

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

GERONIMO VALERIO LOPEZ SUCHI,

Petitioner,

vs.

TONY NORMAND, *in his official capacity as*
Warden of Folkston Detention Center; and
LADEON FRANCIS, *Field Office Director for ICE*
Atlanta Field Office, and
TODD LYONS, *in his official capacity as Acting*
Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
KRISTI NOEM, *Secretary of Homeland Security*; and
PAMELA BONDI, *U.S. Attorney General*.

Respondents.

CASE NO.:

5:25-cv-00174-LGW-BWC

**PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
REGARDING THE ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT IN *MALDONADO BAUTISTA***

Petitioner GERONIMO VALERIO LOPEZ SUCHI, through undersigned counsel, files this supplemental brief to inform the Court of a dispositive legal development that directly refutes Respondents' pending Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay and warrants his immediate and unconditional release from detention.

On December 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in the nationwide class action *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, (*Maldonado* or *Maldonado Bautista*) entered a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Exhibits 1-2. This final judgment renders the class-wide declaratory relief

immediately enforceable, vacates the very agency policy under which Petitioner is detained, and obliterates the central premise of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss or Stay before this Court.

I. THE MALDONADO BAUTISTA COURT ENTERED A FINAL, ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT, CITING RESPONDENTS' OWN NONCOMPLIANCE

On December 18, 2025, the *Maldonado Bautista* court granted the plaintiff class's motion for reconsideration and directed the entry of final judgment. The court expressly found that newly emerged facts—namely, Respondents' widespread non-compliance with the court's prior order and their instructions to Immigration Judges to disregard it—constituted “exigent circumstances that may cause irreparable harm” and necessitated an immediately enforceable order.

Accordingly, the court ordered that it “hereby ENTERS final judgment in this action as to Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Class Complaint”. This final judgment transforms the court's prior grant of summary judgment—which declared the government's policy of detaining interior arrestees under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) to be unlawful—a final, binding, and appealable adjudication. The judgment is no longer an interlocutory order subject to revision; it is a final decree with immediate legal effect.

The court further clarified two critical points:

- (1) **Class-wide APA Vacatur granted:** Its prior order did, in fact, grant “classwide vacatur of the unlawful DHS policy” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to detain noncitizens like Petitioner who were apprehended in the interior. Therefore, the July 2025 ICE Memo and policy used to detain Petitioner has been vacated.
- (2) **Yajure Hurtado declared Untenable:** While the court did not formally vacate the BIA's decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), for procedural reasons, it declared that the decision's “core holding...cannot be squared

with the MSJ Order” and that, as a result, “*Yajure Hurtado* is no longer controlling; the legal conclusion underlying the decision is no longer tenable.”

II. THE FINAL JUDGMENT EVISCERATES THE CORE ARGUMENT IN RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY.

Respondents’ motion rests entirely on a premise that the new *Maldonado Bautista* order has now rendered factually and legally defunct. In their motion, Respondents argued that this case should be stayed because the *Maldonado* order was not a final judgment and therefore had no preclusive effect. Citing *Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U.S. 922 (1975), Respondents contended that “a court cannot grant declaratory relief prior to the entry of a final judgment” and that any pre-judgment declaration is “more akin to an advisory opinion”.

The December 18th order entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) completely demolishes this argument. There is no longer a “pre-final judgment declaration” to debate. There is now a final, enforceable judgment. By Respondents’ own logic, the predicate for their motion—the absence of a final, preclusive judgment—has vanished. The *Maldonado Bautista* court made its intent clear, entering the final judgment specifically to resolve any ambiguity and to counter Respondents’ policy of non-compliance. Any argument that the declaratory judgment is not binding or enforceable is now baseless.

III. CONTINUED DETENTION IN DEFIANCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT WARRANTS IMMEDIATE HABEAS RELIEF.

Petitioner’s continued detention is no longer merely contrary to this Court’s precedent in *J.A.M. v. Streeval*. It is now in open defiance of a final federal judgment that **vacates** the very policy under which he is being held. Petitioner is not just being detained based on a policy that has been declared unlawful; he is being detained based on a policy that a federal court has **formally struck down as part of a final judgment**. This makes the continued detention an even more egregious violation of the APA and the rule of law. The government’s choice to

ignore a final, binding order from a federal court underscores the lawlessness of Petitioner's confinement and makes the case for immediate release through habeas corpus all the more compelling.

While the final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is a momentous step, it does not and cannot provide the individual, coercive remedy of habeas corpus. Immigration law has long distinguished between systemic declaratory or injunctive relief and the uniquely individual remedy of habeas corpus. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 309 (2018) (distinguishing habeas relief from "injunctions, declaratory judgments and other types of relief"); *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. 543, 551 (2022) (noting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) limits class-wide injunctive relief but preserves remedies for an "individual alien"). This individual habeas petition remains the only vehicle to secure Petitioner's actual release.

To remand for a bond hearing would be to reward Respondents' defiance. It would force Petitioner to seek relief from the very administrative apparatus that the *Maldonado Bautista* court found has been instructed to ignore a final federal court judgment. *See* Ex. 1 at 8 (highlighting Respondents' failure to comply with the Court's orders by continuing to deny bond hearings for class members despite the Court's determination that the DHS Policy is unlawful and Respondents' issuing guidance to disregard the Court's declaratory judgment). The only remedy that vindicates the rule of law and Petitioner's fundamental right to be free from unlawful confinement is to grant the writ and order Petitioner's immediate release.

"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.*, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). As the Supreme Court has explained: "The scope and flexibility of the writ [of habeas corpus]—its

capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969); (“Release from custody represents the only adequate remedy in this case, and it is within this Court’s broad equitable power to grant it.” (citing *Swann*, 402 U.S. at 15-16)).

IV. CONCLUSION

The entry of final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is a dispositive event. It transforms the declaratory relief from an interlocutory ruling into a final, binding, and immediately enforceable judgment that vacates the unlawful DHS policy at issue. This development dismantles Respondents’ entire basis for their motion to dismiss or stay.

Combined with Respondents’ complete and utter failure to meet their burden to show cause why Petitioner should be detained, Petitioner’s continued detention is without any legal foundation. When the government fails to justify detention, the court’s obligation to grant immediate habeas relief is paramount. The writ of habeas corpus is intended to be a “swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement” (*Yong v. INS*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000), citing *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). Courts are statutorily directed to give habeas petitions “special, preferential consideration to insure expeditious hearing and determination”. *Id.* To delay relief in the face of such clear illegality, even for judicial efficiency, is generally not authorized because it would reduce the writ to a “sham.” *Id.*, 1120-1121.

For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court deny Respondents’ motion and grant the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, ordering Petitioner’s immediate and unconditional release.

Respectfully Submitted,

This 20th day of December, 2025.

/ Karen Weinstock

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of December, 2025, this DOCUMENT was served, via electronic delivery to Respondents' counsel via the CM/ECF system, which will forward copies to Counsel of Record.

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