

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
CASE NO. 25-25589-CIV-GAYLES**

**JOSE MARIO SILVA CUEVA,**

**Petitioner,**

**v.**

**WARDEN, Miami Federal Detention Center,**

**Respondent.**

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**RESPONDENTS' RETURN IN OPPOSITION  
TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Respondents, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, submit the following return in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1] (Petition). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied.<sup>1</sup>

**BACKGROUND**

Petitioner, Jose Mario Silva Cueva (Petitioner), is a native and citizen of Honduras. *See* Exh. A, Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, (Form I-213) dated November 8, 2014; Exh. B, Form I-213 dated August 13, 2025. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection at an unknown place and unknown date. *Id.*

On November 8, 2014, Petitioner was arrested by local authorities for the offenses of hit and run, following too closely, and no driver's license in Gwinnett County, GA. *See*, Exh. A, Form I-213, dated November 9, 2014. On the same day, Petitioner was encountered by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), who issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), as

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<sup>1</sup> Respondents recognize that courts in this District have rejected similar arguments in granting habeas petitions. *See, e.g., Perez v. Parra*, Case No. 25cv24820 (S.D. Fla.). Nonetheless, Respondents maintain and preserve these arguments for the record in this case.

amended, as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. *See* Exh. C, NTA. On November 12, 2014, Petitioner was released from ICE custody on his own recognizance. *See* Exh. D, Declaration of Deportation Officer Karina Jurdi (Declaration of DO Jurdi).

On October 12, 2021, Petitioner, through counsel, filed written pleadings admitting the allegations in the NTA and conceding the sole charge of removability. *See* Exh. E, Written Pleadings filed October 12, 2021. On November 30, 2021, the immigration court sustained the charge of removal. *See* Exh. F, Order of the Immigration Court dated November 30, 2021.

On August 11, 2025, Petitioner, was encountered by ICE ERO at the Bay County Jail in Panama City, FL and taken into ICE custody. *See* Exh. B, Form I-213 dated August 13, 2025. On September 4, 2025, removal proceedings were transferred to the Immigration Court at Krome. *See* Exh. D, Declaration of DO Jurdi.

On October 1, 2025, Petitioner requested a custody redetermination hearing before the Immigration Judge. *See* Exh. D, Declaration of DO Jurdi. On October 8, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied his request for custody redetermination, citing *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). *See* Exh. G, Order of the Immigration Judge dated October 8, 2025. Petitioner reserved his right to appeal the Immigration Judge's bond order, but he failed to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of the appeal deadline. *See* Exh. D, Declaration of DO Jurdi.

On November 26, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for relief from removal, which is currently pending. *See* Exh. D, Declaration of DO Jurdi. Petitioner is scheduled for a merits hearing on January 29, 2026, to review his application for relief. *See* Exh. H, Notice of Hearing with a hearing date of January 29, 2026.

To date, Petitioner remains in ICE custody at Miami Federal Detention Center. *See* Exh. I, Detention History.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. Section 1225(b)(2) Mandates Detention of Aliens, Like Petitioner, Who Are Present in the United States Without Having Been Lawfully Admitted.**

Under the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), the Government is required to detain all aliens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States without admission and are subject to removal proceedings—regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States or how far from the border they ventured. That unambiguous language resolves this case. *See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, 591 U.S. 657, 676 (2020) (“Our analysis begins and ends with the text.”).

#### **A. The Plain Language of § 1225(b)(2) Mandates Detention of Applicants for Admission.**

“As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with the plain language of the statute. It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, [courts] must enforce it according to its terms.” *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). Section 1225(a) deems all aliens who either “arrive[] in the United States” or who are “present in the United States [and] who ha[ve] not been admitted” to be “applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And “admission” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) means lawful entry after inspection by immigration authorities, and not mere physical entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus, an alien who enters the country without permission is and remains an applicant for admission, regardless of the duration of the alien’s presence in the United States or the alien’s distance from the border.

In turn, § 1225(b)(2) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained” pending removal proceedings if the “alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statute’s use of

the term “shall” makes clear that detention is mandatory, *see Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach*, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998), and the statute makes no exception based upon the duration of the alien’s presence in the country or where in the country the alien is located. Therefore, the statute’s plain text mandates that the Government detain all “applicants for admission” who are not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.

Petitioner falls squarely within the statutory definition. He was “present in the United States,” and there is no dispute that he has “not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a); *see* [D.E. 1 at ¶ 15]. Moreover, Petitioner cannot establish—and has not even alleged that he can establish—that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Therefore, § 1225(b)(2) mandates Petitioner “be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

**B. Applicants for Admission under § 1225(b)(2) are seeking to be legally admitted into the United States.**

As explained above, Petitioner is an “applicant[] for admission” under § 1225(b)(2) and is, therefore, seeking to be legally admitted into the United States. The statute itself makes clear that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” *is* necessarily “seeking admission.” Moreover, an alien like Petitioner, who is identified by immigration authorities as unlawfully present, and who does not choose to withdraw their application for admission depart from the United States voluntarily, is “seeking admission,” i.e., seeking legal authority to remain in the United States.

**1. The “seeking admission” clause does not negate or otherwise limit the statutorily defined term “applicant for admission”.**

Section 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of an “applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that [the] alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The statutory text and context show that being an “applicant for admission” is a means of “seeking admission”—no additional

affirmative step is necessary. In other words, every “applicant for admission” is inherently and necessarily “seeking admission,” at least absent a choice to pursue voluntary withdrawal of the application for admission.

For example, § 1225(a) provides that “[a]ll aliens ... who are applicants for admission *or otherwise* seeking admission or readmission ... shall be inspected.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). The word “[o]therwise” means “in a different way or manner[.]” *Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*, 576 U.S. 519, 535 (2015) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1971)); *see also Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 839 F.3d 958, 963-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“or otherwise” means “the first action is a subset of the second action”). Being an “applicant for admission” is thus a particular “way or manner” of seeking admission, such that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A).<sup>2</sup> No separate affirmative act is necessary. *See Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“[M]any people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the immigration laws”). Accordingly, § 1225(b) unambiguously provides that an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission,” even if the alien is not engaged in some separate, affirmative act to obtain lawful admission.

**2. Any perceived redundancy in the statute cannot serve as a basis to avoid the clear language of the statute.**

As explained above, an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” under § 1225. To the extent this reading results in some redundancy in § 1225(b)(2)(A), that “is not a license to rewrite” § 1225 “contrary to its text.” *Barton v. Barr*, 590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020); *see Heyman v.*

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<sup>2</sup> As § 1225 shows, being an “applicant for admission” is only *one* “way or manner” of “seeking admission,” not the exclusive way. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). For example, lawful permanent residents returning to the United States are not “applicants for admission” because they are already admitted, but they still may be deemed to be “seeking admission” in some circumstances. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103(A)(13)(C).

*Cooper*, 31 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) (“sometimes drafters *do* repeat themselves and *do* include words that add nothing of substance” especially when “the arguably redundant words that the drafters employed ... are functional synonyms” (alterations accepted and emphasis in original)).

“The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.” *Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp.*, 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013). “Redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.” *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239. “[R]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text.” *Id.* Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in *Barton*, “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of a statute contains some redundancy.” *Id.*

Moreover, “the surplusage canon ... must be applied with statutory context in mind” and should not be employed to undermine congressional intent. *United States v. Bronstein*, 849 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017). As explained in greater detail below, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), with the goal of ensuring that aliens who enter the United States unlawfully do not receive greater privileges and benefits than aliens who lawfully present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. The canon against surplusage should not be employed to re-write the statute in contravention of this statutory context.

**3. Applicants for admission are seeking admission when they seek to lawfully remain in the United States.**

Even if “seeking admission” requires some separate affirmative conduct by the alien, an applicant for admission who attempts to avoid removal from the United States, rather than trying

to voluntarily withdraw their application for admission and immediately depart the United States, is “seeking admission.”

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an alien who is present in the United States unlawfully, regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States. Although the alien may not have been affirmatively seeking admission during those years of illegal presence, § 1225(b)(2) is not concerned with the alien’s pre-inspection conduct. Rather, the statute’s use of present tense language (“seeking” and “determines”) shows that its focus is a specific point in time—when “the examining immigration officer” is making a “determin[ation]” regarding the alien’s admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). At *that* point, the alien is “seeking” admission into the United States, and that application is a continuing one. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (defining “seek” and “seeking” as “to endeavor to obtain”). If it were otherwise, the applicant would not attempt to show that he is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). That inference is confirmed by § 1225(a)(4), which authorizes an alien to voluntarily “depart immediately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). An applicant who is placed in section 240 removal proceedings, who forgoes that statutory option and instead endeavors to prove admissibility in proceedings in which the alien has the “burden of establishing that [he] is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” *id.* § 1229a(c)(2)(A)—is endeavoring to obtain admission to the United States in the same way someone who is encountered just after crossing the border is attempting to obtain admission to the United States.

**C. Section 1226 Does Not Support Petitioner’s Argument.**

Petitioner’s reliance upon, and reference to, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is unavailing. Petitioner’s detention is controlled by § 1225(b)(2), not § 1226.

Sections 1225 and 1226 are separate statutory provisions that provide independent bases for detention and, generally, apply to different groups of aliens. While, as explained below, there

is some overlap between the aliens subject to detention under the two detention provisions, that overlap does not create a redundancy because the two statutes provide for different bases for release.

Section 1226(a) authorizes the Executive to “arrest[] and detain[]” any “alien” pending removal proceedings. Section 1226(a) provides the detention authority for the significant group of aliens who are *not* deemed “applicants for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)—specifically, aliens who have been admitted to the United States but are now removable, like those who overstay a visa or lawful permanent residents who engage in conduct that renders them removable.<sup>3</sup> Thus, section 1225(b)(2) is the more specific detention provision. *See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“the specific governs the general”). Accordingly, § 1226(a) does not control Petitioner’s detention.

Section 1226(c) provides for mandatory detention and is an exception to § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention regime. It requires the Executive to detain “any alien” who is deportable or inadmissible for having committed specified offenses or engaged in terrorism-related actions. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). Petitioner has not committed one of the specified offenses and has not engaged in terrorism-related actions. Accordingly, he is not detained under § 1226(c).

Earlier this year, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 2 (2025), which amended portions of § 1226(c). While that amendment adds some overlap between aliens subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(c), that overlap does not apply to Petitioner, and as explained below, it does not create a redundancy as the amendment does independent work.

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<sup>3</sup> The detention of any of the millions of aliens who have overstayed their visas is governed by § 1226(a), because those aliens (unlike Petitioner) *were* lawfully admitted to the United States.

The Laken Riley Act provides for mandatory detention for an alien who is “present ... without being admitted or paroled”—i.e., is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)—and “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing” one of the enumerated criminal acts. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Aliens subject to detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) are effectively applicants for admission that committed one of the enumerated acts and, as applicants for admission, would also be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). There is no redundancy, however, because the two statutes provide for different forms of release. Aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2) are eligible for “humanitarian” parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(5) while aliens detained under § 1226(c) are not and may only be released pursuant to the stricter requirements of that statute.

Under § 1182(b)(5), “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(5). Section 1226(c)(1) largely takes that option off the table for aliens who have also committed the offenses or engaged in the conduct specified in § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). As to those aliens, § 1226(c) states that they are generally ineligible for parole and authorizes their release only if “necessary to provide protection to” a witness or similar person “and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(4). So even as to aliens who are already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), § 1226(c) is not superfluous: It significantly narrows the Executive’s parole power with respect to those aliens.

In fact, Congress's desire to further limit the parole power with respect to criminal aliens was one of the principal reasons that it enacted the Laken Riley Act. The Act was adopted in the wake of a heinous murder committed by an inadmissible alien who was "paroled into this country through a shocking abuse of that power," 171 Cong. Rec. at H278 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2025) (Rep. McClintock), and an abdication of the Executive's "fundamental duty under the Constitution to defend its citizens," 171 Cong. Rec. at H269 (Rep. Roy). The Act thus reflects a "congressional effort to be double sure," *Barton*, 590 U.S. at 239, that unadmitted criminal aliens are not paroled into the country through an abuse of the Secretary's exceptionally narrow parole authority. It does not suggest congressional uncertainty about § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s detention mandate, but rather congressional desire to shut down a parole loophole that allowed the Government to circumvent that mandate.

**D. The Government's Reading Comports with Congressional Intent.**

Before 1996, federal immigration laws required the detention of aliens who presented at a port of entry but allowed aliens who were already unlawfully present in the United States to obtain release pending removal proceedings. In 1996, Congress passed the IIRIRA specifically to stop conferring greater privileges and benefits on aliens who enter the United States unlawfully as compared to those who lawfully present themselves for inspection at a port of entry. Accordingly, the Government's reading of the statute is not only supported by the express language of § 1225, but it also comports with congressional intent. *See King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015) (rejecting interpretation that would lead to a result "that Congress designed the Act to avoid"); *New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino*, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) ("We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.").

The INA, as amended, contains a comprehensive framework governing the regulation of aliens, including the creation of proceedings for the removal of aliens unlawfully in the United

States and requirements for when the Executive is obligated to detain aliens pending removal. Prior to 1996, the INA treated aliens differently based on whether the alien had physically “entered” the United States. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a), 1251 (1994)); see *Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). “Entry” referred to “any coming of an alien into the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), and whether an alien had physically entered the United States (or not) “dictated what type of [removal] proceeding applied” and whether the alien would be detained pending those proceedings, *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1099. Accordingly, the INA’s prior framework, which distinguished between aliens based on physical “entry,” had

the ‘unintended and undesirable consequence’ of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered without inspection ‘could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,’ *including the right to request release on bond*, while aliens who had ‘actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection ... were subject to mandatory custody.

*Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting *Martinez v. Att’y General of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996) (“House Rep.”) (“illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection”).

Congress discarded that regime through enactment of IIRIRA. Among other things, that law had the goal of “ensur[ing] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their legal presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA.” *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). To that end, IIRIRA replaced the prior focus on physical “entry” and instead made lawful “admission” the governing touchstone. IIRIRA defined “admission” to mean “the *lawful* entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)

(emphasis added). In other words, the immigration laws would no longer distinguish aliens based on whether they had managed to evade detection and enter the country without permission. Instead, the “pivotal factor in determining an alien’s status” would be “whether or not the alien has been *lawfully* admitted.” House Rep., *supra*, at 226 (emphasis added); *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar).

Petitioner’s interpretation would restore the regime Congress sought to discard: It would require detention for those who present themselves for inspection at the border in compliance with law yet grant bond hearings to aliens who evade immigration authorities, enter the United States unlawfully, and remain here unlawfully for years, or even decades, until an involuntary encounter with immigration authorities. That is *exactly* the perverse preferential treatment for illegal entrants that IIRIRA sought to eradicate. Accordingly, this Court should reject Petitioner’s interpretation. *King*, 576 U.S. at 492 (rejecting “petitioners’ interpretation because it would ... create the very [thing] that Congress designed the Act to avoid”). The Government’s reading, on the other hand, is true to Congress’s intent and should be adopted.

**E. The Government’s Reading Accords with *Jennings*.**

The Government’s interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). *Jennings* reviewed a Ninth Circuit decision that applied constitutional avoidance to “impos[e] an implicit 6-month time limit on an alien’s detention” under § 1225(b) and § 1226. *Id.* at 292. The Court held that neither provision is so limited. *Id.* at 292, 296-306. In reaching that holding, the Court did not—and did not need to—resolve the precise groups of aliens subject to § 1225(b) or § 1226. Nonetheless, consistent with the Government’s reading, the Court recognized in its description of § 1225(b) that § “1225(b)(2) ... serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Id.* at 287.

**F. Under *Loper Bright*, the Statute Controls, Not Prior Agency Practice**

Any argument that prior agency practice applying § 1226(a) to Petitioner is unavailing because under *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 411 (2024) (overturning *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), the plain language of the statute and not prior practice controls. *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225–26. In overturning *Chevron*, the Supreme Court recognized that courts often change precedents and “correct[] our own mistakes.” *Loper Bright*, 603 U.S. at 411. *Loper Bright* overturned a decades old agency interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act that itself predated IIRIRA by twenty years. *Id.* at 380. Thus, longstanding agency practice carries little, if any, weight under *Loper Bright*.

**II. THE *BAUTISTA* PARTIAL JUDGMENT IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT**

The Court should deny the habeas petition in this case. The December 18, 2025, partial final judgment in *Bautista v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-1873 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), ECF No. 92, is neither binding nor applicable here and presents no basis for granting the petition. First, the *Bautista* declaratory judgment is void with respect to petitioners and custodians outside the Central District of California because it was issued despite a lack of jurisdiction. Second, the Court should not give preclusive effect to the declaratory judgment because it is on appeal, creating a serious risk of inconsistent judgments and unfair results if the *Bautista* judgment is reversed or vacated on appeal. Finally, issue preclusion is inapplicable here, particularly as preclusion principles apply with less force both against the government and in habeas corpus proceedings.

**1. Under black-letter principles of habeas jurisdiction, the *Bautista* declaratory judgment has no preclusive effect outside the Central District of California and over custodians who are located outside that District.**

The *Bautista* class sought a declaratory judgment that class members such as Petitioner were unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than § 1226(a). This is core habeas

relief that must be brought as a habeas claim alone. As the Supreme Court made clear just this year, “[r]egardless of whether [] detainees formally request release from confinement,” if “their claims for relief necessarily imply the invalidity of their confinement[], their claims fall within the core of the writ of habeas corpus and thus must be brought in habeas.” *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court has imposed two fundamental limits on federal court jurisdiction over core habeas claims. *First*, “jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004); *see also J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. at 672. *Second*, a habeas petitioner must name the petitioner’s *immediate* custodian—*i.e.*, the custodian who has actual custody over the petitioner and can produce the “corpus.” *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 435. “Failure to name the petitioner’s custodian as a respondent deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction” needed to issue relief. *Stanley v. Cal. Supreme Court*, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994); *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 444. Thus, a federal district court is wholly without authority to issue the writ in favor of a habeas petitioner who seeks habeas relief in a judicial district in which he is not confined and the immediate custodian is not located. *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 442-43. And a “judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void as to that defendant.” *Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking*, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Given that a challenge to the legality of detention is a core habeas claim, class-wide declaratory relief is inappropriate in the habeas context. *Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (declaratory judgment action not appropriate to address “validity of a defense the State may, or may not, raise in a habeas proceeding” in part because “the underlying claim must be adjudicated in a federal habeas proceeding”); *Fusco v. Grondolsky*, No. 17-1062, 2019 WL 13112044, at \*1 (1st Cir. June 18, 2019) (declaratory judgment action must be dismissed when

habeas available). Indeed, a class-wide declaratory judgment imposed from outside the district of confinement cannot be squared with the district-of-confinement requirement of habeas, where the relief is an order of release, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), not a declaration of legal rights that can later be enforced. *See Calderon*, 523 U.S. at 747 (1998); *Fusco*, 2019 WL 13112044, at \*1; *LoBue v. Christopher*, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the “availability of a habeas remedy in another district ousted us of jurisdiction over an alien’s effort to pose a constitutional attack . . . by means of a suit for declaratory judgment”); *Monk v. Sec. of Navy*, 793 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“In adopting the federal habeas corpus statute, Congress determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a prisoner who claims that he is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States,’ . . . . This specific determination must override the general terms of the declaratory judgment . . . statute.”).

Here, the vast majority of *Bautista* class members are confined *outside* of the Central District of California by immediate custodians who are also *outside* the Central District of California and have not been named in the lawsuit. Therefore, the *Bautista* court lacked jurisdiction to issue habeas relief to all class members who are confined outside the Central District of California by immediate custodians outside that District, and a court’s judgment cannot be binding and preclusive against a party over which it lacked jurisdiction. *Burnham v. Superior Court of Cali.*, 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990). Indeed, another federal district court has already held that the *Bautista* declaratory judgment does not have preclusive effect. Order, *Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-00226 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 12.

In sum, the *Bautista* court’s declaratory judgment purporting to grant relief that at its core sounds in habeas is a legal nullity outside that District. At the time of filing this habeas petition, Petitioner was detained at Miami Federal Detention Center, which is outside the judicial district

of the *Bautista* court. That ends the matter. But if more were needed, Petitioner's immediate custodian is the warden of Miami FDC, and that individual was not a party in the Central District of California; subjecting the immediate custodian to the judgment of the Central District of California would be inconsistent with the immediate custodian rule. *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 439-40; *see also Doe v. Garland*, 109 F.4th 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding immediate custodian and not supervisory ICE Field Office Director should be named in habeas petition).

**2. The Court should not give preclusive effect to a declaratory judgment that is on appeal**

Even if the *Bautista* declaratory judgment could have preclusive effect outside the Central District of California, that judgment has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, *Bautista, et al. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, et al.*, No. 25-7958 (9th Cir.), and this Court should not afford preclusive effect to that judgment or to any underlying legal issues in deciding whether to grant habeas relief in this case.

Courts must exercise significant caution before giving preclusive effect to declaratory judgments that are on appeal. Reflexively granting preclusive effect to such judgments could lead to subsequent judgment "from which it may be impossible to obtain relief" even if the first judgment is reversed on appeal. 9 A.L.R.2d 984. Courts should strive to avoid this "evil result[]." *Id.* ("both the rule under which the operation of a judgment as res judicata is, and the one under which it is not, affected by the pendency of an appeal, have very unfortunate consequences"); *see also* 18A Fed. Prac. & Prod. § 4404 ("Awkward problems can result from the rule that preclusive effects attach to the first judgment" while that judgment is subject to an appeal); 18A Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4433 (the rule that a decision is final for the purposes of preclusion while that decision is pending appeal creates "[s]ubstantial difficulties").

This problem can be “avoided . . . by delaying further proceedings in the second action pending conclusion of the appeal in the first action.” *Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc.*, 505 F.3d 874, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Wright & Miller § 4433). In the circumstances here—and particularly given the constraints of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)—it would not be proper to impose res judicata effect on a class-wide basis while the declaratory judgment is pending on appeal. *See* 9 A.L.R.2d 984 (the “only one safe way of avoiding conflicting judgments on the same cause . . . [is for] the final decision on the merits of the second suit should be delayed until the decision on appeal has been rendered”).

**3. According preclusive effect to the *Bautista* declaratory judgment contravenes other principles of preclusion**

Beyond the two most serious problems with giving effect to the *Bautista* declaratory judgment in this case, three more reasons counsel strongly against doing so.

*First*, under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, “[f]urther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.” To the extent this Court considers whether to award “further” relief than what the *Bautista* court purported to grant to class members outside the Central District of California, such further relief is neither “necessary [n]or proper.” Indeed, the Ninth Circuit—which of course has appellate jurisdiction over the Central District of California—has rejected waiving the district of confinement rule on prudential considerations given the clear congressional mandate limiting habeas jurisdiction to the district of confinement as provided by statute. *Doe*, 109 F.4th at 1199.

*Second*, the circumstances of this case also counsel against applying issue preclusion against the government. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that ‘the Government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant,’ *INS v. Hibi*, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam),

both because of the geographic breadth of government litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the issues the government litigates.” *United States v. Mendoza*, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984). “Government litigation frequently involves legal questions of substantial public importance.” *Id.* Thus, although the Supreme Court has held the federal government “may be estopped . . . from relitigating a question” when “the parties to the lawsuits are the same,” *id.* at 163, 164, it is not so precluded in cases where the party seeking to offensively use preclusion was not a party to the initial litigation, *see id.* at 162. This is because allowing “nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government . . . would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.” *United States v. Mendoza*, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).

For similar reasons, the government should not be precluded from litigating the issue of the proper detention authority here, where the Petitioner was not a named party to the *Bautista* litigation, but instead merely a member of a fundamentally flawed nationwide class. In such a circumstance, applying preclusion against the government raises the same concern raised in *Mendoza*—it allows the *Bautista* court’s decision to freeze the law for all district courts nationwide, and stymies development of the law. This is particularly so because the *Bautista* court could never grant complete habeas relief to all class members as a result of § 1252(f)(1)—instead, the *Bautista* class action was merely a vehicle for seeking to use the judgment in individual habeas matters such as this one. At minimum, the court should exercise its discretion to decline to employ offensive issue preclusion, as it does in cases where a non-party seeks to invoke preclusion against a private party. *See Syverson v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.*, 472 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979)).

The court should also decline to give the *Bautista* declaratory judgment preclusive effect given the existence of several inconsistent judgments from district courts around the country, suggesting that reliance on the adverse judgment in *Bautista* would be unfair. *See Parklane Hosiery*, 439 U.S. at 330–31 (citing existence of prior inconsistent judgments as indicium of unfairness of applying issue preclusion); *see, e.g., Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, – F. Supp. 3d –, 2025 WL 3199872, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-168, 2025 WL 3131942, at \*2–3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); *Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437, 2025 WL 3033967, at \*6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, 4:25-cv-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Topal v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01612, 2025 WL 3486894 (W.D. La. Dec. 3, 2025); *Xiaoquan Chen v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-8350, 2025 WL 3484855 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); *Candido v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-867, 2025 WL 3484932 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025).

**Third**, it is doubtful that issue preclusion is ever appropriate in the habeas context. For instance, in *Griffin v. Gomez*, the Ninth Circuit held that a prior “class action has no preclusive affect in habeas proceedings.” *Griffin v. Gomez*, 139 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 1998). The court later explained that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to habeas proceedings. *See Clifton v. Attorney General*, 997 F.2d 660, 662 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that because “conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place” in habeas and the inapplicability of res judicate to habeas is “inherent in the very role and function of the writ.”) (quoting *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)); *see also Hardwick v. Doolittle*, 558 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The doctrines of res judicate and collateral estoppel are not applicable in habeas proceedings.”); *Hierens v. Mizell*, 729 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984) (“a decision in another case is not res judicata

as to a habeas proceeding.”). In sum, the *Bautista* declaratory judgment has no preclusive effect on this case.

**4. The Court need not await a ruling staying or vacating the *Bautista* declaratory judgment before declining to give it preclusive effect**

Assessing whether the *Bautista* declaratory judgment required granting an individual class member’s habeas petition, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas persuasively explained why the *Bautista* declaratory judgment need not be followed by other U.S. district courts, even before a court of appeal stays or vacates that order.

A dispute in this posture is unusual, but not unheard of. As Justice Story remarked, the traditional comity between courts “does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which the original judgment was given.” *Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough*, 204 U.S. 8, 16 (1907) (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1313 (1833)). It is “a subject [that] may be inquired into every other court, when the proceedings in the former are relied upon, and brought before the latter, by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings.” *Williamson v. Berry*, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 540 (1850); *Old Wayne*, 204 U.S. at 16–17 (same). Indeed, traditional habeas proceedings normally could only challenge “the power and authority of the court” or other detaining authority “to act.” *Brown v. Davenport*, 596 U.S. 118, 129 (2022) (quotation omitted). While the conclusions of another court, when enforced onto a peer court, are generally “unassailable collaterally,” an exception has always existed for “lack of jurisdiction.” *Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.*, 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939); *Ex parte Watkins*, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202–03 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) (same).

When the issuing court lacks jurisdiction, “its judgments and orders are nullities; they are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought . . . in opposition to them; they constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments . . . are considered in law as trespassers.” *Williamson*, 49 U.S. at 541 (quoting *Elliott v. Piersol*, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 329 (1828)); *Watkins*, 28 U.S. at 203 (“An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity[.]”).

\* \* \*

The Court issues this Order with some reluctance. The business of another court is generally beyond this Court’s concern. But the petitioner seeks relief based on the Central District’s orders, leaving this Court no choice but to address their binding effect. Here, a fellow district judge purports to bind all pending and future cases involving the mandatory detention issue to her reasoning in an advisory opinion,

disrupting this Court's extensive immigration docket and the dockets of fellow courts across the Nation. But the Central District's orders are not binding because the Central District lacked authorization to issue them. The orders are unauthorized because they are advisory and because they violate the INA's limits on judicial review. Additionally, they would require this Court to act in defiance of Supreme Court precedent. Thus, the Court rejects the petitioner's assertion that it is bound by the Central District's orders and must grant relief as a result.

Order, *Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 25-cv-00226 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 12, at 11 & 28. Thus, because the *Bautista* declaratory judgment is void for the reasons discussed above, this Court is not required to wait for a court of appeals to stay or vacate that judgment before this Court declines to give it preclusive effect.

Regardless, even if the Court does not treat the *Bautista* judgment as void *now*, the blatant jurisdictional flaws and other points noted above counsel strongly in favor of the Court declining to give it preclusive effect.

#### CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

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