

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA**

Trung Huy Huu Nguyen,

Case No.: 25-CV-01415-JD

Petitioner

**PETITIONER'S REPLY TO
RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE**

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; et al.,

**EXPEDITED HANDLING
REQUESTED**

Respondents.

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PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL HISTORY

Nguyen incorporates by reference the facts alleged in his verified habeas corpus petition. *See* ECF No. 1.

Respondents have provided two deportation officer declarations. ECF No. 11-1 (DO Martin Castillo #1); ECF No. 13-1 (DO Martin Castillo #2). Castillo's first declaration admits that Respondents have been unable to deport Petitioner to Vietnam since at least May 19, 2021. ECF No. 11-1, ¶¶ 4-6. Castillo's admits that Petitioner's prior Order of Supervision ("OOS") issued under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). *See* ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 6. Castillo does not claim that Petitioner was informed orally or in writing of the reason for his redetention on June 8, 2025 and thereby concedes Nguyen's claims that such notice was not provided. *See* ECF Nos. 11-1, 13-1; ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 21.d; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). Castillo's declaration also fails to claim that an informal interview was provided, thereby conceding that no such interview occurred. ECF Nos. 11-1, 13-1; ECF No. 1, ¶ 21.e, 55, 58, 60. Although Castillo claims that "ICE issued a Notice of Interview for Review of Custody and provided Petitioner **an opportunity to request** a personal interview on September 11, 2025," there is no indication from the record that Petitioner was actually given the interview mandated by regulation, nor that he was made aware of the purpose of the interview or of his ability to present or rebut evidence bearing on the likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future at the proposed interview. *See* ECF No. 13-1, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

The only statements Castillo makes regarding the basis for Petitioner's redetention are: (1) "Based on the Government of Vietnam's willingness to accept its citizens, and the

number of successful removals ERO has made to Vietnam this Fiscal year, I believe removal of Nguyen to Vietnam is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future”; and (2) “On June 8, 2025, ICE lawfully revoked Petitioner’s release based on materially changed circumstances, including enhanced cooperation with Vietnam, expanded third-country options, and increased removal capacity.” ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 9; ECF No. 13-1, ¶ 1. However, there is no indication that these reasons were conveyed to Petitioner at the time of redetention or at any point prior to Castillo’s submission of his declarations to this Court. There is no indication these were the actual reasons for detention at time of redetention rather than post-hoc explanations for unlawful conduct. Castillo also states in the first declaration that his belief that Nguyen’s removal to Vietnam is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future due to “Vietnam’s [alleged] willingness to accept its citizens, and the number of successful removals ERO has made to Vietnam this Fiscal Year.” *Id.*, ¶¶ 8-9 (referring to 569 removals of Vietnam citizens in Fiscal Year 2025, up from 58 in FY 2024).

As one sister court has noted:

After the Vietnam War, many Vietnamese people “fled the country to escape political persecution.” Until 2008, Vietnam refused to repatriate Vietnamese immigrants whom the United States had ordered removed. In 2008, the United States and Vietnam reached an agreement under which Vietnam agreed to consider repatriation requests for Vietnamese immigrants who had arrived in the United States after July 12, 1995. This meant that Vietnamese immigrants who had arrived before that date would not be considered for repatriation.

Until 2017, ICE “maintained that the removal of pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants was unlikely given Vietnam’s consistent refusal to repatriate them.” Thus, ICE typically detained pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants for no

more than ninety days after their removal orders became final. After that time expired, most detainees were released on orders of supervision.

In 2017, the United States and Vietnam began to renegotiate the 2008 agreement. Though the 2008 agreement was not formally amended, Vietnamese officials “verbally committed to begin considering ICE travel document requests for pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants on a case-by-case basis, without explicitly committing to accept any of them.”

In accordance with this change, ICE began detaining pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants for longer than ninety days after their final orders of removal. ICE reasoned that Vietnam might issue the necessary travel documents for repatriation. ICE also began re-detaining some individuals who had been released on orders of supervision.

But this policy did not last long. In 2018, following additional meetings between United States and Vietnamese officials, “ICE conceded that, despite Vietnam’s verbal commitment to consider travel document requests for pre-1995 immigrants, in general, the removal of these individuals was still not significantly likely.” ICE accordingly instructed field offices to release pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants within ninety days of a final order of removal.

In 2020 the policy changed again when the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) to create a process for deporting pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants. Under Section 4 of the MOU, Vietnam affirmed that it “intends to issue travel documents where needed, and otherwise to accept the removal of an individual subject to a final order of removal from the United States” if the individual meets four conditions. First, the individual must have Vietnamese citizenship (and only Vietnamese citizenship). Second, the individual must have violated U.S. law, been ordered removed by a U.S. authority, and completed any sentence of imprisonment. Third, the individual must have resided in Vietnam prior to arriving in the United States and have no right to reside in any other country or territory. . . . Petitioner asserts that from September 2021 to September 2023, the United States deported and repatriated only four pre-1995 immigrants to Vietnam. . . .

Tran v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-01886-TMC-BAT, 2025 WL 2898638, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2025) (internal citations omitted); *see also Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025) (Report & Recommendation quoting and

relying on *Tran* to recommend granting habeas corpus and immediate release), *adopted* 2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025).

DO Castillo claims, somewhat incredibly, that “ICE is currently not recognizing MOUs, and the Government of Vietnam has issued travel documents for every travel document request ERO has submitted since February 2025,” further claiming that “[t]he majority of these cases were citizens of Vietnam who entered the United States prior to 1995.” ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 8 (emphasis added).

The claim that Vietnam has issued travel documents for “every” request ERO has submitted since February 2025 is demonstrably false. Vietnam has not issued a travel document in this case, nor for Khanh Nguyen, nor has Vietnam issued a travel document for Tung Tran, nor has Vietnam issued a travel document for Phong Van Do. *See Tran v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1357-G (W.D. Okla.) (ECF No. 15-1, ¶ 12, Declaration of DO George McGettrick) (“On November 22, 2025, ERO submitted a travel document request to the government of Vietnam, **which is still pending**”) (emphasis added); *Nguyen v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1402-D (W.D. Okla.) (ECF No. 15-1, ¶ 14, Declaration of DO George McGettrick) (“On November 1, 2025, I submitted a travel document request... to the government of Vietnam, **which is still pending**”) (emphasis added); *Do v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-05643 (S.D. Tex.) (ECF No. 7-1, ¶ 16, Declaration of DO Ellen Henry) (“On December 4, 2025, HQ forwarded the application to the attaché in Vietnam,” which remains pending). The three declarations, just cited, demonstrate that DO Castillo’s categorical statement is incorrect. This casts doubt over how Castillo is deciding what constitutes a “travel document request” – is he considering only requests that have been granted and ignoring

long-ignored requests that are effectively denials? Second, the *Tran* case in the Western District of Washington, cited above, indicates that Castillo's statement is false. *See Tran v. Scott*, No. 2:25-CV-01886-TMC-BAT, 2025 WL 2898638, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2025) (granting release after no travel document was provided for a pre-1995 Vietnam immigrant with a final order of removal despite the government's claims that "the ERO attaché in Vietnam has submitted the travel document packet to the government in Vietnam with a request to expedite its processing."); *see id.*, at *3 (referring to the 'Rodriguez Declaration' and *Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-cv-01398, 2025 WL 2419288 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025)). There is no indication whether any of the individuals deported to Vietnam in FY 2025 were similarly situated due to lacking any proof of Vietnamese citizenship or having a criminal history as significant as Petitioner's.

Moreover, as Castillo acknowledges, Petitioner is *not* a pre-1995 arrival, which is important because Castillo states that "the majority" of deportations to Vietnam this fiscal year "were citizens of Vietnam **who entered the United States prior to 1995.**" ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 8 (emphasis added); *see also* ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 3 (Petitioner was "admitted in 2007").

The Castillo declarations do not claim that third-country deportation is being attempted.

The first Castillo declaration claims that "[o]n August 19, 2025, ERO submitted a travel document request to the government of Vietnam" which remains "pending" 122 days later (more than a full 90-day removal period) with no stated timeline for an expected decision, or indication of what the decision will be. ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 5. Castillo does not

state any facts that support the government's conclusion that changed circumstances make deportation more likely to occur now than has been true for the last 4+ years.

In short, the Castillo declarations are incapable of supporting the conclusion that there is currently a significant likelihood of Petitioner being removed to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Castillo declarations are likewise incapable of supporting the conclusion that changed circumstances exist which justified revoking Petitioner's OOS at the time of redetention. If anything, Castillo's declaration confirms that there is no significant likelihood of Petitioner's removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Prior to being illegally re-arrested on June 8, 2025, Petitioner served at least 4 days in post-final-order immigration custody before being released on an OOS. ECF No. 1, ¶ 6. As of December 19, 2025, Petitioner's present period of confinement is 194 days, for an aggregate post-order detention period of 198 days (more than the six-month period that is presumptively reasonable).

ARGUMENT

I. Respondents have failed to demonstrate changed circumstances justifying re-detention at the time of re-detention. To the extent Petitioner bears any burden, he has met it. Petitioner's detention time must be aggregated.

Respondents' first error lies in failing to recognize that because Petitioner has already been released on an Order of Supervision ("OOS") pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, *after having previously established no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future* ("NSLRRFF"), it is Respondents who bear the initial burden of establishing "changed circumstances" to redetain under both federal regulation and

Zadvydas.¹ Nothing in Respondents' responses or supporting declarations rebuts the prior finding of NSLRRFF or otherwise demonstrates changed circumstances regarding NSLRRFF *at the moment of redetention*. See, e.g., *Liban O. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-04560-JWB-ECW, ECF No. 10 (Slip Op.), at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) ("The regulation places the burden on the government to make that showing" that "re-detention is authorized if the noncitizen violates supervision conditions or if, based on changed

¹ *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001) ("once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, **the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing**") (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) ("The Service may revoke an alien's release under this section and return the alien to custody **if, on account of changed circumstances**, the Service determines that **there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.**") (emphasis added); see also *Roble v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-3196, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release based on less egregious regulatory violations); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2144, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (same); *Yee S. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-02782-JMB-DLM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2879479 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (same); *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2898985 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (same); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding petitioner was likely to succeed on unlawful redetention claim because "there is no indication that an informal interview was provided"); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387-88 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding that ICE's failures to follow regulatory revocation procedures rendered detention unlawful); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) ("because ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release"); *Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1067-J, 2025 WL 3011896 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2025) (R&R), *adopted*, 2025 WL 3006045 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2025) (granting habeas relief based on a variety of regulatory violations similar to those presented by Petitioner); *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025) (R&R), *adopted* 2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (same); *Hamidi v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) (same); *Abuelhawa v. Noem*, No. 4:25-CV-04128, 2025 WL 2937692 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (same); *Do v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-05643, ECF No. 10 (Slip Op.) (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2025) (same).

circumstances, removal is now significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future”). Therefore, Petitioner’s detention is unlawful, in excess of statutory and regulatory authority, and is unconstitutional. Numerous courts around the country have recently granted habeas petitions to persons that are similarly situated to Petitioner.²

A pending travel document request is an insufficient “changed circumstance” to justify further detention of an individual who has suffered through post-order detention period in excess of the presumptively reasonable detention period. *See, e.g., Tadros v. Noem*, No. 25cv4108, 2025 WL 1678501, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2025) (finding petitioner “demonstrated there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because fifteen years have gone by without the Government securing a third country for his removal”).

To the extent that Respondents submit the *Zadvydas* clock should automatically reset every time a noncitizen is released from custody on an OOS, Petitioner respectfully

² *Supra* at n.1; *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023) (“ICE’s decision to re-detain a noncitizen . . . who has been granted supervised release is governed by ICE’s own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); *Hernandez Escalante v. Noem*, No. 9:25-cv-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“The[] regulations clearly indicate, upon revocation of supervised release, it is [ICE’s] burden to show a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed.”); *Nguyen v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at *3 n.2 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025); *cf. Va V. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2836 (LMP/JFD), *slip op.* at *6-12 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2025) (denying relief because a travel document was obtained, but holding that until ICE proved it had a travel document allowing for immediate deportation, it failed to demonstrate changed circumstances justifying redetention of an individual under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)).

demurs. Numerous cases indicate otherwise,³ as does common sense. If Respondents'

³ See, e.g., *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701; *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023) (“ICE’s decision to re-detain a noncitizen . . . who has been granted supervised release is governed by ICE’s own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); *Hernandez Escalante v. Noem*, No. 9:25-cv-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“The[] regulations clearly indicate, upon revocation of supervised release, it is [ICE’s] burden to show a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed.”); *Giorges v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-07683, 2025 WL 2898967, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (“When calculating time spent in detention, courts aggregate nonconsecutive detention periods. The clock does not restart each time that a nonconsecutive detention begins for a noncitizen.”); *Nguyen v. Scott*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2419288, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (same); *Sied v. Nielsen*, No. 17-CV-06785-LB, 2018 WL 1876807, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (same); *Nhean v. Brott*, No. 17-28-PAM-FLN, 2017 WL 2437268, at *2 (D. Minn. May 2, 2017) (report and recommendation) (holding that when the government detains an alien for 90 days, releases him, and then re-detains him, the second detention “was presumptively reasonable for an additional 90 days (six months in total),” not an additional six months), adopted, 2017 WL 2437246 (D. Minn. June 5, 2017); *Bailey v. Lynch*, No. 16-2600-JLL, 2016 WL 5791407, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that the six-month *Zadvydas* period “does not restart simply because an alien who [was previously detained and then] has previously been released is taken back into custody”); *Farah v. INS*, No. Civ. 02-CV-4725-DSD-RLE, 2003 WL 221809, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that when the government releases an alien and then revokes the release based on changed circumstances, “the revocation would merely restart the 90-day removal period, not necessarily the presumptively reasonable six-month detention period under *Zadvydas*”); *Chen v. Holder*, No. 14-CV-2530, 2015 WL 13236635 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015) (“Surely, under the reasoning of *Zadvydas*, a series of releases and re-detentions by the government, as was done in this case, while technically not in violation of the presumptively reasonable jurisprudential six month removal period, in essence results in an indefinite period of detention, albeit executed in successive six month intervals.”); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2025) (“because ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release”); *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025) (R&R), adopted, 2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (granting a § 1231 habeas claim roughly 3 months after Pham was re-detained in violation of regulation); *Sukhyani v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1243-J, 2025 WL 3283274, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2025) (“Because Petitioner was detained after he was initially ordered removed, Respondents agree that he has been ‘in post order detention

interpretation wins out, Respondents should simply release noncitizens at 179 days of custody for a 24-hour period before redetaining the noncitizen. This sort of gamesmanship would be rewarded and prevent *Zadvydas* claims from ever arising. It is unlikely the Supreme Court intended such a result.⁴

Additionally, if there is any question about whether to aggregate detention periods, the choice not to aggregate only makes sense if re-detention occurred in accordance with law. Here, there is no indication in the record that Respondents lawfully revoked Petitioner's OOS under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g) or (i)(2)-(3) because there is no indication that Petitioner was ever notified in writing of the changed circumstances that allegedly justified his re-detention, nor is there any credible indication in the record that Petitioner ever received an interview at which he was permitted to present evidence to demonstrate no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, nor is there any indication that the Executive Associate Commissioner, acting through the HQPDU, had any involvement in the continued custody decisions made in Petitioner's case, nor is there

in excess of six months' [Doc. No. 18 at 20] despite the fact that his current detention has only lasted approximately five months.”).

⁴ In *Liu v. Carter*, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1207089, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025), the district court stated, “the removal-period clock restarts when an alien subject to a removal order is again detained by ICE.” However, Liu conceded this in his case and the accuracy of that claim was thus not before the court. *See Liu* at *2 (“petitioner appears to concede this point”). Conversely, Petitioner alleged in his verified habeas corpus petition that the regulation that resets the 90-day clock “is *ultra vires* to statute as an arbitrary or capricious interpretation of statute that exceeds statutory authority,” distinguishing the present case from the concessions in *Liu*. ECF No. 2, ¶ 79. Moreover, even if the regulation is valid, restarting the clock pursuant to the regulation necessarily presumes lawful redetention under the regulations, which did not occur here. Consequently, Petitioner's periods of confinement must be aggregated for purposes of the *Zadvydas* claim.

any evidence that changed circumstances existed at the time Petitioner was redetained in July of 2025.⁵ Because Petitioner's due process rights were violated at the moment of re-detention, Respondents have unclean hands and cannot receive the windfall benefit of non-aggregated detention periods assuming *arguendo* there are ever circumstances where detention periods cannot or should not be aggregated.

II. There is no credible or probative evidence indicating that *this* Petitioner is set to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

ERO's prior inability to remove Petitioner, his subsequent release on an OOS under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, and attempts by both parties since 2021 to obtain a Vietnam travel document "are directly relevant to the likelihood now that Petitioner will be removed... in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Sukhyani v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1243-J (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2025) (R&R at 12), *adopted*, 2025 WL 3283274 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2025).

⁵ See, e.g., *Roble v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025); *Yee S. v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2879479 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025); *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2898985 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting habeas and ordering release); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding petitioner was likely to succeed on unlawful redetention claim because "there is no indication that an informal interview was provided"); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387-88 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding that ICE's failures to follow regulatory revocation procedures rendered detention unlawful); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) ("because ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release"); *Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1067-J, 2025 WL 3011896 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2025), *adopted*, 2025 WL 3006045 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2025); *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025); *Hamidi v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) ("The Magistrate Judge found that ICE failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) in re-detaining Petitioner. The Court agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge's findings in this regard.").

“Courts have found that... increase in frequency of removals alone does not demonstrate significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (referring to the same claim of increased removals to Vietnam made in this case); *Compare, e.g., Sang Nguyen v. Bondi*, No. EP-25-CV-323-KC, 2025 WL 3120516 at *7 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025) (lack of details in Vietnam removal data contributed to no finding of significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future) *and, e.g., Nguyen v. Hyde*, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151-52 (same) *with Tran v. Baker*, No. 25-CV-1598-JRR, 2025 WL 2085020 at *4-5 (D. Md. July 24, 2025) (finding that detailed removal data for pre-1995 Vietnamese citizens, travel documents obtained prior to detainment, and scheduled meeting with Vietnamese consulate established significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future).

At present, the following is true: (1) Respondents do not have a travel document; (2) Vietnam has not promised that a travel document will be forthcoming; (3) there is no known timeline for when a travel document will be produced assuming *arguendo* one is eventually issued; (4) Petitioner’s aggregate and present detention periods are both longer than the presumptively reasonable detention period and more double the 90-day removal period; (5) Respondents did not bother to submit a travel document for more than 60 days (more than 2/3s of a full 90-day removal period); (6) Respondents detained Petitioner in violation of federal regulations; and (7) DO Castillo claims the majority of recent deportations to Vietnam have been of pre-1995 arrivals, but this Petitioner was a post-1995 arrival.

As was true in *Momennia*, as of December 15, 2025, “ICE’s sole justification for [Petitioner’s] continued detention appears to be that ‘we’re working on it’ while conceding ‘a lack of visible progress.’” *Momennia*, 2025 WL 3011896, at *7. “That does not suffice under either the regulations or *Zadvydas*.” *Id.* (citing *Yee S. v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2879479, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (finding that “the record does not support a determination that Petitioner is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future” when Petitioner’s home country of Burma was not an option for removal, ICE could “direct the Court to no facts in the record supporting a conclusion that any specific country where Petitioner is not a citizen would agree to accept him,” and “Respondents simply repeat the vague and conclusory assertions that ‘ICE is in the process of obtaining a travel document’”); *Sun v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2800037, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Respondents say they are ‘putting together a travel document [TD] request to send to [the] Cambodian embassy,’ and that ‘[o]nce ICE receives the TD, it will begin efforts to secure a flight itinerary for Petitioner.’ The Court finds these kind of vague assertions—akin to promising the check is in the mail—insufficient to meet ICE’s own requirement to show ‘changed circumstances’ or ‘a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”) (record citations omitted); *Hoac v. Becerra*, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“The fact that Respondents intend to complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not make it significantly likely he will be removed in the foreseeable future.”); *Roble v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2443453, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (finding insufficient the government’s assertion that ICE “requested third country removal assistance from [Enforcement and Removal Operations] HQ”).

“ICE, like any agency, has the duty to follow its own federal regulations. As here, where an immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute . . . and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged [action] is invalid.” *Nguyen v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 1725791, *5 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025) (quoting *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017)).

Momennia, 2025 WL 3011896, at *8.

In addition to *Momennia*, Magistrate Mitchell recently issued a Report and Recommendation for someone similarly situated to this Petitioner in *Pham v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025), *adopted* 2025 WL 3243870 (Nov. 20, 2025). The Petitioner, as in *Pham*, is a Vietnamese citizen. In *Pham*, Magistrate Mitchell recommended granting Pham’s habeas corpus petition and ordering his immediate release due to the exact same regulatory violations Petitioner relies upon. *Compare* ECF No. 1 with *Pham*, 2025 WL 3477023, at *3-6.

This Court should follow *Pham* and hold:

While the McGettrick Declaration states 569 Vietnamese citizens were removed from the United States in 2025, it vaguely notes that this figure “included removals of Vietnam citizens who entered the United States before 1995.” The data does not adequately address the likelihood of removal of pre-1995 Vietnamese citizens such as Petitioner. While stating “ERO is *currently* working on obtaining travel documents” for Petitioner, Respondents provided no evidence of progress they made towards removal of Petitioner himself before re-detention. Even if the Court were to consider the facts from the McGettrick Declaration, . . . Respondents failed to demonstrate changed circumstances justifying re-detention. As such, Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.

Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (record citations omitted).

III. Immediate release is the only appropriate remedy.

Based on ICE’s violations of its own regulations, the Court must conclude that

Petitioner's detention is unlawful and that his release is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). *See Pham*, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (“A majority of district courts have found such regulatory defects amount to due process violations that entitle a petitioner to habeas relief. . . . The Court finds the majority view persuasive and consistent with the facts and circumstances of this case.”); *Yee S.*, 2025 WL 2879479, at *6 (ordering release because Petitioner has shown that ICE's re-detention of him . . . violated the law because ICE did not comply with its own regulations under section 241.13(i)(2)"); *Roble v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2443453, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (holding that “[i]t goes without saying that ICE, like all government agencies, must follow its own regulations” and ordering release based on violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (ordering release based on violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)).

As Judge Palk recognized in *Pham*, a clear majority of courts have held that the violations alleged and proven by Petitioner justify immediate release through the writ of habeas corpus. *See Pham*, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1. Reliance on *Bahadorani* is improper because, aside from being wrongly decided on presently on appeal, *Bahadorani* is factually distinguishable because “the petitioner underwent a particularized interview process regarding their removal after being detained,” whereas here, “similar to the facts of *Roble*, Respondents only provided a perfunctory and generalized statement to Petitioner regarding the reason for revocation of his release.” 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 n.2; *see also Hamidi*, No. 25-CV-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) (distinguishing *Bahadorani* for the same reasons as *Pham*).

Reliance on *Bahadorani* is now especially misplaced because, on December 18,

2025, the Tenth Circuit granted Bahadorani’s petition for release pending the outcome of the appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 23(b), which is an exceedingly strong signal that the Tenth Circuit intends to reverse the district court. *See Bahadorani v. Bondi*, No. 25-6177, Doc. 28 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025).

IV. Miscellaneous

A. Jurisdiction and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

Respondents briefly suggest the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. As countless courts have previously recognized, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is narrowly construed and does not implicate challenges to immigration detention brought directly via habeas. *Accord, e.g., Soberanes v. Comfort*, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004); *Head v. Keisler*, No. 07-CIV-402-F, 2007 WL 4208709, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2007) (“[t]his Court has subject matter jurisdiction over” § 2241 habeas petition); *Maldonado v. Olson*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142-47 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) (thoroughly explaining why 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (g) are inapplicable to immigration-related habeas petitions challenging civil detention, and collecting cases); *Reno v. Am.- Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

The government’s reliance on *Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United States*, 975 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2020) is misplaced because *Tazu* involved an attempt to prevent the execution of a valid removal order so that Tazu could pursue collateral relief while inside the United States. *See Tazu*, 975 F.3d at 296 (“Tazu... argues that the Attorney General cannot execute his removal order now. He asks us to hold that the Attorney General must wait until later—after he finishes exhausting the provisional-waiver process and appealing the

denial of his motion to reopen.”). As the First Circuit noted in *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 618 (1st Cir. 2023), *Tazu* applies only to “‘brief door-to-plane detention[s]’ that are ‘integral to the act of execut[ing] [a] removal order’” “where a noncitizen was detained by ICE after his travel documents were secured and ICE was certain it would deport him to Bangladesh.” *Kong*, 62 F.4th at 618 (emphasis added). “In contrast, [Petitioner]’s detention last for [well] over fifty days and occurred before travel documents were secured, before deportation was certain, and allegedly without a valid warrant or any determination that his removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* The plainest proof of jurisdiction is the Supreme Court’s *Zadvydas* decision. That decision could not have come out the way it did if the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the type of habeas petition presented by Petitioner. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). A variety of circuit and district courts have confirmed as much.⁶

⁶ *Accord, e.g., Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608 (1st Cir. 2023); *Ozturk v. Hyde*, 136 F.4th 382 (2d Cir. 2025); *Bowrin v. U.S. INS*, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999); *Cardoso v. Reno*, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000); *Parra v. Perryman*, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999); *Ochieng v. Mukasey*, 520 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the REAL ID Act provisions limiting habeas relief do not apply when a petitioner seeks review of detention rather than an order of removal); *Maldonado v. Olson*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) (rejecting the argument “that detention is an ‘action taken to remove’ an alien”); *Aditya W.H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691 (D. Minn. 2025); *Medina v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2306274 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2025); *Hernandez Marcelo v. Trump*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2741230 (D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2025); *Roble v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2443453 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025); *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2533673 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025); *Yee S. v. Bondi*, -- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2879479 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025); *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, -- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2898985 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387-88 (D. Mass. 2017); *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); *Momennia v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-1067-J, 2025 WL

B. APA, DJA, and AWA

While habeas corpus provides the primary vehicle for challenging detention, complementary statutory authorities may properly be invoked to provide complete relief where the habeas remedy alone would be inadequate. ICE's decision to re-detain Petitioner constitutes final agency action subject to APA review, as it conclusively determines rights and has direct legal consequences. The government's procedural objections regarding service are immaterial given its actual notice and full participation. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. 670 (2025) did not foreclose APA claims in detention contexts, but rather recognized that certain challenges must proceed through habeas when they directly implicate the validity of confinement—which does not bar supplementary claims addressing procedural violations.

CONCLUSION

The Court must order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner.

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Respectfully submitted,

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