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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Balbino Mayora Cruz, Petitioner, v. Pamela Bondi, et al., Respondents.	No. CV-25-04414-PHX-DWL (JZB) **RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Respondents Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States; John Cantu, Phoenix Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"); Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security ("DHS"); Fred Figueroa, Warden, Eloy Detention Center; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of ICE ("Respondents"), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby respond in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2).

I. INTRODUCTION.

Before 1996, the federal immigration laws required the detention of aliens who presented at a port of entry but allowed aliens who were already unlawfully present in the United States to obtain release pending removal proceedings. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") specifically to stop

conferring greater privileges and benefits on aliens who enter the United States unlawfully as compared to those who lawfully present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.

As relevant here, Congress enacted what is now 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires the detention of any alien "who is an applicant for admission" and defines that term to encompass any "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted" following inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A). The statute makes no exception for how far into the country the alien traveled or how long the alien managed to evade detection. Unless the Secretary exercises the narrow and discretionary parole authority, mandatory detention is the rule for aliens who have never been lawfully admitted.

Petitioner is an "applicant for admission" under Section 1225(a). That provision specifically provides that any "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted … shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission." § 1225(a)(1). Because Petitioner entered the country without inspection, however, he was never "admitted" and thus, he remains an "applicant for admission" who is subject to mandatory detention.

II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.

A. The Pre-IIRIRA Framework Gave Preferential Treatment to Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), as amended, contains a comprehensive framework governing the regulation of aliens, including the creation of proceedings for the removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States and requirements for when the Executive is obligated to detain aliens pending removal.

Prior to 1996, the INA treated aliens differently based on whether the alien had physically "entered" the United States. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a), 1251 (1994)); *see Hing Sum v. Holder*, 602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). "Entry" referred to "any coming of an alien into the United States," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), and whether an alien had physically entered the United States (or not) "dictated what type of [removal] proceeding applied" and

whether the alien would be detained pending those proceedings, *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1099.

At the time, the INA "provided for two types of removal proceedings: deportation hearing and exclusion hearings." *Hose v. I.N.S.*, 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). An alien who arrived at a port of entry would be placed in "exclusion proceedings and subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a grant of parole." *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223; *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)-(b) (1995); *id.* § 1226(a) (1995). In contrast, an alien who physically entered the United States unlawfully would be placed in deportation proceedings. *Id.*; *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100. Aliens in deportation proceedings, unlike those in exclusion proceedings, "were entitled to request release on bond." *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994)).

Thus, the INA's prior framework distinguishing between aliens based on physical "entry" had

> the 'unintended and undesirable consequence' of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered without inspection 'could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,' *including the right to request release on bond*, while aliens who had 'actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection ... were subject to mandatory custody.

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223 (emphasis added) (quoting *Martinez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S.*, 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012)); *see also Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996) ("House Rep.") ("illegal aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection").

B. IIRIRA Eliminated the Preferential Treatment of Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and Mandated Detention of all "Applicants for Admission."

Congress discarded that regime through enactment of IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). Among other things, that law had the goal of "ensur[ing] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their legal presence in

the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA." *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

To that end, IIRIRA replaced the prior focus on physical "entry" and instead made lawful "admission" the governing touchstone. IIRIRA defined "admission" to mean "the *lawful* entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the immigration laws would no longer distinguish aliens based on whether they had managed to evade detection and enter the country without permission. Instead, the "pivotal factor in determining an alien's status" would be "whether or not the alien has been *lawfully* admitted." House Rep., *supra*, at 226 (emphasis added); *Hing Sum*, 602 F.3d at 1100 (similar). IIRIRA also eliminated the exclusion-deportation dichotomy and consolidated both sets of proceedings into "removal proceedings." *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223.

IIRIRA effected these changes through several provisions codified in Section 1225 of Title 8:

Section 1225(a): Section 1225(a) codifies Congress's decision to make lawful "admission," rather than physical entry, the touchstone. That provision states that an alien "present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States" "shall be deemed … an applicant for admission":

> An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). "All aliens … who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States" are required to "be inspected by [an] immigration officer[]." *Id.* § 1225(a)(3). The inspection by the immigration officer is designed to determine whether the alien may be lawfully "admitted" to the country or, instead, must be referred to removal proceedings.

Section 1225(b): IIRIRA also divided removal proceedings into two tracks—expedited removal and non-expedited "Section 240" proceedings—and mandated that

applicants for admission be detained pending both types of proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)-(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) provides for so-called "expedited removal proceedings," *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 109-113 (2020), which can potentially be applied to a subset of aliens—those who (1) are "arriving in the United States," or who (2) have "not been admitted or paroled into the United States" and have "not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). As to these aliens, the immigration officer shall "order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum … or a fear of persecution." *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). In that event, the alien "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear or persecution and, if found not to have such fear, until removed." *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b)(4)(ii). An alien processed for expedited removal who does not indicate an intent to apply for a form of relief from removal is likewise detained until removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a "catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by [subsection (b)(1)]." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). It requires that those aliens be detained pending Section 240 removal proceedings:

> Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien *shall be detained* for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title [Section 240].

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).[1] *See* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii) (mirroring Section 1225(b)(2) detention mandate); *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302 (holding that Section

[1] Subsection (b)(2) does not apply to (1) aliens subject to expedited removal, (2) crewmen, (3) stowaways, or (4) aliens who "arriv[e] on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)-(C).

1225(b)(2) "mandate[s] detention of aliens throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just at the moment those proceedings begin").

While Section 1225(b)(2) does not allow for aliens to be released on bond, the INA grants DHS discretion to exercise its parole authority to temporarily release an applicant for admission, but "only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole, however, "shall not be regarded as admission of the alien." *Id.*; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288 (discussing parole authority). Moreover, when the Secretary determines that "the purposes of such parole … been served," the "alien shall … be returned to the custody from which he was paroled" and be "dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

Section 1226: IIRIRA also created a separate authority addressing the arrest, detention, and release of aliens generally (versus applicants for admission specifically). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226. This is the only provision that governs the detention of aliens who, for example, lawfully enter the country but overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas, or are later determined to have been improperly admitted. The statute provides that "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." *Id.* § 1226(a). Detention under this provision is generally discretionary: The Attorney General "may" either "continue to detain the arrested alien" or release the alien on bond or conditional parole. *Id.* § 1226(a)(1)-(2).[2]

That "default rule," however, does not apply to certain criminal aliens who are being released from detention by another law enforcement agency. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288; *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Section 1226(c) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody" certain classes of criminal aliens—those who are inadmissible or deportable because the alien (1) "committed" certain offenses delineated in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227; or (2) engaged in terrorism-related activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). The Executive must

[2] Conditional parole under Section 1226(a) is broader than parole under Section 1182(d)(5)(A).

detain these aliens "when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense." *Id.*

Congress recently amended Section 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3, (2025), which requires detention of (and prohibits parole for) aliens who (1) are inadmissible because they are physically present in the United States without admission or parole, have committed a material misrepresentation or fraud, or lack required documentation; and (2) are "charged with, arrested for, [] convicted of, admit[] having committed, or admit[] committing acts which constitute the essential elements of" certain listed offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico. Ex. A, Declaration of Deportation Officer Brandy Berghouser, at ¶ 3. He entered the United States without admission or parole on an unknown date at an unknown location. *Id.* at ¶ 3.[3] On August 26, 2025, Petitioner was encountered at the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Intake, Transfer, and Release Jail ("MCSO ITR"). *Id.* at ¶ 4. Petitioner was arrested for five counts of registering a motor vehicle with the intent to evade emissions requirements. *Id.* at ¶ 4. After release from MSCO ITR on August 27, 2025, ICE took him into custody. *Id.* at ¶ 5. On September 1, 2025, ICE issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear ("NTA") for removal proceedings alleging that he is removable from the United States for having entered without inspection or parole and for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. *Id.* at ¶ 6. Petitioner appeared at a bond hearing on October 16, 2025, where the request for bond was withdrawn by the Petitioner's counsel. *Id.* at ¶ 7. Petitioner requested a second bond hearing and appeared at that hearing on November 20, 2025. Ex. A at ¶ 11. The Immigration Judge took no action finding a lack of jurisdiction. *Id.* at ¶ 11. An individual merits hearing is scheduled for December 15, 2025. *Id.* at ¶10.

[3] Petitioner alleges he has resided in the United States since 2001. Doc. 1 at ¶ 41.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Under the plain text of § 1225, Petitioner must be detained pending the outcome of his removal proceedings.

The Court should reject Petitioner's argument that § 1226(a) governs his detention instead of § 1225. When there is "an irreconcilable conflict in two legal provisions," then "the specific governs over the general." *Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). Section 1226(a) applies to aliens "arrested and detained pending a decision" on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In contrast, § 1225 is narrower. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It applies only to "applicants for admission"; that is, as relevant here, aliens present in the United States who have not be admitted. *Id.*; *see also Fla. v. United States*, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2023), *appeal dismissed,* No. 23-11528, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Because Petitioner falls within that category, the specific detention authority under § 1225 governs over the general authority found at § 1226(a).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), an "applicant for admission" is defined as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States." Applicants for admission "fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(2)—the provision relevant here—is the "broader" of the two. *Id.* It "serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here)." *Id.* And section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention. *Id.* at 297; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); *Matter of Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 69 (BIA 2025) ("[A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)."). Section 1225(b) therefore applies because Petitioner is present in the United States without being admitted.

The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has long recognized that "many people who are not *actually* requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordinary sense

are nevertheless deemed to be 'seeking admission' under the immigration laws." *Matter of Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). Statutory language "is known by the company it keeps." *Marquez-Reyes v. Garland*, 36 F.4th 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016)). The phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of "applicant for admission" in § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission are both those individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Both are understood to be "seeking admission" under §1225(a)(1). *See Lemus-Losa*, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 743. Congress made that clear in § 1225(a)(3), which requires all aliens "who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission" to be inspected by immigration officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The word "or" here "introduce[s] an appositive–a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it ('Vienna or Wien,' 'Batman or the Caped Crusader')." *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013).

One of the most basic interpretative canons instructs that a "statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions." *See Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). The court's decision in *Florida v. United States* is instructive here. The district court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) mandates detention of applicants for admission throughout removal proceedings, rejecting the assertion that DHS has discretion to choose to detain an applicant for admission under either section 1225(b) or 1226(a). 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court held that such discretion "would render mandatory detention under § 1225(b) meaningless. Indeed, the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1225(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit." *Id.* The court pointed to *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003), in which the Supreme Court explained that "wholesale failure" by the federal government motivated the 1996 amendments to the INA. *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. The court also relied on, *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 516 (A.G. 2019), in which the Attorney General explained "section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226(a)] (under which detention is permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different classes of aliens." *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. Petitioner,

present in the United States without being admitted, is an applicant for admission and is therefore subject to mandatory detention without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

B. Congress did not intend to treat individuals who unlawfully enter the United States better than those who appear at a port of entry.

When the plain text of a statute is clear, "that meaning is controlling" and courts "need not examine legislative history." *Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.*, 659 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). But to the extent legislative history is relevant here, nothing "refutes the plain language" of § 1225. *Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2011). Congress passed IIRIRA to correct "an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the border unlawfully." *Torres*, 976 F.3d at 928. The Court should reject the Petitioner's interpretation because it would put aliens who "crossed the border unlawfully" in a better position than those "who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry." *Id.* Aliens who presented at port of entry would be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, but those who crossed illegally would be eligible for a bond under § 1226(a).

The BIA recognized this issue in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. In its decision, the BIA affirmed "the Immigration Judge's determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings." 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220. The BIA concluded that aliens "who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an 'admission.'" *Id.* at 228. To hold otherwise would lead to an "incongruous result" that rewards aliens who unlawfully enter the United States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for number of years. *Id.*

In so concluding, the BIA rejected the alien's argument that "because he has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years . . . he cannot be considered as

'seeking admission.'" *Id.* at 221. The BIA determined that this argument "is not supported by the plain language of the INA" and creates a "legal conundrum." *Id.* If the alien "is not admitted to the United States (as he admits) but he is not 'seeking admission' (as he contends), then what is his legal status?" *Id.* (parentheticals in original). The BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* is consistent not only with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but also with the Supreme Court's 2018 decision in *Jennings* and other caselaw issued subsequent to *Jennings*. Specifically, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) applies to all applicants for admission, noting that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is "quite clear" and "unequivocally mandate[s]" detention. 583 U.S. at 300, 303 (explaining that "the word 'shall' usually connotes a requirement" (quoting *Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States*, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016))).

Similarly, relying on *Jennings* and the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a), the Attorney General, in *Matter of M-S-*, unequivocally recognized that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226(a) do not overlap but describe "different classes of aliens." 27 I. & N. Dec. at 516. The Attorney General also held—in an analogous context—that aliens present without admission and placed into expedited removal proceedings are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 even if later placed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings. *Id.* at 518-19. In *Matter of Li*, the BIA held that an alien who illegally crossed into the United States and was apprehended without a warrant while arriving is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 29 I. & N. Dec. at 71. This ongoing evolution of the law makes clear that all applicants for admission are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). *Cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021) (providing that "no amount of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command"); *see generally Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1275 (explaining that "the 1996 expansion of § 1225(b) to include illegal border crossers would make little sense if DHS retained discretion to apply § 1226(a) and release illegal border crossers whenever the agency saw fit"). *Florida's* conclusion "that § 1225(b)'s 'shall be detained' means what it says and . . . is a mandatory requirement . . . flows directly from *Jennings*." *Florida*, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.

C. The Government's position.

The government acknowledges that this Court has explicitly rejected its legal position that aliens who enter without admission, inspection or parole and are charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) are applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), who are therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), regardless of how long ago they entered. *Echevarria v. Bondi, et al.*, No. 2:25-cv-03252-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025). The government also acknowledges a Massachusetts federal district court decision which is now on appeal to the First Circuit rejecting its legal position. *Martinez v. Hyde*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. Jul. 24, 2025), appeal pending, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.). There are, however, some federal courts that have joined what the government acknowledges is a minority position on whether § 1225 applies to persons in Petitioner's position rather than § 1226. *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (finding alien properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) because he was present in United States without having been admitted, and thus an applicant for admission under § 1225(a)); *Chavez v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (same); *Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi*, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025) (same); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (upholding detention under § 1225(b)(2) of alien "present in the country but [who] has not yet been lawfully granted admission"). Accordingly, the government maintains and preserves its position that Petitioner is properly subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).*See also Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-CV-1437-BHL, 2025 WL 3033967, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-CV-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025); *Oliveira v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-CV-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); *Garibay-Robledo v. Noem*, 1:25-cv-00177 (N.D. Tex. 2025); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025); *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, No. 2:25-CV-09785-SVW-AJR, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); *Alonzo v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025).

V. CONCLUSION.

In light of the above, Respondents respectfully request the Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Injunctive Relief. If the Court grants the Petition, the Court should order that Petitioner be given a bond hearing by the Immigration Court, not direct Petitioner's immediate release from immigration detention.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of December, 2025.

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