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15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION

17 YULISA ALVARADO AMBROCIO,

18 Petitioner,

19 v.

20 SERGIO ALBARRAN, Field Office Director
of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs
21 Enforcement Office, KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary of the United States Department of
22 Homeland Security, TODD M. LYONS,
Acting Director of United States Immigration
23 and Customs Enforcement, PAMELA BONDI,
Attorney General of the United States, acting
24 in their official capacities,

25 Respondents.

Case No. 5:25-cv-10215-PCP

**PETITIONER YULISA ALVARADO
AMBROCIO'S REPLY/TRVERSE TO
RESPONDENTS' RETURN AND
OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS**

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28

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 Petitioner is an asylum seeker from Guatemala who has done everything the law has asked
3 of her. She surrendered herself to immigration officials near the border—who determined that she
4 presented neither a flight risk nor a danger—and complied with every requirement imposed on her
5 for over a year and a half. Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) at ¶¶ 2, 29. Still, after
6 attending her immigration court hearing on September 11, 2025, ICE suddenly sought to arrest her—
7 only abstaining after two bystander attorneys intervened on her behalf and that of her then-nine-
8 month-old baby. Pet. ¶ 3. ICE continues to assert the power to arrest her again. Return at 7.

9 Respondents fail to contend with the due process violation at the core of this case and merely
10 recycle statutory arguments that this Court and hundreds of others have thoroughly rejected.
11 Respondents’ threshold jurisdictional objections are likewise unavailing. Consistent with this
12 Court’s prior rulings and the Due Process Clause, the Court should grant the modest relief that
13 Petitioner seeks: the right to a hearing in front of a neutral adjudicator before the government may
14 again restrain her liberty.

15 **ARGUMENT**

16 **I. This Remains a Justiciable Case**

17 **A. Petitioner’s Claims Are Not Moot**

18 As a preliminary matter, although Respondents do not argue mootness directly here, they
19 purport to incorporate by reference all previous arguments in this case. This case is not moot.
20 Respondents continue to assert the authority to re-detain Petitioner at any time without notice or a
21 hearing, creating a substantial risk of future constitutional injury. Return at 7. *Cf. Nadeem v.*
22 *Crawford*, 465 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A petitioner’s release subject to an order of
23 supervision does not render his habeas petition moot where his release may be revoked at any time
24 in the exercise of discretion.”). Where, as here, a defendant ceases challenged conduct only pursuant
25 to a preliminary injunction, the voluntary cessation doctrine applies and the defendant “bears a
26 formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
27 reasonably be expected to recur.” *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*,
28 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).

1 Because Respondents continue to assert mandatory detention authority in this litigation, their
2 court-ordered release of Petitioner pursuant to this Court’s preliminary injunction does not moot her
3 claims. *Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Sonoma County*, 905 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990)
4 (“[W]hen the possibility of controversy remains, the case is not yet moot.”).

5 **B. Respondents’ Jurisdictional Arguments Fail**

6 Respondents’ jurisdictional objections, citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(3), (g), and (b)(9), are
7 foreclosed by binding precedent holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction under 28
8 U.S.C. § 2241 for challenges to immigration detention. Section 1252(e)(3) requires that systemic
9 challenges to § 1225(b) be brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Section
10 1252(g) limits courts’ jurisdiction over decisions to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
11 execute removal orders.” And § 1252(b)(9) consolidates review of claims arising from removal
12 proceedings into a petition for review of a final removal order.

13 None of these provisions reaches habeas challenges to detention that are independent of
14 removal proceedings or the validity or execution of a removal order. Petitioner remains in regular
15 removal proceedings and has no final order of removal. The immigration judge dismissed her case,
16 and she timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where her case remains pending. Pet.
17 ¶¶ 3, 5. The relief Petitioner requests in this habeas action would not terminate, stay, or otherwise
18 interfere with, her ongoing removal proceedings.

19 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the REAL ID Act’s amendments to § 1252 were “not
20 intended to preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges
21 to removal orders.” *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); *see also*
22 *Ibarra-Perez v. United States*, 154 F.4th 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2025) (addressing § 1252(g) specifically
23 and emphasizing that it “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are
24 in some fashion connected to removal orders”). Accordingly, “[i]n cases that do not involve a final
25 order of removal, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court . . . pursuant to 28
26 U.S.C. § 2241.” *Nadarajah v. Gonzales*, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006). As explained in the
27 sections that follow, each of Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments fails.

28

1 **1. Section 1252(e)(3) Does Not Strip This Court of Jurisdiction**

2 Respondents mistakenly contend that § 1252(e)(3) requires that this habeas petition be
3 brought in the D.C. District Court. Return at 2-3. The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1252(e)(3)
4 provides only a “limited grant of jurisdiction to the D.C. district court” for challenges to regulations
5 “entirely linked” to the expedited-removal process. *Mendoza-Linares v. Garland*, 51 F.4th 1146,
6 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2022); *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden*, 993 F.3d 640, 666 (9th Cir. 2021).
7 *See also Garro Pinchi v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 3691938, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
8 19, 2025) (rejecting the applicability of § 1252(e)(3) when plaintiffs did not challenge the expedited-
9 removal process); *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *5
10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).

11 This case presents only an as-applied habeas challenge to ICE’s asserted authority to detain
12 Petitioner during regular removal proceedings without a pre-detention hearing. Petitioner does not
13 challenge any expedited removal determination or policy. There is no expedited-removal
14 determination at all for this Court to review. DHS released Petitioner into the interior on her own
15 recognizance under § 1226(a), after she had encountered immigration officials shortly after entering
16 the United States. Pet. ¶¶ 2, 6; Ex. 1. The agency issued a Notice to Appear for full removal
17 proceedings under § 1229a. Pet. ¶ 6; Return at 1 (citing Decl. of Thomas Auer at ¶ 1). Accordingly,
18 § 1252(e)(3) provides no basis for stripping this Court of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas
19 petition.

20 **2. Section 1252(g) Does Not Bar Review of Petitioner’s Claims**

21 Respondents argue that § 1252(g) “categorically bars jurisdiction” over this habeas action
22 because Petitioner’s detention challenge “arises from” the government’s decision to commence
23 removal proceedings. Return at 3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to
24 hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
25 Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
26 any alien under this chapter.”)).

27 The Ninth Circuit has emphatically rejected this argument. It has held “from the beginning”
28 that “§ 1252(g) does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some

1 fashion connected to removal orders,” and has “specifically held § 1252(g) did not bar due process
 2 claims.” *Ibarra-Perez*, 154 F.4th at 997. Indeed, district courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have
 3 repeatedly rejected the government’s argument that § 1252(g) bars them from issuing injunctive
 4 relief entitling noncitizens in removal proceedings to a pre-detention hearing, recognizing that such
 5 challenges are due process claims independent of removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Aguilar Garcia v.*
 6 *Kaiser*, No. 3:25-cv-05070-JSC, 2025 WL 2998169, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (“Petitioner
 7 does not seek to enjoin, or even challenge, his removal; instead, he seeks a hearing prior to his re-
 8 detention on the grounds he has a vested liberty interest in his current conditional release. Section
 9 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.”) (cleaned up); *Phakeokoth v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-02817-
 10 RBM-SBC, 2025 WL 3124341, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) (“Here, Petitioner does not challenge
 11 the legitimacy of his September 2004 order of removal. Rather, Petitioner challenges the legality of
 12 his present detention which does not require judicial review of ICE’s discretionary authority to
 13 decide ‘when’ or ‘whether’ to execute a removal order.”); *Lam v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-03344, 2025
 14 WL 3763372, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“[B]ecause Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of
 15 his detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings, it is not a challenge to one of the
 16 three discrete events along the road to deportation that § 1252(g) applies to.”) (cleaned up).

17 Here, Petitioner does not challenge any of the three discrete decisions enumerated in
 18 § 1252(g): she does not challenge the government’s 2023 decision to commence removal
 19 proceedings; she does not challenge any past adjudications (indeed, her appeal of the immigration
 20 judge’s dismissal remains pending before the BIA, Pet. ¶ 5); and she does not challenge the
 21 execution of any removal order. She brings only a due process challenge to the government’s
 22 detention procedures. Section 1252(g) therefore does not apply.

23 3. Section 1252(b)(9) Does Not Bar Review of Petitioner’s Claims

24 Respondents argue that § 1252(b)(9) channels *all* removal-related claims to the court of
 25 appeals. Return at 4-6. Respondents cite *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), to argue that
 26 “Petitioner must present her claims before the appropriate court of appeals because she challenges
 27 the Government’s decision or action to detain her in the future, which must be raised before a court
 28 of appeals, not this Court.” Return at 6. This argument fails.

1 In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court held that “§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar”
2 where a noncitizen is “not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the
3 decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any
4 part of the process by which their removability will be determined.” 583 U.S. at 294-95. Petitioner
5 satisfies all three of these conditions. First, there is no existing removal order that Petitioner could
6 even request review of. Second, Petitioner is not challenging the government’s decision to seek her
7 removal or the fact of her past arrest. Rather, she challenges only the government’s ongoing
8 assertion that after it has decided to seek to detain her, it need not provide her with any procedural
9 safeguards. Pet. ¶ 24. And third, she is not challenging any procedure material to the “process by
10 which [her] removability will be determined.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294-95.

11 Respondents further claim that Petitioner challenges “the government’s decision to detain
12 her in the first place.” Return at 6. They are factually mistaken. Respondents attempted to arrest
13 Petitioner on September 11, 2025—as she left her immigration court hearing with her nine-month-
14 old baby, Pet. ¶ 3—without any prior notice. Respondents’ disregard for due process is what
15 Petitioner challenges. Moreover, as a legal matter, *Jennings* specifically rejected an overly broad
16 interpretation of “arising from” that would sweep all removal-related claims into § 1252(b)(9)
17 simply because a noncitizen is in removal proceedings. 583 U.S. at 293. Such an interpretation, the
18 Court cautioned, “would lead to staggering results” and render claims of unconstitutional pre-
19 removal-order detention “effectively unreviewable.” *Id.* “By the time a final order of removal [i]s
20 eventually entered, the allegedly excessive detention would have already taken place.” *Id.*
21 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s concerns, courts throughout the nation have repeatedly held
22 that challenges to ICE detention conduct are fit for district-court review in real time. *E.O.H.C. v.*
23 *Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Under the Government’s
24 reading [of § 1252(b)(9)] . . . aliens [in prolonged detention] could get no judicial review until the
25 Board enters their final orders of removal. . . . [R]eview and relief may come too late to redress
26 these conditions of confinement.”) (cleaned up); *Rodriguez v. LaRose*, No. 3:25-CV-02940-RBM-
27 JLB, 2025 WL 3456475, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (“Petitioner challenges the legality of her
28 continued detention rather than a final order of removal. Accordingly, § 1252(b)(9) does not strip

1 this Court of jurisdiction.”); *You v. Nielsen*, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
2 (“[I]nterpreting §§ 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) to bar Petitioner’s claims challenging his arrest and
3 detention unless those claims were crammed into a petition for review of a removal order would
4 render such claims effectively unreviewable.”) (cleaned up); *Torres-Jurado v. Biden*, No. 19-cv-
5 3595, 2023 WL 7130898, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2023) (noting that *Jennings* forecloses a “reading
6 of § 1252(b)(9)” that “would permit ICE to arrest [and] detain” plaintiff “without any statutory or
7 constitutional constraints”).

8 Here, Petitioner’s case is pending before the BIA following the immigration judge’s
9 dismissal. Pet. ¶ 5. If she were required to wait until the petition-for-review process to challenge the
10 legality of her confinement, the harm would be irreparable and the review meaningless. This is
11 precisely the type of effective denial of judicial review that *Jennings* rejected.

12 Respondents’ reliance on *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016), in arguing that
13 § 1252(b)(9) applies, is similarly misplaced. *Jennings* is irreconcilable with *J.E.F.M.*’s
14 characterization of § 1252(b)(9) as “breathhtaking” in scope and “vise-like in grip,” “swallow[ing]
15 up virtually all claims that are tied to removal proceedings.” *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1031. *See*
16 *Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen*, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that *J.E.F.M.*
17 and “other pre-*Jennings* Ninth Circuit precedent” may “treat Section 1252(b)(9) too broadly in light
18 of the *Jennings* plurality’s rejection of an ‘expansive’ interpretation of ‘arising from’ that would
19 sweep a claim into Section 1252(b)(9) simply because an alien is in removal proceedings or a
20 removal action was taken”) (cleaned up). Moreover, *J.E.F.M.* is distinguishable. There, minor
21 immigrants sought appointed counsel at government expense to represent them in removal
22 proceedings—a claim the Ninth Circuit held was “part and parcel of the removal proceeding itself”
23 and “inextricably intertwined with [] the administrative process.” *J.E.F.M.*, 837 F.3d at 1033. Unlike
24 the right-to-counsel claim in *J.E.F.M.*, Petitioner’s challenge to detention procedures is independent
25 of her removal proceedings and would not affect them even if she prevails here. Section 1252(b)(9)
26 therefore does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.

27 ///

28 ///

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1 **II. Petitioner Is Not Subject to Mandatory Detention**

2 Respondents assert that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention as an ‘applicant for
3 admission’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),” and is therefore “entitled only to the process due to her
4 under the statute.” Return at 7. Consistent with this Court’s previous rulings and hundreds of rulings
5 by other federal courts, the Court should reject the government’s newfound statutory argument. In
6 opposing this claim, Petitioner hereby incorporates and preserves all arguments presented in support
7 of her motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. As Respondents have not
8 presented any new arguments, much less any that undermine the Court’s prior reasoning, *see Pablo*
9 *Sequen v. Albarran*, No. 25-cv-06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2935630 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025), Petitioner
10 presents only an abbreviated rebuttal here.

11 First, Respondents cannot credibly claim that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
12 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) when the government *released her* in 2024, more than a year before
13 the initiation of this litigation, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Pet. Ex. 1 (Order of Release on
14 Recognizance and Notice of Custody Determination). Respondents do not address this
15 contradiction. Nor do they cite any authority permitting the government to retroactively
16 recharacterize its own prior immigration enforcement decisions for litigation purposes, particularly
17 where that recharacterization contradicts contemporaneous custody records. If Petitioner had been
18 granted humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5), Border Patrol would have issued a Form I-94
19 documenting the parole grant and cited 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Border Patrol did not issue such
20 documentation because it did not grant humanitarian parole—rather, it released Petitioner under
21 § 1226(a), as the Order of Release on Recognizance and Notice of Custody Determination indicate.

22 Second, Respondents argue that Petitioner remains subject to mandatory detention under
23 § 1225(b)(2)(A) as an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission,” notwithstanding her
24 release into the interior and years of presence here. Return at 7 (citing § 1225(b)(2)(A)). District
25 courts throughout this Circuit have repeatedly held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to
26 noncitizens released into the interior under § 1226(a). *See, e.g., Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, No. 25-
27 CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); *see also Garro*
28 *Pinchi*, 2025 WL 3691938, at *26-29 (identifying “numerous problems with DHS’s interpretation

1 of § 1225(b)(2)"). *Accord Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F.4th 1048, 1061
2 (7th Cir. 2025) (rejecting argument that "an 'applicant for admission' is synonymous with a person
3 'seeking admission'"). Respondents cite no binding authority for their sweeping claim that a
4 noncitizen who is released into the interior on her own recognizance and is physically present in the
5 interior of the country for years endures indefinitely as an "applicant seeking admission." Petitioner
6 is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

7 **III. The Due Process Clause Requires a Hearing Before Re-Detention or Further**
8 **Restraint on Liberty, With the Burden on the Government**

9 Respondents conspicuously fail to directly address the central question in this case: whether
10 Petitioner is entitled to a pre-detention hearing before re-detention. Their opposition focuses
11 exclusively on jurisdiction and their assertion of mandatory detention authority under § 1225(b)(2).
12 *See generally* Return. Respondents offer no argument as to why the Due Process Clause permits
13 them to detain Petitioner without a hearing after she has enjoyed conditional liberty for over two
14 years, complying with all release conditions.

15 Petitioner prevails on the merits in any event. The Supreme Court has held that revocation
16 of conditional liberty requires "an informal hearing" because the "liberty of the parolee, although
17 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty." *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408
18 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Petitioner's liberty interest—freedom from detention after two years of
19 compliance with release conditions—warrants at least the minimal procedural safeguards that
20 district courts in this Circuit routinely provide. Those safeguards include not only a hearing before
21 a neutral adjudicator, but also the proper allocation of the burden of proof.

22 Respondents contend that "[a]t any future hearing, Petitioner should have the burden of
23 demonstrating that [she is] not a flight risk or danger to the community." Return at 11 (citing
24 *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1210-12 (9th Cir. 2022) ("Nothing in this record suggests
25 that placing the burden of proof on the government was constitutionally necessary to minimize the
26 risk of error, much less that such burden-shifting would be constitutionally necessary in all, most,
27 or many cases.")).

1 *Rodriguez Diaz* is, however, inapposite. That case involved exceptional circumstances
2 absent here: a petitioner whom an immigration judge had found to have “an extensive criminal
3 history” and to present “a danger to the community due to his gang affiliation.” *Rodriguez Diaz*, 53
4 F.4th at 1193. Furthermore, the petitioner had already received one bond hearing and argued that
5 the Due Process Clause entitled him to a second. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit’s holding that burden-shifting
6 was not “constitutionally necessary” under those distinct facts does not establish a general rule
7 applicable to all detention challenges. *Id.* at 1212.

8 Absent such exceptional circumstances, “the ‘consensus view’ among District Courts
9 conclud[es] that after *Jennings* where the government seeks to detain an alien pending removal
10 proceedings, it bears the burden of proving that such detention is justified.” *Ixchop Perez v.*
11 *McAleenan*, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (cleaned up); *see also Garro Pinchi v.*
12 *Noem*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2025); *Calderon v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06695-AMO,
13 2025 WL 2430609, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025).

14 The Court should also enjoin Respondents from imposing additional restrictions on
15 Petitioner’s conditional liberty without a hearing. Respondents rely entirely on statutory arguments
16 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention; they do not contend that Petitioner poses any flight
17 risk or danger to the community. In the absence of any argument or evidence that Petitioner poses a
18 risk justifying such restrictions, the Court should enjoin Respondents from imposing electronic
19 monitoring, GPS tracking, or increased reporting requirements unless the government makes a
20 showing of necessity at a hearing.

21 District courts in this Circuit have enjoined such conduct in analogous cases. *See Espinoza*
22 *v. Kaiser*, No. 1:25-CV-01101 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2675785, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025)
23 (ordering that “DHS SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions on [petitioners], such as
24 electronic monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody
25 hearing”); *N.Y.V.D. v. Santracruz*, No. 5:25-CV-03404-WLH-SP, 2026 WL 45268, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
26 Jan. 6, 2026) (“Respondents are enjoined from detaining N.Y.V.D., or significantly restraining
27 N.Y.V.D.’s liberty, including but not limited to using a 24/7 ankle monitor or other similar restraints,
28 including, but not limited to, requiring N.Y.V.D to be within 75 miles of her home, unless they

1 provide her with a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where Respondents bear
 2 the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that N.Y.V.D. is a flight risk or a
 3 danger such that her physical custody is required.”).

4 Accordingly, Respondents should be enjoined from imposing any new restrictions on
 5 Petitioner’s liberty without first demonstrating, at a hearing before a neutral arbiter and by clear and
 6 convincing evidence, that such restrictions are necessary.

7 **IV. Respondents’ Speculative Contentions About a Hypothetical Future Removal**
 8 **Order Are Unripe and Irrelevant to the Due Process Right to a Hearing**

9 Respondents argue that “[e]ven if the Court grants Petitioner’s habeas petition, any order
 10 cannot affect the execution of any future removal order including, but not limited to, Petitioner’s
 11 mandatory detention under the INA.” Return at 13 (citing §§ 1231(a)(2)(A), 1252(g)). Respondents’
 12 concern is unripe, speculative, and unresponsive to the constitutional injury giving rise to this case.
 13 Petitioner has no final removal order—her appeal remains pending before the Board of Immigration
 14 Appeals. Pet. ¶ 5. She challenges detention without certain minimal procedural safeguards—a due
 15 process claim entirely independent of the validity of a hypothetical removal determination that may
 16 not ever issue. The Ninth Circuit has held that “§ 1252(g) does not prohibit challenges to unlawful
 17 practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders,” and has
 18 “specifically held § 1252(g) did not bar due process claims.” *Ibarra-Perez*, 154 F.4th at 997; *see*
 19 *also Aguilar Garcia*, 2025 WL 2998169 at *3 (“Petitioner does not seek to enjoin, or even challenge,
 20 his removal; instead, he seeks a hearing prior to his re-detention on the grounds he has a vested
 21 liberty interest in his current conditional release. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.”)
 22 (cleaned up).

23 Courts throughout the Ninth Circuit routinely issue permanent injunctions requiring pre-
 24 detention hearings without limiting such relief to the period preceding a final removal order. *See,*
 25 *e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); *E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, 795 F.
 26 Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Faizyan v. Casey*, No. 3:25-CV-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025
 27 WL 3208844, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, No. 2:25-CV-01404-
 28 JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Chaudhry v. Bondi*, No. 2:25-CV-

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1 02339-DGE, 2025 WL 3706534, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 2025). Should a final removal order
2 eventually issue, Respondents may move to set a hearing and demonstrate to a neutral arbiter that
3 circumstances have changed such that detention is warranted.

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should permanently enjoin Respondents from re-
6 detaining Petitioner or imposing new restrictions on her liberty—including electronic monitoring,
7 GPS tracking, or increased reporting requirements—unless such detention or restrictions are ordered
8 at a properly noticed custody hearing before a neutral arbiter, in which the government bears the
9 burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or danger to the
10 community.

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Respectfully submitted,

DATED: January 16, 2026

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ATTESTATION

1
2 I, Jordan Wells, am the ECF user whose identification and password are being used to file
3 the PETITIONER YULISA ALVARADO AMBROCIO'S REPLY/TRVERSE TO
4 RESPONDENTS' RETURN AND OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. In
5 compliance with LR 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that all parties have concurred in this filing.
6

7 DATED: January 16, 2026

LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
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