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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edwin ACOSTA-CIBRIAN,
(Alien Registration # )

Petitioner,

Case No.:

v.

Hon. _____

MICHAEL T. ROSE, in his official capacity as Acting ICE Deputy Field Office Director; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; J.L. JAMISON, in his official capacity as Warden of the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center; PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; and SIRCE OWEN, Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review,

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Edwin Acosta-Cibrian, a 20 year-old native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States at age 8, on or about June 29, 2013, along with his sister, Angelica, then age 9. Because they approached the border, unaccompanied by adults, and without travel documents for an authorized admission, DHS border officials detained Edwin (and his sister) for approximately 20 days. They issued him a "Notice to Appear" for proceedings in Immigration

Court. See Notice to Appear, at Exhibit A.

2. Border officials then transferred Edwin and his sister to a juvenile detention facility for unaccompanied minors, located in Miami, Florida, run by the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”). On or about July 17, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security and the ORR then released them to their parents in Philadelphia, to attend removal proceedings in the Philadelphia Immigration Court. See Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and release documents, at Exhibit B.

3. Edwin (hereinafter, Mr. Acosta) has remained in the United States since his 2013 arrival.

4. On January 30, 2014, the Immigration Court administratively closed Mr. Acosta-Cibrian’s case (along with his sister’s). See Order of Administrative Closure, at Exhibit C.

5. Mr. Acosta attended Philadelphia’s Luis Marin Middle School and is a recent graduate of Lincoln High School, and since has been a construction worker. See Exhibit D (Marin Middle School and Lincoln High School diplomas). Since his release from ORR juvenile detention, he has always resided with his parents and siblings in Philadelphia.

6. On November 21, at approximately 7a.m., ICE agents arrested Mr. Acosta-Cibrian as he was travelling to his worksite, for no articulated reason. Mr. Acosta-Cibrian has no criminal record.

7. He is currently detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia and, due to a recent change in immigration law and administrative policy, he is unable to ask for a custody hearing before the Immigration Court.

8. Throughout the past 10 months of the Trump administration, the government has peeled away the due process custody-review rights of detained non-citizens through policy memos

and its control of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Specifically, despite his stable residence with his family, lack of criminal record, and full-time employment, Mr. Acosta-Cibrian is now ineligible to ask the Immigration Court for a bond hearing.

9. Most significantly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) issued *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which holds that those who are classified as “entry without inspection” are now “applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and ineligible to apply for bond in front of an immigration judge, even if they were processed and released at the border and have been in the United States for an extended period of time. Historically, similarly-situated individuals were subject to the detention rules under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which gave the Immigration Judges authority to hold a custody redetermination hearing and grant release under a bond or conditional parole.

10. Without this habeas corpus challenge to this de facto “mandatory detention” rule, Mr. Acosta-Cibrian, would otherwise be eligible to apply for a bond in front of an immigration judge.

11. In addition, DHS violated Mr. Espinal-Rosa’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by detaining him without conducting an individualized assessment to determine if his detention was warranted. Detention for those detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is used to ensure that an individual will show up to court and is not a danger to persons or property. DHS has not demonstrated that Mr. Espinal-Rosa, who did not require detention before under either of those categories now poses a flight risk or is a danger to persons or property.

12. For these reasons, Mr. Espinal-Rosa requests that the Court declare that DHS has violated Mr. Espinal-Rosa’s due process rights by detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and

declare that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and either (1) order his immediate release as DHS has violated his due process rights, (2) order that he receive a bond hearing with the burden on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a danger persons or property and/or a flight risk and that there is no combination of alternatives to detention that could mitigate those risks.

JURISDICTION

13. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, the APA, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

14. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

15. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

16. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center (“FDC”) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which is within the jurisdiction of this District when this action was originally filed.

17. Venue is proper in this District because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Petitioner’s claims occurred in this District, and Petitioner resides in this District. There is no real property involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

18. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the respondents “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court must require respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

19. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

20. To the extent required, Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies as required by law and his only remedy is by way of this judicial action. In addition, the administrative agency has already predetermined that Petitioner is not eligible for any relief through the agency. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Therefore, any attempt to seek relief through the agency would be futile.

PARTIES

21. Petitioner is currently detained by the Department of Homeland Security. He was at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center when he filed his habeas petition with this Court.

22. Respondent, Michael T. Rose, is the ICE Deputy Field Office Director for the ICE Philadelphia Field Office. He was the Petitioner’s immediate custodian at the time this habeas was filed, and, upon information and belief, resides in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

23. Respondent Todd Lyons is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In this capacity, Respondent Lyons oversees all detention of noncitizens held in ICE custody and is a legal custodian of petitioner with the authority to release him.

24. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

25. Respondent is J.L. Jamison, Warden of the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Respondent is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

26. Respondent Pam Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.

27. Respondent Sirce Owen is sued in her official capacity as the Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and oversees the Immigration Courts.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

28. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras.

29. In 2013, Petitioner attempted to enter the United States without proper travel documents, when he was 8 years old. After several weeks of border detention— as a juvenile in custody and care of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, he was released into the United States to

reside with his parents in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. *See Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and release documents*, at Exhibit B.

30. In or about 2013, on information and belief, and with the help of counsel, he filed an application for asylum in an effort to obtain relief from removal and permanent status in the United States. On information and belief, that application remains pending.

31. On January 30, 2014, the Immigration Court in Philadelphia, PA, admiratively closed his case, noting that he was an applicant for asylum as a juvenile. *See Immigration Court Order*, at Exhibit C.

32. On June 9, 2023, Petitioner graduated from Lincoln High School, where he was awarded a Bi-Lingual Certificate for his proficiency in English and Spanish, was a member of the varsity volleyball team, and engaged in volunteer work as a tax preparer for non-English speakers after receiving training from the IRS. *See Exhibit D (Marin Middle School and Lincoln High School diplomas)*; *see also Exhibit E (volunteer work as a tax preparer for non-English speakers after receiving training from the IRS)*.

33. Since his high school graduation in 2023, he has been working full-time as a construction contractor for Alibe Property Management and Done-Right Construction in Northeast Philadelphia.

34. Mr. Acosta has no criminal record.

35. Since his arrival in the United States in 2013, he has always resided with his parents and siblings in their Philadelphia home.

36. On November 21, 2025, at approximately 7:10am, on his way to work, ICE agents, using three cars with tinted windows, conducted a car stop, blocking-in Mr. Acosta in on Rhawn Street in Northeast Philadelphia. He complied with all directives of the arresting agents, an

produced a photo on his phone of his Honduran passport as ID. The only reason a DHS officer gave him for the stop was, that his truck “fit a description.”

37. ICE officers then took him to the Philadelphia ICE office at 114 N. 8th Street and place in a holding cell.

38. While processing him inside the holding cell, an ICE Officer showed him a warrant of administrative arrest (known as a Form I-200, indicating he was being detained under Section 236 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226). The officer signed the I-200 Warrant of Arrest in front of him but did not give him a copy.

39. After processing, ICE officers placed him into the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where he remains.

40. Upon information and belief, and based on recent, routine ICE practice, ICE will transfer Mr. Acosta out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to a long-term ICE detention facility within a matter of days.¹

41. Upon information and belief, neither DHS nor its sub-agencies have made any claim that he is a danger to persons or property or a flight risk.

42. DHS did not perform an individualized risk assessment prior to or contemporaneously with the decision to detain Mr. Acosta.

1. Undersigned Counsel visited the ICE Office on the day of this writing/filing to obtain a copy of the Warrant, but was told it was not available because it is being sent with Mr. Acosta’s file ahead to the Moshannon Valley Processing Center, where, according to the Officer, ICE will send Mr. Acosta before the Thanksgiving holiday.)

LEGAL BACKGROUND

PETITIONER'S DETENTION VIOLATES PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

I. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter.

43. As noted above, "Federal courts have jurisdiction to review habeas petitions filed by immigration detainees who assert that they are 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" *Artiga v. Genalo*, No. 25-CV-5208 (OEM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196847, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025) quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter.

II. Petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies.

44. Petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies by seeking a bond before the Immigration Court nor requesting discretionary parole from ICE.

45. While courts generally require exhaustion of administrative remedies before detainees may challenge their detention in court via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, exhaustion is a prudential matter, not a statutory requirement. *Artiga*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196847, at *8-9.

46. Further, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues. See *Qatanani v. Att'y Gen.*, 144 F.4th 485, 500 (3d Cir. 2025). Therefore, any administrative proceedings would be futile because Petitioner raises a constitutional due process claim. *Qatanani*, 144 F 4th at 500.

47. Exhaustion of administrative remedies in certain circumstances, including when "(1) available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in

certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.” *Hechavarria v. Whitaker*, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) citing *Able v. U.S.*, 88 F.3d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1996).

48. Here, two of these exceptions apply. First, any attempt to seek administrative remedy will be futile. In Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) ruled for the first time that anyone who is classified as an “inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been present in the United States for over 2 years” can be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and “shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240.” *Id.* at 219-220. The consequence of this decision is that individuals who were historically classified as entry without inspection or EWI and eligible to apply for a bond before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) are now ineligible for an immigration judge-issued bond. Therefore, any attempt to seek release before an immigration judge would be futile.

49. Second, this petition raises a substantial constitution question, i.e., whether DHS has violated his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution in detaining him. Therefore, Petitioner should not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies.

III. PETITIONER IS DETAINED UDNER 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

50. The next issue is to determine what section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs Petitioner’s detention.

51. Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

A. Background of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226.

52. Two sections of Immigration and Nationality Act govern detention of non-citizens who have not received a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

53. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs those who are considered “applicants for admission.” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). This section states that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States. . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.”

54. Applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 are divided into two subsections: those covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

55. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) generally applies to those noncitizens “initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” This section also applies to other aliens who receive a special designation by the Attorney General of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). These individuals are subject to what is commonly known as “expedited removal.”

56. Noncitizens who fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) are subject to immediate removal unless they make a fear-based claim. Upon making that claim, if they pass a credible fear interview, they are put into removal proceedings where their fear-based application is considered. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Noncitizens who either do not make a fear-based claim or do not make a credible fear-based claim are detained until removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(iii)(IV). Those who make a fear-based claim are detained while an immigration court considers the non-citizen’s claim. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

57. The next category of individuals fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). This is a general “catchall provision’ that applies to all other applicants.” *J.U. v. Maldonado*, No. 25-CV-04836 (OEM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2025) quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 285. Those detained under this section are commonly known as “arriving aliens.”

58. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that: “in the case of an alien who is an applicant

for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” while the non-citizen is in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

59. Detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. But DHS may grant anyone who falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) temporary parole on a case-by-case and individualized basis. But when the purposes of the parole have been accomplished and/or the terms of that parole are concluded, the individual is returned to detention. *J.U.*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *13-14. Those designated as applicants for admission are not eligible to apply for a bond from an immigration judge.

60. Historically, these individuals are noncitizens who go to a border checkpoint crossing and request entry.

61. The next category of individuals fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Noncitizens detained under this section are then classified under one of two subsections here as well: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

62. “Section 1226(a) governs a separate non-mandatory detention scheme and provides for the ‘default rule’ for detaining and removing aliens ‘already present in the United States.’” *J.U.*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *14 quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303.

63. This section provides that “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

64. “While that decision is pending, the Attorney General may “continue to detain the arrested alien,” “release the alien on bond of at least \$1,500,” or “release the alien on conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

65. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) contains several “exceptions [to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] for persons ‘who fall[] into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities.’” *J.U.*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *14 quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303. Detention is mandatory for those who fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

66. But even those detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for prolonged detention in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A federal judge can then order that an immigration judge conduct a bond hearing with the burden on the government to show by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a danger to persons or property or a flight risk and that no alternatives to detention exist that could mitigate that risk for the detention to continue. See *Black v. Dir. Thomas Decker*, 103 F.4th 133 (2d Cir. 2024); *Cantor v. Freden*, 761 F. Supp. 3d 630, 635-41 (W.D.N.Y. 2025).

67. An NTA issued by the DHS can indicate the non-citizen’s detention status. The NTA has specific boxes for those who fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). Those under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) fall under the box that states, “Section 235(b)(1) order was vacated pursuant to: [] 8 CFR 208.30 [] 8 CFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv).” Those under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2) fall under the box that states, “You are an arriving alien.” Finally, those who fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) fall under the box entitled “You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”

B. Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

68. Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for several reasons.

69. Petitioner has been in the United States since 2005. He was not detained within 2 years of his entry into the United States nor was he detained at a port of entry.

70. Petitioner, to our knowledge, has never committed an aggravated felony that would subject him to mandatory detention nor is he subject to mandatory detention provisions under the Laken Riley Act.

71. In addition, Petitioner does not fall into any other category.

72. DHS makes no allegation that he ever was under expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which is referred to generally as “expedited removal.” In addition, since he arrived in 2002, he cannot be subject to expedited removal as a noncitizen must be in the country for less than two years to qualify for expedited removal. See Make the Road New York v. Noem, No. 25-190, 2025 WL 2494908, at *23 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025).

73. In addition, Petitioner cannot be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because he has already in the United States several years and is not presently “seeking admission” to the United States. See Materano v. Arteta, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179608, at *30-31 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2025) (explaining that the terms “arriving” and “seeking admission” are present-tense words and do not apply to an individuals who have been in the country for several years) citing Benitez v. Francis, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, at *21-23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (also holding that expanding detention under 1225(b) would greatly expand mandatory detention beyond what how DHS has traditionally treated this statute and that enforcing it this way would negate 8 U.S.C § 1226(a)).

74. To the extent that Respondent argues that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as an applicant for admission pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), this argument fails.

75. In Yajure Hurtado, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that anyone who is classified as an “inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been present in the United

States for over 2 years” can be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and “shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240.” *Id.* at 219-220. The consequence of this decision is that individuals who were historically classified as entry without inspection or EWI and eligible to apply for a bond before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) are now ineligible for an immigration judge-issued bond. But the Board’s reversal of historical practice and newly revised interpretation of the detention statutes are not entitled to any deference. See Loper Bright Ent. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412-13 (2024). Numerous courts around the country have rejected the reasoning in Yajure Hurtado and held that those who have been in the United States longer than two years are classified under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) were, at minimum, entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. *Artiga*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196847, at *15-24; *Orellana v. Moniz*, Civil Action No. 25-cv-12664-PBS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196282, at *13-14 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025) (collecting cases).

76. Furthermore, the government’s policy in Yajure Hurtado renders other statutes, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) and the Laken Riley Act, superfluous. J.U., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *22-24.

77. Upon information and belief, Petitioner was not, at the time of arrest, paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and, therefore, Petitioner could not “be returned” under that provision to mandatory custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Petitioner is therefore not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 for this reason as well.

78. In addition, Petitioner is not lawfully subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), including because he has not been convicted of any crime that triggers such detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513-14, 531 (2003) (allowing mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for brief detention of persons convicted of certain crimes and who concede removability).

79. Accordingly, Petitioner is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) based on Respondents' treatment of Petitioner and the plain text of the statute.

80. As a person detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner must, upon his request, receive a custody redetermination hearing (colloquially called a "bond hearing") with strong procedural protections. 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) & 1003.19(a)-(f).

81. If the Court does not release Petitioner outright, Petitioner respectfully requests a bond hearing with the burden on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a danger to the public or property and not a flight risk and to likewise demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no alternatives to detention can mitigate the risk of flight or danger. Cantor v. Freden, 761 F. Supp. 3d 630, 635-41 (W.D.N.Y. 2025).

IV. Petitioner's Arrest and Detention Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

82. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevents the "Government from depriving any person of 'life liberty or property, without due process of law.'" *J.U.*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630, at *27. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

83. It is well-established that the Due Process clause "applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.

84. DHS arrested and detained Petitioner without an individualized assessment as to whether he is a flight risk and/or a danger to the community in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

**Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process
(Unlawful Arrest and Detention)**

85. Petitioner alleges and incorporates all prior paragraphs above.
86. DHS detained Petitioner with no process, no showing of changed circumstances and no opportunity for Petitioner to respond to its decision to detain him.
87. This violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
88. Petitioner's arrest and continued detention is therefore unlawful.
89. Petitioner's continuing detention is therefore unlawful.
90. Therefore, Petitioner requests immediate release from custody.

COUNT TWO

**Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process
(Failure to Provide Bond Hearing Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a))**

91. Petitioner alleges and incorporates all prior paragraphs above.
92. Because Petitioner is a person arrested inside the United States and is subject to detention, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
93. Petitioner has not been, and will not be, provided with a bond hearing as required by law.
94. Petitioner's continued detention is therefore unlawful.
95. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) & 1003.19(a)-(f), if the Court does not order Petitioner's immediate release, he is entitled to receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge with strong procedural protections.

96. Therefore, if the Court does not release Petitioner outright, Petitioner requests a court order that he is entitled to a bond hearing in front of an immigration judge with the burden on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a danger to the public or property and not a flight risk and to likewise demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no alternatives to detention can mitigate the risk of flight or danger or on conditions the Court deems just and proper.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside this District;
3. Adjudicate this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 which requires that the Court expedite consideration of any action brought under 28 U.S.C. Chapter 153, which governs habeas petitions.
4. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful.
5. Issue an order requiring Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, or, in the alternative, to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing with the burden on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a danger to the public or property and not a flight risk and to likewise demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no alternatives to detention can mitigate the risk of flight or danger or on conditions the Court deems just and proper.

6. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and

7. Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: November 24th, 2025
Philadelphia, PA

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Thomas M. Griffin
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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Edwin Acosta-Cibrian, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 24th day of November 2025.

s/ Thomas M. Griffin
Thomas M. Griffin