

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

MOHAMED MUQTAR JARANOW,

Petitioner,

vs.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of
the United States; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary, United States Department of
Homeland Security; LAURA
HERMOSILLO, Acting Seattle Field
Office Director, United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services;
BRUCE SCOTT, Warden of Immigration
Detention Facility; and the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

Respondents.

No. CV25-2396

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF**

RECITATIONS TO SUBSTANTIALLY CONFORM TO AO 242

Personal Information

1. (a) Full name: Mohamed Muqtar Jaranow
- (b) Other names used: None
2. Place of confinement:
 - (a) Northwest Immigration Processing Center (NWIPC)
 - (b) 1623 East J Street, Tacoma, Washington 98241-1615, pursuant to a contractual arrangement with my custodian, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director at Seattle, Washington.
 - (c) Case number or numbers [ICE file number, if known]: My A# has been provided to the government along with the filing of this petition.

3. I am currently being held on orders by federal authorities: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

4. I am currently being held on an immigration charge.

Decision or Action You Are Challenging

5. What are you challenging in this petition: immigration detention.

6. Provide more information about the decision or action you are challenging:

(a) Name and location of the agency or court: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(b) Docket number, case number, or opinion number: My A# has been provided to the government along with the filing of this petition.

(c) Decision or action you are challenging: I was initially ordered removed on April 22, 2021. My appeal was denied on September 1, 2021. I was detained by ICE beginning in December of 2022. I was detained for 90 days, after which I was released on an order of supervision in approximately March, 2023. I was re-detained on July 29, 2025.

Your Earlier Challenges of the Decision or Action

7-9. First, second, and third appeals: None

10. Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255: N/A

11. Appeals of immigration proceedings:

Does this case concern immigration proceedings? Yes

(a) Date you were taken into immigration custody:

(b) Date of the removal or reinstatement order:

(c) Did you file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals? Yes.

(1) Date of filing: Unknown

(2) Case number: Unknown

(3) Result: Denied

(4) Date of result: September 1, 2021.

(5) Issues raised: I lack the paperwork to answer.

(d) Did you appeal the decision to the United States Court of Appeals? No.

12. Other than the appeals listed above, have you filed any other petition, application, or motion about the issues raised in this petition? No.

Grounds for Your Challenge in This Petition

I. Introduction

Petitioner Jaranow is presently detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (NWIPC). Petitioner has been held in immigration custody for over six months. Removal to the former country of residence is not reasonably foreseeable. Petitioner's continued detention is therefore in violation of *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). In addition, his re-detention violates both his constitutional due process rights and Respondents' own regulations.

Petitioner seeks (a) release; (b) an order preventing re-detention unless the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community, based on changed circumstances after their most recent release by ICE; (c) an order preventing removal to a third country without notice and meaningful opportunity to respond in compliance with the statute and due process in reopened removal proceedings; and (d) an order barring removal to any third country pursuant to Respondents' punitive removal policy.

Petitioner Jaranow was initially detained in December 2022 for 90 days. Petitioner was released on condition of reporting as requested. Since Petitioner's release, he has fully complied with those conditions. On July 29, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained without any determination by the government that he had become a flight

1 risk or a danger to the community or that removal was likely in the reasonably
2 foreseeable future.

3 **II. Jurisdiction and Venue**

4 This case arises under the Constitution of the United States, the Immigration and
5 Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, *et seq.*, and the Administrative Procedures
6 Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596, 701–706.

7 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, *et seq.*
8 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (United States
9 as Respondent), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act). Respondents have waived
10 sovereign immunity for purposes of this suit. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706.

11 The Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, *et*
12 *seq.*; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, *et seq.*; the All Writs Act, 28
13 U.S.C. § 1651; the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the Court’s
14 inherent equitable powers.

15 Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because
16 Respondents are agencies or officers of agencies of the United States; Respondents
17 Hermosillo and Scott reside in this district; and Petitioner is detained in this district.
18 Venue is further proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the
19 events or omissions giving rise to Petitioner’s claims occurred in this district.

20 Because Petitioner is seeking relief related only to his custody status, which is
21 not inconsistent with an order of removal, exhaustion of administrative remedies, if any,
22 is not required.

23 **III. Requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243**

24 Petitioner is “in custody” for the purpose of § 2241 because he has been detained
25 by Respondent ICE in Tacoma, Washington, since July 29, 2025.

1 **IV. Parties**

2 Mr. Jaranow is a citizen of Somalia. He has a final order of removal with
3 Somalia as the country designated for removal. Petitioner is detained in the control and
4 custody of Respondents at NWIPC. As such, Petitioner is a resident of Tacoma,
5 Washington.

6 Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. In this
7 capacity, Respondent Bondi is the legal custodian of Petitioner. Respondent Bondi is
8 sued in her official capacity.

9 Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
10 Security ("DHS"). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is the legal custodian of
11 Petitioner. Respondent Noem is sued in her official capacity.

12 Respondent Laura Hermosillo is the Field Office Director for ICE Enforcement
13 and Removal Operations ("ERO") in Seattle, Washington. As the ERO Seattle Field
14 Office Director, she is Petitioner's immediate custodian, responsible for his detention at
15 NWIPC, and is the person with the authority to authorize detention or release.
16 Respondent Hermosillo is sued in her official capacity.

17 Respondent Bruce Scott is the Warden of the NWIPC, oversees the day-to-day
18 functioning of the NWIPC, and has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant
19 to a contract with ICE to detain noncitizens. Respondent Scott is sued in his official
20 capacity as the Warden of a federal detention facility. *See Juarez v. Asher*, No. CV20-
21 700, 2021 WL 1946222, at *3–5 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2021).

22 Respondent United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter
23 ICE) is the federal executive agency responsible for the enforcement of immigration
24 laws, including the arrest, detention, and removal of noncitizens. Respondent ICE is a
25 legal custodian of Petitioner.
26

V. Background

Mr. Jaranow was born in a refugee camp in Somalia on [REDACTED]. His family emigrated to the United States when he was eight years old. He graduated from high school and got an AA in business. He then attended Central Washington University through part of his senior year. He had two daughters with his first wife; they eventually divorced. He remarried to a woman with three children. He continues to support his daughters and also provides support for his new family. He is also a critical source of support for his aging parents. Mr. Jaranow has a commercial driver's license and, until his re-detention, was working as an independent contractor for Chione Logistics. They have indicated their desire to reemploy him upon his release. (Exh. A).

VI. Particularized Facts Pertaining to Petitioner's Continued Detention

Petitioner cannot presently be returned to Somalia, because there is no record of his birth in Somalia. Removal to Somalia is thus not reasonably foreseeable. On information and belief, ICE has not obtained a travel document from Somalia for Petitioner, nor has Somalia agreed to accept Petitioner. Respondents effectively acknowledged that there was no reasonable foreseeable removal to Somalia, because they released him on conditions. On information and belief, he was re-detained solely because of Respondents' policy to round up as many noncitizens as possible. *See, e.g.*, Jose Olivares, "Trump administration sets quota to arrest 3,000 people a day in anti-immigration agenda," *The Guardian* (May 29, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/29/trump-ice-arrest-quota> [<https://perma.cc/6P5L-NUDM>].

VII. The Legal Framework Regarding Indefinite Detention Pending Removal

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed is mandatory during the so-called 90-day "removal period." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). This period begins on the "date the order of removal becomes administratively final." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). But the *Zadvydas* Court believed

1 that a “serious constitutional threat” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
2 was posed by the indefinite detention of noncitizens. 533 U.S. at 699. The Court
3 therefore interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to permit only detention related to the
4 statute’s “basic purpose [of] effectuating [a noncitizen]’s removal[.]” *Id.* at 696–99.

5 The Court further held that the presumptive period during which the detention is
6 reasonably necessary to effectuate a noncitizen’s removal is six months. After that, the
7 noncitizen is eligible for conditional release if there is “no significant likelihood of
8 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* at 701. After the “presumptively
9 reasonable” period of six months, when the noncitizen can “provide[] good reason to
10 believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
11 future,” then “the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
12 showing.” *Id.*

13 The issue is not whether Respondents have been able to remove some
14 individuals to a given country. Rather, the court must make an individualized analysis
15 as to a particular detainee. *See Nguyen v. Scott*, -- F.Supp.3d --, 2025 WL 2419288, *17
16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (stating increase in total number of removals to Vietnam,
17 including those who entered pre-1995, fails to rebut the evidence presented by
18 Petitioner that “his individual circumstances make removal unlikely.”). Facts that are
19 part of the analysis include whether Respondent provides evidence that the request was
20 submitted to Somalia, whether Somalia has acknowledged receipt of the request or
21 otherwise responded to Petitioner’s request, and the anticipated wait time for a response
22 from Somalia.

23 When a petitioner has been detained for a total of six months after a final order
24 of removal, the *Zadvydas* presumptively reasonable period has expired, even if the
25 petitioner’s current period of detention is less than six months. “A petitioner’s total
26 length of confinement need not be consecutive to reach the six-month presumptively

reasonable limit established in *Zadvydas*.” *Tang v. Bondi*, No. CV25-1473-RAJ-TLF, 2025 WL 2637750, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2025).

VIII. The Law Pertaining to a Noncitizen’s Procedural Due Process Right Not to Be Re-detained Absent a Hearing Establishing that the Individual Is Either a Flight Risk or a Danger to the Community

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976). To state a claim for a violation of procedural due process rights, a petitioner must establish (1) a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. *ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry*, 803 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court must also consider “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335).

Petitioner’s interest in not being detained is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]” *E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, No. CV25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3, *9 (quoting *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)) (granting petition and ordering immediate release with no re-detention absent “an immigration court hearing . . . held (with adequate notice) to determine whether detention is appropriate.”). *See also, e.g., Lopez Dejesus v. Bostock*, No. 25-CV-01427-JHC-TLF, 2025 WL 3268002 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 2025) (granting similar relief); *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, No. CV25-1404-JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025) (granting similar relief).

Where there is a liberty interest, determining what procedures are due generally requires examining the factors set forth in *Mathews*:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including

1 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
2 additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

3 *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3 (quoting *Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335).

4 Given that the liberty interest here is “the most elemental,” numerous courts
5 have found that this first factor weighs heavily in a petitioner’s favor. *See Ledesma*
6 *Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7 (this factor “must be accorded significant weight”).
7 Petitioner’s status as a noncitizen does not negate that interest. “While the temporary
8 detention of noncitizens may sometimes be justified by concerns about public safety or
9 flight risk, the government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained
10 by the requirements of due process[.]” *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3 (quoting
11 *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017)).

12 The second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty, also weighs in the
13 petitioner’s favor. A detainee’s release to the community on an OREC reflected ICE’s
14 determination that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.
15 *See, e.g., Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *8 (when ICE released Petitioner,
16 “it did so after determining—as required by regulation—that ‘such release would not
17 pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any
18 future proceeding.’ . . . By issuing the OREC, ICE necessarily found that [Petitioner]
19 was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.”) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
20 § 236.1(c)(8)); *Barrenechea v. Albarran*, No. CV25-7883-VC, 2025 WL 2717279, at
21 *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2025) (“ICE’s release of Barrenechea on his own recognizance
22 in 2020 can only be understood as reflecting a determination that he did not pose a
23 flight risk or danger to the community”).

24 The final factor, the government’s interest in detaining a petitioner without
25 providing a pre-deprivation hearing, also weighs in the petitioner’s favor. “[T]he
26 government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is low.” *Carballo*, 2025

1 WL 2381464, *8 (cleaned up). “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and
2 impose a minimal cost.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

3 As stated in *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *5, “although it would have
4 required the expenditure of finite resources (money and time) to provide Petitioner
5 notice and hearing on ATD violations before arresting and re-detaining him, those costs
6 are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.”

7 The holding that a released detainee was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing
8 comes not from *Ledesma Gonzalez* and *E.A. T.-B.* alone; dozens of other courts have
9 reached this conclusion as well. *See, e.g., Pinchi v. Noem*, -- F.Supp.3d --, No. CV25-
10 5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (“Providing [petitioner]
11 with the procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing will have significant value in
12 helping ensure that any future detention has a lawful basis.”); *Doe v. Becerra*, 787
13 F.Supp.3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“[G]iven that Petitioner was previously found
14 to not be a danger or risk of flight and the unresolved questions about the timing and
15 reliability of the new information, the risk of erroneous deprivation remains high.”);
16 *Valdez v. Joyce*, 25 Civ. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18,
17 2025) (“Petitioner’s re-detention without any change in circumstances or procedure
18 establishes a high risk of erroneous deprivation of his protected liberty interest.”).

19 In any hearing held by the government to try to justify re-detention, the
20 government bears the burden of establishing flight risk or danger by clear and
21 convincing evidence. *See Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski*, No. CV22-1357-MMA-JLB,
22 2023 WL 139801, at *7 n.9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (noting that “an overwhelming
23 majority of courts” have so held). For cases in this district, *see Odimara v. Bostock*, No.
24 CV24-1412-MJP-TLF, 2025 WL 1490395, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2025), *report*
25 *and recommendation adopted*, No. CV24-1412 MJP, 2025 WL 1489705 (W.D. Wash.
26 May 23, 2025) (citing cases).

1 In addition, the government should be required to meet its burden based on
 2 changed circumstances subsequent to the petitioner's previous release by ICE. *See*
 3 *Duong v. Kaiser*, No. CV25-7598-JST, 2025 WL 2689266, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
 4 2025) (holding that any re-detention first required a hearing "whether a material change
 5 of circumstances justifies [petitioner's] re-detention").

6 **IX. The Law Pertaining to a Noncitizen's Regulatory Right Not to Be Re-detained**
 7 **Absent Notice, an Opportunity to Be Heard, and Findings that the Regulatory**
 8 **Standards for Re-detention Have Been Met.**

9 The revocation of a noncitizen's release is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i),
 10 which authorizes ICE to revoke a noncitizen's release under § 1231 for purposes of
 11 removal or for violation of conditions of release. The government may revoke a
 12 noncitizen's release and return them to ICE custody due to failure to comply with any
 13 of the conditions of release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or if, "on account of changed
 14 circumstances, the [Immigration] Service determines that there is a significant
 15 likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,"
 16 *id.* § 241.13(i)(2).

17 Such revocation of release, even if justified by one of the reasons recognized by
 18 regulation, requires notice and an opportunity for the noncitizen to be heard. Upon a
 19 determination by the government (namely ICE) to re-detain a person previously
 20 released following a removal order:

21 the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her
 22 release. [ICE] will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after
 23 his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the alien an opportunity to
 24 respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. The
 25 [noncitizen] may submit any evidence or information that he or she
 26 believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed
 in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated
 the order of supervision. The revocation custody review will include
 an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a
 determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and
 further denial of release.

1 *Id.* § 241.13(i)(3).

2 ICE's decision to re-detain also cannot be arbitrary, but instead is governed by
3 the factors laid out in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f), including:

4 the history of the [noncitizen's] efforts to comply with the order of
5 removal, the history of [ICE's] efforts to remove [noncitizens] to the
6 country in question or to third countries, including the ongoing nature
7 of [ICE's] efforts to remove [the noncitizen] and the [noncitizen's]
8 assistance with those efforts, the reasonably foreseeable results of
9 those efforts, and the views of the Department of State regarding the
10 prospects for removal of [noncitizens] to the country or countries in
11 question.

12 *Id.* See also *Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3
13 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025). While courts do not make these determinations in the first
14 instance, they may review them for compliance with the regulation. See *id.*; *Nguyen v.*
15 *Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at *3 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025) (citing
16 *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023)).

17 **X. The Legal Framework for Third-Country Removals**

18 The immigration laws delineate the proper procedures by which a country may
19 be designated for removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). These procedures move in
20 incremental steps.

21 First, an individual with a removal order may designate the country to which
22 they want to be removed, and the government *shall* remove the individual to that
23 country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A). The government may disregard that designation if
24 (1) the individual fails to designate a country promptly; (2) the government of that
25 country does not inform the U.S. government finally, within 30 days after the date the
26 U.S. government first inquires, whether the government will accept the individual into
that country; (3) the government of the country is not willing to accept the individual
into the country; or (4) the government decides that removing the individual to that
country is prejudicial to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C).

1 Second, if the individual is not removed to the country they designated under
2 § 1231(b)(2)(A), the government shall remove the individual to the country of which
3 the individual is a “subject, national, or citizen” unless the government of that country
4 does not inform the U.S. government or the individual within 30 days after first inquiry
5 or within another reasonable period of time whether the government will accept the
6 individual into the country or the country is not willing to accept the individual into the
7 country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(D).

8 Third, if the individual is not removed to either the country of their designation
9 or the country of which they are a subject, national, or citizen, then the government
10 shall remove them to any of the following options: (1) the country from which the
11 individual was admitted to the United States; (2) the country in which is located the
12 foreign port from which the individual left for the United States or for a foreign
13 territory contiguous to the United States; (3) the country in which the individual resided
14 before the individual entered the United States and from which the individual entered
15 the United States; (4) the country in which the individual was born; or (5) the country in
16 which the individual’s birthplace is located when the individual was ordered removed.
17 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E). *Only* “[i]f impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible” to
18 remove the individual to any of these countries may the government remove the
19 individual to “another country whose government will accept [them] into that country.”
20 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii).

21 Notwithstanding any of these procedures, the statute prohibits removal to a third
22 country where a person may be persecuted or tortured, a form of protection known as
23 withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The government “may not
24 remove [a noncitizen] to a country if the Attorney General decides that the
25 [noncitizen’s] life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the
26 [noncitizen’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

1 political opinion.” *Id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Withholding of removal is
2 a mandatory protection.

3 Similarly, Congress codified protections enshrined in the Convention Against
4 Torture (CAT) prohibiting the government from removing a person to a country where
5 they would be tortured. *See* Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
6 (‘‘FARRA’’), Public Law 105–277, div. G, sec. 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2631–822 (8
7 U.S.C. § 1231 note) (‘‘It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite,
8 or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are
9 substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to
10 torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.’’);
11 28 C.F.R. §§ 200.1, 208.16–208.18, 1208.16–1208.18. CAT protection is also
12 mandatory.

13 To comport with the requirements of due process, the government must provide
14 notice of the third-country removal and an opportunity to respond. Due process requires
15 ‘‘written notice of the country being designated’’ and ‘‘the statutory basis for the
16 designation, i.e., the applicable subsection of § 1231(b)(2).’’ *Aden v. Nielsen*, 409
17 F.Supp.3d 998, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2019); *see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland*
18 *Sec.*, No. CV25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025) (‘‘All
19 removals to third countries, i.e., removal to a country other than the country or
20 countries designated during immigration proceedings as the country of removal on the
21 non-citizen’s order of removal, must be preceded by written notice to both the non-
22 citizen and the non-citizen’s counsel in a language the non-citizen can understand.’’
23 (citation omitted)); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (due process
24 requires notice to the noncitizen of the right to apply for asylum and withholding to the
25 country where they will be removed). The government must be able to show evidence
26 that the third country will accept the individual into that country. *See Himri v. Ashcroft*,

1 378 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2004), *as amended* (Aug. 24, 2004), *amended sub nom. El*
2 *Himri v. Ashcroft*, No. 03-71152, 2004 WL 1879255 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) (“at the
3 time the government proposes a country of removal pursuant to § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii),
4 the government must be able to show that the proposed country *will* accept the
5 [individual]”).

6 Due process also demands that the government “ask the noncitizen whether he or
7 she fears persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and memorialize
8 in writing the noncitizen’s response. This requirement ensures DHS will obtain the
9 necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with § (b)(3) and avoids [a dispute
10 about what the officer and noncitizen said].” *Aden*, 409 F.Supp.3d at 1019; *cf. D.V.D.*,
11 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (“Following notice, the individual must be given a meaningful
12 opportunity, and a minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection
13 prior to removal.”) (emphasis omitted).

14 If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the
15 noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an immigration
16 judge in reopened removal proceedings. *Cf. D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring
17 the government to move to reopen the noncitizen’s immigration proceedings if the
18 individual demonstrates “reasonable fear” and to provide “a meaningful opportunity,
19 and a minimum of fifteen days, for the non-citizen to seek reopening of their
20 immigration proceedings” if the noncitizen is found to not have demonstrated
21 “reasonable fear”); *Aden*, 409 F.Supp.3d at 1019 (requiring notice and time for a
22 respondent to file a motion to reopen and seek relief).

23 Finally, notice of the country to which the noncitizen will be removed must not
24 be “last minute” because that would deprive an individual of a meaningful opportunity
25 to apply for fear-based protection from removal. *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041. They
26

1 must have time to prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence and to seek
2 reopening of their removal case.

3 **XI. Facts Pertaining to Punitive Banishment to Third Countries**

4 Since January 2025, Respondents have developed and implemented a policy and
5 practice of removing individuals to third countries, without first following the
6 procedures in the INA for designation and removal to a third country and without
7 providing fair notice and an opportunity to contest the removal in immigration court.

8 Respondents reportedly have negotiated with at least 58 countries to accept
9 deportees from other nations. On June 25, 2025, the *New York Times* reported that
10 seven countries—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo, Mexico, Panama, and
11 Rwanda—had agreed to accept deportees who are not their own citizens.¹ Since then,
12 ICE has carried out highly publicized third-country deportations to South Sudan and
13 Eswatini. It also attempted—and completed—an “end-run” around the protections of
14 the Convention Against Torture by deporting a group of migrants to Ghana, which sent
15 them on to their countries of citizenship despite fears of persecution.

16 Punishment and deterrence appear to be the point of the Administration’s third-
17 country removal scheme. The Administration has reportedly negotiated with countries
18 to have deportees imprisoned in prisons, camps, or other facilities. The government
19 paid El Salvador about \$5 million to arbitrarily and indefinitely imprison more than 200
20 deported Venezuelans in a maximum-security prison notorious for gross human rights
21 abuses, known as CECOT. In February, Panama and Costa Rica took in hundreds of
22 deportees from countries in Africa and Central Asia and imprisoned them in hotels, a
23 jungle camp, and a detention center. On July 4, 2025, ICE deported eight men,
24 including one pre-1995 Vietnamese refugee, to South Sudan. The men have been

25 ¹ Edward Wong, et al., *Inside the Global Deal-Making Behind Trump’s Mass*
26 *Deportations*, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-immigrants-deportations.html> [<https://perma.cc/64G9-XYGB>].

1 detained incommunicado ever since. On July 15, 2025, ICE deported five men to the
2 tiny African nation of Eswatini, including one man from Vietnam, where they are
3 reportedly being held in solitary confinement.

4 The Administration has hand-selected countries known for human rights abuses
5 and instability for these third-country deportation agreements to frighten people in the
6 United States into self-deporting or to accept removal to their home countries. Indeed,
7 conditions in South Sudan are so extreme that the U.S. State Department website warns
8 Americans not to travel there, and, if they do, to prepare their will, make funeral
9 arrangements, and appoint a hostage-taker negotiator first.

10 On July 9, 2025, ICE issued a new memo stating that, when seeking to remove
11 an individual to a country not designated on the removal order, ICE may deport that
12 person without any procedures for notice or an opportunity to be heard if the State
13 Department confirms it has received diplomatic assurances that individuals will not be
14 persecuted or tortured. Exh. B. If no diplomatic assurances are received, the ICE memo
15 instructs officers to serve on the individual a Notice of Removal that includes the
16 intended country of removal. It instructs officers not to ask whether the individual is
17 afraid of removal to that country. It states that officers should “generally wait at least 24
18 hours following service of the Notice of Removal before effectuating removal” but that
19 “[i]n exigent circumstances, [ICE] may execute a removal order six (6) or more hours
20 after service of the Notice of Removal as long as the [noncitizen] is provided
21 reasonable means and opportunity to speak with an attorney prior to removal.”

22 The memo further instructs that if the noncitizen “does not affirmatively state a
23 fear of persecution or torture if removed to the country of removal listed on the Notice
24 of Removal within 24 hours, [ICE] may proceed with removal to the country identified
25 on the notice.” If the noncitizen “does affirmatively state a fear if removed to the
26 country of removal,” then ICE will refer the case to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (“USCIS”) for a screening for eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. “USCIS will generally screen within 24 hours.” If USCIS determines that the noncitizen does not meet the standard, the individual will be removed. If USCIS determines that the noncitizen has met the standard, then the policy directs ICE to either move to reopen removal proceedings “for the sole purpose of determining eligibility for [withholding of removal protection] and CAT” or designate another country for removal.

The eight men who were ultimately deported to South Sudan all claimed fear of removal to South Sudan. None of those men were provided a fear screening by a USCIS officer or otherwise, despite the fact that they were held by ICE for six weeks on a U.S. military base in Djibouti before their final removal to South Sudan.

XII. The Law Governing Punitive Removal Practices

It is bedrock law that the U.S. government may not impose or inflict an infamous punishment for violations of civil immigration law. In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while deportation itself was not a punishment, the government could not attach punitive conditions to deportation—in that case, imprisonment at hard labor—absent a criminal charge, trial in a court of law, and the protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).

Importantly, the Court distinguished deportation, which the Court reasoned is “not a ‘banishment,’ in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment,” from government actions aimed at punishment, such as imprisonment at hard labor in addition to deportation. *Id.* at 236. The Court explained that deportation “is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of [a noncitizen] who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to

reside here shall depend.” *Id.* (quoting *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 730 (1893)). But the Court admonished that the government may not “declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property . . . unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a judicial trial.” *Id.* at 237.

Deportation of individuals to third countries to be imprisoned or harmed is unquestionably punishment.

Grounds for Relief

Ground One: Petitioner’s Continued Detention in Immigration Custody Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Because There Is No Significant Likelihood that Petitioner Will Be Removed in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future.

The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

Because Petitioner’s removal order became final in 2021, the removal period has long since expired, and detention is no longer required under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. In addition, the presumptively reasonable period of six months has passed.

There is “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. On information and belief, nothing has changed regarding Somalia’s willingness to issue travel documents.

Therefore, the burden shifts to the government to rebut that showing. The government cannot meet that burden under the facts of this case. *See Nguyen v. Scott*, No. CV25-1398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *28–29 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction requiring release under *Zadvydas*); *Tang*, 2025 WL 2637750, at *6 (same).

Ground Two: Procedural Due Process

The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

1 Petitioner has a liberty interest in not being re-detained. Applying the three-
2 factor test of *Mathews*, that interest is high. The risk of any erroneous deprivation is
3 also high, because ICE's previous release of him necessarily reflected a conclusion that
4 he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Here, as in *Ledesma Gonzalez*,
5 "ICE revoked that release without any reassessment of those factors." 2025 WL
6 2841574, at *8.

7 Finally, the cost to the government of providing a hearing is low, and
8 significantly outweighed by the other factors. His re-detention violated his due process
9 rights and was therefore unlawful.

10 **Ground Three: Failure to Comply With Regulations**

11 The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

12 Respondents have not complied with their obligations under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13
13 and therefore Petitioner is entitled to release. On information and belief,

14 a) Respondents did not make a determination either that, on account of changed
15 circumstances, there was a significant likelihood that Petitioner would be removed in
16 the reasonably foreseeable future or that Petitioner violated the conditions of release;

17 b) to the extent that Respondents made such a determination, they lacked an
18 adequate basis to do so and did not properly consider the factors specified in the
19 regulations;

20 c) Respondents did not timely notify Petitioner in writing of the reasons for
21 revocation in a manner that he could reasonably respond to;

22 d) Respondents did not conduct the required initial informal interview;

23 e) Respondents did not afford Petitioner an opportunity to respond; and

24 f) Respondents did not advise Petitioner of the right to request a review of the
25 detention and did not comply with the requirements for such review. His re-detention
26 was therefore contrary to Respondents' regulations and unlawful.

1 **Ground Four: Violation of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231,**
2 **Convention Against Torture, Implementing Regulations, and the**
3 **Administrative Procedure Act**

4 The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

5 The Fifth Amendment, the INA, the CAT, and implementing regulations
6 mandate meaningful notice and opportunity to respond to any attempt to remove
7 Petitioner to a third country in reopened removal proceedings. They also require an
8 opportunity for Petitioner to make a fear-based claim against removal to a third country
9 in reopened removal proceedings. Respondents' policy for third-country removals
10 violates all of these laws because it directs ICE agents to remove individuals to third
11 countries without any notice or process *at all* where diplomatic assurances are received
12 and, where no diplomatic assurances are received, to provide flagrantly insufficient
13 notice (6–24 hours) and opportunity to respond, in violation of the statute, regulations,
14 and Fifth Amendment.

15 Prior to any third-country removal, Petitioner must be provided with
16 constitutionally and statutorily compliant notice and an opportunity to respond and
17 contest that removal if he has a fear of persecution or torture in that country in reopened
18 removal proceedings. *See Nguyen*, 2025 WL 2419288, at *29 (granting preliminary
19 injunction against “removing Petitioner to a country other than [home country] without
20 notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings with
21 a hearing before an immigration judge”).

22 **Ground Five: Punitive Third-Country Banishment; Violation of Fifth and**
23 **Eighth Amendments**

24 The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

25 Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, no person shall “be held to
26 answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury;” “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

1 jeopardy of life or limb;” or “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
2 process of law.”

3 The Eighth Amendment provides that no “cruel and unusual punishments” may
4 be inflicted.

5 The U.S. Supreme Court long ago held that the government may not inflict upon
6 individuals an “infamous punishment” in addition to deportation as a penalty for an
7 immigration violation, absent criminal charges, a judicial trial, and attendant
8 constitutional protections. *Wong Wing*, 163 U.S. at 236–38.

9 Petitioner was convicted and completed the sentence for his criminal
10 convictions. Petitioner’s convictions arguably made him removable from the United
11 States, but the convictions do not authorize the government to inflict, as a matter of
12 executive policy and discretion, additional punishment on Petitioner. Respondents’
13 third-country removal program is punitive in both its nature and its execution.

14 The government has arranged for third countries to receive deportees and
15 imprison them on arrival, possibly indefinitely, and often in abhorrent conditions. It has
16 selected countries notorious for human rights abuses and instability for third-country
17 removal arrangements. It has targeted individuals with criminal convictions for third-
18 country removals, where they will be imprisoned and harmed, and has publicly
19 broadcast those removals to demonize and dehumanize the individuals subjected to
20 these practices and strike fear in the immigrant community to send a message of
21 retribution and deterrence.

22 Respondents’ third-country removal program is more than a publicity stunt. The
23 hundreds of individuals who have already been subjected to it have been banished in
24 foreign prisons upon arrival without charge and often without communication with the
25 outside world, including their families and lawyers. Respondents may not subject
26 Petitioner to their third-country removal program, which is designed to impose a severe

1 punishment on their subjects. Such conduct “shocks the conscience” under Fifth
2 Amendment substantive due process, is cruel and unusual punishment, and may not be
3 imposed without charge and a judicial trial.

4 Respondents may not seek to remove Petitioner to a third country under their
5 punitive banishment policy and practices. *See Nguyen*, 2025 WL 2419288, at *29
6 (granting preliminary injunction against “removing Petitioner to any country where he
7 is likely to face imprisonment upon arrival”).

8 **Prayer for Relief**

9 Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

10 (a) Assume jurisdiction over this action;

11 (b) Issue an Order directing Respondents promptly to show cause why this
12 Petition should not be granted;

13 (c) Order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody;

14 (d) Order that Respondents may not re-detain Petitioner without first holding
15 a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the government bears the burden of
16 establishing flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence
17 based on changed circumstances since Petitioner was previously released;

18 (e) Order that Respondents may not remove or seek to remove Petitioner to a
19 third country without notice and meaningful opportunity to respond in compliance with
20 the statute and due process in reopened removal proceedings;

21 (f) Order that Respondents may not remove Petitioner to any third country
22 because Respondents’ third-country removal program seeks to impose unconstitutional
23 punishment on its subjects, including imprisonment and other forms of harm; and

24 (g) Order all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
25
26

Verification Pursuant to LCR 100(e)

Counsel verifies that this petition is authorized by Petitioner. It does not personally bear Petitioner's signature because of the significant difficulty for counsel in meeting with Petitioner in person and because mailing the petition to Petitioner and having it mailed back would cause delay that would only extend the period of his unlawful detention. Counsel knows the facts asserted above or alleges them on information and belief, based on information obtained from the government and/or Petitioner.

DATED this 26th day of November 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Alan Zarky
Staff Attorney
Attorney for Mohamed Jaranow