents have instructed immigration judges to ignore. Accordingly, the Court can exercise jurisdiction regardless of whether Petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies.¹

¹ On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary

VENUE

11. Venue is proper in this Court because Petitioners is physically confined within the District of New Jersey. *See Spencer v. Kemna*, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (finding that venue is determined at the time a habeas petition is filed).

SPECIFIC FACTS ABOUT PETITIONER

12. Petitioner Victor Lizandro Chalco resides in Queens, New York and is Hispanic.

13. He first came to the United States in January 2024 hoping to find safety and refuge. Upon entering, Respondents briefly detained and processed him for release, subject to his appearance in immigration court. His Notice to Appear charged with removability for being present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. On information and belief, his release from custody was pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Later, in December 2024, he filed a timely application for asylum.

judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are refusing to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that class members be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

14. Mr. Chalco has a history of past persecution and suffers from a serious medical condition. He has endured many acts of violence as a result of the fact that he is gay.

15. On information and belief, Mr. Chalco has no criminal convictions in this country.

16. On information and belief, on November 29, 2025, Respondents stopped, questioned, photographed, and ultimately detained Mr. Chalco—but not because of anything that he may have done. Instead, Mr. Chalco was arrested as part of an operation of indiscriminate stops of Hispanic people in the Corona, Queens neighborhood.

17. Mr. Chalco remains in detention at the Elizabeth Detention Center.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. The Government's Statutory Authority to Detain Noncitizens

18. The two primary provisions of the United States Code that govern the detention of noncitizens prior to an order of removal are 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 U.S.C § 1225(b).²

² Section 1226(c) concerns mandatory detention for noncitizens who have been convicted, or in some circumstances arrested, for certain criminal offenses, and is irrelevant to the instant petition, as none of Petitioner's arrest fit the relevant offenses under Section 1226(c). Moreover, Respondents are not relying on Section 1226(c) to justify Petitioner's detention.

19. Section 1226(a) governs the detention of most noncitizens who are already in the United States and subject to formal removal proceedings before an immigration court under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (“[U.S. immigration law] authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] ***already in the country*** pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”) (emphasis added).

20. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an [noncitizen] ‘pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287-89.

21. Detention under Section 1226(a) is discretionary, not mandatory; the government “may release the [noncitizen] on—(A) a bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).

22. Under the Section 1226 framework, release is appropriate where a noncitizen “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). *See Velesaca v. Decker*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations require ICE officials to make an individualized custody determination”);

see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-CV-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).

23. If, after an individualized consideration, ICE chooses to detain the noncitizen pursuant to Section 1226(a) pending removal proceedings, the individual may ask for a bond redetermination hearing before the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

24. In contrast with Section 1226, which applies to “certain [noncitizens] *already in the country*,” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added), Section 1225(b) governs detention of noncitizens seeking entry into the United States (*i.e.*, “applicants for admission”). In other words, Section 1225(b) mandates detention for those noncitizens subject to it, and they are not eligible to be considered for release.

25. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to a narrower subset of applicants for admission. It provides that, “if the examining officer determines that a[] [noncitizen] *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] *shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

26. As courts in this District and countless others have almost uniformly held, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens, like Petitioners, who are detained while living in the United States. *Castillo v. Lyons*, No. 25-CV-16219 (MEF), 2025 WL 2940990, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2025); *Lomeu v. Soto*, No.

25CV16589 (EP), 2025 WL 2981296, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (holding that the detention of a noncitizen who has resided in the United States for years under Section 1225(b) “is incompatible with the overall statutory scheme” and “completely ignore[s] the plain and longstanding distinction in U.S. immigration law between those noncitizens who are entering the country and those who remain after entering.”) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 286); *Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *3–6 (similar and collecting cases); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto*, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (similar); *Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at *6–10.

27. Many courts have ultimately decided that when Section 1225(b)(2) is applied unlawfully, release is the most appropriate remedy. *Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at *11; *Bethancourt Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9; *Ramos v. Rokosky*, No. 25CV15892 (EP), 2025 WL 3063588, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025); *Maldonado v. Cabezas*, No. CV 25-13004, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025); *see also Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588 at *15 (concluding that detention while waiting for a bond hearing is “inadequate to address the denial of due process that Mr. Lopez Benitez was entitled to in the first instance”); *Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis*, No. 25-CV-5528, 2025 WL 1927931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (finding that a custody redetermination hearing does not cure any constitutional violations and that such a remedy “rings hollow”); *Artiga v. Genalo*, No. 25-CV-

5208 (OEM), 2025 WL 2829434, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); *J.U. v. Maldonado*, 25-CV-04836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (noting that “there was no ‘initial decision’ as ICE’s detention of Petitioner did not comport with the implementing regulations and § 1226(a); thus, a bond hearing for a post-deprivation review is wholly inadequate to remedy that unlawful detention”).

II. Noncitizens’ Procedural Due Process Rights

28. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens to due process of law. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). As clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court, the protection of the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens in the United States “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted).

29. Stated simply, “while [DHS] might want to enforce this country’s immigration laws efficiently, it cannot do that at the expense of fairness and due process.” *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, No. 25-CV-267, 2025 WL 1284720, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2025) (citing *United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954)).

30. Further, noncitizens are entitled to procedural due process protections, even in the face of policy shifts between administrations. While a “new administration can change the rules . . . it cannot change them and make up new rules

as it goes along when the new rules abridge constitutional rights.” *Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer*, No. 25-CV-493, 2025 WL 1953796, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2025).

31. In the context of immigration detention due process claims, the Third Circuit has applied the three-factor balancing test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge* to determine what due process requires. *Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.*, 12 F.4th 321, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); *see also Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 225 (3d Cir. 2018), *abrogated on statutory grounds by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022) (applying a *Mathews* test “to identify “the specific dictates of due process” for an immigration habeas petitioner).

32. These factors are: (i) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (ii) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (iii) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Id.*

33. In light of a noncitizen’s due process rights and the procedural rights conferred by Section 1226(a) and the implementing regulations, a decision to detain a noncitizen **requires an individualized determination** as to the noncitizen’s risk of flight and danger to the community. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL

2985256, at *6 (“Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when she was detained without an individualized determination under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations”); *K.A. v. Green*, No. 18-3436, 2018 WL 4676049, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Sep. 28, 2018) (Linares, J.) (holding that the immigration judge granted petitioner an “‘individualized determination’ of his dangerousness and flight risk taking into account *inter alia* petitioner’s ‘extensive record,’ ‘history of incarceration,’ and ‘risk were he released once more,’ as required by the Government ‘to prove that [petitioner’s] continued detention was necessary to further the ends of § 1226(c)’”); *Velesaca v. Decker*, No. 20-CV-1803, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *10; *Kelly v. Almodovar*, No. 25-CV-6448, 2025 WL 2381591, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. 25-CV-02157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *13 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-05632, 2025 WL 2084921, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025).

34. Under the *Mathews* rubric, freedom from imprisonment, physical restraint, or other forms of government custody is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *9 (“[Petitioner] invokes the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment”) (quoting *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*,

978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)) (citing *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 529); *Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (noncitizens in immigration custody had an arguably even greater liberty interest in remaining out of detention than criminal parolees who required due process protection).

35. With respect to the second *Mathews* factor, given the strong liberty interest at stake, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process requires at least some notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person can be placed in immigration detention. *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025). Further, due process requires that “notice must be afforded within a reasonable time and in such manner as will allow [noncitizens] to actually seek . . . relief[.]” *Id.*

36. For the third *Mathews* factor, “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it advances a legitimate government purpose.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 854. The recognized government interests in immigration detention are “ensuring the appearance of [noncitizens] at future immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Absent evidence in the record that a noncitizen is dangerous, and in situations when the noncitizen has appeared for immigration proceedings, district courts have held that the government cannot demonstrate a significant interest in their detention. *See Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13; *Valdez*, No. 25-CV-4627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 2025).

37. Recent decisions by federal courts in various jurisdictions confirm that due process requires the government to make individualized determinations to detain noncitizens and give them notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard when challenging their detention. *See Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, *5–6; *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (“Respondents’ ongoing detention of [Mr. Lopez Benitez] with no process at all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or opportunity to respond, violates his due process rights.”) (citations omitted).

38. Further, if a noncitizen does not receive individualized consideration pre-deprivation, his due process rights are irrevocably violated, and no amount of procedure provided post-detention can remedy that violation. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *5–6 (“Respondents’ post-hoc reasoning at the August 14, 2025 bond hearing does not rectify the lack of individualized determination at the time of arrest” and “The court therefore finds that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when she was detained without an individualized determination under § 1226. . . . The Court grants the writ of habeas corpus . . . and orders Respondents to release Petitioner”); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *14 (“Given the nature of the constitutional violation Mr. Lopez Benitez sustained here—i.e., Respondents’ failure to conduct any kind of individualized assessment before detaining him—any post-deprivation review by an immigration judge would

be inadequate.”); *see also* *Chipantiza-Sisalema*, 2025 WL 1927931, at *3 (finding bond “hearing is no substitute for the requirement that ICE engage in a deliberative process prior to, or contemporaneous with, the initial decision to strip a person of the freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause.”) (citation modified); *Kelly*, 2025 WL 2381591, at *3 (same).

39. As a result, courts have ordered a noncitizen’s immediate release where their pre-detention due process rights have been violated. *See, e.g., Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7; *Rivera Zumba*, 2025 WL 2753496, at *11; *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *15; *Lomeu*, 2025 WL 2981296, at *9; *Soto*, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9; *see also Maklad v. Murray*, No. 1:25-CV-946, 2025 WL 2299376, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug 8, 2025); *Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *7; *Velasquez*, 2025 WL 1953796, at *18; *Singh v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025); *Kelly*, 2025 WL 2381591, at *8; *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *19; *Valdez*, 2025 WL 1707737, at *5.

40. Here, immediate release is appropriate because Respondents have not—and cannot—show that they conducted an individualized determination regarding Petitioner before his summary arrest. Respondents’ reliance on Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision establishes their decision to forego any evaluation of whether Petitioner’s circumstances would otherwise warrant detention under Section 1226, which provides the sole lawful authority for detaining individuals

residing in the U.S. Indeed, in what is becoming a routine litigation strategy, Respondents will likely advance a two-part argument to perpetuate their unlawful detention scheme: first, they will claim Petitioner's detention is lawful under Section 1225(b)(2), and then, as a fallback, acknowledge that Section 1226 applies but that Petitioner should seek an administrative bond hearing. All the while, Petitioner will likely remain in detention awaiting such a hearing and for any administrative appellate process to run its course. Immediate release is the only remedy that would end this game of bait-and-switch.

41. In the alternative, Petitioner seeks at a minimum a bond hearing at which Respondents bear the burden of justifying his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. *See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020) (ordering government to bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence at an immigration bond hearing, relying on *Mathews*); *Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573 (2022).

III. TIMELINE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2243

42. Courts considering petitions for writs of habeas corpus are directed to either issue a writ "forthwith," or to direct the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted within three days, or, with good cause, within twenty days. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

43. Once the government has responded, the statute directs the Court to schedule a hearing on the petition “not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.” *Id.*

44. Because Petitioner’s liberty remains heavily burdened during his continued detention, we ask the Court to adhere to the clear schedule set forth in § 2243 and order the Government to Show Cause within three days as to why the Petition should not be granted.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

**VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Failure to Conduct an Individualized Pre-Detention Assessment)**

45. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

46. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. *See generally Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

47. Accordingly, Petitioner was entitled to due process of law *in advance* of any detention. *Cf. Contreras Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2985256, at *5.

48. The Third Circuit applies the *Mathews v. Eldridge* factors to determine what due process requires in the context of immigration detention, balancing: (i) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (ii) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (iii) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Gayle*, 12 F.4th at 331 (citation modified) (quoting *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335)

49. Petitioner’s private interests here are strong: he has been deprived of their liberty. Indeed, detention is the “carefully limited exception” and implicates the “most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851.

50. Further, Respondents detained Petitioner without notice, without an opportunity to respond, and without any meaningful evaluation as to his particular circumstances, including whether he poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.

51. With respect to the government’s interest, Respondents have not offered any individualized purpose for Petitioner’s detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

52. Necessarily, therefore, based on ICE’s view that Petitioner’s detention was mandatory, an individualized assessment of the factors in his case was not made

prior to his detention. *See Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *11 (“The problem is that Respondents have not offered any explanation for Mr. Lopez Benitez’s detention other than their initial assertion that it is mandatory—that is, that it is *non-discretionary*. Such an assertion is precisely the *opposite* of an exercise of discretion, which entails some sort of judgment”) (emphasis in original).

53. For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ detention of Petitioner violates the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As multiple courts have held, no amount of post-deprivation process can cure the foregoing violation, and Petitioner should be released.

COUNT TWO
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Substantive Due Process)

54. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

55. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. At its core, a person’s protected liberty interest mandates freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and applies with equal force to individuals in immigration detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Doherty v. Thornburgh*, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991). Because “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without

trial is the carefully limited exception,” the government may imprison people as a preventive measure only within strict limits. *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (quoting *U.S. v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).

56. In the immigration context, detention is nonpunitive and therefore held to different standards than criminal detention. *See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). Specifically, Courts have recognized only two legitimate purposes for immigration detention: mitigating flight risk and preventing danger to the community. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 853–54; *Faure v. Decker*, No. 15-CV-5128, 2015 WL 6143801, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2015). Detention is nevertheless the “carefully limited exception” and implicates the “most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 851.

57. Petitioner is not a flight risk or a danger to the community at large. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (noting that immigration detention aims to ensure the detainee’s appearance at immigration proceedings and protect the community from dangerous individuals). He filed a timely asylum application and has a future court date. Because Respondents’ detention of Petitioner bears no “reasonable relation” to the government’s interests in preventing flight and danger, *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), his detention is devoid of any reasoned justification.

58. For the foregoing reasons, Respondents' arbitrary and abrupt detention of Petitioner violated his substantive due process rights.

COUNT THREE

VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (Freedom from Unlawful Stop and Seizure)

59. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

60. The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures" and establishes that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

61. Except at the border and its functional equivalents, the Fourth Amendment prohibits Respondents from conducting a detentive stop to question a person without reasonable suspicion that a person is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. *See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). The Government bears the burden of providing "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. *See Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The race of an individual cannot itself create reasonable suspicion, even for a temporary stop. *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975); *Noem v. Vasquez*

Perdomo, No. 25A169, --- S.Ct. ----, 2025 WL 2585637, at *3 (Sep. 8, 2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to even approach Petitioner, much less to question and detain him.

62. “[T]o establish reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot rely solely on generalizations that, if accepted, would cast suspicion on large segments of the law-abiding population.” *United States v. Manzo-Jurado*, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006); *see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, 606 U.S. __ (2025), 2025 WL 2585637, at *3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion[.]”).

63. Petitioner’s detention had no basis apart from race. Rather, it was part of a coordinated, indiscriminate sweep of individuals who appeared to be of Hispanic descent in the Corona, Queens area, which has gone on for over a month and led to numerous detentions on November 29th and 30th. Respondents have a pattern and practice of making race-based stops in the Corona, Queens neighborhood—and other areas of New York City with a high concentration of immigrants—and detaining and questioning people under false pretenses. *Cf. Escobar Molina v. DHS*, No. CV 25-3417 (BAH), 2025 WL 3465518 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2025) (finding unlawful a similar policy in the Washington, D.C. area).

64. As a result, Petitioner’s detention violates the Fourth Amendment because they were arrested without probable cause or a proper warrant. *See, e.g.,*

Gamez Lira v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00855, 2025 WL 2581710, at *3–4 (D.N.M. Sept. 5, 2025) (finding habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim likely to succeed in showing arrest and continued detention unconstitutional when Respondents failed to make a probable cause determination before re-arresting and detaining noncitizen in removal proceedings).

65. The appropriate remedy for this violation is release from detention. *See, e.g., Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *18, *report and recommendation adopted*, 2025 WL 2349133 (ordering habeas petitioner’s “release from detention . . . granted because her Fourth Amendment rights were violated.”).

COUNT FOUR

VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) AND *MALDONADO BAUTISTA*

66. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above.

67. Upon information and belief, Respondents are currently detaining Petitioners pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), its mandatory detention authority.

68. However, Petitioner was, at the time his their arrest and detention by Respondents, not seeking admission to the United States. He was already residing in the United States.

69. Section 1226 governs the detention of individuals residing within the United States, like Petitioners, and implements a discretionary detention regime with the opportunity for release.

70. Because his detention should be governed by Section 1226, the application of the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), to Petitioner is unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act .

71. Moreover, on November 20, 2025, a district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

72. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

73. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he/she/they is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

COUNT FIVE

VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT and 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(2)

74. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

75. The Administrative Procedure Act prohibits agency action which is arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

76. ICE officers’ authority to conduct warrantless arrests is prescribed in 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(2). That statute requires that officers have “reason to believe” a

person is in the U.S. in violation of laws *and* “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” That assessment must be individualized.

77. On information and belief, no individualized assessment of flight risk was conducted for petitioner.

78. Instead, his detention was part of an operation to stop, question and detain Hispanic New Yorkers based solely on their race and presence in certain neighborhoods of New York. Respondents’ policy and practice of making warrantless arrests without the required individualized flight risk analysis is “final agency action” that violates the Administrative Procedure Act. *See Escobar Molina*, 2025 WL 3465518, at *2 (“enjoin[ing] preliminarily defendants from continuing any policy or practice of conducting warrantless civil immigration arrests in the District without making individualized probable cause determinations as to each arrestee’s risk of escape, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)”).

79. An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). An agency must articulate “a satisfactory explanation” for its action,

“including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”

Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 773 (2019) (citation omitted).

80. Respondents’ decision to detain Petitioner and suddenly subject him to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2) as a result of their indiscriminate Corona operation, irrespective his individual circumstances, is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully requests that this Court:

- a. Declare that Petitioner’s detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- b. Declare that Respondents’ actions violate the Fourth Amendment;
- c. Declare that Respondents’ actions violate the Administrative Procedure Act;
- d. Grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately and unconditionally release Petitioner from custody;
- e. Alternatively, order that a bond hearing be held before a neutral adjudicator where the Government bears the burden of proof of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that each Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community;

f. In the alternative, issue an order to show cause directing the government to respond to this Petition within three (3) days, and hold a hearing within eight (8) days, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243;

g. Order a stay of removal to retain the Court's jurisdiction while these proceedings are pending;

h. Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

i. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: New York, NY
December 3, 2025

/s/ Franchesca Chabla

Franchesca N. Chabla, Esq.
MAKE THE ROAD NEW JERSEY
42 Broad Street
Elizabeth, NJ 07201
Phone: (908) 368-1196 ext. 1012
franchesca.chabla@maketheroadnj.org

MAKE THE ROAD NEW YORK
Harold A. Solis* (*pro hac vice*
forthcoming)
Paige Austin* (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
301 Grove Street
Brooklyn, NY 11237
(718) 418-7690
Harold.Solis@maketheroadny.org
Paige.Austin@maketheroadny.org

* NOT ADMITTED IN THE DISTRICT
OF NEW JERSEY –