**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
**SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA**

**CASE NO. 25-CV-25606-PCH**

JEFFERSON CHAVARRIA-RIVERAS,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, *et al.*,

Respondent.

_____/

**RESPONDENTS' RETURN IN OPPOSITION**
**TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Respondents[1], by and through the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, submit the following return in opposition to the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 6] (Petition). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative transferred to the Middle District of Florida where Petitioner is detained at the Glades County Detention Center in Moor Haven, Florida. Otherwise, the Petition should be denied.

## INTRODUCTION

Petitioner is currently detained at the Glades County Detention Center, a detention center in Moore Haven, Florida, which is in Glades County, in the Middle District of Florida. See 28

[1] A writ of habeas corpus must "be directed to the person having custody of the person detained." 28 USC § 2243. In cases involving present physical confinement, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), that "the immediate custodian, not a supervisory official who exercises legal control, is the proper respondent." *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 439 (2004). Petitioner is currently detained at the Glades County Detention Center, a detention center in Moore Haven, Florida, which is in Glades County in the Middle District of Florida.

U.S.C. § 89(b) (explaining the counties, which includes Glades County, that comprise the Middle District of Florida). By way of the Petition, Petitioner, Jefferson Rolando Chavarria-Riveras, in relevant part, asks this Court to "[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus clarifying that the statutory basis for petitioner's detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to petitioner," thus entitling him to a bond redetermination hearing and/or release. Petition at p. 2-3 ¶ 6-8 and page 15, ¶62. Accordingly, this case comes down to a question of statutory interpretation. Specifically, what statutory provision controls Petitioner's detention.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention for "an alien who is an applicant for admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Pursuant to § 1225(a), "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted … shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Accordingly, under a plain language reading of § 1225, Petitioner is an applicant for admission and is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). For the reasons explained more fully below, the Petition should be denied.

## BACKGROUND

The Petitioner, Jefferson Rolando Chavarria-Riveras (Petitioner), is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States without being inspected or admitted, on or about April 2, 2022. ***See* Ex. A, Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien, November 19, 2025 (Form I-213, Nov. 19, 2025)**. Border Patrol encountered Petitioner in the El Paso, Texas Sector area of responsibility, and detained him after determining he unlawfully entered the United States. ***Id* and *see also* Exhibit B, Notice to Appear, dated April 4, 2022**. Border Patrol issued and served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear ("NTA"), charging Petitioner as inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), as amended, in that he was an alien present in the United Stats without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United

States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. ***See* Ex. B, Notice to Appear, dated April 4, 2022.** On April 27, 2022, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance. ***See* Ex. C, Form I-220A, Order of Release on Recognizance**.

At an initial master calendar hearing on July 22, 2025, Petitioner admitted the allegations, conceded his removability, and announced his intention to seek relief from removal. ***See* Ex. D, Declaration of Deportation Officer Shane Baksh ("Declaration").**

On November 19, 2025, Petitioner was encountered by Florida Highway Patrol ("FHP") during a traffic stop. ***See* Ex. A, Form I-213, Nov. 19, 2025**. FHP verified Petitioner was amenable to removal and transferred him into ICE custody. ***See id.*; *see also* Ex. D, Declaration**.

Petitioner is currently detained at the Glades County Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida. ***See* Ex. D**. Petitioner was scheduled for a master calendar hearing on December 11, 2025, wherein he requested a continuance to permit his attorney time to prepare. ***See id***. Petitioner is next scheduled for a master calendar hearing on January 22, 2026. ***Id.*** Petitioner is detained pursuant to section 235(b)(2)(A), as an applicant for admission who is seeking admission to the United States. To date, Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the Immigration Judge. *Id.*

## ARGUMENT

### I. The Amended Petition Should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction, or in the alternative, transferred to the Middle District of Florida, Where Petitioner is Detained.

Section 2441 allows "the [U.S.] Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge" to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 2441(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted the "within their respective jurisdiction language to mean that a Section 2441 petitioner challenging his present physical custody must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of confinement." *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 446-

47 (2004). "In challenges to present physical confinement…the immediate custodian, not a supervisory official who exercises legal control, is the proper respondent." *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 435-40, 439.

Recently, in *Trump v. J.G.G.*, the Supreme Court reinforced that even for habeas petitions filed by immigration detainees, "jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement" *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025) (citing *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 426, 443). In *J.G.G*, the Supreme Court found that detainees in Texas improperly filed a putative class action challenging their detention in the District of Colombia. ("The detainees are confined in Texas, so venue is improper in the District of Columbia.").

Importantly, this Court, citing *Padilla*, has previously dismissed habeas petitions for lack of jurisdiction filed by immigration detainees located outside the Southern District of Florida. *See Zhang v. United States*, 21-CV-81382-ALTMAN, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162725, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2021) (dismissing habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction where detainee was detained in Glades County Jail, in Glades County, Florida, because jurisdiction lies in the district of confinement); *Dolme v. Barr*, 20-CV-24106-Altman, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197596, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2020) (dismissing habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction where detainee was detained in Wakulla County Jail, in Wakulla County, in the Northern District of Florida, because jurisdiction lies in the district of confinement).

Accordingly, the Amended Petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, transferred to the Middle District of Florida where Petitioner is currently detained.

## II. Section 1225(b)(2) Mandates Detention of Aliens, Like Petitioner, Who Are Present in the United States Without Having Been Lawfully Admitted.

### A. The Plain Language of § 1225(b)(2) Mandates Detention of Applicants for Admission.

"As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute. It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, [courts] must enforce it according to its terms." *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). Section 1225(a) deems all aliens who either "arrive[] in the United States" or who are "present in the United States [and] who ha[ve] not been admitted" to be "applicant[s] for admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And "admission" under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") means lawful entry after inspection by immigration authorities, and not mere physical entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus, an alien who enters the country without permission is and remains an applicant for admission, regardless of the duration of the alien's presence in the United States or the alien's distance from the border.

In turn, § 1225(b)(2) provides that "an alien who is an applicant for admission" "shall be detained" pending removal proceedings if the "alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statute's use of the term "shall" makes clear that detention is mandatory, *see Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach*, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998), and the statute makes no exception based upon the duration of the alien's presence in the country or where in the country the alien is located. Therefore, the statute's plain text mandates that the Government detain all "applicants for admission" who are not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.

Petitioner falls squarely within the statutory definition. He was "present in the United States," and there is no dispute that he has "not been admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a); *see* Ex. A, I-213; see also Ex. B. Moreover, Petitioner cannot establish—and has not even alleged that he can

establish—that he is "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Therefore, § 1225(b)(2) mandates Petitioner "be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a]." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

### B. Applicants for Admission under § 1225(b)(2) are seeking to be legally admitted into the United States.

As explained above, Petitioner is an "applicant[] for admission" under § 1225(b)(2) and is, therefore, seeking to be legally admitted into the United States. The statute itself makes clear that an alien who is an "applicant for admission" *is* necessarily "seeking admission." Moreover, an alien like Petitioner, who is identified by immigration authorities as unlawfully present, and who does not choose to voluntarily withdraw their application for admission and depart from the United States, is "seeking admission," i.e., seeking legal authority to remain in the United States.

#### 1. The "seeking admission" clause does not negate or otherwise limit the statutorily defined term "applicant for admission".

Section 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of an "applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that [the] alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statutory text and context show that being an "applicant for admission" is a means of "seeking admission"—no additional affirmative step is necessary. In other words, every "applicant for admission" is inherently and necessarily "seeking admission," at least absent a choice to voluntarily withdraw their application for admission and depart the United States pursuant to section 1225(a)(4).

For example, § 1225(a) provides that "[a]ll aliens … who are applicants for admission *or otherwise* seeking admission or readmission … shall be inspected." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). The word "[o]therwise' means 'in a different way or manner[.]'" *Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*, 576 U.S. 519, 535 (2015) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1971)); *see also Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds*

*Tobacco Co.*, 839 F.3d 958, 963-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) ("or otherwise" means "the first action is a subset of the second action"). Being an "applicant for admission" is thus a particular "way or manner" of seeking admission, such that an alien who is an "applicant for admission" *is* "seeking admission" for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A).[2] No separate affirmative act is necessary. *See Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) ("[M]any people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be 'seeking admission' under the immigration laws"). Accordingly, § 1225(b) unambiguously provides that an alien who is an "applicant for admission" is "seeking admission," even if the alien is not engaged in some separate, affirmative act to obtain lawful admission.

**2. Any perceived redundancy in the statute cannot serve as a basis to avoid the clear language of the statute.**

As explained above, an "applicant for admission" is "seeking admission" under § 1225. To the extent this reading results in some redundancy in § 1225(b)(2)(A), that "is not a license to rewrite" § 1225 "contrary to its text." *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020); *see Heyman v. Cooper*, 31 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) ("sometimes drafters *do* repeat themselves and *do* include words that add nothing of substance" especially when "the arguably redundant words that the drafters employed … are functional synonyms" (alterations accepted and emphasis in original)).

"The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule." *Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp.*, 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013). "Redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a

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[2] As § 1225 shows, being an "applicant for admission" is only *one* "way or manner" of "seeking admission," not the exclusive way. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). For example, lawful permanent residents returning to the United States are not "applicants for admission" because they are already admitted, but they still may be deemed to be "seeking admission" in some circumstances. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103(A)(13)(C).

congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication." *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239. "[R]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text." *Id.* Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in *Barton*, "[s]ometimes the better overall reading of a statute contains some redundancy." *Id.*

Moreover, "the surplusage cannon … must be applied with statutory context in mind" and should not be employed to undermine congressional intent. *United States v. Bronstein*, 849 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017). As explained in greater detail below, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), with the goal of ensuring that aliens who enter the United States unlawfully do not receive greater privileges and benefits than aliens who lawfully present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. The canon against surplusage should not be employed to re-write the statute in contravention of this statutory context.

**3. Applicants for admission are seeking admission when they seek to lawfully remain in the United States.**

Even if this Court finds that "seeking admission" requires some separate affirmative conduct by the alien, an applicant for admission who attempts to avoid removal from the United States, rather than trying to voluntarily withdraw their application for admission and immediately depart the United States, is "seeking admission."

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an alien who is present in the United States unlawfully, regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States. Although the alien may not have been affirmatively seeking admission during those years of illegal presence, § 1225(b)(2) is not concerned with the alien's pre-inspection conduct. Rather, the statute's use of present tense

language ("seeking" and "determines") shows that its focus is on when "the examining immigration officer" is making a "determin[ation]" regarding the alien's admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The alien is "seeking" admission into the United States, and that application for admission is a continuing one while the alien remains in the United States. *See* The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (defining "seek" and "seeking" as "to endeavor to obtain"). If it were otherwise, the applicant would not attempt to show that he is "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). That inference is confirmed by § 1225(a)(4), which authorizes an alien to voluntarily "depart immediately from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). An applicant who forgoes withdrawing their application and instead endeavors to prove admissibility once and if placed in § 240 removal proceedings—proceedings in which the alien has the "burden of establishing that [he] is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted," *id.* § 1229a(c)(2)(A)—is endeavoring to obtain admission to the United States in the same way someone who is encountered just after crossing the border is attempting to obtain admission to the United States. Notwithstanding, the statute makes clear that no affirmative act is necessary, where the alien entered the United States without being admitted. *See* 1225(a)(1).

**C. Section 1226 Does Not Support Petitioner's Argument.**

Petitioner's reliance upon, and reference to, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is unavailing. Petitioner's detention is controlled by § 1225(b)(2), not § 1226.

Sections 1225 and 1226 are separate statutory provisions that provide independent bases for detention and, generally, apply to different groups of aliens. While, as explained below, there is some overlap between the aliens subject to detention under the two detention provisions, that overlap does not create a redundance because the two statutes provide for different bases for release.

Section 1226(a) authorizes the Executive to "arrest[] and detain[]" *any* "alien" pending removal proceedings. Section 1226(a) provides the detention authority for the significant group of aliens who are *not* deemed "applicants for admission" subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)—specifically, aliens who have been admitted to the United States but are now removable, like those who overstay a visa or lawful permanent residents who engage in conduct that renders them removable.[3] Thus, section 1225(b)(2) is the more specific detention provision. *See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) ("the specific governs the general"). Accordingly, § 1226(a) does not control Petitioner's detention.

Section 1226(c) provides for mandatory detention and is an exception to § 1226(a)'s discretionary detention regime. It requires the Executive to detain "any alien" who is deportable or inadmissible for having committed specified offenses or engaged in terrorism-related actions. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). Petitioner has not committed one of the specified offenses and has not engaged in terrorism-related actions. Accordingly, he is not detained under § 1226(c).

Earlier this year, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 2 (2025), which amended portions of § 1226(c). While that amendment adds some overlap between aliens subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(c), that overlap does not apply to Petitioner, and as explained below, it does not create a redundancy as the amendment does independent work.

The Laken Riley Act provides for mandatory detention for an alien who is "present … without being admitted or paroled"—i.e., is inadmissible under §1182(a)(6)(A)—and "is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing" one of the

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[3] The detention of any of the millions of aliens who have overstayed their visas is governed by § 1226(a), because those aliens (unlike Petitioner) *were* lawfully admitted to the United States.

enumerated criminal acts. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Aliens subject to detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) are effectively applicants for admission that committed one of the enumerated acts and, as applicants for admission, would also be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). There is no redundancy, however, because the two statutes provide for different forms of release. Aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2) are eligible for "humanitarian" parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(5) while aliens detained under §1226(c) are not and may only be released pursuant to the stricter requirements of that statute.

**D. The Government's Reading Comports with Congressional Intent.**

Before 1996, federal immigration laws required the detention of aliens who presented at a port of entry but allowed aliens who were already unlawfully present in the United States to obtain release pending removal proceedings. In 1996, Congress passed the IIRIRA specifically to stop conferring greater privileges and benefits on aliens who enter the United States unlawfully as compared to those who lawfully present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. Accordingly, the Government's reading of the statute is not only supported by the express language of § 1225, but it also comports with congressional intent. *See King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015) (rejecting interpretation that would lead to a result "that Congress designed the Act to avoid"); *New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino*, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) ("We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.").

The INA, as amended, contains a comprehensive framework governing the regulation of aliens, including the creation of proceedings for the removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States and requirements for when the Executive is obligated to detain aliens pending removal.

Prior to 1996, the INA treated aliens differently based on whether the alien had physically "entered" the United States. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a), 1251 (1994)); *see Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100

(9th Cir. 2010) (same). "Entry" referred to "any coming of an alien into the United States," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), and whether an alien had physically entered the United States (or not) "dictated what type of [removal] proceeding applied" and whether the alien would be detained pending those proceedings, *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1099. Accordingly, the INA's prior framework, which distinguished between aliens based on physical "entry," had

> the 'unintended and undesirable consequence' of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered without inspection 'could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,' *including the right to request release on bond*, while aliens who had 'actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection … were subject to mandatory custody.

*Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting *Martinez v. Att'y General of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (2012)); *see also Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996) ("House Rep.") ("illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection").

Congress discarded that regime through enactment of IIRIRA. Among other things, that law had the goal of "ensur[ing] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their legal presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). To that end, IIRIRA replaced the prior focus on physical "entry" and instead made lawful "admission" the governing touchstone. IIRIRA defined "admission" to mean "the *lawful* entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the immigration laws would no longer distinguish aliens based on whether they had managed to evade detection and enter the country without permission. Instead, the "pivotal factor in determining an alien's status" would be "whether or not the alien

has been *lawfully* admitted." House Rep., *supra*, at 226 (emphasis added); *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar).

Petitioner's interpretation would restore the regime Congress sought to discard: It would require detention for those who present themselves for inspection at the border in compliance with law yet grant bond hearings to aliens who evade immigration authorities, enter the United States unlawfully, and remain here unlawfully for years, or even decades, until an involuntary encounter with immigration authorities. That is *exactly* the perverse preferential treatment for illegal entrants that IIRIRA sought to eradicate. Accordingly, this Court should reject Petitioner's interpretation. *King*, 576 U.S. at 492 (rejecting "petitioners' interpretation because it would … create the very [thing] that Congress designed the Act to avoid").

The Government's reading, on the other hand, is true to Congress's intent and should be adopted.

**E. The Government's Reading Accords with *Jennings*.**

The Government's interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). *Jennings* reviewed a Ninth Circuit decision that applied constitutional avoidance to "impos[e] an implicit 6-month time limit on an alien's detention" under § 1225(b) and § 1226. *Id.* at 292. The Court held that neither provision is so limited. *Id.* at 292, 296-306. In reaching that holding, the Court did not—and did not need to—resolve the precise groups of aliens subject to § 1225(b) or § 1226. Nonetheless, consistent with the Government's reading, the Court recognized in its description of § 1225(b) that § "1225(b)(2) …. serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1)." *Id.* at 287.

### F. Under *Loper Bright*, the Statute Controls, Not Prior Agency Practice

Any argument that prior agency practice applying § 1226(a) to Petitioner is unavailing because under *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 411 (2024) (overturning *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), the plain language of the statute and not prior practice controls. *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225–26. In overturning *Chevron*, the Supreme Court recognized that courts often change precedents and "correct[] our own mistakes." *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 411. *Loper Bright* overturned a decades old agency interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act that itself predated IIRIRA by twenty years. *Id.* at 380. Thus, longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*.

## CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative transferred to the Middle District of Florida where Petitioner is detained at the Glades County Detention Center in Moor Haven, Florida. Otherwise, the Petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

**I HEREBY CERTIFY** that on January 5, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF

*/s/Danielle Croke*
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Assistant United States Attorney