

history of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and persuasive decisions from other district courts, including the recent decision in *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025) and *Jimenez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-CV-05026, 2025 WL 3265493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025).

Accordingly, this Court should deny Plaintiff's petition and grant summary judgment for the Government.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Luis A. Hernandez Gabriel, is a native and citizen of Guatemala. Dkt. 1 at 3. In 2011, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection. Dkt. 1 at 3. Petitioner's Removal Order is not yet final. Dkt. 1-2 at 2. On June 17, 2025, Petitioner was detained by ICE and has been in ICE custody since that time. Dkt. 1 at 4. On information and belief, the examining immigration official denied Petitioner admission into the United States, explained the basis for charging Petitioner with being subject to removal, and ordered Petitioner to appear in immigration court. A Bond hearing before the Immigration Judge was held on July 10, 2025 and bond was denied. Dkt.1-1. The Immigration Judge determined that she did *not* have jurisdiction and found in the alternative that bond should be denied because Petitioner was a flight risk. Dkt. 1-1. The Immigration Judge later entered an order finding that she did in fact have jurisdiction to review Petitioner's bond determination and again found that Petitioner was a flight risk – so bond remained denied. Dkt. 1-2.

Petitioner has appealed the Bond determination and it is *still* pending. Dkt. 1-3.

II. ARGUMENT

Prior to addressing the merits, the Government acknowledges that this Court has previously rejected its arguments concerning the applicability of § 1225(b)(2). However, the Government, with this motion, requests a reconsideration of that prior ruling. *See Camreta v. Greene*, 563 U.S. 692, 701 n. 7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.”). For the reasons discussed below, including recent decisions from other courts in the Fifth Circuit and the Southern District of Texas, this Court should reconsider its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) and find that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

A. PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO FILING THE PETITION.

As a threshold matter, the Court should dismiss the habeas petition because Petitioner has not administratively exhausted his claims. In accord with the general rule that parties seeking relief against federal agencies must exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief, it is well-taken that a habeas petitioner must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing a federal habeas petition under § 2241. *See, e.g., Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States*, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a federal prisoner seeking habeas relief under § 2241 must first exhaust all available administrative remedies).

In this case, Petitioner had a hearing before an immigration judge. Dkt. 1-1. Petitioner's appeal of that decision is *still* pending. Petitioner argues he should not have to wait for his appeal to be heard because an administrative appeal of the bond decision would be futile in light of *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Dkt. 1 at 11. However, because Petitioner's appeal is still pending, he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. *See Fuller v. Rich*, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring an appeal in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement); *Abdoulaye Ba v. Director of Detroit Field Office, ICE*, No. 4:25-CV-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025) (dismissing for failure to exhaust where petitioner sought "review of the application and interpretation of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*" but had yet to appeal to the BIA).

B. PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO MANDATORY DETENTION UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1225

Petitioner's habeas petition should be denied because he falls under the plain language of the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Here, Petitioner is an alien present in the United States who entered the country unlawfully "without being admitted or paroled." Dkt. 1 at 7. As discussed below, an alien "present in the United States who has not been admitted," is by definition "an applicant for admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Thus, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. *See id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A) (instructing that "the alien *shall* be detained" in the case of "an alien seeking admission" who "is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted" (emphasis added)).

1. The Plain Language and Statutory Structure of the INA

“As usual, we start with the statutory text.” *Restaurant Law Center v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor*, 120 F.4th 163, 177 (5th Cir. 2024). Section 1225(b)(2) provides the following:

in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for [removal proceedings].

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Based on this text, if an alien is an “applicant for admission”, then they are subject to mandatory detention. The INA defines “applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Here, was not previously admitted into the United States, and the Petitioner is therefore subject to mandatory detention and is not eligible for a bond. *See Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025).

2. Persuasive decisions from other district courts.

Although the Government acknowledges that many district courts have ruled against the Government on the § 1225(b)(2) issue, including this Court,² the Court should consider the recent decisions of several district courts that have adopted the Government’s and the BIA’s interpretation.

² Other courts in the Southern District of Texas have issued decisions that reject the Government’s position. *See, e.g., Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. CV H-25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025)(on appeal); *Fuentes v. Lyons*, 5:25-cv-153 (S.D. Tex. October 16, 2025); *Ortiz v. Bondi*, 5:25-cv-132 (S.D. Tex. October 15, 2025); *Baltazar v. Vasquez*, 25-cv-175 (S.D. Tex. October 14, 2025); *Covarrubias v. Vergara*, 5:25-cv-112 (S.D. Texas October 8, 2025).

Most recently, another court in the Southern District of Texas decided *Cabanas v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025), in the Government’s favor. In denying the habeas petition and granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment, the *Cabanas* Court held “[t]he text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) supports the Government’s position.” The *Cabanas* Court reasoned that “[t]he statutory definition of *applicant for admission* is broad and, indeed, so broad that Petitioner doesn’t dispute that she is such a person. . . . That factual determination itself resolves the question as to whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies.” *Id.* at *4 (emphasis in original). Thus, the *Cabanas* Court held that the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act required a ruling in the Government’s favor. The court also explained why it was not persuaded by the many other district court decisions deciding to the contrary. *Id.* at * 5; *see also Jimenez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-CV-05026, 2025 WL 3265493, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025).³

³ Although many courts originally rejected the Government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2), including this Court, there is a growing body of case law agreeing with the Government’s position. *See Alonzo v. Noem*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (Shubb, J.); *Andrade v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01695, 2025 WL 3252707 (W.D. La. Nov. 21, 2025) (Joseph, J.); *Ba v. Dir. of Detroit Field Office*, No. 4:25-CV-02208, 2025 WL 3264535 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2025) (Calabrese, J.); *Ba v. Dir. of Detroit Field Office*, No. 4:25-CV-02208, 2025 WL 2977712 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025) (Calabrese, J.), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 3264535 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2025); *Candido v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-867, 2025 WL 3484932 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (Sinatra Jr., J.); *Chavez v. Noem*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (Bencivengo, J.); *Chen v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-08350, 2025 WL 3484855 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (Vyskocil, J.); *Cruz v. Noem*, No. 8:25-CV-02566, 2025 WL 3482630 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (Blumenfeld Jr., J.); *Garcia v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Dep’t of Homeland* (continue)

The Government urges this Court to reconsider its prior rulings and follow the reasoning of *Cabanas* and the Government's other proffered authorities.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that the Court deny Petitioner's request for habeas relief and grant the instant motion.

Sec., No. 2:25-CV-1004-KCD-NPM, 2025 WL 3277163 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (Dudek, J.); *Garibay-Robledo v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-177-H, 2025 WL 3264478 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025) (Hendrix, J.); *Kum v. Ross*, No. 6:25-CV-00451, 2025 WL 3113646 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2025), (Whitehurst, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3113644 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2025) (Joseph, J.); *Melgar v. Bondi*, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025) (Buescher, J.); *Mursalin v. Dedos, Warden*, No. 1:25-cv-00681, 2025 WL 3140824 (D.N.M. Nov. 10, 2025) (Strickland, M.J.); *Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (Divine, J.); *Oliveira v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025) (Joseph, J.); *Pena v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11983, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025) (Gorton, J.); *Ramos v. Lyons*, No. 2:25-cv-09785, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (Wilson, J.); *Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025) (Ludwig, J.); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) (Joseph, J.); *Suarez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00202-JMD, 2025 WL 3312168 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 2025) (Divine, J.); *Topal v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01612, 2025 WL 3486894 (W.D. La. Dec. 3, 2025) (Doughty, J.); *Ugarte-Arenas v. Olson*, No. 25-C-1721, 2025 WL 3514451 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2025) (Griesbach, J.); *Valencia v. Chestnut*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (Shubb, J.); *Vargas Lopez v. Trump*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (Buescher, J.).

Dated: December 19, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on December 19, 2025, the foregoing was filed and served on all attorneys of record via the District's ECF system.

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