

Accordingly, this Court should deny Rodriguez-Hidalgo's § 2241 petition and grant summary judgment for the Government.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Hidalgo Rodriguez, is a native and citizen of Cuba. Dkt. 1-2. In 1997, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection. *Id.*; Dkt. 1 at ¶ 34. ICE served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear ("NTA") charging him with removability pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. Dkt. 1-2. In the NTA, the examining immigration official denied Petitioner admission into the United States, explained the basis for charging Petitioner with being subject to removal, and ordered Petitioner to appear in immigration court. *Id.* Petitioner was released from immigration custody, but ICE recently re-detained the Petitioner. Dkt. 1. Petitioner remains in removal proceedings.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner is challenging the legality of the restraint or imprisonment. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The burden is on the petitioner to show the confinement is unlawful. *See, e.g., Walker v. Johnston*, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). When it comes to detention during removal proceedings, it is well-taken that the authority to detain is elemental to the authority to deport, as "[d]etention is necessarily a part of th[e] deportation procedure." *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952); *see Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not

be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.”). As the Supreme Court has stated in no unmistakable terms, “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).

III. ARGUMENT

PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO MANDATORY DETENTION UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Petitioner’s habeas petition should be denied because he falls under the plain language of the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Here, Petitioner admits that he is an alien present in the United States who entered the country unlawfully “without inspection.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 34. As discussed below, an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted,” is by definition “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Thus, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. *See id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A) (instructing that “the alien *shall* be detained” in the case of “an alien seeking admission” who “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” (emphasis added)).

The Court recently decided this issue in *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025). In denying the habeas petition and granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held “[t]he text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) supports the Government’s position.” The Court reasoned that “[t]he statutory definition of *applicant for admission* is broad and, indeed, so broad that Petitioner doesn’t dispute that she is such a person. . . . That factual determination itself resolves the question as to whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies.” *Id.* at *4 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court held that the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act required a ruling in the Government’s favor.

The court also explained why it was not persuaded by the many other district court decisions deciding to the contrary. *Id.* at * 5.

With respect to Petitioner's due process claim, it is a recast of his disagreement with the Government holding an alien without bond under § 1225(b)(2). Dkt. 1 at ¶ 46-49. In other words, the Petitioner argues that the Government's detention of him without a bond determination violates his right to due process. *Id.* This Court has previously rejected such an argument. *See Jimenez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-CV-05026, 2025 WL 3265493, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025) (in denying a due process claim, noting that "[i]t's thus the 'longstanding view' of the Supreme Court that 'the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.'" (quoting *Demore v Kim*, 538 US 510, 526 (2003))).

The facts of this case do not warrant a deviation from the Court's prior rulings.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that the Court deny Petitioner's request for habeas relief and grant the instant motion. The Court should enter judgment as a matter of law finding that Petitioner is lawfully subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

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Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on December 10, 2025, the foregoing was filed and served on all attorneys of record via the District's ECF system.

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